Argentina's partisan past: nationalism, Peronism and historiography, 1955-76. by Goebel, T.M.
SHL ITEM BARCODE
19 1721901  5
REFERENCE ONLY
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON THESIS 
Degree  Year  i ^Loo 0   Name of Author
SHL ITEM BARCODE
19 1721901  5
*
COPYRIGHT
This Is a thesis accepted for a Higher Degree of the University of London,  it is an 
unpubfished typescript and the copyright is held by the author.  All persons consulting 
the thesis must read and abide by the Copyright Declaration below.
COPYRIGHT DECLARATION
I recognise that the copyright of the above-described thesis rests with the author and 
that no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without the 
prior written consent of the author.
Theses may not be lent to individuals, but the Senate House Library may lend a copy 
to  approved  libraries  within  the  United  Kingdom,  for  consultation  solely  on  the 
.premises of those  libraries.  Application  should  be  made  to:  Inter-Library  Loans, 
Senate House Library, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU.
REPRODUCTION
University  of  London  theses  may  not  be  reproduced  without  explicit  written 
permission from the Senate House Library.  Enquiries should  be addressed to the 
Theses Section of the Library.  Regulations concerning reproduction vary according 
to the date of acceptance of the thesis and are listed below as guidelines.
A.  Before 1962.  Permission granted only upon the prior written consent of the 
author.  (The Senate House Library will provide addresses where possible).
B.  1962 -1974.  In many cases the author has agreed to permit copying upon 
completion of a Copyright Declaration.
C.  1975 -1988.  Most theses may be copied upon completion of a Copyright 
Declaration.
D.  1989 onwards.  Most theses may be copied.
s copy has been deposited in the Senate House Library, Senate House,
LOANS
This thesis comes within category D.
$ copy has been deposited in the Library of
Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU.
C:\Documents and SetdngsVprockxVxcat SettingsNTemporary Internet Files\OLK8\Copyright - thesis (2).doc
fArgentina’s Partisan Past:
Nationalism, Peronism and Historiography, 1955-76
Thomas Michael Goebel
A thesis submitted to the University of London  in candidacy for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy from the Department of History, University College LondonUMI Number: U592435
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted.  Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U592435
Published by ProQuest LLC 2013.  Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved.  This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml  48106-1346Abstract of thesis
This PhD thesis is an inquiry into history as politics in Argentina from the overthrow 
of Peron  to  the  military  coup  of  1976.  Its  main  aim  is  to  explain  why  and  how  a 
particular strand of nationalist historical writing (historical revisionism) conquered the 
public sphere in this period, so that by the 1970s its principal tenets had become almost 
common  sense  in  the  Argentines’  understanding  of  their  national  past.  For  this 
purpose,  the  thesis  contextualises  the  revisionist  discourse  in  relation  to,  firstly,  the 
intellectual field and,  secondly, political developments, arguing that only a combina­
tion of cultural and political history allows us to account for the success of revisionism 
in influencing the collective historical consciousness. The principal primary sources on 
which the thesis relies are the publications of revisionists (both books and periodicals), 
militant periodicals, daily newspapers and institutional sources, in particular related to 
public education.
Special emphasis is given to the conditions that underpinned the production and 
the public success of revisionist symbolic goods. In six chapters the thesis analyses the 
historical development of the relationship between the liberal and the nationalist view 
of history (1); the connection between contemporary debates about Peronism and the 
revisionist  version  of the  past  (2);  the  influence  of Marxism  (3);  the  cultural  and 
political networks of revisionism (4); the Peronist appropriation of revisionist imagery 
(5); and the relationship between nationalist intellectuals and the state (6). From these 
points, the thesis derives broader conclusions about the relationship between politics, 
national identity and historical narratives by singling out the factors that contributed to 
such  a  strong  politicisation  of  historiography  under  nationalist  signs.  Particularly 
stressed  is  the  mutually  reinforcing  interplay  between  a  profound  crisis  of political 
legitimacy,  a  fragile  intellectual  field  and  an  uneven  institutionalisation  of historio­
graphy.
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The background
This thesis explores  a particular construction of Argentine  national  identity between 
1955  and  1976.  It  focuses  on  the  strongly  nationalist  and  anti-liberal  current  of 
historical writing known as historical revisionism and seeks to explain why this current 
acquired  such  importance  in collective understandings  of the  past  during  the  period 
considered.  Although  in  the  strictest  sense  this  thesis  is  therefore  a  history  of 
historiography, the nature of its object of analysis compels a broader contextualisation. 
Revisionism was not so much an inquiry into history designed to expand knowledge, 
but  rather  a  consciously  partisan  account  of  Argentina’s  past  developed  to  serve 
political purposes of the present.  Casting historical figures as symbols for contempo­
rary struggles, the revisionist current created an idealised imagery of the nation and its 
leaders.  A crucial  ingredient of twentieth-century nationalist thought in Argentina its 
motifs  were  appropriated  as  a  political  weapon,  after  1955,  especially  by  Peronist 
groups.  Through  its  convergence  with  Peronism,  revisionism  gained  wide  currency 
during  the  1960s  and  began  to  strongly  shape  the  ways  in  which  Argentines 
understood their past.  Exploring the production, dissemination and political  usage  of 
historical revisionism, this thesis ultimately seeks to contribute to our understanding of 
the history of Argentine nationalism and debates about national identity.
In  order  to  understand  the  main  ideas  of revisionism,  it  is  first  necessary  to 
delineate  the  dilemmas  to  which  it  proposed  an  answer.  Broadly  speaking,  these 
dilemmas  evolved  around  the  questions  of national  identity.  One  might  expect  the 
problem  of collective  identity  to  be  particularly  acute  in  an  immigrant  society  like 
Argentina. A common joke holds that, whilst Mexicans descended from the Aztecs and
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Peruvians from the Incas, Argentines descended from boats. There have indeed been 
few places  in  world  history  so  deluged  by  mass  immigration  as  Argentina  between 
1860  and  1930.  Situated  at the  margins  of the  Spanish  Empire,  the  territory  of the 
Viceroyalty  of the  River  Plate  had  been  scarcely  populated  and,  compared  to  the 
splendour  of Mexico  City  or  Lima,  its  capital  Buenos  Aires  had  been  a  lacklustre 
outpost of minor importance before the May Revolution of 1810 and the declaration of 
independence in 1816. Unsurprisingly, for the remainder of the nineteenth century and 
especially after 1852, the question of how to forge “a nation for the Argentine desert”, 
as  the  title  of an  essay  by  the  historian  Tulio  Halperin  Donghi  suggests,  dominated 
political debates.1
Historians  agree  on  the  broad  outlines  under  which  this  preoccupation 
developed.  From  a  bird’s-eye  perspective,  the  century  after  independence  can  be 
summarised as the rise of the model of liberal development, which came under attack 
from  the  1920s  onwards.  At  first,  as  in  many  other  Spanish  American  countries, 
Argentina’s independence solved fewer problems than its liberator Jose de San Martin 
might have hoped. The four decades after 1810 were characterised by internal warfare 
and the politics of that era dominated by patriarchal caudillos, military strongmen who 
ruled  through  clientelistic  methods  and  often  assembled  a  large  popular  following.3  
Only  after  the  most  significant  of  them,  Juan  Manuel  de  Rosas  (governor  of 
Argentina’s mightiest province, Buenos Aires, from  1829-32 and  1835-52),4 had been 
defeated in the battle of Caseros, did the questions of how to organise a nation-state 
and  how  to  endow  it  with  a  cohesive  national  identity  pose  themselves  in  all 
seriousness.  From  the  1850s the  task  of nation-building  fell  to  a  new  generation  of 
leaders,  known  as  the  Generation  of  1837,  many  of whom  had  been  exiled  during
1  Tulio Halperin Donghi, Una nacion para el desierto argentino (Buenos Aires: Editores de America 
Latina, 2004).
2 The standard textbooks are now the series by Sudamericana, which is more general, and Ariel, which 
focuses on political and intellectual history and includes documents: Noemi Goldman (ed.), Revolucion, 
Republica,  Confederacion (1806-1852) (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana,  1998); Marta Bonaudo (ed.), 
Liberalismo, estadoy orden burgues (1852-1880) (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana,  1999); Mirta Lobato 
(ed.), Elprogreso, la modernizacion y sus limites (1880-1916) (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 2000); 
Jose Carlos Chiaramonte (ed.), Ciudades, provincias, estados: orlgenes de la nacion argentina (1800- 
1846) (Buenos Aires: Ariel,  1997); Tulio Halperin Donghi (ed.), Proyectoy construccion de una nacion 
(1846-1880) (Buenos Aires: Ariel,  1995); and Natalio Botana and Ezequiel Gallo (eds.), De la 
Republicaposible a la Republica verdadera (1880-1910) (Buenos Aires: Ariel,  1997).
3  A useful correction to many stereotypes about caudillismo is Noemi Goldman and Ricardo Salvatore 
(eds.), Caudillismos rioplatenses: nuevas miradas a un viejo problema (Buenos Aires: Eudeba and 
Facultad de Filosofia y Letras, UBA,  1998).
4 The classic work about Rosas in English is: John Lynch, Argentine dictator: Juan Manuel de Rosas 
1829-1852 (Oxford: Clarendon,  1981).
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Rosas’  regime.  Writer-statesmen  such  as  Bartolome  Mitre  or  Domingo  Faustino 
Sarmiento  argued  that  Rosas  was  the  epitome  of barbarian  backwardness  and  that 
caudillismo  had  to  be  eradicated  from  Argentine  politics  to  make  place  for  an 
enlightened  project  of  progress  and  civilisation  inspired  by  the  advances  of  the 
European nations and the United States.
The  ideas  of the  Generation  of  1837  are  generally  associated  with  the  term 
liberalism,  since its thinkers drew upon cosmopolitan and liberal  ideas from Europe. 
But these  ideas  soon appeared to be  strangely “misplaced”  in  Latin America,  as the 
Brazilian  writer  Machado  de  Assis  noted  for  his  country  in  1879.5   Thinkers  like 
Sarmiento  faced the problem that,  in contrast to the Old  World, there was no  strong 
society from which a state could be built. The Argentine translation of liberalism was 
thus tainted with an original sin: the political order was not conceived as an arena for 
the free expression of a society composed of free citizens, but rather as a tool for the 
creation of a society from above. In the elitist eyes of liberal statesmen, the caudillos’ 
mass  following  bespoke  the  untrustworthiness  of an  amorphous  populace  that  was 
scattered over the boundless hinterlands. According to Sarmiento’s famous dictum of 
1845 —extolled or reviled depending on viewpoint—, the population needed guidance 
with  regard  to  the  quintessential  dilemma  between  “civilisation  and  barbarism”.6 
Besides European immigration, education was deemed promising to indicate the right 
path.  Given  the  social  thinness  that  underpinned  this  project of nation-building,  the 
state remained pivotal as an instrument to implement the ideal of a liberal Argentine 
nation.
Although  there  were  always  dissident  voices,  the  consensus  around  this  state- 
focused interpretation of liberalism was sustained relatively well for several decades. 
From  the  viewpoint  of  a  still  narrow  elite,  there  seemed  to  be  few  convincing 
alternatives  to  the  dominant  ideas  and,  in  any  event,  the  benefits  they  promised  to 
yield,  not  least  the  material  ones,  were  satisfying  enough  to  forestall  sweeping 
questioning. Prospects looked good indeed for some decades. Landowners, who at the 
beginning of the twentieth century formed a dynamic  agro-capitalist class,7  accumu­
lated  legendary wealth and the  Parisian expression riche  comme  un argentin  embol­
dened  Buenos  Aires’  aspiration to  become the  Southern hemisphere’s  replica of the
5 Roberto Schwarz, Misplaced ideas: essays on Brazilian culture (London: Verso,  1992), p. 31.
6 Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, Facundo: civilizacion y barbarie (Madrid: Catedra,  1990).
7 See Roy Hora, The landowners of the Argentine Pampas: a social and political history,  1860-1945 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), esp. pp.  1-130.
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capital  of the  nineteenth  century.  One  hundred  years  after  the  May  Revolution,  to 
many observers, Argentina looked like a tremendous success story, a land of promise 
that had secured its place among the world’s great, rich and powerful. Some harboured 
subdued  doubts  already  and,  especially  in the  two  decades  after the  Centenary,  the 
effects  of  mass  immigration  and  the  middle  class’s  quest  for  participation  in  the 
political process began to appear threatening to some members of the elite.  Yet only 
during the World Depression did the hitherto almost unshakable confidence in Argen­
tina’s perpetual progress crumble for good. After  1930, most Argentines became con­
vinced that the nineteenth-century ideal of setting up an overseas mimesis of Europe 
would  never  materialise,  and  ever  since  then  the  Argentine  nation-state  has  been 
primarily  understood  as  a  spectacular  failure.  As  the  liberal  consensus  broke  apart, 
explanations began to diverge widely as to what had gone wrong.
The  predominance  of the  prism  of failure  beclouded  the  recognition  of some 
rather  impressive  achievements:  the  modernising  state  accomplished  significant 
industrialisation and expanded the system of welfare provisions.  Per capita GDP and
o
living standards rose.  The heretofore heterogeneous immigrant masses coalesced into 
an  Argentine  people  to  the  extent  that  from  the  1930s  onwards  the  issue  of 
immigration no longer dominated public debate. By the  1960s, the grandsons of poor 
and illiterate Calabrian peasants were being awarded doctorates from the University of 
Buenos  Aires.  However,  the  abyss  between  the  myth  of  Argentina’s  continuous 
progress  and  the  country’s  perceived  reality  continued  to  widen,  as  circumstances 
fuelled the fear that the golden age had vanished for good with increasingly persuasive 
evidence.  Since  the  World  Depression  economic  problems  were  matched  by  the 
elusiveness of a viable political order.  In the face of the oligarchy’s declining power 
and the rise of the middle and later the popular classes, Argentina’s fragmented elites 
displayed  an  utter  incapacity  to  shape  a  legitimate  framework  for  the  political 
expression of group interests. In the absence of a strong tradition of conservatism, the 
populist  experiment  led  by Juan  Domingo  Peron  (1946-55)  for a while  managed  to 
convince parts of the elite that a state-led co-option of the working class was the most
8 See Carlos Diaz Alejandro, Essays on the economic history of the Argentine Republic (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press,  1970), pp. 443-448 on indices of industrial output between  1935 and 
1966, which doubled or tripled in almost all areas, and p. 496 on expenditure on the welfare system 
between  1950-63, which tripled in this period. See Rosemary Thorp, Progress, Poverty, and Exclusion: 
An Economic History of Latin America in the 20th Century (Washington: Inter-American Development 
Bank,  1998), p. 353 on GDP in US$ per capita at  1970 prices (which more than doubled between  1930 
and  1970) and p. 360 on the Historical Living Standard Index, based on the Human Development 
Indicator (1930s: 79;  1970s:  125).
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promising  guarantor  of  social  order.9  But  the  Peronist  evocation  of  a  harmonious 
national  community  turned  out  to  be  deceptive  in  the  light  of exhausted  monetary 
reserves  from  the  1950s  onwards.  Peron’s  regime  temporarily  managed  to  suppress 
oppositional  tendencies by further increasing the  state’s  encroachment  upon  society, 
but he thereby entered into conflict with entrenched corporate interests,  in particular 
the Catholic Church. This provided the final trigger for the military coup that ousted 
Peronism from state power in  1955. Yet the subsequent attempts to exclude Peronism 
from political participation proved even less capable of producing a feasible solution to 
the predicaments of the political system. When Peron returned to power in 1973, it was 
in  a  climate  of acute  polarisation  and  spiralling  political  violence,  which  in  1976 
culminated  in  yet  another military  coup.  The  leaders  of the  ensuing  dictatorship  set 
themselves  the  goal  of once  and  forever eradicating  what  they  called  “subversion”, 
torturing  and  killing  thousands  of Argentines  in  a  “Dirty  War”.  Against  the  back­
ground of an economic crisis, the military then launched a disastrous conventional war 
against Britain to recuperate the Falkland Islands in  1982. This war was quickly lost, 
bringing further discredit to the  military as an institution,  but ultimately helping the 
restoration of democracy in the following year. In short, the five decades before  1983 
were marked by a protracted crisis of liberal democracy, accompanied by a desperate 
search  for  explanations  of the  country’s  lamentable  condition.  Countless  efforts,  in 
diverse literary and academic genres, have been devoted to pinpointing historical mo­
ments, figures and structures that could be held responsible for Argentina’s problems. 
As Jeremy Adelman has noted, “there are few countries where the ghosts of the past 
haunt the present so relentlessly.”1 0
Under  such  circumstances,  it  was  no  surprise  that  history  came  to  be  seen  as 
central to an understanding of Argentina’s dilemmas of nation-building. Closely linked 
to political developments, historical revisionism, which emerged in the  1930s, became 
well-nigh hegemonic in the 1960s and then declined after the restoration of democracy, 
claimed  to  have  the  answer  regarding  the  question  of what  had  caused  Argentina’s 
malaise:  the  liberalism  of  the  Generation  of  1837.  Notwithstanding  the  current’s 
heterogeneity,  the  main  arguments  of revisionism  can  be  summarised  as  follows:  a 
conspiracy  between  British  imperialism  and  the  local  oligarchy  had  subjugated
9 A good introduction to the basic features of the Peronist regime is Juan Carlos Torre (ed.), Los ahos 
peronistas (1943-1955) (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 2002)
10 Jeremy Adelman, review of Nicolas Shumway’s The invention of  Argentina, in Journal of Latin 
American Studies, vol. 24, no. 2 (1992), p. 471.
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Argentina’s  national  consciousness.  Liberalism  was  a  foreign  ideology,  which  had 
been  imported  by  perfidious  intellectuals  such  as  Sarmiento  and  Mitre  in  order  to 
facilitate  the  degradation  of  Argentina.  The  traitors  employed  a  falsified  history 
—interchangeably referred to as “liberal” or “official” history— as their most efficient 
ideological  weapon,  which  served  to  prolong  Argentina’s  ignominious  debasement. 
What was most disgraceful, according to the revisionists, was that the nation honoured 
in a pantheon of heroes those responsible for its opprobrium. Figures like Sarmiento or 
Mitre thus urgently needed to be replaced by those who embodied authentic national 
values, who had heroically resisted against foreign penetration, namely the caudillos. 
As  for  the  analogous  struggles  of the  present,  the  new  pantheon  would  inspire  the 
people to free Argentina from the chains of foreign powers. In short, revisionists belli­
gerently set out to revise the  ideas  associated with the nineteenth-century project of 
liberal nation-building.
Revisionism and nationalism
The  central  question  of this thesis  is  why  and how historical  revisionism  gained  so 
much currency in the two decades after the overthrow of Peron in 1955. This question 
determines  my  approach  and,  to  varying  degrees,  differentiates  it from the  previous 
secondary literature. Today, the prospects for such a historicisation of revisionism are 
more favourable than when it was first attempted twenty years ago. In the aftermath of 
the dreadful outcome of the disputes of the  1960s and 70s, many of the surviving left- 
wing intellectuals began to reconsider the premises upon which their earlier beliefs had 
been  based.  As  a  key  component  of the  political  discourse  of that  era,  historical 
revisionism  came  under  scrutiny,  too.  There  were  important  antecedents,  of course, 
especially  two  essays  by  Halperin  Donghi,  the  first  published  in  1970,  the  second 
fourteen  years  later,  which are  still  the  best on the topic.1 1   There was  furthermore  a 
short monograph on  “nationalism and  historiography in  Latin America”  by the  Uru­
guayan historian Carlos Rama, published in  1981, which mostly dealt with Argentine 
revisionism,  denouncing  it as a  source  for all  kinds of fascist  ideology  in  the  River 
Plate.1 2   Yet especially after  1990  revisionism became  an object of historical  inquiry 
rather than political passions. The most important outcome was a monograph by Diana
1 1  Tulio Halperin Donghi, El revisionismo historico argentino (Buenos Aires and Mexico City: Siglo 
XXI,  1971) and Tulio Halperin Donghi, “El revisionismo historico como vision decadentista de la 
historia nacional”, Alternativas (June  1984), pp. 72-93.
1 2 Carlos M. Rama, Nacionalismo e historiografia en America Latina (Madrid: Tecnos,  1981).
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Quattrocchi-Woisson,1 3  but there now also exists a large number of articles and book 
sections on revisionism.1 4 The fact that interest in the topic has not diminished since 
then is shown by the re-publishing in 2005 of Halperin’s two articles.1 5
My thesis will not contradict any of the major claims of these studies, such as the 
non-academic  character,  the  nationalistic  fervour  and  the  chiefly  political  aims  of 
revisionism, all points about which revisionists themselves were remarkably candid. I 
also agree with the common argument that during the two decades after the overthrow 
of Peron  revisionism  became  “a  sort  of common  sense  among  vast  sectors  [of the 
population,]  not only intellectuals”,  or,  even more  generally, that “Argentine  culture 
was characterised, from around  1930 until our days [1986], by the presence of history 
as politics  and politics as history, thanks to the  strength of historical  revisionism.”1 6  
However, so far, perhaps because the literature on revisionism has largely been written 
by Argentine historians, to whom the relevance of the subject matter is  immediately 
evident from their own biographical experience, the main interest has been to explain 
how the revisionist current came into being in the first place and, to a lesser extent,
1 3  Diana Quattrocchi-Woisson, Un nationalisme de deracines: I’ Argentine, pays malade de sa memoire 
(Paris and Toulouse: CNRS,  1992).
1 4  In chronological order of appearance, the most important are: Alejandro Cattaruzza, “Algunas 
reflexiones sobre el revisionismo historico”, in: Fernando J. Devoto (ed.), La historiografia argentina en 
el siglo XX (Buenos Aires: CEAL,  1993), vol.  1, pp.  113-139; Maristella Svampa, El dilema argentino: 
civilizacion o barbarie: de Sarmiento al revisionismo peronista (Buenos Aires: El Cielo por Asalto, 
1994), pp.  171-189 and pp. 269-281; Michael Riekenberg, “Zum politischen Gebrauch der Geschichte
in Argentinien und Guatemala (1810-1955)”, in: Michael Riekenberg (ed.), Politik und Geschichte in 
Argentinien und Guatemala (19./20. Jahrhundert) (Frankfurt am Main: Diesterweg,  1994), pp.  11-154, 
esp. pp.  118-130; Jos6 Carlos Chiaramonte, “En tomo a los origenes del revisionismo historico, in: Ana 
Frega and Ariadna Islas (eds.), Nuevas miradas en torno al artiguismo (Montevideo: Universidad de la 
Republica, 2001), pp. 29-61; Daniel Campione, Argentina: la escritura de su historia (Buenos Aires: 
Centro Cultural de la Cooperation, 2002), where references to revisionism are scattered throughout, but 
see esp. pp. 84-90; Alejandro Cattaruzza, “El revisionismo: itinerarios de cuatro decadas”, in: Alejandro 
Cattaruzza and Alejandro Eujanian, Politicos de la historia: Argentina 1860-1960 (Buenos Aires: 
Alianza, 2003), pp.  143-182; the corresponding articles in Fernando J. Devoto and Nora Pagano (eds.), 
La historiografia academicay la historiografia militante en Argentinay Uruguay (Buenos Aires:
Biblos, 2004); and the special section of prohistoria, vol. 8 (2004) (pp.  167-265). There is furthermore a 
vast number of articles on more specific questions of revisionism as well as several biographies of 
revisionists. For reasons of space, they cannot be referenced here, but will be throughout the individual 
chapters where appropriate. There are also the many works by Norberto Galasso about revisionism. 
Although invaluable as a source of information, they are not really studies of revisionism, but rather part 
of the left-leaning revisionist literature itself, reproducing the discourse that is analysed here. Although 
ideologically from a different perspective, namely the extreme Right, the same goes for Antonio 
Caponnetto, Los criticos del revisionismo historico, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: Instituto Bibliografico 
“Antonio Zinny”,  1998).
1 5  Tulio Halperin Donghi, El revisionismo historico como vision decadentista de la historia nacional 
(Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 2005).
16 First quotation from Oscar Teran, Nuestros ahos sesentas: la formacion de la nueva izquierda 
intelectual en la Argentina 1956-1966, 3rd ed. (Buenos Aires: El Cielo por Asalto,  1993), p. 57. Second 
quotation from Silvia Sigal and Eliseo Veron, Peron o muerte: los fundamentos discursivos del 
fenomeno peronista, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 2003), p.  196.
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how  its  ideas  subsequently  developed.  Scholarly  attention  has  thus  by  and  large 
centred on the period before 1955. The question of why and how, by 1970, “the task of 
historical  revision  could  [...]  be  deemed to  be  complete”  and  why  “the  intellectual 
movement that had promoted  it,  achieved  [...]  an unexpected triumph”,  as  Halperin
1  7
Donghi remarked then, has received less attention.  The main question of this thesis 
thus has not as yet been explored in detail.
This question,  in turn, interests me mostly inasmuch as it can contribute to our
understanding of nationalism  in twentieth-century Argentina.  To  what extent  does  a
study of revisionism allow for broader conclusions  about nationalism? As  a  starting
point,  this  problem  might  be  addressed  by  conceptually  narrowing  down  the  term
nationalism.  From a broad perspective, two strands of theories of nationalism can be
divided.  On the one hand, perennialist theorists  such as Anthony  Smith have  argued
18 that usually “a state’s ethnic core shapes the character and boundaries of the nation.” 
On the other hand, according to modernists such as Ernest Gellner or Eric Hobsbawm, 
nationalism was the outcome of practices of state-building and “it is nationalism which 
engenders nations and not the other way round.”19 Hobsbawm and Ranger’s paradigm 
of nationalism  as  the  “invention  of tradition”  encapsulates  this  view  that  national 
identities  were the  outgrowth  of a  creative  process  of modernisation  rather than  the 
extension of pre-modem perennial bonds. Although Latin America has often fallen off 
the map of these theories of nationalism, the modernist perspective has predominated 
when the region’s nationalisms have been considered. In the case of Argentina, for the 
reasons  outlined  above,  it  is  easy  to  see  why  this  approach  seems  preferable. 
Perennialism  might  be  applied  to  Mexico  or  Peru,  but  what  came  closest  to  the 
imagery of an ethnic archetype in Argentina —the figure of the gaucho— was usually 
portrayed in cultural and social rather than ethnic terms. Even if Argentina possessed 
an  ethnic  core,  it  is  more  promising  to  analyse  nationalist  discourse  from  the  mid­
nineteenth century onwards in the light of an “invented tradition”, not only because the 
state  assumed  such  a  central  role  in  the  creation  and  dissemination  of a  cohesive 
collective identity, but also for a second reason. According to Hobsbawm, an
17 Halperin Donghi, El revisionismo, p. 43.
18 Anthony Smith, National identity (Harmondsworth: Penguin,  1991), p. 39.
19 Ernest Gellner, Nations and nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell,  1983), p. 55.
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‘invented tradition’  is taken to mean a set of practices [...] which seek to inculcate certain values 
and  norms  of behaviour by repetition,  which  automatically  implies  continuity  with  the  past.  In 
fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past.20 
As  the  case  of historical  revisionism  shows,  such  references  to  a  “suitable  historic 
past” indeed became crucial in Argentine nationalism.
However,  accepting  that  Argentine  nationalism  was  based  on  continually 
reformulated “invented traditions” does not resolve all analytical problems related to it. 
A  first distinction concerns the  difference  between the  nineteenth-century  cosmopo­
litan project of nation-building and the later development of anti-liberal evocations of 
the  nation  as  the  fundamental  category  of  understanding  and  forging  social  and 
political reality. Both befit the modernist definition of nationalism as a set of ideas that 
sought to advance ideas about national identity to construe and/or convoke a political 
community.  In  accordance  with  the  modernist  model,  the  difference  between  the 
nation-building designs of statesmen like Sarmiento and his later detractors could thus
be read as the superseding of one form of nationalism by another. Hobsbawm himself
21 has analysed Latin American nationalism along the lines of such phases.  Although 
analytically  valid,  in  a thesis  on  the  twentieth  century,  this  makes  the  definition  of 
nationalism  too  broad  to  be  useful.  Contemporary  denomination  in  Argentina  after 
1930  separated  “liberalism”,  of which  Sarmiento  was  a paradigmatic  emblem,  from 
“nationalism”,  understood  as  a  set  of  ideas  that  stressed  the  nation  as  the  main 
organising principle of politics, denounced cosmopolitanism and universalism and was 
opposed to liberalism, typically branding it as anti-national. Likewise, in her study on 
constructions of national identity in the late nineteenth century, Lilia Ana Bertoni has 
distinguished  between  the  inclusive  ideals  of cosmopolitan  patriotism,  on  the  one 
hand, and nationalism, on the other, which stressed the homogeneity and authenticity
99 of an indivisible national community.  It is this second form of nationalism on which 
this thesis focuses. The term nationalism henceforth does not refer to the liberal model 
of nation-building,  but  instead  denotes  only the  anti-liberal  form of nationalism that 
was dominant from at least the 1930s onwards.
20 Eric J. Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing traditions”, in: Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger 
(eds.), The invention of tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  1983), p.  1.
21  Eric J. Hobsbawm, “Nationalism and nationality in Latin America”, in: Bouda Etemad, Jean Batou, 
and Thomas David (eds.), Pour une histoire economique et sociale internationale: Melanges offerts a 
Paul Bairoch (Geneva: Editions Passe Present,  1995), pp. 313-323.
22 Lilia Ana Bertoni, Patriotas, cosmopolitas y nacionalistas: la construccion de la nacionalidad 
argentina a fines del siglo XIX (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 2001).
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However, usage of the term should not be narrowed too much either.  Most stu­
dies on twentieth-century Argentine nationalism have concentrated on the authoritarian 
and largely anti-democratic strands of thought that gained momentum in the  1930s.23 
These were expounded by groupings of right-wing thinkers and activists who launched 
periodicals,  founded  debating  clubs  and  set  up  street-fighting  gangs  and  sometimes 
large  political  associations,  thus  forming  a political  current,  which  in  contemporary 
political  debates  almost  monopolised  the  Spanish  term  nacionalismo  for  itself. 
Although  this  near-monopolisation  might  be  interpreted  as  a  sign  of this  current’s 
temporary hegemony, it should not mislead the analyst into assuming that this was the 
only  form  of nationalism  after  1930.  Other  nationalist  groups,  such  as  FORJA,  a 
breakaway faction from the Radical Party in the mid-thirties, differentiated themselves 
from the most authoritarian strands by stressing the popular ingredients of the national 
community. Even if the reactionary and authoritarian ideas of the interwar period were 
the most typical form of nationalism in the 1930s, for the period after 1955, it is highly 
problematic  to  equate  these  ideas  with  nationalism  tout  court.  In  the  1960s,  in  the 
context of politico-ideological mobility and the imprints of international developments 
such as the  Algerian war of independence  or the  Cuban  Revolution,  the  reactionary 
interwar  forms  were  largely  eclipsed  by  an  eclectic  blend  of anti-imperialist  tercer- 
mundismo, populism and Marxism. Throughout the thesis, I will therefore differentiate 
between the term nacionalismo, by which I mean the right-wing strand of thought that 
emerged in the interwar period, possessed a degree of self-consciousness as a political 
current and was often associated with the Catholic Right and an authoritarian emphasis 
upon hierarchy, order and discipline, and the broader term “nationalism”, which also 
includes the  more  left-leaning and populist currents that gained weight after  1955.24 
Nationalism  will  be  understood  as  the  common  denominator  of these  sets  of ideas, 
which  converged  in  their  anti-imperialism,  anti-liberalism  and  their  stress  on  the 
authenticity of the national community in opposition to supposedly damaging foreign
23 Marysa Navarro Gerassi, Los nacionalistas (Buenos Aires: Jorge Alvarez,  1968); Enrique Zuleta 
Alvarez, El nacionalismo argentino, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: La Bastilla,  1975); Cristidn Buchrucker, 
Nacionalismoy peronismo: la Argentina en la crisis ideologica mundial (1927-1955) (Buenos Aires: 
Sudamericana,  1987), pp.  116-257; David Rock, Authoritarian Argentina: the Nationalist movement-its 
history and its impact (Berkeley: University of California Press,  1993); and Alberto Spektorowski,  The 
origins of  Argentina’ s revolution of the right (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press,
2003).
24 This device has been proposed in previous English-language literature: Sandra McGee Deutsch and 
Ronald Dolkart (eds.), The Argentine right: its history and intellectual origins,  1910 to the present 
(Wilmington: SR Books,  1993) and Sandra McGee Deutsch, Las Derechas: the extreme right in 
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile,  1890-1939 (Stanford: Stanford University Press,  1999).
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influences.  Based  on  this  definition,  nationalism  is  understood  as  a  particular 
discourse,  which  is  not  necessarily  expressed  through  a  single  movement  with  the 
exclusive aim to promote this discourse, although there can be nationalist movements 
that adopt elements from it. In this case, Peronism was a nationalist movement of this 
kind.
If  twentieth-century  Argentine  nationalism  is  understood  in  this  way,  then 
historical  revisionism  can  be  seen  as  the  nationalist  “invention  of  tradition”  par 
excellence.  Yet although all revisionists can be regarded as nationalists according to 
the definition above, the question remains to what extent the  inverse  is true as well. 
The scholarly literature on twentieth-century Argentine nationalism has unanimously 
cast revisionism as a distinctive and crucial part of its subject matter,  although often 
without  analysing  it  in  much  depth.  This  is  not  to  say  that  everybody  with  a 
nationalist mindset was also a revisionist. For example, many politicians who are often 
qualified as nationalist cannot be called revisionists, simply because they never wrote 
anything  about  history.  Some  of  the  protagonists  of  the  studies  of  Argentine 
nationalism,  such as a number of priests,  military advisers or journalists,  should not 
primarily be treated as revisionists either. Nevertheless,  most writers whose political 
orientation  was  nationalist  did  engage  in  the  production  and/or  dissemination  of 
revisionism, be it through history books,  more  general essays or journalistic articles. 
For the  period  after  1930,  at  least  one  half of the  thinkers  considered  in  the  afore­
mentioned  scholarly  studies  can  also  be  classified  as  revisionists,  even  if writing 
history was rarely their exclusive occupation. The link between nationalist thought and 
history  was  even  stronger  in  the  1960s.  In  this  decade,  the  terms  “revisionist”  and 
“nationalist intellectual” can almost be used synonymously. As Ana Maria Barletta and 
Maria Dolores Bejar have remarked,
25 For example, Spektorowski, The origins, pp. 93-109 uses revisionism as evidence for his argument 
that there was a synthesis between right- and left-wing nationalism. Deutsch, Las Derechas, pp. 327-328 
sees revisionism as a crucial component that set the Argentine Right apart from its Brazilian and Chilean 
counterparts and as proof for her point that right-wing nationalism was more influential in Argentina 
than in the other two countries. Navarro Gerassi, Los nacionalistas, pp.  131-145 identifies the exaltation 
of Rosas as the main criterion that distinguished Argentine nationalism from similar currents of thought 
elsewhere. Other studies, such as Samuel Baily, Labor, nationalism, and politics in Argentina (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,  1967), which is fundamentally concerned with the working class 
rather than intellectual debates, and Pablo Jose Hernandez, Peronismo y pensamiento nacional,  1955- 
1973 (Buenos Aires: Biblos,  1997), largely a piece of anecdotal journalism, have also repeatedly 
touched upon revisionism.
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in the corrosive criticism of the paradigm of the liberal nation and in the consequent re-invention 
of the Argentine past in order to legitimise the desired nation, we recognise two elements that are 
shared by all nationalists.26 
In  the  light  of  these  considerations,  it  seems  justified  to  derive  some  broader 
conclusions  about  nationalism  from  analysing  its  “invention  of tradition”,  namely 
revisionism.
In  a  next  step,  revisionism  and  nationalist  discourse  in  general  might  then  be 
connected to broader political problems.  The rise of revisionism,  as an  instance of a 
highly partisan and anti-liberal nationalism, coincided with Argentina’s main period of 
political  instability  between  1930  and  1983.  It  is  tempting  to  argue  that  nationalist 
mythologies  such  as  revisionism  contributed to  these  difficulties  of agreeing  on  a 
legitimate  political  order.  Is  it not telling  enough that  the  leaders  of military  coups 
(there were  six  between  1930 and  1976) frequently drew on combative  and  divisive 
nationalist ideas? On the other side of the political violence of the 1970s, did the name 
of the  guerrilla  group  Montoneros  not  show  that  they  were  inspired  by  historical 
revisionism? Looking across the Andes, was Chile’s greater political stability not also 
matched by a nationalist account of the past, decadentismo, that was less partisan and 
polemical than its Argentine counterpart? Undoubtedly,  Argentina’s protracted  crisis 
of liberal democracy between  1930 and  1983  was underpinned by a political  culture 
marked by divisions between brothers in arms and irreconcilable “enemies” who had 
to  be  eliminated,  whether  symbolically  or physically,  of which  nationalism  (and  its 
main version of the past, revisionism) were important elements. The very terms demo­
cracy and (especially) liberalism were widely discredited throughout this period. In the 
1960s, labelling oneself as a liberal was almost tantamount to political suicide.
However, with regard to nationalist discourse in that period, much depends on the 
conceptual  lens  through  which  we  examine  the  relationship  between  ideas  and 
practical  politics.  The  scholarship  on  nationalist  ideology  —in  particular  by  non- 
Argentine authors— has often suffered from a rather unidirectional schematism, accor­
ding  to  which  the  subject  of analysis  (nationalist  ideas  or,  more  generally,  identity 
constructions)  is envisaged only  as  a potential  driving force  of Argentina’s  political 
instability or calamitous human rights record, rather than also asking how these ideas 
came  to  be  politically  applied.  Often,  the  publications  of nationalist  thinkers  were 
scanned in search of the “ideological origins” of military coups. For example, Alberto
26 Ana Maria Barletta and Maria Dolores Bejar, “Nacionalismo, nacionalismos, nacionalistas:  ...^un 
debate historiografico?”, Anuario del Instituto de Estudios Historico-Sociales, vol. 3 (1988), p. 382.
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Spektorowski has argued that the “nationalist ideology that had an important influence 
on  Argentinian  politics  achieved  consummation  with  the  successful  revolution  of
97 1943, which ushered in Peronism.”  In a book published in 2003, he identified this as
98 the ideology of “reactionary modernism”.  David Rock started from the premise that 
Argentine  political  culture  was  inherently  authoritarian  and  then  found  plenty  of 
examples that suggest that the ideology of the “Nationalist movement” was the main
9Q
responsible for this authoritarianism.  Nicolas Shumway went back much further. For 
him, the “guiding fictions” inherent in the later writings of the early nineteenth-century 
thinker Mariano Moreno (according to Shumway, “a frighteningly authoritarian figure, 
reminiscent of Machiavelli,  the  Grand  Inquisitor,  and the  French Jacobins”)  already 
forecast the populism of both Hipolito Yrigoyen and Juan Peron as well as the fact that 
“Fascists and third-world communists would become the new paternalists.”30 With the 
help of Rock’s and Shumway’s studies, Diane Taylor found that “many of the myths 
and evils we associate with the Dirty War can already be identified in the nineteenth 
century”, such as “Catholic values exemplified in the Crusades, the Inquisition, and the 
Counter-Reformation;  [...]  the  distrust  of foreigners;  [...]  the  tendency  to  resort  to 
violence”.3 1
I do not share the confidence of these authors that harmful ideas translated into 
political  practices  so  effortlessly.  Before  speculating about the  extent to  which  they 
became  practical  guidelines  for  guerrillas,  political  leaders  or  military  men,  to  the 
detriment  of Argentina’s  stability,  we  should  look  at  the  means  of production  and 
transmission of these ideas. My question, therefore, is not whether nationalist intellec­
tuals or revisionists should in the last instance be held responsible for military coups, 
but  what  the  structural  stimuli  were  for  their  discourse  to  spread  and  to  acquire 
meaning. The danger of an excessive structuralism increased every time I revisited the 
books  and  articles  of  revisionists.  Although  most  of them  might  have  wanted  to 
become  advisers  to  the  Prince,  their  essayism  more  often  seemed  to  express  their 
relatively weak integration into political parties or movements. Their own political ini­
27 Alberto Spektorowski, “The ideological origins of right and left nationalism in Argentina,  1930-43”, 
Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 29 (1994), pp.  155-184, p.  155.
28 Spektorowski, The origins.
29 Rock, Authoritarian Argentina.
30 Nicolas Shumway,  The invention of  Argentina (Berkeley: University of California Press,  1991), p. 28 
(Machiavelli etc.), p. 40 (Yrigoyen) and p. 46 (the remaining three). He does not further specify in what 
sense Moreno resembled Machiavelli, the Grand Inquisitor and the Jacobins, nor whom he means by 
“Fascists and third-world communists”.
31  Diane Taylor, Disappearing acts: spectacles of  gender and nationalism in Argentina’s  "Dirty War” 
(Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press,  1997), p. 37.
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tiatives were usually failures and they were thus in search of more promising political 
allies,  whom they  often  believed  to  find  in  the  orbit  of Peronism.  This  made  them 
vulnerable  to  political  developments  (often  actually  ephemeral  conjunctures)  upon 
which they had little influence. This impression of revisionists at first seemed parado­
xical in the light of the wide dissemination of their ideas in the  1960s and  1970s.  Yet 
this  seeming paradox  is the  main  argument  of this thesis:  the  revisionist  account  of 
Argentina’s  past  spread  so  widely  precisely  because  its  producers  failed  to  retain  a 
hegemonic grip on their own discourse.
Intellectuals and politics
For the same reason, I am sceptical that the main explanatory factors for the spread of 
nationalist discourse —here revisionism— can be found through a textual analysis of 
nationalist writings  alone.  Elaborate  linguistic  approaches  to  intellectual  history  like 
Dominick LaCapra’s might be able to interpret the meaning of texts without analysing 
the  context,32  but  this  should  not  lead  us  to  infer  that  the  social  acceptance  of an 
invented tradition stems exclusively from the creative potential of its producers.  With 
regard to the topic of this thesis, an excessive focus on revisionist writings entails the 
danger of examining revisionism  as  a current of historiography,  which  the  historian 
who  analyses these writings  is tempted to judge  according to her or his own under­
standing of Argentine history. But in order to understand the success of revisionism the 
extent to which an account of, say, the unfolding of the battle of Caseros was true to 
events or not is largely irrelevant.  The problem of historical truth, as raised by post­
modernist theorists in recent years, has little illuminative potential here. Keith Jenkins’ 
question of whether historiography is “value-free or always  ‘positioned for someone’ 
[...], innocent or ideological, unbiased or biased, fact or fancy”33 would allow for only 
two answers with respect to this case: either, one can simply reaffirm the revisionists’ 
claim  to  have  found  historical  truth.  Or  else,  the  historiography  in  question  can  be 
taken  to  confirm  the  suspicion  that  historical  writing  is  essentially  fictitious. 
Revisionism would be an inexpensive victim for this, because its political agenda was 
so blatant. Instead, I would much prefer to circumvent such dichotomous questions by 
insisting  that,  to  be  believable,  revisionist  interpretations  had  to  fulfil  a  required 
minimum of plausibility. For example, it needed to be generally accepted that Britain
32 Dominick LaCapra, Rethinking intellectual history: texts, contexts,  language (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press,  1983).
33 Keith Jenkins, Re-thinking history (London: Routledge,  1991), p. 67.
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had indeed had far-reaching commercial interests in Argentina, that “liberals” such as 
Mitre or Sarmiento had encouraged or led cruel wars against the montonera insurgen­
cies of the interior, and that Argentina’s export-led integration into the world market 
had  indeed had its pitfalls in the  form of a disadvantageous dependency on  interna­
tional  price  fluctuations.  But  none  of this  helps  our  understanding  of revisionism  a 
great deal. As Oscar Teran has remarked,
the  power  of revisionism  in  these  years  [1955-66]  does  not  reside  in  any  novel  contributions, 
given that it has reached an extreme degree of codification of its own discourse that only allows 
for a quantitative expansion [...] of the supposed evidence that it had upheld for decades.34 
As  I  will  try  to  show  with  the  example  of historical  revisionism,  the  efficacy  of 
nationalist ideas cannot easily be found by only scanning nationalist writings.
Two  theorists,  Raymond  Williams  and  Pierre  Bourdieu,  have  helped  me 
conceptually to unravel my reservations about an approach to nationalism that focuses 
on texts alone. Both allow us to discard the notion of individually endowed creativity 
as the source of literary production, instead insisting on the concrete social and mate­
rial circumstances that set the parameters for this production. Bourdieu’s critique of an 
approach that casts content as the predominant determinant of discursive dynamics is 
particularly  appropriate  for  a  study  that,  rather  than  paraphrasing  nationalist 
mythologies,  seeks  to  explain  their effectiveness.  For this  purpose,  nationalist  ideas 
can be conceptualised as symbolic goods, the production and circulation of which is 
subject to a certain logic. According to Bourdieu, the rules that guide this production 
become comprehensible when contextualised within interconnected fields, which can 
be understood as a “structured space of positions, within which the same positions or 
their interactions are determined by the distribution of different types of resources or 
‘capital’”.35  Depending  on  the  type  of  capital  that  different  actors  seek,  one  can 
distinguish between different fields, within which the agents are defined by “properties 
of  position [that are] irreducible to intrinsic properties”.36
Of  special  importance  here  are  the  intellectual  and  the  political  fields,  both
T7 structured by particular types of capital.  In this model, the intellectual field is distinct 
from politics and defined as
34 Teran, Nuestros anos sesentas, p. 57.
35 Pierre Bourdieu, Questions de sociologie (Paris: Editions de Minuit,  1980), p.  113.
36 Pierre Bourdieu, “Champ intellectuel et projet cr6ateur”, Les Temps Modernes, no. 246 (1966), pp. 
865-906, p. 865.
37 Ibid. on the intellectual field and Pierre Bourdieu, Langage et pouvoir symbolique (Paris: Fayard,
2003), pp. 213-258 on the political field.
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a  properly  intellectual  order,  dominated  through  a  particular  kind  of legitimacy,  [which]  was 
defined by  its opposition to economic power,  political power and religious power,  that  is to all 
instances  that  could  try  to  legislate  in  the  domain  of culture  in  the  name  of power  or  of an 
authority that was not properly intellectual.38 
The question is not whether this theoretical blueprint can be applied without qualifi­
cation to this case study. Since the degree of autonomy of a given field from another is 
the result of a historical process, the model should be seen as an analytical ideal-type 
rather than as an observable norm.  Bourdieu himself has warned that “however great 
the autonomy of the intellectual field is, it is determined, in structure and function, by 
the place it occupies within the field of power.”  For this very reason, however, the 
analytical category of the intellectual field is useful for an exploration of the interrela­
tionship between intellectuals (and their ideas) and political power.  Such an approach 
is perhaps especially apposite for Latin American countries, where both intellectuals 
and  the  state  have  usually been  interpreted  as  extraordinarily  influential  in  shaping 
collective identities.40
The question of why  and  in what ways revisionism was  disseminated  between 
1955  and  1976  will  thus  be  embedded  in  an  analysis  of  the  interplay  between 
intellectuals  and  politics  in  that  period.  The  classification  of nationalist  thinkers  as 
intellectuals must be considered first, because it is less immediately obvious than their 
connection to politics. Given the difficulty to resolve the question of what constitutes 
an  intellectual,  many  studies  of intellectuals  demarcate  their  subject  by  stating  that 
there are as many definitions of the term as there are intellectuals and that, as long as 
their  agents  see  themselves  as  such,  there  is  no  need  to  engage  in  theoretical 
discussions. This is impossible here, because my protagonists —whether we call them 
revisionists or more generically nationalist thinkers— denied being intellectuals. They 
also  have partially  fallen off the  map  of studies  about Argentine  intellectuals  in the 
1960s, such as the one by Silvia Sigal, who distinguishes between “progressive intel­
lectuals”, who are the focus of her book, and “nationalist ideologues”, whose writings 
and careers she does not analyse.41  The term intellectual was anathema to Argentine
38 Bourdieu, “Champ intellectuel”, p. 866.
39 Pierre Bourdieu, “Champ de pouvoir, champ intellectuel et habitus de classe”, Scolies, no.  1   (1971), 
pp. 7-26, p.  14.
40 For a general overview of this problem, see Nicola Miller, In the shadow of the state: intellectuals and 
the quest for national identity in twentieth-century Spanish America (London and New York: Verso, 
1999).
41 Silvia Sigal, Intelectualesy poder en Argentina: la decada del sesenta (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 
2002), p. 63.
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nationalists for varying reasons, ranging from the extreme rightists, for whom it rang 
bells of liberalism,  democracy,  Marxism and, to  more than one,  Judaism,  whilst the 
more left-leaning argued that, under the semi-colonial conditions in Argentina,  intel­
lectuals were an instrumental part of the oppressive apparatus of imperialism. But we 
should not be misled by this denial. Following Norberto Bobbio, a preoccupation with 
refusing the label can be revealing in itself, since s/he “who speaks of intellectuals, in 
doing so develops a task that habitually corresponds to  intellectuals” and the person 
“turns into an intellectual, even though s/he starts writing about intellectuals to say all 
possible ills about them”.42 Repeated and passionate refusal of the category does not 
necessarily prove that the author is no intellectual; instead, one might be dealing with 
an extreme case of the model of the militant intellectual.
Unless we accept the categories used in their self-portrayals, I cannot think of any 
convincing  reason not to  see  revisionists  as  intellectuals,  however  the  term  is  con­
ceived. If, in a Gramscian vein, intellectuals are understood through their relationship 
with political power and their function in society, the case is fairly clear-cut and the 
very  notion  of the  “ideologue”  becomes  only  a  variant  of the  intellectual.  If one 
commits what Gramsci called the “widespread error [...] of [looking] for this criterion 
of distinction in the intrinsic nature of intellectual activity”, revisionists still appear as 
intellectuals,  because  they wrote  essays,  books  and  articles.43  A  definition  based  on 
Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge or a Weberian model that characterises intellec­
tuals  through  their  privileged  access  to  knowledge  and  their  critical  distance  from 
political projects are admittedly more difficult here.44 But still, by construing accounts 
of what constituted national authenticity, Argentina’s nationalist thinkers bore, formu­
lated  and  communicated  ideas  about  social  reality.  Moreover,  they  also  sought  to 
authorise their accounts  by proving that they possessed  cultural  capital  (knowledge, 
educational  competences  or familiarity with  literary texts)  and the  kind  of symbolic 
capital  that,  according to  Bourdieu,  is  peculiar to  the  intellectual  field  (for example 
honours  endowed  by prestigious  cultural  institutions).45  In  short,  a case  study  about
42 Norberto Bobbio, II dubbio e la scelta: intellettuali e potere nella societa contemporanea (Rome: La 
Nuova Italia Scientifica,  1993), p.  10 and p.  113.
43 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the prison notebooks, translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers,  1971), p. 8.
44 Karl Mannheim, Ideologie und Utopie, 7th ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann,  1985) and Max 
Weber,  Wissenschaft als Beruf  / Politik als Beruf (Tubingen: Mohr,  1992).
45 On cultural capital, see Pierre Bourdieu, “Les trois etats du capital culturel”, Actes de la Recherche en 
Sciences Sociales, no. 30 (1979), pp. 3-6. On symbolic capital, see Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a theory 
of  practice, translated by Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  1977), pp.  171-183.
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revisionists  inevitably  raises  questions  about  intellectual  debates.  Most  studies  on 
Argentine  intellectuals  in  the  1960s,  including  Sigal’s,  have  effectively  ended  up 
treating at least the most prominent populist essayists —who were also revisionists— 
as intellectuals.46
There  are  now  several  such  studies,  but  Sigal’s  and  Teran’s,  both  originally 
published  in  1991,  still  stand out.47  Both trace the  development of ideas  against the 
background of cultural modernisation and the political predicaments of the period from 
1955  to  1966.  Both  are  concerned  with  analysing  the  political  radicalisation  of 
intellectuals and thereby the origins of the self-declared “Peronisation” of the  young 
middle class after the coup of 1966.  For this,  Sigal  and Teran draw attention to  the 
political homelessness of intellectuals in that period, which among large sectors of the 
Left, then hegemonic in intellectual debates, finally resulted in their decision to declare 
themselves  supporters  of the  prohibited  Peronist  movement.  However,  the  ways  in 
which the two studies reconstruct their topic differ. Whereas Teran treats what he calls 
the “formation of the Argentine intellectual New Left” in the vein of a history of ideas, 
drawing out ideological hegemonies and cross-fertilisations, Sigal is more interested in 
a  sociological  reconstruction  of networks,  institutions  and  the  structural  relation  of 
intellectuals with political power.  Although Teran’s book allows us to situate certain 
notions in a broader context of currents of thought in the  1960s,  Sigal’s approach is 
thus closer to what I am proposing.  Yet again, my object of study constitutes only a 
part of these broader intellectual debates, and a rather peculiar one, whose dynamic is 
closely interwoven with Sigal’s and Teran’s concerns, but responds to non-intellectual 
stimuli even more strongly than their topics do. The focus has to shift according to the 
sample of people we look at.  For example, the centrality that Sigal concedes to deve­
lopments in universities makes less sense for this study, given that revisionism largely 
developed outside academia.  Similarly, the ending of Sigal’s and Teran’s studies, the 
coup of 1966, when the new military rulers put an end to university autonomy, might 
have constituted a clear-cut break for “progressive intellectuals”, who were now forced
46 Sigal, Intelectuales y poder, esp. pp.  172-187 and Teran, Nuestros anos sesentas, where references are 
scattered throughout the study.
47 Sigal, Intelectuales y poder and Teran, Nuestros anos sesentas. Other examples are: Hector Ricardo 
Leis, Intelectuales y politico,  1966-1973 (Buenos Aires: CEAL,  1991); Federico Neiburg, Os 
intelectuais e a invencao do peronismo: estudos de antropologia social e cultural (SSo Paulo: Editora da 
Universidade de Sao Paulo,  1997); Horacio Gonzalez, Restos pampeanos: ciencia, ensayo y politico en 
la cultura argentina en el siglo XX (Buenos Aires: Colihue,  1999); and Claudio Suasnabar,  Universidad 
y intelectuales: educacion y politico en la Argentina (1955-1976) (Buenos Aires: FLACSO/Manantial,
2004), which focuses on debates about education policies.
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into  exile or into  substituting private  institutions,  but it was  less of an  inflexion  for 
those sectors that were not part of the university in the first place.
Intellectual debates in the  1960s, as both Teran and Sigal have stressed, acquired 
their meaning in relation to politics. That this also goes for nationalist thinkers barely 
demands  detailed  clarification,  since,  in  the  context  of a  modem  nation-state,  their 
normative statements referred to the properties of the political community. This opens 
a new line of inquiry that analyses the relationship of the producers of nationalist ideas
48 with  the  state,  as Nicola  Miller has  done  for  several  Spanish  American  countries. 
Here,  the  two  most  important  characteristics  of the  political  situation  in  Argentina 
between 1955 and  1973 were the proscription of Peronism and the crisis of legitimacy 
linked to this. Although the decade before the coup of 1966, in which the composition 
of power brokers can be described as a stalemate, differed from the ensuing authorita­
rian military regime that sought to resolve this stalemate unilaterally, these two basic 
facts  remained.  Since  Peronism,  despite  being  banned  from  electoral  participation, 
retained  political  clout  (before  1966  mostly through the  union  movement  and  from 
1969  also  through political  violence),  other political  actors  were  obliged  to  adopt  a 
stance in relation to the exiled leader. Similarly, intellectual debates in the entire period 
from  1955 to  1973 revolved around the question of how to interpret and position one­
self in relation to Peronism; a problem that arguably extended into the three years of 
Peronist government from  1973 to  1976, which dramatically displayed the disintegra­
tion of national-populist politics.49
These  debates  did  not  develop  independently  from  the  political  situation. 
Especially in the case of populist revisionists, their contribution to  interpretations of 
Peronism  should  not  be  seen  as  only  an  intellectual  debate  or  an  “invention  of 
Peronism”  that  was  disconnected  from  the  reality  of  the  movement,  as  Federico 
Neiburg’s  study  suggests,50  because  many  of them  became  so  involved  in  Peronist 
militancy themselves.  The expression “the fact of Peronism”, coined by the Catholic 
nacionalista  Mario  Amadeo,5 1   captures  very well  the two  faces  of the  problem  that
48 Miller, In the shadow.
49 1  am, of course, not the first to note the importance of understandings of Peronism in the development 
of intellectual debates in the  1960s. Carlos Altamirano, Peronismo y  cultura de izquierda (Buenos 
Aires: Temas Grupo Editorial, 2001), for example, has stressed the importance of Peronism for left- 
wing intellectuals, whose traditional political organisations now found themselves deprived of their 
ideal-typical clientele.
50 Neiburg, Os intelectuais.
51 Mario Amadeo, Ayer, hoy, mahana (Buenos Aires: Gure,  1956), p. 91. The expression is taken up by 
Altamirano, Peronismoy cultura de izquierda, p. 49.
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post-1955 interpretations of Peronism had to tackle: Peronism was now a phenomenon 
of the past that required analysis,  but,  at the  same time,  it was also a contemporary 
presence because of the continuing adherence to the deposed leader of large parts of 
the  population.  Neiburg’s  approach  becomes  problematic,  where  the  intellectuals  in 
question began to declare themselves as Peronists. Whilst the Peronisation of middle- 
class intellectuals and students occurred on a large scale only after 1966, this problem 
affected the most prominent revisionist essayists from at least  1955 onwards, as they 
became embroiled in the intricacies of Peronist politics. This engendered a discursive 
dynamic, as described by Silvia Sigal and Eliseo Veron,'  in which various trends that 
were  notoriously  inchoate  competed  for  credibility  as  the  most  authentic  Peronists. 
Revisionist constructions of historical  lineages  became  instrumental  in this  competi­
tion.  As  I  will  argue,  many of the reasons  for the  spread of revisionism have  to  be 
sought in these internal dynamics of the Peronist movement.
Although, therefore,  I  will  by default contribute to  interpretations of Peronism, 
this is not the main aim of this study.  In part,  I refrain from trying to deliver a new 
interpretation  of Peronism because  so  many  compelling  arguments  have  been  made 
about  it already.  Today,  the  scholarship  about Peronism  in the  period  from  1955  to 
1976 alone is extensive and diverse, in particular regarding, firstly, the Peronist trade 
unions  and  its  relation  with  the  working  class  and,  secondly,  examinations  of the 
Peronist  youth  groups  and  the  emergent  guerrillas.53  However,  the  richness  of this 
literature is neither a good nor the only reason for my reluctance to contribute to this 
field. The better justification is my scepticism regarding the extent to which the ideas 
of intellectuals modified Peron’s or his movement’s political practices. As I will try to 
show,  Peronism  drew  on  revisionist  motifs  after  1955  and  revisionism  and  both 
Peronist doctrine and imagery resembled each other in several respects, but historically 
this  affinity  was  elective.  The  Peronist  appropriation  of revisionism  occurred  as  a 
function  of  conjunctural  political  necessities  rather  than  due  to  a  permanent  and 
necessary ideological convergence. This view fits well into what has become an almost
52 Sigal and Ver6n, Peron o muerte.
53 If one has to restrict the bibliography to a few illustrative examples, they might include, for the first: 
Daniel James, Resistance and integration: Peronism and the Argentine working class,  1946-1976 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  1988) and Juan Carlos Torre, El gigante invertebrado: los 
sindicatos en el gobierno, Argentina 1973-1976 (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 2004); and for the second: 
Richard Gillespie, Soldiers of Peron: Argentina’s Montoneros (Oxford: Clarendon Press,  1982) and 
Lucas Lanusse, Montoneros: el mito de sus 12 fundadores (Buenos Aires: Vergara, 2005). Somewhere 
in between the two trends is Samuel Amaral and Mariano Ben Plotkin (eds.), Peron: del exilio al poder, 
2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: EDUNTREF, 2004).
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consensual  interpretation  in recent  years,  namely  that  Peronism  should  be  primarily 
understood as a form or a style of applied politics rather than as the expression of a 
stable ideological programme upon which the elaborations of intellectuals could have 
left decisive imprints.54
Scope and structure of the thesis
In sum, this thesis draws on the insights of several areas of Argentine historiography 
that  have  developed  over  the  last  twenty  years:  works  on  revisionism  itself,  the 
historiography about Argentine nationalism, studies of intellectual debates in the 1960s 
and, ultimately, parts of the literature about Peronism. My main aim is not to revise the 
major  lines  of existing  interpretations.  Rather,  by  adopting  a different  angle  on  the 
topic, I aim at a new collage of existing knowledge, relating several areas that hitherto 
have  been  studied  largely  in  isolation  from  each  other.  The  thesis  is  not  mainly  a 
history of historiography, but a study of the conditions  for what could be  called the 
“plausibilisation”  of a  particular  “invention  of tradition”.  In  order  to  render  these 
conditions comprehensible,  it draws  on insights from theories  of cultural  production 
and seeks to contextualise historical revisionism in the tension between the intellectual 
and the political field.
For  this  purpose,  the  thesis  relies  mostly  on  published  primary  sources.  This 
concerns firstly the monographs of revisionists. Since there are more than one hundred 
of them, I have concentrated on the most prominent authors and books, but I will also 
draw  on  less  known  examples,  wherever  these  help  the  clarification  of particular 
points.  Secondly,  the  thesis  is  based  on  a  broad  review  of periodical  publications, 
available at the Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut in Berlin and several archives in Buenos 
Aires. In particular the opening and continuous expansion of the well-organised Centro 
de  Documentation  e  Investigation  de  la  Cultura  de  Izquierdas  en  la  Argentina 
(CeDInCI) in Buenos Aires has facilitated access to relevant publications that were not 
easily available before.  These were complemented by the rarely consulted Coleccion 
Becerra  at  the  National  Library  in  Buenos  Aires,  which  contain  a  broad  variety  of 
political weeklies, although the series are hardly ever complete.  The kind of periodi­
cals consulted include academic and especially historical journals, both by revisionists 
and other historians, but in particular a large number of cultural and political reviews,
54 See Juan Carlos Torre’s remarks in the compilation of interviews Roy Hora and Javier Trimboli 
(eds.), Pensar la Argentina: los historiadores hablan de historia y politico (Buenos Aires: El Cielo por 
Asalto,  1994), pp. 217-218.
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magazines  and  weekly  papers.  The  main  focus  is  on  periodicals  that  were  close  to 
Peronism and/or known for their nationalism, but other political organs, belonging for 
example to  Socialist or Radical tendencies, were used, too.  I  have tried to  include a 
great breadth of such publications, because only this allows to determine with greater 
precision a pattern of the areas of public debate where revisionism gained  currency. 
From these  periodicals  also  stems  much of the biographical  information  on the  less 
well-known  revisionists.  Furthermore,  I  have  consulted  mainstream  newspapers  and 
magazines such as La Nacion or Primera Plana as well as provincial dailies in order to 
complement  information  on  specific  issues.  Lastly,  some  unpublished  sources  were 
included, such as outlines of courses at the University of Buenos Aires, parliamentary 
debates, police records —which became available through the opening of the Archivo 
de  la  Comision  Provincial  por  la  Memoria  in  La  Plata—  as  well  as  trade  union 
documents  from  the  archive  of the  Confederation  General  del  Trabajo  (CGT)  in 
Buenos Aires.
The structure of the thesis is a blending of a chronological with a thematic order. 
By  and  large  it  is  conceived  as  a tale  of how a version  of Argentina’s  history  was 
projected into political disputes. The structure thus follows the logic of politicisation, 
that is from the intellectual towards the political field. The first chapter takes revisio­
nism first of all as what it is in the strictest sense: a historiographical current. Here, I 
will outline the development of Argentine historiography since Mitre and delineate the 
origins of historical revisionism as well as some of its major historiographical charac­
teristics.  This allows the reader to  locate revisionism within the historical process of 
the differentiation of the intellectual field, broaching some themes that are more fully 
elaborated later on.  Chapter two delineates the major concerns of intellectual debates 
in the period that was opened by the military coup of 1955, connecting these debates to 
the social background of internal migration and to the cultural modernisation that was 
characteristic  of the  period.  These  debates  will  be  analysed  from  the  perspective  of 
how they related to, firstly, constructions of national identity and, secondly, the predo­
minant political question of the time, namely how intellectuals positioned themselves 
with  regard  to  Peronism.  These  two  chapters  together  are  meant  to  draw  out  the 
conditions and the ideological linkages that form the background to the flourishing of 
historical revisionism.
Chapter three links the intellectual debates of the period to the modifications of 
the revisionist version of the past that also began around 1955. It will explore some of
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the  differences  and  similarities  of the  discourse  of a  neo-revisionist  generation  of 
populist and left-leaning essayists who widely sold their books in the  1960s with the 
original  rosista  nucleus  described  in  the  first  chapter.  I  will  argue  that  a  lack  of 
ideological specificity allowed revisionism a high degree of flexibility so that it could 
be  adopted  for various  purposes  and  that  its unity consisted  largely  in  identifying  a 
common enemy in what was  seen as the  intellectual  establishment.  In the  following 
chapter,  I  will  then  look  at  the  formation  of networks  between  the  intellectual  and 
political  fields.  This  implies  identifying  the  kind  of vehicles  that  underpinned  the 
dissemination  of  historical  revisionism:  periodicals,  publishers  and  the  militant 
activities of nationalist intellectuals through which their ideas became applicable  for 
political  disputes.  This  will  set  the  stage  for  the  last  section  of this  thesis,  which 
focuses on revisionism in the political sphere, in particular in relation to the state.
Chapter five analyses the Peronist appropriation of historical revisionism in the 
immediate aftermath of the coup of 1955. I will argue that this appropriation was not a 
necessary outcome  of an ideological affinity between revisionism and Peronism,  but 
owed much to the political circumstances of the moment. The leaders of the so-called 
Liberating Revolution, who had ousted Peron, sought to legitimise themselves with a 
dogmatic  version of “official  history”.  In their  intention to  discredit the  overthrown 
Peronist  government,  they  compared  him  to  Rosas.  In  turn,  the  semi-legal  Peronist 
press accepted the validity of this historical comparison, inverted the originally deroga­
tory value judgment attached to it and finally arrived at praising Rosas as a forerunner 
of Peron’s  deeds.  The  sixth  and  last chapter examines  the  trajectories  of nationalist 
intellectuals  in public  office  and the  kind of historical  genealogies  employed  by the 
governments of Arturo  Frondizi  (1958-62), the military regime of 1966 to  1973  and 
the subsequent Peronist administration that ended with the coup of 1976. Here, I will 
argue that revisionism was not adopted as a new “official history” until  1973 and that 
when it was (under Peronism) it began to decline. Taken together, the last two chapters 
thus try to show how the appropriation of nationalist narratives for political reasons not 
only was the reason for the flourishing of revisionism in the collective imaginary, but 
also  contained  already  the  origin  of its  decline.  Finally,  I  will  try  to  offer  a  more 
general  framework  that  points  out  some  of the  conditions  that  contributed  to  the 
politicisation  of  history  and  then  go  on  to  draw  broader  conclusions  about  the 
connection between nationalist ideas and politics in Argentina.
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Argentina’s two pantheons: From mitrismo to revisionism
Introduction
It seems paradoxical that historical revisionism, a current that claimed to pinpoint an 
unequivocal essence of national  identity from the study of history,  imparted the idea 
that the country was in fact divided into two perfectly opposed poles.  This is all the 
more surprising in an immigrant society like Argentina. In contrast to, say, Peru where 
there  was  at  least  some  plausibility  in  positing  a  division  between  an  indigenous 
highland  and  a mestizo  and white  coast,  in Argentina the  social  bases  of these  two 
poles were difficult to identify. Yet the notion of two Argentinas was perhaps the most 
momentous  imprint that historical  revisionism  left behind.  Although there  were  few 
common ideological denominators among revisionists, they all maintained that Argen­
tina could be neatly divided into manifestations of the true Argentine spirit, on the one 
hand,  and  a malicious  ensemble  of anti-national  forces,  on the  other.  In  contrast to 
other forms of bi-culturalism, this division was not ethnically defined, but according to 
a more general cultural  and political  framework.  In the revisionist view, Argentina’s 
spiritual essence could historically be found in the nineteenth-century caudillos, whilst 
the epitome of the anti-national sectors was a liberal urban elite that was more interes­
ted in its links to Europe than in the “real” nation. That the issue of mass immigration 
ceased  to  instil  heated  debates  from  around  1930  onwards,  therefore  presented  no 
problems  for  the  continuation  of the  notion  of two  Argentinas,  which  underpinned 
political culture for several decades.
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Argentina also had two different historical pantheons, which claimed to represent 
different traditions. As Silvia Sigal has remarked,
if Mexicans  or  Peruvians  could  draw  upon  autochthonous  cultural  referents,  the  invention  of a 
mythic past in a frontier society had to start from scratch, or almost so. And,  lacking an original 
past, the Argentine historians created two.1  
These  are  normally  identified  as  “liberal”,  “official”  or  mitrista  history  and  the 
revisionist  or  nationalist  version.  Put  schematically,  they  maintained  the  following: 
according to the liberal standpoint, Argentine history had begun properly with the May 
Revolution  of  1810,  when  an  enlightened  elite  realised  that  independence  from 
Europe’s supposedly most backward country was the only way to progress. Bernardino 
Rivadavia’s liberalism and secularism embodied this spirit well, but his modernising 
designs  were  interrupted  by  the  barbaric  forces  of the  caudillos  who  embodied  the 
darkest sides of bloodthirsty regression. Fortunately, however, the powers of civilisa­
tion managed to overthrow the “tyranny” of Rosas and set Argentina on the path of 
progress again by introducing European-inspired liberal  institutions.  For revisionists, 
in  contrast,  this  liberal  history  served  only  to  prolong  Argentina’s  subordination  to 
foreign ideas and cultures. In their accounts, Spain’s hierarchic Catholicism was prefe­
rable to Britain’s corrupting materialism and liberalism, which had simply replaced the 
former colonial power. The caudillos were the true incorporation of everything Argen­
tine and they had therefore heroically  fought against foreign intrusions.  Lamentably, 
Mitre and the liberals had prevailed so that in the present it was essential to fight for 
the re-establishment of the authentically national forces.
Still  today,  the  image  of two  Argentinas  is  upheld  in  some  examples  of the 
scholarly literature on Argentina. Nicolas Shumway, for example, has argued that the 
political divisions of twentieth-century Argentina could be explained by and essential­
ly were a prolongation of the two competing traditions that had emerged already in the 
immediate  aftermath  of independence.2  Although  Shumway  phrases  his  account  in 
constructivist terminology, he thus casts twentieth-century nationalism as a continua­
tion rather than an invention of tradition. In contrast to such a view, this chapter seeks 
to anchor the construction of Argentina’s two pantheons in the context of its historical 
conditions.  The  types  of conditions  that  receive  particular  attention  are,  firstly,  the 
institutional and professional bases upon which Argentine historians constructed their 
accounts of the past and how politics and history related to each other in the process of
1  Sigal, Intelectualesy poder, p.  13.
2 Shumway, The invention.
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their emergence.  I  will  argue that this relation followed no  regular pattern and that, 
although the link between politics and history underwent significant modifications, it 
was never altogether broken.  Secondly, and closely related to the first point, the kind 
of authority  from  which  writers  of history  derived  their  authority  to  participate  in 
historiographical debates will be analysed.  Crucial for an understanding of the social 
role of the historian is Bourdieu’s category of the “intellectual field”, as outlined in the 
introduction.  Particular emphasis  will  thus  be  given to  the  transition  from the  nine­
teenth-century  figure  of the pensador,  who  as  a member of a  small  elite  combined 
intellectual and political activities to the more restricted notion of the intellectual as a 
category that was distinct from the politician and the corresponding, albeit belated and 
incomplete, rise of the professional historian.
In order to delineate continuities and ruptures as well as to situate developments 
in their specific historical circumstances the topic will be approached chronologically, 
contextualising revisionism within the broader field of historical debates in Argentina 
from a long-term perspective. This will allow us to arrive at a clearer understanding of 
the specificities of revisionism and to define some traits that characterised it over time 
and  beyond  its  ideological  heterogeneities.  In  other  words,  I  will  set  out  a  map  of 
revisionism and introduce some of its principal writers, which will be a necessary basis 
for the understanding of subsequent chapters. To some extent, this also means that this 
chapter draws on a large body of secondary literature without contributing many novel 
points about details. The overall conclusion nevertheless differs significantly from the 
views that Argentina’s two pantheons were the derivates of nineteenth-century pheno­
mena and that they were opposed to each other in every respect.
/. Mitrismo, Argentina’s “official history” and incipient institutionalisation
No  other  figure  is  so  closely  associated  with  the  emergence  of historiography  in 
Argentina  as  the  statesman-writer  Bartolome  Mitre  (1821-1906).  In  order to  under­
stand  his  historical  writing  it  is  necessary  to  briefly  recall  the  political  background 
against which it developed.3 The battle of Caseros, in which Juan Manuel de Rosas had 
been  defeated  in  1852,  marked  the  beginning  of the  decline  of caudillismo  as  the
3 Here and in the following paragraphs, it will be impossible to review the entire literature on Mitre, 
Sarmiento and the generation of 1837, which, after all, is in itself part of the subject of this study. It 
should be added, however, that my account has been especially informed by Halperin Donghi, Una 
nacidn.
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dominant form of politics and the  onset of a period usually referred to  as  “national 
organisation”.  Ideologically,  this  process  was  led  by  Rosas’  opponents  of  the 
Generation of 1837, such as Mitre and Domingo Faustino  Sarmiento (1811-88), who 
had spent much of the period from  1838 to  1852  in exile in neighbouring countries, 
from where they had campaigned against Rosas’ “tyranny”. During Mitre’s presidency 
(1862-68), attempts were made to modernise the country through the  introduction of 
liberal institutions, the encouragement of immigration from Europe and the attraction 
of foreign  —particularly  British—  capital.  Mitre  also  endeavoured  to  eradicate  the 
remains of caudillismo  in the  impoverished provinces of the  interior,  launching two 
bloody campaigns in the northwest (first, against the rebellion of Angel  Vicente  “El 
Chacho” Penaloza in La Rioja and, second, against the montonera of Felipe Varela) as 
well  as  embarking  on  an  unpopular war  against  neighbouring  Paraguay,  which  had 
disastrous effects on that country.  Although many of these processes intensified and 
matured only after  1880, the period of national organisation thus laid the foundations 
for  Argentina’s  export-led  integration  into  the  world  market  under  the  ideological 
premises  of liberalism  and porteho  centralism,  of which  Mitre  was  an  outstanding 
proponent.
In  his  Galena  de  celebridades  argentinas  —published  in  1857  together  with 
other authors— Mitre sketched the biographies of the statesmen and soldiers who had 
been involved in the fight for independence from Spain (especially Jose de San Martin, 
Mariano  Moreno  and  Manuel  Belgrano)  and those whom he  saw as the  enlightened 
leaders (such as Rivadavia) who subsequently sought to set Argentina on the path of 
catching  up  with  the  European  beacons  of  progress.4  The  general  thrust  of  his 
interpretation  was  not  too  dissimilar  from  Sarmiento’s,  whose  book  Facundo, 
published first in 1845, depicted the struggle between the “barbarism” of the caudillos 
and  the  progressive  forces  of  “civilisation”.5   In  both  cases,  the  interpretation  of 
Argentina’s  dilemma  was  less  dichotomous  and  simplistic  than  later  summaries  of 
their work suggested. Especially Sarmiento’s account revealed a degree of admiration 
for  the  archaic  vigour  of its  main  character  Facundo,  so  that  the  reader  could  be 
forgiven  for  concluding  that  the  caudillo,  despite  his  abominable  rawness,  at  least 
embodied something authentically Argentine that needed to be understood and accom­
4 Bartolome Mitre, Galeria de celebridades argentinas: biografias de los personajes mas notables del 
Rio de la Plata (Buenos Aires: Ledoux y Vignal,  1857).
5 Sarmiento, Facundo. See generally on Sarmiento Tulio Halperin Donghi (ed.), Sarmiento: author of a 
nation (Berkeley and London: University of California Press,  1994).
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modated in one way or another. Mitre also left some room for such ambiguities, as he 
conceded the positive influences of some caudillos, such as Martin Miguel de Giiemes 
or Manuel Dorrego. Nevertheless, their overall attitude towards caudillismo was dispa­
raging. Mitre defined the majority of them as
the representatives of the domineering tendencies of barbarism [...]. The lives of [Artigas, Lopez, 
Quiroga, Ramirez, Aldao, Ibarra] can serve as a lesson for those to come for their crimes and for 
their unprecedented cruelties. Here we have another series of historical portraits, terrible and grim 
portraits that evoke horror, but which serve to enhance the beautiful countenances of those who 
have become famous for their service, virtue or intellectual works.6 
Although not explicitly mentioning his name,  it went without saying that Rosas was 
among  those  symbols  of barbarism  who  did  not  deserve  a  place  in  his  Galena. 
Excluding  him  and  most  other  caudillos  Mitre  sought  to  lay  the  foundations  for  a 
pantheon of national heroes who could serve as models that later generations  should 
emulate.  Written in accessible style, Mitre thus combined an intellectual predilection 
of his —the writing of history— with his preoccupation to outline the principles that 
should guide the young nation’s future progress. He also took care that his version of 
national history lived on in an institutionalised form by founding the Junta de Historia 
y  Numismatica  in  1893/95,  later  reorganised  as  Academia Nacional  de  la  Historia. 
This institution was accompanied by other important steps towards disseminating his 
views, such as the foundation of the newspaper La Nacion in  1870.  In the late nine­
teenth century, Mitre’s view of history, often called mitrismo, achieved almost canoni­
cal status in schoolbooks and came to exert great influence on how later generations of 
Argentines pictured their country’s past.
In the absence of both professional historians and professional politicians, Mitre 
and Sarmiento were typical examples of nineteenth-century pensadores, men of letters 
whose public career combined the  generation of political and  social  knowledge with 
policy-making.  The  notion  of history  as  a  pedagogical  prop  for  the  advance  of a 
national identity was easily consensual among this elite. It is illustrative in this respect 
that this premise was not at stake in the most celebrated historiographical debate of the 
time, that between Mitre and Vicente Fidel Lopez.  Whilst Lopez advocated the use of 
oral  sources  and  a  more  imaginative  style  to  endear  a  broader  public  to  historical 
writing, Mitre insisted on meticulousness as the historian’s principal virtue and on the 
necessity  to  rely  on  written  and  consequently  verifiable  documents.  Yet  both  con­
verged not only in their liberal abhorrence of caudillismo, but also in their cultivation
6 Mitre, Galeria, p. iii.
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of historiography as an important ingredient of patriotic education from the viewpoint
*7
of a rather narrow elite.  Mitre thus did not see his advocacy of scientific methods for 
the  reconstruction  of  historical  truth  as  potentially  conflicting  with  the  political 
purpose  of history,  but  rather  as  complementary  with  or  even  conducive  to  such  a 
mission.
Fairly soon, however, Mitre’s view on the past as predominantly a guideline for 
the future would come under pressure under the imprints of positivism and the trans­
formation of learned culture. As Angel Rama has noted for Latin America as a whole, 
the kind of marriage between culture  and politics within a restricted urban elite that 
was embodied in the  figure of the pensador became strained  under the  modernising
o
marks of increasing literacy and social mobility from around 1870 onwards.  This also 
brought about changes in the social position of the writer of history,  who no  longer 
necessarily combined intellectual prestige with a dominant role in politics and society.9 
As the new historians no longer needed to be directly concerned with the legitimation 
of their own presidencies, their inspections of the past took fresh directions. Between 
1881  and  1887, Adolfo Saldias (1850-1914), a liberal lawyer and disciple of Mitre’s, 
published  a  three-volume  study  on  Rosas  in  which  he  tried  to  evaluate  the  past 
divisions between Federalists and Unitarians from a dispassionate point of view. In the 
book, Saldias stressed Rosas’ popularity and pondered about the possibility of repatri­
ating the caudillo*s remains from Southampton.1 0 Eleven years later, Ernesto Quesada 
(1858-1934), a lawyer and sociologist, published a work called La epoca de Rosas. His 
marriage  to  the  granddaughter  of the  rosista  general  Angel  Pacheco  had  allowed 
Quesada  privileged  access  to  the  archives,  from  which  the  main  protagonist  of his 
book emerged in an openly positive light.1 1   Although Quesada was closely linked to
7 Bartolom6 Mitre, Comprobaciones historicas, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: Juan Rolddn,  1916). On Lopez’s 
skills as a historian see Tulio Halperin Donghi, Ensayos de historiografia (Buenos Aires: El Cielo por 
Asalto,  1996), pp. 35-44. For a concise summary of the polemic in English see Joseph R. Barager, “The 
historiography of the Rio de la Plata area since  1830”, Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 39, 
no. 4 (1959), pp. 588-642, pp. 596-597. My argument here is, of course, far from novel. It has been 
made already by Alberto Pla, Ideologiay metodo en la historiografia argentina (Buenos Aires: Nueva 
Vision,  1972), p. 29.
8 Angel Rama, The lettered city, translated by John Charles Chasteen (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press,  1996), pp. 50-73.
9 For a characterisation of this “old” type of historian, see E. Bradford Bums, “Ideology in nineteenth- 
century Latin American historiography”, Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 58, no. 3 (1978), 
pp. 409-431.
Adolfo Saldias, Historia de la confederacion argentina: Rozas y su epoca, 2nd ed., 5 vols. (Buenos 
Aires,  1892). The first edition of three volumes had been published in Paris, but to my knowledge is 
unavailable in Britain.
1 1  Ernesto Quesada, La epoca de Rosas (Buenos Aires: Amoldo Moen,  1898).
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the conservative establishment during the second presidency of Julio A. Roca (1898-
12
1904),  in contrast to  Mitre,  he was not an influential policy-maker.  In the  case  of 
Saldias,  Mitre himself seemed to acknowledge that there was  some kind of division 
between the historian and the politician that his disciple personified: stressing his own 
fight against Rosas’  “tyranny”, he wrote, the book had to be rejected from a political 
point of view, whilst its strengths as a piece of history had to be praised.1 3  In a sense, 
therefore, the iron grip that, according to later detractors, Mitre had exerted on histo­
riographical  orthodoxy did not  last  for long,  as  the  reconsideration of past  episodes 
from an angle that did not a priori exclude Rosas’ contribution to the formation of the 
Argentine nation-state loomed already among his own liberal followers.
Although  there  was  thus  some  room  for  debate  in  the  historiographical 
interpretation of Rosas,  the  link between history and the project to  forge  a national 
identity remained. In the long run, Saldias’ preference for “impartiality” over political 
applicability did  little to  modify the  entrenched  belief that history  should  be  a  sub­
discipline of nation-building. The link between the rise of positivist empiricism and the 
institutional  consolidation  of history  as  a  provider  of narratives  that  bolstered  the 
myths  of nation-building  had  parallels  elsewhere  in  the  Americas,  including  in  the 
United  States.14  However,  in  contrast  to  the  US,  the  concrete  effects  of positivist 
dogmas on the work of Spanish American historians were  limited.  South of the  Rio 
Grande,  the  conditions  for  historiography  with  their  acute  lack  of  well-organised 
archives meant that, in daily practice, empiricist statements were little more than the 
payment  of lip  service  to  overseas  methodological  fashions.  Whereas  US  historians 
came  to  see  themselves  as  a  group  of professionals  who  adhered  to  certain  regular 
standards and German Geisteswissenschaften had well before developed a full-blown 
ethos  of professionalism,  this  was  not  the  case  in  Latin  America.L >   Well  into  the 
middle of the twentieth century, in many countries there were no structures to convoke
12 See on him Eduardo Zimmermann, “Ernesto Quesada, La epoca de Rosas, y el reformismo 
institucional del cambio de siglo”, in: Devoto (ed.), La historiografia, vol.  1, pp. 23-44.
1 3  Quattrocchi-Woisson, Un nationalisme, pp. 21-22.
1 4  According to Peter Novick, That noble dream: the  “objectivity question” and the American historical 
profession (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press,  1988), pp. 61-108, US historians 
used the claim to empirical objectivity not to challenge dominant versions of their nation’s past, but to 
minimise dissent within their profession, whilst they continued to sustain “the story o f‘freedom realized 
and stabilized through the achievement of national solidarity’” (p. 72. The quote within the quote is by 
John Higham).
1 5  Whilst by 1890, social sciences had hardly taken root as an academic discipline in Latin America, the 
“traditional values” of German university professors in the humanities and social sciences already “were 
evidently under attack” (Fritz K. Ringer, The decline of the German mandarins: the German academic 
community,  1890-1933 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,  1969), p. 82).
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a scholarly community of historians. Still today, one struggles to find Latin American 
equivalents of the kind of associations such as the British Royal Historical Society that 
have shaped the historical profession elsewhere. As for training, as late as the  1970s a 
large number of Latin American historians received their original degree in law rather 
than  history;  only  from  that  decade  onwards  have  universities  begun  to  urge  the 
completion of doctoral  theses  in  history  on  a broader scale.  Comparative  studies  of 
historiography furthermore note the scarcity of historical reviews in twentieth-century 
Latin America, which in Europe provided a corporate platform for the expression of 
group demands and peer legitimation.1 6
Among the bigger countries of the region, Argentina lagged behind markedly in 
this respect. The contrast with Chile was striking. West of the Andes, the foundation of 
the University of Chile in 1842 had led to embryonic attempts to establish history as an 
academic discipline, which was paralleled by the earlier decline of the  figure  of the 
erudite and comprehensive pensador.  Although in Chile, too, this institutionalisation 
was  dominated  by  the  nation-state’s  demand  for  historiography  as  a  legitimising 
device, the role of historians as suppliers —publicly commemorated in monuments— 
came to be seen as less dispensable than in Argentina, where the state mounted fewer 
efforts to create a community of historians.1 7  As for historiography in the universities, 
the  Faculty  of Philosophy  and  Letters  of the  University  of Buenos  Aires  (UBA), 
complementing the traditional  disciplines of medicine and law, was founded only in 
1896, that is 75 years after the university had first opened. Only from  1906 onwards, 
did  the  faculty  begin  to  confer  degrees  in  history  and  it  took  another  fifteen  years 
before the UBA’s institute for historical research (Instituto de Investigaciones Histo-
I  o
ricas) was founded.  At the University of La Plata (UNLP), the Faculty of Humanities 
and Educational Sciences became an autonomous unit in 1921  and its centre for histo­
16 Miller, In the shadow, pp. 210-212 and Lutz Raphael, Geschichtswissenschaft im Zeitalter der 
Extreme:  Theorien, Methoden,  Tendenzen von 1900 bis zur Gegenwart (Munich: Beck, 2003), p. 37.
17 The comparison between Argentina and Chile in this respect is often drawn, e.g. by Jorge Myers, 
“Pasados en pugna: la dificil renovacidn del campo historico argentino entre 1930 y  1955”, in: Federico 
Neiburg and Mariano Plotkin (eds.), Intelectuales y expertos: la constitucion del conocimiento social en 
la Argentina (Buenos Aires and Mexico City: Paidds, 2004), pp. 67-106, p. 67. More extensively on the 
Chilean case, see Allen Woll, A functional past: the uses of history in nineteenth-century Chile (Baton 
Rouge and London: Louisiana University Press,  1982).
1 8  Pablo Buchbinder, Historia de la Facultad de Filosofiay Letras (Buenos Aires: Eudeba,  1997), esp. 
pp. 73-79 on the history section in the faculty after 1906 and pp.  139-144 on the institute and his “La 
Facultad de Filosofia y Letras y la enseftanza universitaria de la historia”, in: Julio Stortini, Nora Pagano 
and Pablo Buchbinder, Estudios de historiografia argentina, vol.  1   (Buenos Aires: Biblos,  1997), pp. 
33-52.
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rical  studies  was  not  inaugurated until  1932.19  Corresponding developments  beyond 
the realm of universities were slow, too. For example, although the Junta de Historia y 
Numismatica (renamed as Academia Nacional de la Historia in 1938) began to publish 
a bulletin from 1924 onwards, this publication was neither regular nor did it represent 
a professional community of Argentine historians.
Furthermore, the process of consolidation was rather intermittent, at least in part 
due to political interferences in the domain of culture. The period from  1930 to  1945, 
which has been described as a “Golden Era in Argentine historiography”,20 saw signifi­
cant advances, but these subsequently faltered, only to pick up momentum again after 
1955. The first attempt at a comprehensive multi-volume history of Argentina, which 
was  begun  by  the  Junta/Academia  in  1936,  therefore  had  to  remain  a  standard 
reference work for students of history for decades to come.  Additionally, the institu­
tion was temporarily closed down from  1953  until the overthrow of Peron two years 
later. Its journal of historical research, called lnvestigaciones y Ensayos, was launched 
only in  1966. In sum, the professionalisation and institutional consolidation of Argen­
tine historiography came about through an unsteady and patchy process that stretched 
over the  first four decades of the twentieth century and experienced  repeated  diver­
sions, if not outright interruptions.
2. Professionalisation, the Nueva Escuela and the politics of the Centenary 
Generation
The changes in the social role of the historian that accompanied these developments 
were also a by-product of transformations in Argentine society and politics.  The key 
period to consider in order to account for the differentiation between intellectual labour 
and political activities is the decade that began with the centenary celebrations of the 
May  Revolution.  The  Saenz  Pena  Law  of  1912  not  only  established  universal  and 
compulsory suffrage for all male citizens over the age of eighteen, but also triggered 
the  rise  of  middle-class  participation  and,  ultimately,  mass  politics.  The  gradual
19 On history at the UNLP see generally Adrian G. Zarrilli, Talia V. Gutierrez and Osvaldo Graciano, 
Los estudios histdricos en la Universidad Nacional de La Plata,  1905-1990 (Buenos Aires: Academia 
Nacional de la Historia / Fundacidn Banco Municipal de La Plata,  1998).
20 Barager, “The historiography”, p. 606.
_l Ricardo Levene, Historia de la nacidn argentina, desde las orlgenes hasta la organizacion defmitiva 
en 1862,  10 vols. (Buenos Aires: Junta de Historia y Numismatica / Academia Nacional de la Historia, 
1936-50).
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opening of the political field, which previously had been dominated by a narrow elite, 
also contributed to the appearance of career politicians,  in contrast to the nineteenth- 
century writer-statesmen-soldiers such as Mitre. Although the decline of the pensador 
had already begun under the post-1880 modernisation, his replacement with professio­
nal  politicians  became  definite  during  the  presidency  of Hipolito  Yrigoyen  of the 
Radical Party (1916-22 and  1928-30). Conversely, the Cordoba University Reform of 
1918 sought to assert the freedom of teaching and the right of the tripartite government
(consisting of academic staff, students and alumni) to decide appointments to crucial
22 positions instead of such appointments being decreed by the presidency of the nation. 
There followed a number of confrontations, which demonstrated the emergence of an 
intellectual field in Bourdieu’s sense.  To be sure, this differentiation never matured 
in Argentina to the extent that it did in many European countries, as culture and the 
arts continued to be sponsored by oligarchic capital well into the  1930s and political 
power  overtly  interfered  in  the  intellectual  field  at  least  until  the  1970s.  But  what 
matters for the moment is that intellectual authority, political influence and economic 
capital were no longer necessarily united in the same hands.
Historians  began  to  specialise.  This  change  was  associated  with  the  Nueva 
Escuela Historica, or New School, which from 1916 onwards asserted its hegemony in 
Argentine historical research by strengthening its institutional bedrock, notably in the 
Junta de Historia y Numismatica and the historical sections at the UBA and the UNLP 
(whilst  the  University  of  Cordoba,  despite  the  Reform  of  1918,  remained  more 
marginal).24 The historians of the Nueva Escuela —among the  most important were 
Emilio  Ravignani  (1886-1954),  Ricardo  Levene  (1885-1959),  Diego  Luis  Molinari 
(1889-1966) and Romulo Carbia (1885-1944)— belonged to a generation that was no 
longer tied to the passionate divisions of the nineteenth century and, as their surnames 
indicated, several of them were of immigrant origin. They legitimised their historiogra­
phical  production  through  the  establishment  of  disciplinary  yardsticks  rather  than 
through  politics  and  social  prestige.  Under  the  influence  of  the  methodological 
handbooks  en  vogue  in  Europe,  in  particular those  by  Ernst  Bemheim  and  Charles 
Seignobos, they strove for an empiricism that relied especially on legal documents and
22 See generally Juan Carlos Portantiero, Estudiantes y politico en America Latina 1918-1938 (Mexico 
City: Siglo XXI,  1978).
23 Bourdieu, “Champ intellectuel”. See also introduction.
24 For a concise overview of the historiographical developments from  1880 to the Nueva Escuela see 
Halperin Donghi, Ensayos, pp. 45-55 and on the Nueva Escuela the introductory remarks in Devoto 
(ed.), La historiografia, vol.  1, pp.  10-12.
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implemented  unified  standards  that  set  history  as  a  discipline  apart  from  other, 
especially literary, inquiries into social reality.
Under  the  pre-eminence  of the  Nueva  Escuela  the  ties  between  history  and 
politics were modified once more.  It is true that the members of the Nueva Escuela 
were not exclusively historians, since they aspired to and fulfilled political functions, 
the most prominent of them as Radicals. Ravignani was a national deputy of the UCR 
for  several  periods  between  1936  and  1950.  The  more  populist-inclined  Molinari 
befriended  Yrigoyen,  became  the  president’s  private  secretary,  undersecretary  of 
foreign relations and, from 1928, senator for the Federal Capital. In 1946 he became a 
supporter of Peronism,  was  appointed  as  Peron’s  personal  delegate  on  a diplomatic 
mission  and  elected  to  the  national  senate.  In  comparison  to  their  forerunners  in 
historiography,  however,  the  men  of the  Nueva  Escuela  distinguished  themselves 
chiefly as historians rather than policy-makers.  Since they derived their authority to 
engage in the writing of history from an ethos of professionalism, their writings were 
not obviously designed to further the authors’  own political stances, as had been the 
case earlier.
Nevertheless,  these  modifications  did  not  lead  to  the  complete  autonomy  of 
historiography from politics. For the continuation of this link, the political activities of 
the  Nueva Escuela were  less  significant  than  their understanding  of the  purpose  of 
history.  Levene was an outspoken advocate of the idea that historiography should be 
part and parcel of the task to produce narratives about national identity that generated a 
sense  of a  common  ancestral  past,  which  in  turn  should  serve  as  the  basis  for  the 
projection  of the  nation’s  future.  When  he  was  named  president  of  the  National 
Commission of Museums, Monuments and Historical Sites in 1936, he declared that its 
aim was to  “conserve,  defend  and promote the  historical  and artistic heritage  of the 
nation, because monuments and museums enrich the tradition of a people and define 
its personality.”  In the two decades after  1920 and especially during the presidency 
of Agustin P. Justo (1932-38), of whom he was a personal friend, Levene accumulated 
positions  and  launched  initiatives,  through which  he  could  promote  such  an  official
25 On Ravignani see Pablo Buchbinder, “Emilio Ravignani: la historia, la nacion y las provincias”, in: 
Devoto (ed.), La historiografia, vol.  1, pp. 79-112. On Molinari see Miguel Unamuno, “Prologo”, in: 
Diego Luis Molinari: parlamentario e historiador (Buenos Aires: Circulo de Legisladores de la Nacion 
Argentina) and the compilation of letters between Diego Luis Molinari and Juan Domingo Peron,
Peron... ”antes que llegue el lechero” (Correspondencia) (Buenos Aires,  1965).
26 Obras de Ricardo Levene (Buenos Aires: Academia Nacional de la Historia,  1964), vol.  1, p. 87, 
quoted in Quattrocchi-Woisson, Un nationalisme, pp.  152-153. Generally on Levene, see ibid., pp.  169- 
174.
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patriotic  enterprise:  dean of the  Faculty  of Humanities  at the  UNLP,  director  of its 
centre for historical studies, founder and director of the Instituto de Historia in UBA’s 
Law Faculty, chairman of the commission for the celebration of Sarmiento in 1938 and 
initiator for the establishment of numerous provincial archives.
Yet most important was Levene’s influence as president of the Junta de Historia y 
Numismatica,  restructured  as  the  Academia Nacional  de  la  Historia  by  presidential 
decree in  1938. No other institution became so closely associated with “official histo­
ry” and the dissemination of mitrismo as the Academia. This was only in part a result 
of the  fact  that  Mitre  had  founded  it  in  1893.  The  decade  of the  1930s  was  more 
important for this perception. Under Levene’s second directorship from  1934 to  1953, 
the  institution’s  ties  with  political  power  intensified,  whilst  it  also  experienced  the 
height of its influence on Argentina’s collective historical imaginary. Various provin­
cial branches of the Academia, usually named Juntas, were founded during the thirties,
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through  which  the  influence  of the  central  board  in  Buenos  Aires  was  extended. 
Particularly  in  these  branches,  but  also  in  the  federal  centre,  the  impression  of an 
impenetrable league of dignitaries —based on status rather than professional merit— 
was reinforced through the strategy to elect members from a cross-section of the elite 
in order to assure the support of influential groups and lend additional legitimacy to the 
Academia’s project. The outcome was an extremely conservative body, consisting only 
of men  before  1980.  In  contrast to  the  institutes  of historical  research  in  Argentine 
universities,  one would  frequently And men of the armed  forces or the church,  who 
hardly ever devoted themselves to historical  research.  In this environment,  empiri­
cism became an additional  legitimising element for the  forging of a patriotic  liturgy 
rather than the basis  for critical  historiographical  practice that challenged traditional 
views.  In  the  long  run,  this  combination  also justified  doubts  over  the  question  of 
whether someone was included in (or excluded from) this officially consecrated club 
on the basis of professional criteria or rather because of political considerations.
The  combination  of empiricist  fetishism and patriotic  fervour characterised  the 
activities and public stance of the Academia for a long time. Even in 1961, in response
th
to criticisms against historical figures on the occasion of the  150  anniversary of the
27 San Juan  1932, Mendoza 1934, Santa Fe  1935, Catamarca 1936, Salta 1937, Santiago del Estero  1940 
and La Rioja 1940. A second wave of such foundations followed in the late sixties.
28 See the enumeration of the dominant figures of the provincial branches in Armando Raul Bazan, “La 
investigation historica en la Argentina (1940-1973)”, Investigaciones y Ensayos, no.  16 (1974), pp. 211- 
227.
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May  Revolution,  the  governing  board  unanimously  drafted  a  declaration  which 
repeated that the main function of the Academia was to
promote  historical  studies,  concerning  itself fundamentally  with  their scientific  seriousness  and 
with their patriotic content.  In this sense, the Academia must continue to lament the appearance 
of some works of polemic character [...], which are not founded on meticulous research [...] and 
for their content might gravely disturb  public  sentiment,  provoking scorn  for the  representative 
personalities of the past and scepticism regarding their great deeds.29 
Although the declaration left the reader uncertain of whether the stumbling block that 
caused offence in the Academia was methodological shortcomings or dissenting views, 
he  or  she  had  good  reason  to  suspect  that  the  real  problem  lay  in  the  purity  of a 
national pantheon rather than in scholarly criteria. The history of the Academia clearly 
pointed  in  that  direction.  After  all,  its  director  Levene  had  proposed  to  construct  a 
national pantheon —here an actual building— because
for many years the country has longed to see united in a great national Pantheon,  in accordance 
with  historical  consecration,  the  mortal  remains  and  the  evocative  symbols  of  the  great 
constructors of nationality.30
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The  project  itself  petered  out  in  the  intricacies  of  bureaucracy,  but  Levene’s 
statement captures the Academia’s outlook on history as an element of nation-building 
quite well.
The opinion of the Academia was habitually sought in the  state’s  initiatives  to 
define national symbols, which gained momentum in the late 1930s and early 1940s, in 
a  process  that  paralleled  the  institutionalisation  of historiography.  For  example,  in 
1941 the Ministry of Justice and Public Instruction created a commission that consisted 
of Academia-members in order to once and for all define the “authentic” versions of 
the national flag and anthem.  Still in the  1960s, the Academia legislated routinely on 
matters such as changes in street names, procedures in public historical ceremonies and 
the building of monuments.33 As a public institution, the Academia’s function was to 
construct and then police the nation’s historical imaginary.
29 Reproduced in La Nacion, 31  May  1961  and Revista del Instituto de Investigaciones Histdricas Juan 
Manuel de Rosas, no. 23 (1961), p. 449 (hereafter abbreviated as Revista del Instituto Rosas). 
Subsequently, the tone of the declaration was tempered in the Boletin de la Academia Nacional de la 
Historia, no. 32 (1961), p. 37.
30 Boletin de la Junta de Historiay Numismatica Americana, no. 9 (1936), pp. 401-402.
31 Quattrocchi-Woisson, Un nationalisme, p.  153.
32 Alejandro Cattaruzza, “Desciffando pasados: debates y representaciones de la historia nacional”, in: 
Alejandro Cattaruzza (ed.), Crisis economica, avance del estado e incertidumbre politico (1930-1943) 
(Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 2001), p. 432.
33 The principal source for this are the summaries of the Academia’s activities in its Boletin, nos. 27
(1956)-46 (1973).
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The question of whether it did so exclusively or predominantly from a liberal and 
mitrista standpoint, is a matter of definitions. Still in the 1960s, there were many signs 
that  distinguished  the  Academia  as  a  bastion  and  propagator  of Mitre’s  views  on 
history.  First,  it incessantly organised  ceremonies  in homage to  Mitre,  who  after all 
was  its  founder.34  Second,  as  we  have  seen,  the  fundamental  preoccupation  of the 
institution  to  establish  a pantheon  of heroes  abided  by  Mitre’s  idea of history  as  a 
pedagogical device. Third, the figures that populated this pantheon and the fixation on 
the  political  biographies  of great  men  of the  nineteenth  century  —in  particular  in 
relation  to  the  May  Revolution—  also  followed  in  the  footsteps  of the  father  of 
Argentine  historiography.  Even  the  Academia’s  research journal,  Investigaciones y 
Ensayos, complied with these topical guidelines in the first ten years of its publication 
from 1966: political biographies and diplomatic and legal history accounted for at least 
two thirds of all articles. In terms of periodisation, the May Revolution, independence 
and  the  period  of national  organisation  were  strongly  overrepresented,  which  again 
suggests a preoccupation with events and figures meant to serve as edifying examples 
for  the  readership.  Although  the  period  of  Rosas’  rule  —which  was  still  called 
“dictatorship” in an index published in 1976— was not altogether absent, it did receive 
much  less  attention.  The  same  went  for  the  federal  caudillos.  Finally,  out  of 282 
articles, only one was devoted to the philosophy of history.35 Typical titles of articles 
in Investigaciones y Ensayos were “Did Belgrano, Guemes,  San Martin and Pueyrre- 
don swear independence?”, “Belgrano’s flag and its historical places” or “San Martin’s
T  A
candidature as head of state in 1818”.  With regard to its perception of the public role 
of history, the Academia doubtless continued to be a bulwark of mitrismo.
However, the fact that this kind of “official history” is also often called “liberal 
history” should not lead us to infer that it was a club for the promotion of liberalism in 
the  sense  the  term  is  usually  understood,  at  least  in  Europe.  Of course,  one  could
^ 7
already argue over the extent to which Mitre himself was a liberal.  Yet to characte­
rise the Nueva Escuela and Argentina’s “official history” from the  1930s onwards as
34 For the period after 1955, see e.g. Boletin de la Academia, no. 27 (1956), p. 20 and p. 36, no. 28
(1957), p. 33, no. 30 (1959), p. 52. This practice continued at the very least into the  1970s (see ibid., no. 
46, p. 213).
35 See Nestor E. Poitevin, “Indice general de las colaboraciones de Investigaciones y Ensayos (1966- 
1976)”, Investigaciones y Ensayos, vol. 20 (1976), pp. 475-510.
36 Emilio A. Breda, “Belgrano, GUemes, San Martin y Pueyrredon, Juraron la independencia?”, 
Investigaciones y Ensayos, no. 5 (1968), pp. 263-288; Ramon de Castro Esteves, “La bandera de 
Belgrano y sus lugares historicos”, no. 9 (1970), pp. 273-288; and Joaquin Perez, “La candidatura de 
San Martin a la jefatura del Estado en  1818”, no. 8 (1970), pp. 209-215.
37 See introduction.
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liberal is even more problematic. Not only were the most distinguished historians of 
this time often associated with Radicalism, but the Academia’s doors were also open to 
anti-liberals and authoritarian nacionalistas. For example, in 1921  the Junta/Academia 
appointed another historian of the Nueva Escuela as a member for life:  Enrique Ruiz 
Guinazu,  who  as  foreign  minister  of Ramon  S.  Castillo’s  conservative  government 
(1942-43)  campaigned  for Argentina’s  neutrality  in  World  War  II.  In the  following 
year,  it  appointed  Carlos  Ibarguren  (1877-1956),  a  writer,  lawyer  and  professor  of 
history at the UBA from an oligarchic family of the province of Salta and ideologically 
a conservative and elitist nacionalista, who complained that populist Yrigoyenism had
l  o
led to the “flattening of hierarchy”.  After the restorative military coup of 1930 (some 
leaders  of  which  did  not  conceal  their  sympathy  with  Italian  totalitarianism),  the 
provisional president Jose Felix Uriburu (1930-32), with whom Ibarguren had family 
ties, named him intervening governor of the province of Cordoba, where he supervised 
a corporatist experiment. From 1932 to  1936, he was a member of the fascist-inspired 
Accion Nacionalista Argentina,  the  nucleus  of the  Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista 
(ALN).39 In  1930, after eight years of university lectures on the topic, he published a 
widely sold biography of Rosas, which hailed the caudillo as the “restorer of laws”, 
whose aim had been to “control political and social anarchy, restore order and defend 
religion”,  so  that  “Rosas,  in  our  past,  represents  the  most  efficient  and  powerful 
embodiment  of  the  realistic  and  conservative  spirit”.40  The  book  is  generally 
considered  to  be  the  starting point  of nationalist  historical  revisionism,41  but  it  had 
been written by someone who was far from marginalised by “official” history.
This does not mean that by the  1930s the historiographical establishment of the 
Academia and its director Levene had become reactionary revisionists and hispanistas, 
as the account of Carlos Rama would have it.42 It is nevertheless true that the Nueva 
Escuela  and  the  mainstream  of  Argentine  historical  thought  from  the  Centenary 
onwards  did  not  religiously  perpetuate  a  supposedly  monolithic  mitrismo  insofar  as
38 Carlos Ibarguren (father), La historia que he vivido (Buenos Aires: Peuser,  1955), p. 428. In the run­
up to the elections of 1916, Ibarguren drafted the programme of Lisandro de la Torre’s Partido 
Demdcrata Progresista. Six years later, he became himself the presidential candidate of the conservative 
coalition, but lost the elections to the Radical Marcelo T. Alvear (president  1922-28).
39 Cristi&n Buchrucker, “La vision de la historia contempor&nea en cuatro nacionalistas de los afios 
treinta”, Criterio, nos.  1829-30 (1980), pp. 60-76, p. 60.
40 Carlos Ibarguren (father), Juan Manuel de Rosas: su vida, su tiempo, su drama, 5th ed. (Buenos 
Aires: Roldan,  1933), p. 318 and p. 43.
41 See e.g. Deutsch, Las Derechas, p. 223.
42 Rama, Nacionalismo e historiografia; such characterisations of Levene can be found on p. 35, p. 43 
and p.  140.
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their  ideological  orientations  and  their  interpretations  of the  past  were  concerned. 
Molinari even became a self-confessed rosista in the 1940s and in 1954 participated in 
a  revisionist  campaign  for the  repatriation  of Rosas’  remains.43  Ravignani,  in  turn, 
although  he  later  disagreed  with  the  belligerent  style  of revisionism,  advocated  a 
rehabilitation of the federalist tradition and had a very positive view of Jose Gervasio 
Artigas.44 Romulo Carina’s history of historiography was also far from adhering to a 
schematic  mitrismo.45  Throughout  the  1920s,  there  was  a  myriad  of  attempts  by 
historical  writers  to  reassess  the  legacy  of  Rosas  and  of  the  federal  caudillos, 
sometimes  already  accompanied  by  the  complaint  that  previous  historiography  had 
suffered  from  “falsifications”.46  Beneath  these  changes,  there  were  a  number  of 
underlying  continuities  —especially  in  methodology  and  theory—,  but  by  1930 
historians  no  longer  unanimously  condemned  federalism,  caudillismo  or  Rosas. 
Similarly to Saldias decades earlier, the new interpretations did not necessarily imply 
an  outright  condemnation  of everything  liberal,  but  in their  evaluation  of historical 
episodes and figures they constituted noteworthy attempts to rehabilitate the legacy of 
the caudillos.
These  were  only  the  historiographical  repercussions  of a  much  more  general 
reformulation  of national  identity  that  had  been  brought  about  by  a  generation  of 
intellectuals  who  matured  around  the  Centenary  —to  whom  the  Nueva  Escuela 
belonged not only biographically, but also ideologically. The Centenary generation is 
usually associated with the novelist and biographer Manuel  Galvez (1882-1962)  and 
the literary historian Ricardo Rojas (1882-1957), sometimes also with the poet Leopol- 
do Lugones (1874-1938). It is very difficult to distil a coherent ideological reasoning 
from the writing of these authors, not least because of their political mobility, which, 
to  put  it  schematically,  followed  a  movement  from  Left  to  Right:  Galvez  initially 
considered himself a socialist, but ended up as a Catholic and hispanista supporter of 
populism,  whilst  Lugones’  career  brought  him  from  anarchism  to  a  declaration  of 
belief in fascism. Rojas, whose political stance was the most difficult to pin down, was
43 This was called Organizacidn Popular por la Repatriacidn de los restos del General Rosas, presided by 
Jose Maria Rosa (see Boletin del Instituto Juan Manuel de Rosas de Investigaciones Historicas, no.  19- 
20, May-July 1954, p. 3 (hereafter Boletin del Instituto Rosas)). See also chapter six on his later 
activities.
44 See Buchbinder, “Emilio Ravignani”.
45 Romulo Carbia, Historia crltica de la historiografia argentina (desde sus origenes en el siglo XVI)
(La Plata: Universidad de La Plata,  1939).
46 Jose Carlos Chiaramonte, “En tomo a los origenes del revisionismo historico”, in: Frega and Islas 
(eds.), Nuevas miradas, pp. 29-61.
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to some extent influenced by Marxism in an early phase and, in comparison to Galvez 
and Lugones, was more sympathetic to liberal democracy.  Yet they also had traits in 
common.  Socially,  all  came  from  declining  provincial  families,  which  had  been 
affected by the break-up of a narrow elite, and at a relatively young age moved to the 
capital  where  they  initiated  an  intellectual  career.  Their  literary  production  should 
therefore  be  seen  once  more  against  the  background  of the  growing  complexity  of 
Argentine  society  and  the  development  of an  intellectual  field,  in  which  the  writer 
became a distinct social category. As is evident from the writings of Galvez, who was 
among the first to be able to make a living from them, the hitherto dominant gentle- 
man-writer was replaced by the professional author,  who derived authority from the 
“constitution of ideologies of the artist”.47 In close relation to this emerged what Jose 
Luis  Romero  has  called  the  “spirit  of the  Centenary”,  which  set  out  in  search  of 
authenticity  amid  the  immigrant  society  of Buenos  Aires  at  the  beginning  of the 
century.48 The overall contribution of this “spirit”, under the influence of arielismo, to 
understandings of argentinidad (a term attributed to Rojas), is perhaps best conceptu­
alised as a transition from liberal cosmopolitanism to “cultural nationalism”.49 In this 
vein,  a  socially  more  complex  elite  revalorised  two  elements  of Argentine  national 
identity: the Spanish legacy and the figure of the gaucho, in particular Jose Hernandez’ 
figure  Martin  Fierro,  who  was  promoted  through  Lugones’  El payador  and  Rojas’ 
history  of Argentine  literature,  but  in  the  process  arguably  lost  his  character  as  a 
heretic symbol against dominant culture.50
The impact of the Centenary Generation on historiography, then, was marked by 
a  departure  from  the  premises  of  classical  liberalism.  Although  both  Rojas  and 
Lugones were also members of the Junta de Historia y Numismatica (admitted in 1916 
and 1936 respectively), they were not biased against caudillismo per se. Even Rojas as 
the  most  liberal  of the three,  who  in  1932  unfavourably  contrasted  Rosas  with  San 
Martin, had not been deprecating of caudillos in his book La argentinidad, published
47 “La Argentina del Centenario: campo intelectual, vida literaria y temas ideoldgicos”, in: Carlos 
Altamirano and Beatriz Sarlo, Ensayos argentinos: de Sarmiento a la vanguardia, 2nd ed. (Buenos 
Aires: Ariel,  1997), pp.  161-199, p.  167. On the change from the gentleman-writer to the professional 
see David Viflas, De Sarmiento a Cortazar: literatura argentina y realidad politico (Buenos Aires:
Siglo XX,  1971), pp. 32-137.
48 Jos6 Luis Romero, A history of  Argentine political thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1963), chapter two.
49 The expression comes from Eduardo Jose C&rdenas and Carlos Manuel Paya, El primer nacionalismo 
argentino en Manuel Galvez y Ricardo Rojas (Buenos Aires: A. Pefta Lillo,  1978).
50 See “Heroes patricios y gauchos rebeldes: pasados en pugna”, in: Cattaruzza and Eujanian, Politicos 
de la historia, pp. 217-262.
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sixteen  years  earlier.5 1   Lugones  never  organically  participated  in  the  revisionist 
enterprise, but prominent revisionists of both Right and Left later mentioned his name 
as  an  inspiration.  Galvez,  on  the  other  hand,  became  one  of the  main  figures  of 
revisionism. Never admitted to the Academia, he co-founded the Instituto de Investiga­
ciones Historicas Juan Manuel de Rosas in 1938. More novelistic in style than Ibargu­
ren, he also wrote a biography of Rosas, which not only strengthened his credentials as 
one  of the  more  populist  revisionists,  but  also  lent  authority  to  a  historiographical 
current  that  suffered  from  a  lack  of literary  talent.  According  to  Galvez,  120,000 
copies were sold.53 In his person, the “spirit of the Centenary” directly culminated in 
revisionism.
To summarise, when the period of export-led growth drew to a definite close with 
the  coup  of  1930  and  an  authoritarian,  anti-democratic  and  anti-liberal  strand  of 
nationalism gained ground among Argentina’s intellectuals, nineteenth-century libera­
lism had already experienced substantial fissures, which to some extent also affected 
historiography. As Jose Carlos Chiaramonte has shown, it was in fact difficult by 1930 
to  find  an area of the  nation’s  historical  imaginary that had  remained  unspoiled  by 
attempts  at  revision.54  On  the  other  hand,  many  of the  changes  in  the  views  on 
Argentina’s  national  identity  that  had  developed  since  Mitre  were  the  results  of a 
reworking of liberal  motifs rather than a radical rupture or reversal of them.  Saldias 
had been a disciple of Mitre, who also exerted considerable influence on Rojas. And 
did  not  the  scepticism  vis-a-vis  mass  immigration  of the  Centenary  Generation,  as 
Fernando  Devoto  stresses,  already  have  an  antecedent  in  the  later  writings  of 
Sarmiento himself?55 Furthermore, despite the transformations of the social position of 
the writer and the historian and the increasing empiricism as  a by-product of positi­
vism, the dominant historiography from the Centenary onwards drew again closer to 
Mitre’s  idea of history  as  a pedagogic  foundation  for the  future.  Mutatis  mutandis, 
many features of a liberalism that never had been quite so liberal after all underpinned
51  Ricardo Rojas, El santo de la espada: vida de San Martin (Buenos Aires,  1933) and Ricardo Rojas,
La argentinidad: ensayo historico sobre nuestra conciencia nacional en la gesta de la emancipacion, 
1810-1816 (Buenos Aires: Juan Roldan,  1916).
52 See Julio Irazusta, Las dificultades de la historia cientlficay el Rosas del Dr. E.  H.  Celesia (Buenos 
Aires: Alpe,  1955), p.  144 and the interview with Juan Jos£ Hemdndez Arregui in Compahero, no.  12,
27 August 1963.
53 Manuel G&lvez,  Vida deJuan Manuel de Rosas, 5th ed. (Buenos Aires: Tor,  1953). The figure is 
mentioned by Quattrocchi-Woisson, Un nationalisme, p. 200.
54 Chiaramonte, “En tomo a los origenes”, in: Frega and Islas (eds.), Nuevas miradas, pp. 29-61.
55 Fernando J. Devoto, Nacionalismo, fascismo y tradicionalismo en la Argentina moderna: una historia 
(Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 2002), esp. pp.  14-34. The reference is mainly to Sarmiento’s Conflictoy 
armonia de razas.
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the early manifestations of a cultural  nationalism.  Only in the  1930s was  liberalism 
dealt a more serious blow.  This came not as a careful revision, but rather as a syste­
matic inversion of everything that —often in caricatural simplification— was regarded 
as  liberal.  With regard to  its understanding of the goals of historiography,  however, 
this  now  vehemently  anti-liberal  nationalism  showed  some  remarkable  similarities 
with the dominant historians of the previous era.
5.  Towards a map of revisionism, 1930-55 and beyond
A.  The political vocation of revisionism
The  nacionalistas  of the  1930s  gained  public  standing  in the  context  of a  crisis  of 
political  legitimacy.  They  fiercely  rejected  liberalism,  which  they  identified  as  the 
ideological basis upon which Argentina had become integrated into the world market 
since the  1850s. From the late  1920s, liberalism was increasingly under attack as the 
alleged  fountainhead  from which Argentina’s present malaise  sprang.  An increasing 
number of intellectuals, politicians manques and members of the armed forces believed 
that  decrepit  and  corrupting  liberal  democracy  should  be  superseded  by  an 
authoritarian  and  hierarchical  state  that  ensured  public  order  and  discipline.  The 
cultural  rationale  of their political  arguments  relied  on  an  organic  notion  of Argen­
tina’s Hispanic and Catholic roots, which they opposed to a heartless materialism and 
the  disintegrative  effects  of liberalism.  The  nacionalistas  mostly came  from  middle 
and upper class backgrounds and in their early phase they spumed the inclusion of the 
masses in politics and society.  This anti-popular bias, however, melted down among 
many  nacionalistas  during the  1930s,  reinforced  by two  interlocking  developments. 
Domestically, although their initial target had been the populism of Yrigoyen’s second 
presidency (1928-30), the ousting of Radicalism in 1930 and the failure of the ensuing 
governments  to  implement  the  system  nacionalistas  had  envisaged  (and  to  forge  a 
legitimate  order  in  general)  began  to  shed  a  different  light  on  the  deposed  leader. 
Internationally,  Yrigoyen  had  at  least  rhetorically  been  committed  to  defending 
Argentina’s sovereignty against foreign interference. The new decade, in contrast, saw 
a government that reacted to the plummeting of Argentine export prices on the world 
market by strengthening the country’s traditional ties with Britain in a way that many 
regarded as humiliating. Beyond its ideological eclecticism and fragmentation, Argen­
tine  nationalism  as  a  whole  thus  acquired  more  populist  and  anti-imperialist  traits,
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which were most clearly expressed in the Fuerza de Orientation Radical de la Joven 
Argentina (FORJA),  a group that broke away from the mainstream Radical  Party in 
1935 and evoked the populist legacy of Yrigoyen.56
The political concerns of nacionalistas can be illustrated with the example of the 
brothers  Rodolfo  and  Julio  Irazusta  (1897-1968  and  1899-1982  respectively),  the
•  •  •  57 second of whom became an important revisionist historian.  They came from a cattle- 
growing family that owned medium-sized land in the province of Entre Rios,  which 
had suffered the fluctuations of beef prices on the world market, especially in the wake 
of the Great Depression.  After Julio’s return to Argentina from his studies at Oxford 
and the  Sorbonne,  in  1927 they founded the weekly (and  later daily)  newspaper La 
Nueva Republica (LNR), which became known as the most vociferous organ of anti-
f o
liberal  and  anti-democratic  opposition  to  Yrigoyen.  Particularly  Rodolfo  was 
influenced by the ideas of the anti-Dreyfusard and architect of the Action Frangaise 
Charles  Maurras  (1868-1952),  although he  discounted Maurras’  monarchism  (which 
made  no  sense  in  Argentina),  ignored  his  anti-clericalism  (which  did  not  sit 
comfortably with a group of intellectuals who often came from backgrounds linked to 
the  hierarchy  of the  Catholic  Church)  and  adopted  his  anti-Semitism  rather  half­
heartedly. The most consistent features of the LNR’s sermon were the assertion of an 
organic  national  community  with  a  strong  and  hierarchically  organised  state  as  a 
bulwark  against  the  corrupting  and  supposedly  foreign  ideologies  of  democracy, 
liberalism  and  Marxism.  This  was  accompanied  by  a  bias  against  cosmopolitan 
intellectuals, whom the writers of LNR held responsible for the decline of Argentina’s 
true grandeur and by an exaltation of direct political action, revolutionary violence and 
military  splendour.  When  Uriburu,  who  had  publicly  expressed  that  he  found
56 A comprehensive and critical monograph on FORJA remains to be written. The best-known accounts 
are Miguel Angel Scenna, FORJA: una aventura argentina (de Yrigoyen a Peron) (Buenos Aires: 
Editorial de Belgrano,  1983) and Arturo Jauretche, F.O.R.J.A. y la decada infame, 3rd ed. (Buenos 
Aires: Coyoacdn,  1962), which both cast FORJA as an antecedent for contemporary political 
engagement. See also chapter four.
57 The literature on both, but especially on Julio, is vast. The biographically most relevant are Noriko 
Mutsuki, Julio Irazusta: treinta ahos de nacionalismo argentino (Buenos Aires: Biblos, 2004) and his 
own memoirs Julio Irazusta, Memorias: historia de un historiador a la fuerza (Buenos Aires: Ediciones 
Culturales Argentinas,  1975).
58 On LNR see especially Olga Echeverria, “Una gran manifestacidn de la intelligentsia: la reaccion de 
La Nueva Republica”, in: Susana Bianchi and Maria Estela Spinelli (eds.), Adores,  ideas y proyectos 
politicos en la Argentina contemporanea (Tandil: Instituto de Estudios Historico-Sociales,  1997), pp. 
125-156 and Olga Echeverria, “De la apelacion antidemocratica al colonialismo como argumento 
impugnador de la oligarquia: los hermanos Irazusta en la genesis del revisionismo historico argentino”, 
prohistoria, no. 8 (2004), pp.  173-191. A sample of articles was re-edited later: Julio Irazusta (ed.), El 
pensamiento politico nacionalista: antologia, 3 vols. (Buenos Aires: Obligado,  1975).Argentina’s two pantheons
inspiration in reading LNR, overthrew Yrigoyen in the coup of 1930, the journalists of 
LNR believed that the time had come for their rise into policy-making positions. It was 
perhaps in the concept of  politique d ’ abord where LNR was most Maurassian.
Beyond their  defiant  calls  for  political  activism,  it  is  difficult to  pin  down  an 
ideological  coherence  among the propagators of nacionalismo.  Although anti-libera­
lism  and  some  sort of authoritarianism were common denominators,  on  many  other 
questions opinions  diverged.  The  glorification  of Argentina’s  Hispanic  heritage  was 
another  frequent  theme,  for  example  in  the  writings  of  Galvez,  but  others  (say, 
Lugones)  had  little  patience  with  this.  The  groups  around  the  courses  on  Catholic 
culture  organised  by  Tomas  Casares  and  the  Catholic  review  Criterio  also  had 
considerable weight, but some of the more modernist nationalists saw little point in the 
revival of Thomism. Because of their tendency to align according to matters of day-to- 
day politics, there was often sharp disagreement even among those who subsequently 
united to exalt Rosas, as testified by the polemic between Galvez and Julio  Irazusta 
regarding the best stance to adopt towards Yrigoyen.59
The  examples  of two  more  revisionist  historians,  Juan  Pablo  Oliver  and  Jose 
Maria Rosa (who became the most prolific of all revisionists), can serve to clarify the 
background  of nacionalistas.60  Both  came  from the  upper  classes  and  socialised  in 
exclusive  circles.6 1  In  both  cases,  one  grandfather  had  been  minister  of a  national 
government. Rosa’s father was also a national minister, whilst Oliver’s father had been 
a conservative national deputy as well as minister in the province of Buenos Aires. For 
both it seemed only natural to envisage a career in politics. After having finished his 
studies in law at the UBA, Rosa (1906-91) was helped by his father’s political contacts 
and began to serve as a functionary of the Uriburu administration in Santa Fe in  1930. 
Oliver,  in  turn,  enlisted  in  a  movement  called  Union  Revolucionaria  Juventud 
Argentina, took part on Uriburu’s side in the violent street confrontations of September
59 In  1928, Galvez supported Yrigoyen, Irazusta was opposed to him. Devoto, Nacionalismo, fascismo y 
tradicionalismo, pp.  190-191.
60 On Oliver see the interview with him by Luis Alberto Romero, 23 June  1973, Archivo de Historia 
Oral, Instituto Torcuato di Telia. In stark contrast to Julio Irazusta, Rosa’s biography before  1945 is 
little studied, but Dario Macor and Eduardo Iglesias, Elperonismo antes delperonismo: memoria e 
historia en los origenes del peronismo santafesino (Santa Fe: Universidad Nacional del Litoral,  1997), 
pp. 37-38 contains some valuable information. More exhaustive, but also more problematic because 
mostly an autobiographical account by Rosa himself, is: Pablo Jose Hernandez, Conversaciones con 
Jose Maria Rosa (Buenos Aires: Colihue,  1978).
61 This was true for the large majority of the founders of the Instituto Rosas. For example, in his 
memoirs, Benito Llambi, Medio siglo de politico y diplomacia (Buenos Aires: Corregidor,  1997), p.  180 
remembered that he had regularly met with Galvez at the Jockey Club, the prime symbol of porteho 
exclusivism.
50Argentina's two pantheons
1930  and  shortly thereafter enrolled with the paramilitary  Legion  Civica Argentina,
f\~ )
which became something like Uriburu’s semi-official combat patrol.  Both also had a 
good relationship with the reactionary military regime in power from 1943, when Rosa 
was named director of the educational council of Santa Fe. Moreover, both affiliated 
themselves  to  the  Alianza  Libertadora  Nacionalista  (ALN),  which  united  the 
nacionalista  sectors  with populist  inclinations.  Only  in  the  1960s  did their political 
orientations  diverge  significantly,  when  Oliver  rejected  the  Marxist  influences  in 
revisionism, whilst Rosa publicised his approval of the Cuban Revolution.
Those  who  —like  the  Irazusta  brothers,  Rosa  or  Oliver—  became  revisionist 
historians  in  the  1930s  had  not  received  a  professional  education  in  history,  even 
though the UBA had been awarding degrees in the subject since the first decade of the 
century. The majority of them were lawyers by profession and politicians by vocation, 
whilst  initially  showing  little  interest  in  history.  Historiographical  debates  did  not 
always escape their attention, but they laid no claim to authority in the interpretation of 
the  national  past.  Ernesto  Palacio  (1900-1979)  —besides  the  Irazustas  the  most 
important driving force behind LNR and later one of the most prominent revisionist 
historians— wrote in 1928:
La Nueva  Republica  has  promised  in  its  programme  a  revision  of historical  values,  which  its 
editors carry out  insofar as historical  moments add topicality to the political  or social  problems 
that are raised.  [...]  It is only natural,  given the  limited nature of our task,  that we  should  limit 
ourselves, most of the time, to raising the issue in a rational way, leaving the work of proving or 
refuting our assertions to the historians [...].5,64 
Palacio saw no need for disputes over a ground that he felt belonged in the safe hands 
of professionals.  In the  late twenties,  LNR did  not  exalt  Rosas.65  Nor was  Rosas  a 
frequent motif among nacionalistas in general. In a later interview, Oliver stated that, 
by  1930, “there was no rosismo yet.”66 In other words, the beginnings of revisionism 
cannot be understood as a politicised historiography, but rather as politics that turned 
into historiography.  One therefore has to  seek the incentives  for revisionism beyond
62 See Marcus Klein, “The Legidn Civica Argentina and the radicalisation of Argentine nacionalismo 
during the Decada Infame”, Estudios Interdisciplinarios de America Latinay el Caribe, vol.  13, no. 2 
(2002), pp. 5-30.
63 See the interview with Rosa after his return from Cuba in 18 de Marzo, no. 8, 5 February 1962.
64 La Nueva Republica, no. 31, 8 September 1928; quoted by Zuleta Alvarez, El nacionalismo, vol.  1, p. 
127.
65 For LNR, see Irazusta (ed.), Pensamiento nacionalista.
66 Interview with Oliver by Romero, Instituto Di Telia, p.  15. The preference of Uriburu’s followers in 
historical matters was instead Lavalle, an enemy of Rosas (see Cattaruzza, “Descifrando pasados”, in: 
Cattaruzza (ed.), Crisis economica, p. 436).
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the  confines  of the  historiographical  debates  that  had  developed  over  the  decades 
before 1930.
The  typical  revisionist  was  an  intellectual  who  had failed as  a  politician.  His 
(never her) increased interest in history was directly proportional to his failure in and 
consequent disappointment with applied politics. The emergence of revisionism can be 
dated remarkably precisely and linked to concrete political developments. In 1934, the 
first  orchestrated  nacionalista  campaign  for the  repatriation of Rosas’  remains  took 
place and the  Irazusta brothers published their book La Argentina y el imperialismo 
britanico, a milestone in the formulation of revisionism.67 What had happened? Firstly, 
the  nacionalistas  who  until  recently  had  hoped  for  politically  decisive  roles  in  the 
Uriburu  administration  were  either  disappointed  with  the  course  of  this  military 
government or removed from office when the Revolution of 1930 took a more liberal- 
conservative  turn  after  Uriburu  was  replaced  by  Agustin  P.  Justo  (1932-38).  LNR 
abandoned Uriburu in October  1931  and the frustration with Uriburu was retrospec­
tively expressed by nacionalistas such as Oliver: “yes, there was disillusion among the 
nacionalista groups, because Uriburu simply handed government back to the previous
/o
system.”  Secondly,  of cardinal  importance  was  the  widespread  outrage  at  some 
scandalous details that leaked from the negotiations of the Roca-Runciman Treaty in 
1933, which allowed Argentina to retain access to the British market in exchange for 
guarantees to purchase British goods.69 As a reaction to these developments the main 
target  of nacionalista  attacks  was  no  longer the  undisciplined  masses,  Marxism  or 
Yrigoyen’s populism,  but  instead the  liberal  oligarchy that,  in their view,  sought to 
continue Argentina’s demeaning submission to British commercial interests.
The  Irazustas’  La Argentina y  el  imperialismo  britanico  (1934)  expressed  this 
view very clearly. The book is divided into three parts: the first narrated the behaviour
67 “La junta americana de homenaje y repatriation de los restos del Brigadier General Don Juan Manuel 
de Rosas al Pueblo Argentino en ocasion del aniversario del combate de ‘La Vuelta de Obligado”’, press 
statement, leaflet, Buenos Aires, 20 November 1934. The book reference is: Rodolfo Irazusta and Julio 
Irazusta, La Argentina y el imperialismo britanico: los eslabones de una cadena,  1806-1933, 2nd ed. 
(Buenos Aires: Independencia,  1982). See Quattrocchi-Woisson,  Un nationalisme, pp.  122-129 on the 
repercussions of this book and pp.  130-137 on the repatriation campaign.
68 Interview with Oliver by Romero, Instituto Di Telia, p.  16. Similar points can be found throughout the 
literature; see e.g. the interview with Carlos Ibarguren (son) by Luis Alberto Romero,  15 July  1971, 
Archivo de Historia Oral, Instituto Torcuato di Telia, p. 26. The rupture of LNR is reprinted in Irazusta 
(ed.), Pensamiento nacionalista, pp.  183-189.
69 For a brief discussion of the impact of the Roca-Runciman Pact on Argentine historiography in 
English, see Peter Alhadeff, “Dependency, historiography and objections to the Roca Pact”, in: 
Christopher Abel and Colin M. Lewis (eds.), Latin America, Economic Imperialism and the State:  The 
Political Economy of the External Connection from Independence to the Present (London and Dover, 
NH: The Athlone Press,  1985), pp. 367-379.
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of the  Argentine  mission to  London  during the  negotiations  of the  Roca-Runciman 
Pact, which Julio bemoaned as egregiously submissive. The second part, also written 
by Julio, outlined and denounced the individual points of the Treaty.  Only Rodolfo’s 
part, the last and shortest, ventured into the “history of the Argentine oligarchy”, which 
was the group held responsible for Argentina’s current ills. Ever since the first national 
president, Bernardino Rivadavia, who had initiated the chain of Argentina’s submis-
70 sion to the British commercialist yoke due to his admiration for European liberalism, 
the  oligarchy  had  distinguished  itself  as  the  anti-national  parasite  par  excellence, 
argued Rodolfo. Only the interlude of Rosas’ regime had been capable of resisting the 
transformation of the country into the South American equivalent of Asian or African 
colonies,  but unfortunately the  “anti-national  fervour of the  emigres”,7 1  who  fought 
against Rosas from Montevideo, finally assured that the putrefying foreign penetration 
returned  after  1852.  This  short  historiographical  exercise,  however,  was  mostly  an 
attempt to extend the basis for what had already been argued in the previous chapters. 
Julio later remarked about the book that “what we studied and what we saw, the past 
and  the  present,  reciprocally  illuminated  each  other”,  but the  starting  point  was  the
72 authors’ moral indignation over the Roca-Runciman Pact.
As many authoritarian nationalist intellectuals now aimed their invectives against 
the  oligarchy  rather than  working-class  agitation,  they  drew  closer to  the  emerging 
populist  nationalism  of FORJA.  The  contacts  of the  Irazustas  and  other  right-wing 
nacionalistas were particularly cordial with Raul  Scalabrini  Ortiz (1898-1959),  who, 
although never organically affiliated to FORJA, became known as its most prominent 
writer.  Julio Irazusta later pointed out in his memoirs that it was
in the year in which we published La Argentina y el imperialismo britanico that there was a sort 
of blossoming of a new consciousness about the national reality, what Scalabrini Ortiz calls [...] 
a ‘movement of nationalist realism’.74 
Through his book Politico britanica en el Rio de la Plata (1939), in which he rabidly 
denounced British commercial and political conspiracies as the source of Argentina’s
70 Irazusta brothers, La Argentina y el imperialismo britanico, p.  182.
71 Ibid., p.  181.
72 Julio Irazusta, Ensayos historicos (Buenos Aires: Eudeba,  1968), p.  12.
73 For a short summary of his biography in English see Mark Falcoff, “Raul Scalabrini Ortiz: the making 
of an Argentine nationalist”, Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 52, no.  1   (1972), pp. 74-101.
74 Irazusta, Memorias, p. 221. Likewise, Carlos Ibarguren (son) acknowledged his friendship with 
Scalabrini (interview by Romero, Instituto di Telia, p. 27).
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problems,  Scalabrini  also  became  a  promoter  of  historical  revisionism.  *   Him 
excepted, however,  most of the writers close to  FORJA at that stage were even less 
interested  in  history  than  the  nacionalistas.  Although  Quattrocchi  has  argued  that 
FORJA had a strong influence on the development of revisionism in the  1930s and in
76 the early years of the Instituto Rosas, the evidence to support such a case is scarce. 
Atilio  Garcia  Mellid,  who  seems  to  have  been  the  next  among  them  to  turn  to 
historiography, published his first history book only in 1946.77 Arturo Jauretche, in the 
1960s the most prolific and successful of all populist essayists, admitted that he was a 
latecomer to revisionism and that FORJA was not very interested in history during its
70
ten years  of existence.  In any  event,  even  if their participation  in revisionism had 
been organic from early on, there is no reason to assume that their preoccupations were 
more historiographical.  If the close  link between history and politics had undergone 
significant modifications  in the previous  decades,  revisionists  reinforced  it  from the 
1930s onwards.
75 Raul Scalabrini Ortiz, Politico britanica en el Rio de la Plata, 4th ed. (Buenos Aires: Plus Ultra,
1965).
76 Quattrocchi-Woisson, Un nationalisme, pp. 224-228. Her case is based on the argument that there was 
a strong Yrigoyenist current of revisionism from as early as  1916 onwards, in support of which she 
mentions a number of Radicals who were also revisionists (notably Dardo Corvalan Mendilaharzu, 
Joaquin Diaz de Vivar and Ricardo Caballero). It should be added, however, that they were hardly the 
most prominent revisionist writers, that (with the exception of Corvalan) they were not affiliated to the 
Instituto Rosas and that their links to FORJA were at best tenuous. Quattrocchi also mentions Carlos 
Steffens Soler, a member of the Directive Council of the Instituto Rosas, as “a distinguished figure of 
the Yrigoyenist group FORJA” (p. 243n.; the formulation in the French original of her book is more 
cautious (“on nous dit que...”) than in the Spanish translation, where it is directly affirmed that he was 
“una figura distinguida”). This is the only reference to Steffens Soler as a FORJA-member I have come 
across, however. To the best of my knowledge, all other erstwhile forjistas who later affiliated 
themselves to the Institute (Roque Raul Arag6n, Ren6 Saul Orsi, Roberto Tamagno, Garcia Mellid and 
Jauretche) did so only after 1945, and mostly after 1958. The other person who is often mentioned to 
substantiate Quattrocchi’s claim that there was a triangular relationship between Radicalism, Peronism 
and revisionism is John William Cooke. But his links to Yrigoyenism and FORJA, which are sometimes 
recorded in the secondary literature, were at best opaque and Norberto Galasso, Cooke: de Per  on al 
Che,  una biografiapolitico (Buenos Aires: Homo Sapiens,  1997), p.  12 has convincingly argued that 
Cooke’s interpretation of Argentine history was far from revisionist at the very least until  1943. All this 
supports the argument of Alejandro Cattaruzza, Historia y politico en los ahos treinta: comentarios en 
torno al caso radical (Buenos Aires: Biblos,  1991) that the convergence between revisionism and 
Radicalism was more partial.
77 Atilio Garcia Mellid, Caudillos y montoneras en la historia argentina (Buenos Aires: Recuperation 
Nacional,  1946).
78 Arturo Jauretche, Politico nacionaly revisionismo histdrico (Buenos Aires: A. Pena Lillo,  1959), p. 3 
and Jauretche, F.O.R.J.A. y la decada infame, pp. 39-42.
54Argentina’ s two pantheons
B.  The institutionalisation of revisionism and its models
Even  though  —throughout  the  history  of this  current—  the  majority  of revisionist 
intellectuals were lawyers and failed politicians, their historical writing made it neces­
sary for them to position themselves in the field of historians. It is noticeable that the 
first attempts to endow revisionism in general and rosismo in particular with an institu­
tional framework paralleled the foundation of historical commissions, the building of 
monuments and the institutional advances of “official” history under the auspices of 
the state. Just as 1934 was a key date for the political incentives behind revisionism, it 
was  perhaps  no  coincidence  that  the  year  1938  saw  not  only the  transformation  of 
Mitre’s  Junta  into  the  Academia  Nacional  de  la  Historia,  but  also  the  foundation 
—independently from each other— of two revisionist institutes, whose intention was 
to counter the Academia’s prerogative in creating a national pantheon. On  15 June, a 
group of right-wing upper-class nacionalistas, including Rosa, founded the Instituto de 
Estudios Federalistas in Santa Fe, in commemoration of the hundredth anniversary of 
the  province’s main caudillo,  Estanislao  Lopez.79  Much more  important  in the  long 
run,  however, was the foundation of the Instituto de Investigaciones  Historicas Juan 
Manuel  de  Rosas  in  the  Federal  Capital  in  the  same  year,  in  which  —besides  the
mentors of LNR— Galvez, the sons of the elder Carlos Ibarguren and Ramon Doll, a
80 former socialist and then self-confessed fascist, assumed leading roles.
Throughout the following four and a half decades the attitude of revisionists and 
especially the  Instituto Rosas toward the Academia was characterised by belligerent 
assaults against its supposed liberalism and its monopoly on defining an official pan­
theon. Nearly every single issue of the institute’s review —published irregularly from 
1939 onwards with a circulation of approximately  1,500 copies— and its even more 
polemical bulletin, which occasionally replaced the review, provide ample evidence of 
this  tendency.  The  revisionist  self-portrayal  as  marginalised  and  subversive franc- 
tireurs  against  a  vicious  enemy  upon  whom  officialdom  had  bestowed  superior 
weapons  on the  battlefield  of history helped to  create  some  kind  of esprit de  corps 
among them and led to the rise of the idea that there were now two ideas of Argen­
tina’s past, perfectly opposed to each other in every respect.
79 Information on this initiative is difficult to find and references are widely scattered. See e.g. Miguel 
Angel Scenna, Los que escribieron nuestra historia (Buenos Aires: La Bastilla,  1976), p. 252 and Macor 
and Iglesias, El peronismo antes del peronismo, pp. 38,  179 and 193.
80 On Doll see Norberto Galasso, Ramon Doll: socialismo o fascismo (Buenos Aires: CEAL,  1989).
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However,  it  is perhaps  more  interesting and  revealing to  draw attention to  the 
underlying  similarities  —and  sometimes  even  personal  connections—  between  the 
Instituto Rosas and the Academia. The main difference, of course, was that the Acade­
mia was publicly financed, whilst, before its nationalisation by presidential decree in 
1997,  the  sources of funding of the  Instituto  Rosas were private  (and usually rather 
opaque) or at best semi-public, as was the case from the  1950s onwards when trade 
unions  donated  money.  Although neither of the two  institutions had many  full-time 
staff, in the case of the Academia an increasing number of the contributors to its publi­
cations gained money from their historical writing and/or employment in universities, 
whilst before 1997 all members of the Instituto Rosas were ad honorem hobbyists who 
usually spent little time at the institute.  In its make-up, however, the Instituto  Rosas 
tried  to  mirror  the  Academia.  Among  its  foundational  members,  the  majority  of 
lawyers and journalists was complemented by clergy (for example, the Jesuit Leonardo 
Castellani) and military men (its first two presidents were an army general and a navy 
captain).  Such  backgrounds  among  the  members  of  the  Instituto  would  remain 
common  over  time,  later  complemented  by  a  small  contingent  of medical  doctors. 
Furthermore, the members of the institute were almost exclusively male throughout its 
entire existence, very few were under 30 years old at any given time and, at least until
1955,  many  members  had  Spanish  surnames  and/or  two  surnames,  which  were
8 1 overrepresented in comparison to Jewish and Italian names.  Although less remarka­
ble, the institutional structure of the two bodies was comparable, too: at the top stood a 
president,  followed  by  vice-presidents,  a  secretary,  a  treasurer  and,  finally,  the
81 The information on the members of the Instituto Rosas stems from a wide range of published sources, 
especially its Revista and Boletin, whereas the information on the Academia comes largely from the 
Boletin de la Academia Nacional de la Historia. Whilst on this basis it is relatively easy to reconstruct 
the structure and functioning of the Academia, this is not the case with the rosistas (which implicitly 
shows that their institutionalisation was less successful). At the Instituto Rosas I was repeatedly told that 
the minutes of meetings, lists of members and subscribers to the publications, financial records and 
other similar unpublished documents were lost during the military dictatorship after 1976. At least, the 
periodicals occasionally included lists of the members, e.g. in  1938, in  1951, in  1968 and in  1971. From 
these I gathered the names of 171  members altogether. Although it is difficult to obtain precise 
biographical information on all of them, from a large number of references in contemporary periodical 
publications and in the secondary literature an approximate picture can be constructed of their 
occupational and social backgrounds, age and gender. This picture remained similar over time, although 
the mixture was slightly more diverse in the  1960s in terms of class, age and professional and political 
backgrounds, if not regarding gender. Two of the  171  were women, both of whom largely unknown and 
insignificant for the history of revisionism.  112 surnames were Spanish and only 25 Italian; 8 German, 6 
English, 4 French and the remaining 16 were other, mixed or could not be categorised with certainty, but 
none was recognisably Jewish. Although this does not necessarily mean that there was never anyone 
with a Jewish background among them, Jews were certainly underrepresented (in contrast to, say, 
academic social sciences), which was hardly surprising in the light of the anti-Semitism of many 
members of the Instituto Rosas.
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members (vocales at the Instituto Rosas and academicos de numero at the Academia). 
Although  less  successfully  than  the  Academia,  the  institute  also  sought  to  anchor 
institutional procedures in codified statutes and rules. Parallels were still evident much 
later,  when  the  rosistas  sought  to  counter  the  expansion  of the  Academia  through 
branches in the interior (Juntas) by launching similar initiatives in 1959 and 1969.
These unstable provincial pockets of revisionism —often named after caudillos, 
too, such as the Instituto Alejandro Heredia in Tucuman or the Instituto Juan Facundo 
Quiroga in Mendoza (both founded in 1959)— were an instructive microcosm of how
o9
attempts at institutionalisation interplayed with politics.  Labelled as a “patriotic cam- 
paign to disseminate the historical truth of the River Plate”,  the foundations followed 
a  certain  pattern.  The  by  then  president  of  the  institute,  Rosa,  who  was  usually 
accompanied by another person from Buenos Aires, travelled to the provincial capital, 
invariably on a day near to the two principal national holidays, 25 May (May Revolu­
tion of 1810) and 9 July (Declaration of Independence of 1816). He was scheduled to 
give talks with titles such as “The two Argentinas” or “The Conspiracy of Silence”, in 
which he typically declared that the
Argentine  history that  is  taught  in  schools,  the  history that you  have  learned,  is  not  Argentine 
history  [...].  Against foreign-inspired  liberalism, the people rose  up and  for that they had their 
caudillos,  faithful  expressions  of the  national  sentiment  and  soul,  a  soul  whose  existence  the 
liberals  deny  [...].  This  is  how  Quiroga  [...],  Artigas,  L6pez  and  Rosas  arose.  However,  the 
history which we are taught tends to create among the people a feeling of repulsion towards these 
authentic  defenders  of nationality.  Rosas  is  the  expression  of the  Federal  par  excellence  and 
federal  means the affirmation of the Argentine, whilst Unitarianism  is the faithful  expression of 
colonialism.  Rosas  was  always  fought  against  with  foreign  help  and  he  was  made  to  fall  from 
power because of foreign action and because of betrayal.84 
In most cases the premises for the talk were provided by trade unions, occasionally by 
a  parish  church,  and  on  rare  occasions  the  talk  was  delivered  in  public  libraries, 
depending on the stance of the local authorities. The following day began with a visit 
to the local newspaper which dutifully published an interview with Rosa.  The actual 
foundation of the new branch of the Instituto Rosas consisted in signing the statutes,
82 Information on the following stems largely from reports in the respective provincial daily newspapers 
of the day of the foundation or re-foundation of these institutes (e.g. Los Principios (Cdrdoba), 7 July 
1959; Los Andes (Mendoza), 8 and 9 July 1959 and 8 July 1960; Gaceta de Tucuman, 26 May 1969) 
and from the review of the Instituto Rosas (esp. no. 21  (1960), pp. 44-62) and the second series of the 
bulletin (esp. no. 6, September 1969, pp.  16-17). In the case of Tucum&n also from the periodical of the 
institute itself (Revision Historica, nos.  1-3 (May 1960, May 1961  and July 1968)).
83 Revista del Instituto Rosas, no. 22 (July-December 1960), p. 387.
84 Revista del Instituto Rosas, no. 21 (1960), p. 45 (“Las dos Argentinas”), p. 52 (“La conspiracion de 
silencio”) and pp. 47-48.
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hoisting  the  Argentine  flag  and  holding  a  mass  in  church.  Although  it  was  often
85 stressed that the new institute “had no connotation of any political type whatsoever”, 
the authorities often thought differently and interfered in the events, apparently fearing 
that they might turn into a political demonstration.  A look at the  list of members in 
these branches shows that official suspicions were not entirely unjustified inasmuch as,
besides the usual dignitaries from the provincial elite, Peronist politicians and unions
86 at this stage sponsored and attended the activities of these institutes.
Although explicitly directed against the Academia, the purpose and character of 
revisionist institutionalisation thus not only paralleled the developments of “official” 
history, but also imitated them. There was even a degree of personal contact and over­
lap between the Academia and rosismo. Again, the branches in the interior, where the 
field  of historians  was  more  fragile  (and  possibilities  for  recruitment  consequently 
more limited) than in the capital, reveal this.  Yet even in the more polarised context 
of Buenos Aires, there were examples of historians who, at one point or another had 
been a member of both institutions. For example, the Jesuit priest and colonial histo­
rian Guillermo Furlong was a member of the Academia as well as the Instituto Rosas 
at different times and, in  1970, Julio Irazusta was appointed as academico de numero. 
The revisionist movement, which had now created its own institutional framework to 
disseminate  its ideas, thus protracted and reinvigorated rather than invented the  link 
between  the  aim  to  construct  a  national  identity  and  the  claim  to  be  professional 
historians.
C.  The activities and historiography of revisionism
The preferred kind of activities and the form of historical writing of revisionists were 
not very different either from those whom they identified as their liberal  or mitrista 
enemies. The main activity of revisionists consisted in the glorification and vilification 
of the  great  men  and  battles  of the  nineteenth  century.  One  of the  statutes  of the 
Instituto Rosas left no doubt that the institute’s chief aim was “to initiate a process of
85 Boletin del Instituto Rosas, second series, no. 6, September 1969, p.  16.
86 The list is potentially long, but as examples of Peronist (or neo-Peronist) politicians, one could 
mention Enrique Corval&n Nanclares in Mendoza or Juan Carlos Cornejo Linares in Jujuy.
87 Even the boundaries with the universities were blurred. In the case of Tucuman, it was perfectly 
compatible for Manuel Garcia Soriano to be a member of the Instituto Alejandro Heredia and a lecturer 
at the Universidad Nacional de Tucuman. Even the dean of this university’s Faculty of Philosophy and 
Letters (Enrique Wurschmit) was associated with the revisionist institute. Another typical example of a 
historian from the provinces who stood between the Academia and revisionism was Armando Raul 
Bazan (La Rioja).
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revalorisation  of the  personage  [i.e.  Rosas]”.88  Similarly to  the  Academia,  the  chief 
vehicles for the consecration of historical figures were the holding of a public homage, 
commemorative events, the elevation of statues or the mounting of memorial plaques 
in public places. The most regular event was the annual pilgrimage to San Pedro in the 
province  of Buenos  Aires  on  20  November  to  commemorate  the  naval  battle  that 
Rosas’  troops  had  fought  against  the  Anglo-French  intervention  of  1845.  Another 
preoccupation was the foundation of commissions to campaign for the repatriation of 
Rosas’  remains  from  England  and  the  abrogation  of Law  139  of  1857  which  had 
declared Rosas a traitor to the fatherland. Behind these initiatives stood the idea of a 
pedagogical mission with the ultimate aim that the state adopt the revisionist pantheon 
and  interpretation.  The  periodicals  of revisionist  institutions  were  thus  filled  with 
reprints of letters that were sent to governors, ministers and other functionaries of the 
state, asking them to participate in a commemoration, to rename a street or to drop a 
proposal by the Academia.
In the 1960s, these activities acquired a folkloric character. The trips to San Pedro 
culminated with asados, accompanied by folkloric music and dance (pehas). The more 
popularly  oriented  periodicals  of  the  Instituto  Rosas,  Revision  (1959-66)  and  the 
bulletin of the  institute  (1946-54  and  1968-71),  frequently displayed visual  symbols 
associated with caudillos and gauchos,  such as the  so-called  “Tacuara” lance  or the 
Federal Star. They also featured poems. Without irony, the writer Ignacio B. Anzoate- 
gui, a nacionalista of the far Right and a Peronist supporter, wrote a “eulogy to the 
hero”, accompanied by a picture of Rosas:
He was bom to a great father by an illustrious mother.  He was a child of the soil, white on both 
sides of the family and Creole from head to foot without any mixture of democratic mulattoes or 
English economists, as the pimps of free trade were called back then.89 
The  rest of the  issue  featured  reports  of the  activities  of the  Instituto,  letters  of the 
readers,  reviews and  some other articles which the  front page announced with titles 
such as “The power of truth: historical revisionism” or “Urquiza, the mercenary: chro­
nicle  of a betrayal”.90 Usually,  anyone with the  most basic  knowledge  of Argentine 
history could predict the content of such texts without actually reading them. In short, 
the campaigning issues of revisionism reached an extreme degree of codification and 
repetitiveness.
88 Revista del Instituto Rosas, no.  1   (1939), p.  156.
89 Boletin del Instituto Rosas, second series, no. 3, October-November 1968, p. 22.
90 Ibid.  Urquiza had overthrown Rosas in 1852 in the battle of Caseros.
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The fixation on the question of who to revere as the foundational fathers of the 
nation was reflected in the thematic predilections of the historiography produced by 
the  Instituto  Rosas.  Of the  105  articles  published  between  1939  and  1961  in  the 
Revista del Instituto Rosas, which had a stronger claim to academic authority than the 
other periodicals, ninety referred to the time span from the wars of independence to the 
beginning of Roca’s first presidency, not a single one focused on colonial history, and 
the rest were either general overviews or could be subsumed in the category “revisio­
nism against its enemies”.  Political  and military history was highly over-represented 
(seventy  articles),  whilst  social  questions  were  virtually  absent  (two  articles). 
Furthermore,  there  was  a  strong  bias  towards  the  biographies  of great  nineteenth- 
century men (sixty articles). The inclination towards political history and biographies 
was similar to the Academia’s preferences, although they were even more pronounced 
in the case of the rosistas.
Another affinity with “official” history was that revisionists saw the relationship 
between their rather unomamented empiricism and the political usages to which it was 
put as peculiarly unproblematic. On the rare occasions when revisionists ventured into 
the terrain of methodology or the philosophy of history, still in the  1960s, questions 
were resolved by referring to Ranke.91 Asked in an interview in 1968 which Argentine 
and international historians he considered as his models, Rosa mentioned a number of 
revisionists and,  “on a universal  scale,  Romulo Carbia taught me to critically recon-
09 struct historical  facts with the objective method of Ranke.”  Yet Ranke’s name was 
only a label  for the revisionists’  claim that they had historical truth on their side.  A 
typical editorial of the review of the Instituto Rosas maintained that “the inheritors of 
the  initiators  of the  historical  lie,  the  disseminators  of falsified  history are  now  left 
more  lonely  than  ever”  because  “the  truth  has  triumphed.”93  The  revisionists’  una­
dorned claim to truth coexisted happily with their candid demand that history should 
serve as a political weapon,  since empiricism would be unfailingly conducive to the 
fulfilment of their political  goals.94  As a result,  revisionists  never produced  a single
91 E.g. Rodolfo Ortega Pefia and Eduardo Luis Duhalde, Las guerras civiles argentinas y la 
historiografia (Buenos Aires: Sudestada,  1967), p.  14 or Elias Gimenez Vega, Revision al revisionismo: 
contribucion a la polemica de Rosa con Soares de Souza (Buenos Aires: published by the author,  1969),
&30-
Jos6 Maria Rosa, Historia del revisionismo y otros ensayos (Buenos Aires: Merlin,  1968), pp. 8-9.
93 Revista del Instituto Rosas, no.  17 (1958), p. 3.
94 Examples of this are innumerable. Two especially straight-forward texts are Ricardo Font Ezcurra, 
“La historia instrumento politico”, Revista del Instituto Rosas, no. 4 (1939), pp.  117-130 and Jauretche, 
Politico nacional.
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methodological  or  theoretical  debate  worth  mentioning.  Their  methodological  texts 
amounted to an exercise in circular peer consecration, in which revisionists mutually 
complimented each other’s writings. An article called “Outline of methodology” in the 
bulletin of the Instituto Rosas in the late 1960s, for example, was mainly a recommen­
dation to read Rosa, Galvez and Scalabrini Ortiz. Reading these authors would teach 
the historian the method of unmasking the “deformation of the understanding of reality 
[...which]  is the cemetery of coherent political  action.”95  Similarly,  book reviews  in 
revisionist periodicals sermonised about the works of their own group,  accompanied 
by  predictable  use  of adjectives  (“notable”,  “valiant”  etc.).  The  key  question  with 
which  revisionist  reviewers  approached  their  task  was  usually  how  the  author  had 
evaluated the great men of the nineteenth century.
In many respects, revisionist activities and historiography were thus the  mirror 
image of the kind of history that they polemically cast as their enemy. What was new 
about  revisionism  was  not  so  much  a  positive  evaluation  of Rosas,  caudillismo  or 
Federalism.  As we have seen, different viewpoints had already emerged in the after- 
math of Mitre’s biographical works. The notion that history should serve as a tool for 
politics or for the  construction  of a national  identity fomented by the  state  was  not 
exclusive  to  revisionism  either.  What  was  new  was  the  systematic  and  Manichean 
nature  of the revisionist enterprise to  forge  an  alternative pantheon  in  function  of a 
fervent anti-liberal nationalism. For this task it was necessary to essentialise the traits 
of a supposedly monolithic enemy and gloss over the intellectual and historiographical 
developments that had occurred since Mitre. The definition of the relationship between 
revisionism and earlier historiography was therefore ambivalent, especially in relation 
to  the  Nueva  Escuela  and  the  Academia,  but  also  regarding  earlier  writers  such  as 
Saldias. Since in the revisionists’ view historiography always translated political stand­
points,  they  had  difficulties  in  understanding  how  a  liberal  and  a  disciple  of Mitre 
could  have  had  a  balanced  view  of Rosas.96  The  revisionist  understanding  both  of 
nineteenth-century  politics  and  of  the  contemporary  field  of  historiography  were 
profoundly dualist and inversely analogous:  “official” history had not changed since
95 Boletin del Instituto Rosas, no. 3, October-November 1968, pp.  19-21.
96 A solution to this dilemma was eventually found in the argument that the case of Saldias was 
“curious” and that he quickly fell prey to “that subtle form of ideological terrorism which is the 
‘conspiracy of silence’” (Norberto D’Atri, “El revisionismo historico: su historiografia”, in: Arturo 
Jauretche, Politico nacionaly revisionismo historico, 6th ed. (Buenos Aires: A. Pena Lillo,  1982), p.
115 and p.  116. As Quattrocchi-Woisson, Un nationalisme, pp. 22-25 has shown, Saldias’ career in fact 
suffered no setbacks whatsoever from the publication of his book on Rosas.
61Argentina’s two pantheons
Mitre, whilst they themselves were the direct successors of the struggle of Rosas and 
other caudillos. As this position precluded the possibility of change, their historiogra­
phy remained ahistorical.
D.  The revisionists eclipsed by Peronism
Whilst  institutionalisation  and  the  codification  of  revisionist  activities  and 
historiography to some extent allowed for the emergence of a distinctive group identity 
around the organisational nucleus of the Instituto Rosas, the boundaries of revisionism 
in general were blurred. From its very foundational moment onwards, the Instituto Ro­
sas remained a fragile club that failed to monopolise the discourse of its members. All 
of them, throughout their career, published many more articles in nacionalista weekly 
newspapers and cultural reviews than they did in the Instituto’s bulletin or review. In 
the  early  forties,  for  example,  nacionalista  publications  such  as  Nuevo  Orden,  El 
Pampero  or El Restaurador  (all  on the  extreme  Right  of the  political  spectrum)  or 
Scalabrini’s  more  populist  Reconquista,  none  of  which  was  predominantly 
historiographical, became much more important for the dissemination of revisionism 
than the narrowly circumscribed institutional rosismo. Furthermore, given the political 
affiliations of the revisionists, it was not surprising that nacionalista groups such as the 
ALN  (besides  Oliver  and  Rosa,  Carlos  Ibarguren  (son)  also  belonged  to  this 
organisation) also began to fulfil a crucial role as vehicles for revisionist and rosista 
imagery, for example through street demonstrations. This permeability towards politics 
only  increased over time.  Especially after  1955,  the  growing  success of revisionism 
also meant that its institutional nucleus found it harder to retain control over the broad 
diversity of voices that in one way or another expressed revisionism (see chapter four).
In contrast to  the  interest  in  and the  links with applied politics,  the  revisionist 
impact on  academic  historiography remained  limited.  This  was  less  the  outcome  of 
systematic  marginalisation  than  of the  revisionists’  lack  of interest  in  the  historical 
research undertaken in public universities, which contrasted with their fixation on the 
Academia Nacional de la Historia. Whilst the latter was easily identified as the state’s 
organ for the forging of a civic historical  imaginary, this point was more difficult to 
make for universities.  Although in the eyes of revisionists they did form part of the 
abominable apparatus through which the oligarchy imbued the people with a “falsified 
history”,  at  least  before  1955  they  tended  not  to  be  the  main  target  of polemics. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that initially we find few revisionists among university
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professors.  That  this  partly  changed  in  the  years  between  1943  and  1946  was  not 
because  revisionists  were  actively  seeking  employment  in  universities,  but  rather 
because of political developments to which they were vulnerable.
The strong politicisation of revisionism meant that, from 1943 onwards, the rela­
tionship between nationalist  intellectuals  and  Peronism became  a crucial  touchstone 
for the  future  career  of revisionist  authors  as  well  as  for  the  development  of their 
version of history as a whole. Initially, the odds for nacionalistas to assume the kind of 
influential  political  roles  they  had  longed  for  since  Uriburu  looked  promising.97 
Cordial ties with some of the military officers who had seized power in the coup of 
1943 at first yielded public posts for members of the Instituto Rosas, particularly when 
the  regime  needed  staff  for  its  federal  interventions  in  the  provinces.  Federico 
Ibarguren  and  Ramon  Doll  became  governmental  functionaries  in  the  province  of 
Tucuman  and  Palacio  a  minister  in  San  Juan.  Jose  Alfredo  Villegas  Oromi  was 
appointed economy minister in Mendoza and Hector Llambias, another member of the 
institute,  undersecretary  of education at the  federal  level.  Most  important,  however, 
was the province of Santa Fe, where the intervening governor Arturo Saavedra was a 
close ally of the nacionalistas, who consequently allocated a number of posts to them, 
as  the  aforementioned  example  of  Rosa  as  director  of  the  provincial  Council  of
QO
Education  (with  Font  Ezcurra as  his  secretary)  shows.  The  more  populist-inclined 
nationalists, in turn, placed their hopes in the rising figure of Peron himself.  FORJA 
was  dissolved  in December  1945  in  support  of Peronism  and  some  of its  members 
were granted jobs by the new administration after  1946. Jauretche, for example, was 
named director of the bank of the province of Buenos Aires.
Views about history were hardly of any importance in determining the relation­
ship between Peronism and nationalism. Peron’s moves therefore affected the rosistas 
as  much  as they  did  other nationalistic  thinkers.  Although  Peron’s  rhetoric  adopted 
many elements of the various trends of nationalism that had emerged since the  1930s, 
in particular its populist variants, his dealings with their erstwhile formulators turned 
out  to  be  less  congenial  than  they  had  hoped.99  Whilst  prestigious  and  politically 
influential posts were to be filled with former Radicals,  Socialists and Conservatives
97 For a concise introduction in English to the relations between the nacionalista Right, the military 
regime of 1943 and Peronism see Richard J. Walter, “The Right and the Peronists,  1943-1955”, in: 
Deutsch and Dolkart (eds.), The Argentine right, pp. 99-118.
98 On the negotiations leading to this situation in Santa Fe and the role of another member of the 
Instituto, Carlos Steffens Soler, in them, see Hernandez, Conversaciones con Rosa, p.  108.
99 The standard account on this issue remains Buchrucker, Nacionalismo y peronismo.
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who  had  participated  in  the  formation  of the  Peronist  coalition  in  late  1945,  the 
nacionalistas were treated like a potential  nuisance.  Apparently,  the  Peronist deputy 
and  rosista  Joaquin  Diaz  de  Vivar  suggested  to  Peron  to  appoint  a  number  of his 
nacionalista friends —many of them revisionist writers— to ambassadorships, but the 
project faltered in Juan Atilio Bramuglia’s ministry of foreign affairs.100 Instead, after 
massive resignations of anti-Peronist academic staff in public universities, in history, 
sociology  and  neighbouring  disciplines  some  revisionists  and/or  nacionalistas  were 
drafted in to fill the void.1 0 1  Their entry into the university thus was the outcome of a 
short-lived political circumstances rather than of a design to develop a scholarly profile 
as historians.
At best the relationship between revisionism and Peronism can be characterised
102 as a “marriage of reason”, as Quattrocchi has suggested.  If we follow this interpreta­
tion, it needs to be added, however, that the conjugal rights were unequally distributed, 
which led either to tensions or to outright separation.  Even with the forjistas, whose 
arguments  were  more  easily  compatible  with  Peron’s,  relations  were  uneasy.  The 
stance  of  the  more  right-wing  revisionists  vis-a-vis  the  new  regime  after  1946 
vacillated between two options. Either they tried to carve out a niche between culture 
and politics, thereby allowing themselves to be co-opted by a government on whose 
policy they knew they had little influence,  or they assumed an oppositional posture. 
The pitfalls of both choices can be  illustrated by the experiences of the  founders  of 
LNR, Ernesto Palacio and Julio Irazusta. The former was elected deputy on a Peronist 
ticket in  1946 and became president of the National  Commission of Culture.  In this 
position, he struggled to make his voice heard in politics and already in the following 
year he resigned. After his failure as a politician, he dedicated himself more fully to the
writing of history again and in  1954 published a comprehensive history of Argentina 
1  01
since  the  conquest.  Irazusta,  in  turn,  saw  few  opportunities  to  influence  political 
decisions under Peronism and remained in silent opposition, until in  1956 he publicly 
denounced  the  “indescribable  and  incredible  regime  of  Peron”  for  its  supposedly 
feigned  economic  nationalism,  behind  which,  according  to  Irazusta,  the  leader  had
100 Interview with Joaquin Diaz de Vivar by Romero, Archivo de Historia Oral, Instituto Torcuato di 
Telia, June-August 1972, p.  14.
1 0 1  For example John William Cooke, Gabriel Antonio Puentes, Jos6 Maria Rosa and Hector Saenz y 
Quesada at the UBA and Juan Jos6 Hem&ndez Arregui, Federico Ibarguren, Roberto Marfany and 
Carlos Steffens Soler at the UNLP.
102 Quattrocchi-Woisson,  Un nationalisme, pp. 257-352.
103 Ibid., pp. 288-297. The corresponding reference for the book is Ernesto Palacio, Historia argentina 
(Buenos Aires: A. Pefia Lillo,  1954).
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demagogically concealed his real designs to continue the country’s sell-out to British 
imperialism.104 Given his second disenchantment with the pragmatisms of day-to-day 
politics, perhaps it was no surprise that from the late fifties Irazusta was known as one 
of the most committed historians among revisionists, who stood apart for his refusal to 
take part in overtly political undertakings.
Political developments also had an impact on the fate of the Instituto Rosas, from 
which Irazusta resigned in late 1949 and the more populist Rosa was elected president 
in  1951.  Although  revisionists  felt  compelled  to  position  themselves  in  relation  to 
politics, they eschewed the Instituto Rosas as a tribune for that purpose.  Throughout 
the  Peronist decade,  the  institute’s publications avoided  not only confrontation  with 
Peron but also too overt political positioning in general. It seems that one of the main 
aims was to prevent a degree of politicisation that —given the divergent political views 
of its members— could have threatened group solidarity and instead to maintain the 
character of the institute as a refuge from active politics. For this reason, it is mislea­
ding to speak of a “complete Peronisation” of the institute, as Quattrocchi has done,105 
even after the Peronist deputy John William Cooke had become vice-president of the 
institute. An editorial of the bulletin in 1954 pointed out that the Instituto Rosas had no 
links to any particular political tendency because
if revisionism and the Institute devoted themselves to intervening in today’s politics, no matter in 
which  tendency,  they  would  jeopardise  the  historical  cause  of  revisionism  in  unjustified 
adventures, preventing the addressee of Historical Truth —the Argentine People— from adopting 
this cause [...].106
Although the anti-Peronist opposition continued to draw derogatory analogies between 
Peron and Rosas’  “tyranny” and held that the cordial affinities between Peronism and 
right-wing nacionalismo were only hidden behind a deceptive fa£ade, revisionists saw 
too organic a link with Peron as dangerous, since many among their ranks were scepti­
cal about the real intentions of his regime. Even Rosa, who later personified the link 
between revisionism and Peronism, did not identify with the populist movement at this 
stage.107 Similarly, the institutional nucleus in which he had made his first steps as a
104 Julio Irazusta, Perony la crisis argentino (Buenos Aires: Unidn Republicana,  1956), p. 9. There are 
many more examples of more explicit nacionalista opposition to Peron, too. For example, Roberto de 
Laferrdre participated in the military uprising against Per6n in  1951.
105 Quattrocchi-Woisson, Un nationalisme, p. 324. For a convincing critique of Quattrocchi’s arguments 
see Julio Stortini, “Historia y polltica: produccidn y propaganda revisionista durante el primer 
peronismo”, prohistoria, no. 8 (2004), pp. 229-249.
106 Boletin del Instituto Rosas, nos.  19-20, May-July 1954, p. 2.
107 Interview with Rosas in Envido, no. 2, November 1970, p. 44.
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historiographical militant, the Instituto de Estudios Federalistas in  Santa Fe,  kept its
10R distance from officialdom during this period.
Conversely, the Peronist regime saw no reason to adopt or promote the revisionist 
version of history.  To be sure, there were attempts to insert Peronism into a broader 
revisionist genealogy from within the Peronist camp. As a Peronist deputy, Cooke set 
the tone for the kind of analogies that were later often drawn,  when he  wrote  in an 
article in the daily La Epoca in the late forties:
There  can’t  be  total  Argentine  independence  without  an  intellectual  liberation  that  completes 
political  and  economic  liberation.  What  has  been  taught  as  “history”  so  far  is  a  malicious 
distortion of the real facts [...]. We are not mere destroyers of statues — we want heroes too, but 
authentic ones [...]. The descamisado [i.e. follower of Per6n] recognises in the montonero, in the 
gaucho, in the rabble, his brothers in suffering and in struggle. [...] As men of the New Argentina 
we are a historical continuity of the men who authentically created the nation.109 
However, before he became Peron’s official delegate in Argentina in 1956, Cooke was 
a secondary figure in Peronism. Although already at this stage there might have been 
some  financial  support  from  Peronist  unions,  there  is  no  evidence  of direct  public 
sponsorship of revisionist activities.
Nor did the Peronist regime draw on the revisionist account of history. Regarding 
official propaganda and education (increasingly pervasive  after  1950) there  were  no 
traces of revisionist imagery.  San Martin was systematically glorified and likened to 
Peron, but the uncontroversial liberator was not specific to any particular pantheon of 
heroes (and San Martin was probably chosen for exactly this reason). It has been sug­
gested that Peronism endeavoured to  strike a balance  “between Rosas  and  Sarmien- 
to”.110 However, when the controversial period from  1829 to  1880 was touched upon 
in schoolbooks or propaganda, Peronist preference lay with the “liberal” pantheon. The 
most famous example was the naming of the railways after nationalisation in  1948 as 
San  Martin,  Belgrano,  Urquiza,  Sarmiento,  Mitre and Roca.  In a celebration  for the 
anniversary of the railway nationalisation two years later, the National Commission of 
Museums,  Monuments  and  Historical  Sites,  depicted  Sarmiento  as  an  intellectual
108 Macor and Iglesias, El peronismo antes del peronismo, p.  179.
109 Reproduced in Crisis, no. 23, March  1975.
1,0 Colin M. Winston, “Between Rosas and Sarmiento: notes on nationalism in Peronist thought”,  The 
Americas, vol. 39, no.  1   (1983), pp. 305-332. Two good examples of sparing out the middle sixty years 
of the nineteenth century in official liturgy would be the primary schoolbook Fernando J. Veronelli, 
Abanderados: libro de lectura inicial (Buenos Aires: Kapelusz,  1955) or the Peronist propaganda book 
Sintesis Historica de la Republica Argentina, (Buenos Aires: no publisher given, no year given 
(probably 1950-55)).
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precursor of Peron’s  deed.1 1 1   Only after the  overthrow of Peron would the  Peronist
movement appropriate revisionism (see chapter five).
However,  the  very  fact  that  Peron’s  stance  in  historiographical  issues  would
become  an  important  question  for  revisionists  reveals  the  extent  to  which  their
historical writing was oriented towards the political field and especially towards being
accepted and adopted by the state as the replacement for the liberal pantheon. Even if
the  Instituto  Rosas  was  an  institutional  core  that  resisted  transformation  into  the
mouthpiece of a clearly identifiable political tendency, most of its members continued
to see themselves as politicians or as intellectuals with a right to intervene in politics
112 rather than defining themselves as historians.  This was even clearer for the populist 
and  nationalist  intellectuals,  such  as  the  erstwhile  members  of FORJA,  who  at  this 
point were only tangentially linked to formalised revisionist activities and initiatives. 
History  thus  remained  a  surrogate  activity  for  periods  in  which  political  fortunes 
turned  out  to  be  less  favourable  than  they  had  hoped.  This  political  orientation  of 
revisionism, as we will see in the following chapters, was the principal constant of the 
current.
Conclusion
Revisionists  differed  less than they  imagined  from those  whom they declared  to  be
their arch-enemies. Both revisionism and the “official” history of the Academia were
mostly concerned with a moral-political  assessment of nineteenth-century  great men
and their aptitude for being adored as the epitomes of Argentina’s national identity. As
Nicola Miller has put it, there was an overall “tendency to appraise historical figures
rather as one might weigh up a potential in-law to see if they merited being accepted as
1  1
‘one  of the  family’  or  not.”  This  led  to  a  preoccupation  with  civic  ceremonies, 
statues  and  symbols  rather  than  historical  research.  This  is  not  to  say  that  we  are 
dealing with the narcissism of small differences. In terms of their preferential choice of 
historical models liberal and revisionist historians were diametrically opposed and the 
institutions  on  which  their  version  was  based  as  well  as  their  proponents  were
111 Juan Francisco Castro, Sarmientoy los ferrocarriles argentinos (Buenos Aires: Ministerio de 
Educacion de la Nacidn. Comision Nacional de Museos y Monumentos Histdricos. Museo Historico 
Sarmiento,  1950).
112 Again, the interviews with Diaz de Vivar, Carlos Ibarguren (son) and Oliver of the oral history 
archive of the Instituto di Telia are good examples of this. Even clearer is the case of the memoirs by 
Llambi, Medio siglo.
113 Miller, In the shadow, p. 214.
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accurately distinguishable: on the one hand, the Academia and its commemorations of 
figures such as Mitre, Rivadavia or Sarmiento; on the other hand, the Instituto Rosas 
and  its  glorification  of the  caudillos.  But  in  many  respects,  the  two  were  a  mirror 
image of each other rather than representing fundamentally different understandings of 
history and its public usages. Revisionism was not a “paradigm change”, not even in 
the sense of a “change of world views”. According to Thomas Kuhn’s definition, “led 
by a new paradigm, scientists adopt new instruments and look in new places.”114 But 
this did not happen with historical  revisionism.  First, they intervened in  historiogra­
phical  debates  from  a political  point of view.  Second,  their nationalism  might  have 
been more radical and more decisively anti-liberal than that of their predecessors, but 
many of the liberal premises had been gradually eroding since the Centenary.  In the 
person of Galvez,  revisionism developed directly  from the  “cultural  nationalism”  of 
the Centenary generation. Third, and most importantly, the historiographical rehabilita­
tion of Rosas or federalism as such were hardly novel by 1930. All that was new about 
the  revisionist enterprise  was  the  systematic  nature  of their  inversion  of everything 
they associated with liberalism.
In the eyes of revisionists, ever since Mitre politics and history in Argentina had 
continuously been nothing but two sides of the same coin. Their inability to distinguish 
the intellectual or the historian from the politician applied both to their analysis of their 
enemies as well as to their own aim of influencing in intellectual and political debates. 
Hegemony  in historiographical  debates  —supported by  a rather crude  empiricism— 
would, according to them, necessarily bolster the fulfilment of their political ambitions 
and vice versa.  Given that politicisation or, more generally, the cultivation of history 
for the construction of a national identity were such rampant phenomena in Argentine 
historiography,  it  is  tempting  to  look  for  explanations  in  a  deficient  institutionali­
sation.115 The institutional bases for historical research were precarious all over Latin 
America  and  especially  in  Argentina,  in  notable  contrast  to  Chile,  for  example. 
Halperin Donghi’s argument that Chile’s counterpart to Argentine revisionism, deca- 
dentismo,  was  characterised  by  less  explicit  links  and  references  to  contemporary
114 Thomas S. Kuhn, The structure of  scientific revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press,  1996), p.  111.
115 The argument is made especially by Quattrocchi-Woisson, Un nationalisme, p. 9.
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politics thus at first sight seems to confirm that institutionalisation and politicisation 
stood in an inversely proportional relation to each other.11 6
It  is  more  complicated  than  that,  however.  Firstly,  the  institutionalisation  of 
history in Argentina was never mainly due to the efforts of an independent professional 
group.  Already  the  mitrista  initiative  of the  Junta  de  Historia  y  Numismatica  was 
designed to support the state’s attempt to foster a civic historical imaginary rather than 
to create a historical profession that worked independently from the guidelines set by 
policy-makers.  Secondly, and more remarkably, revisionism historically emerged at a 
time when the figure of the pensador was no  longer dominant in public debates and 
when  political  power had  already become  differentiated  from  intellectual  influence. 
This was not a mere historical coincidence. The existence of an intellectual field with 
its own rules to some extent even explains the dynamic of the trajectories and activities 
of revisionists: lawyers by profession and politicians by vocation, they moved into the 
alternative realm of historiography after they had failed to secure a comfortable niche 
for themselves in politics. But the moment when nacionalista intellectuals discovered 
their  interest  in  history  coincided  with  increasing  institutionalisation  and  professio- 
nalisation under the auspices of the Nueva Escuela,  inaugurating the  “Golden era in 
Argentine historiography”. As Bourdieu notes, “the existence of a specialised field of 
production is the  condition for the  appearance  of a struggle between orthodoxy and 
heterodoxy”.117 Revisionism was not the symptom of the complete lack of institutions 
that typically organise and structure the intellectual life of a society. As Ernest Gellner 
has argued, “a crucial aspect of nationalism [...] is that intellectuals have ceased to be
1  1  ft
a substitutable commodity.”  The evidence presented in this chapter indeed suggests 
an  interpretation  of revisionism  as  a phenomenon  that  paralleled  a  sudden  drive  at 
institutionalisation within the overall context of an uneven and patchy modernisation 
and  consolidation  of the  intellectual  field,  which  did  not  become  fully  autonomous 
from politics. Although the latter remained the prime motivation for revisionist writers, 
the  characteristics  and  dynamics  of  their  enterprise  must  therefore  be  explained 
through the interplay between the political and the intellectual field.
116 Halperin Donghi, Ensayos, pp.  107-109. On decadentismo see Sofia Correa Sutil, “El pensamiento en 
Chile en el siglo xx bajo la sombra de Portales”, in: Oscar Teran (ed.), Ideas en el siglo: intelectuales y 
cultura en el siglo XX latinoamericano (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 2004), pp. 211-305.
117 Bourdieu, Langage et pouvoir symbolique, p. 208.
118 Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson,  1964), p.  159.
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In many respects  revisionism resembled  what Raymond  Williams  has  called  a 
“cultural  formation”.  Although  there  was  an  identifiable  institution,  the  Instituto 
Rosas, the much broader overall range of the activities of revisionists meant that the 
“establishment of a selective tradition” was
also  a  question  of formations;  those  effective  movements  and  tendencies,  in  intellectual  and
artistic  life, which have significant and sometimes decisive  influence on the active development
119
of a culture, and which have a variable and often oblique relation to formal institutions.
In  the  long  run,  the  formula  of success  of revisionism  resided  not  so  much  in  its 
institutionalisation, although this provided an identifiable nucleus and pole of orienta­
tion over an extended period of time. Much more important was the permeability and 
relative informality of hardly institutionalised networks, which allowed for adaptation 
and  flexibility in the  face  of political  developments  and broader  intellectual  climate 
changes. Since it was not the sign of a traditional society with a reduced urban intellec­
tual and political elite, revisionism furthermore meets Williams’ requirement of forma­
tions  as  being  “characteristic  of developed  and  complex  societies”.  The  opposition 
between  Argentina’s  two  pantheons  —liberal  and  nationalist—  should  not  be 
understood as the continuation of nineteenth-century divisions between a liberal  and 
cosmopolitan  elite  and  an  autochthonous  caudillismo,  but  rather  as  a  retrospective 
selection  of  traditions,  the  practices  of  which  developed  parallel  to  an  uneven 
modernisation  of  intellectual  life.  The  second  coming  of  revisionism  after  1955, 
although within a different ideological climate, once again coincided with an upsurge 
of cultural modernisation.
119 Raymond Williams, Marxism and literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press,  1977), p.  117.
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Intellectual debates and Peronism in the context of cultural 
modernisation
We have to defend a university that is autonomous but also socially responsible. 
It should not be under the orders of a ruler —nor of a party or political 
ideology— but must be ready to serve society, the people who maintain it.
Risieri Frondizi,  1956
The university has to be a decisive and  fundamental part of the design and the 
orientation of the national government and, therefore,  of all Argentines.
Rodolfo Puiggros,  1973*
Introduction
Although revisionism was strictly speaking a historiographical current, the attraction 
of  the  writings  of  its  proponents  for  the  general  public  did  not  reside  in  their 
clarification of historical problems, but in their connection to contemporary questions. 
Revisionism  became  even  less  historiographical  in  the  1960s.  Essays  by  populist- 
revisionist authors  such  as Arturo Jauretche  or Juan Jose Hernandez Arregui,  which 
only  marginally  dealt  with  history,  sold  well  not  because  of their  historiographical 
insights, but because they addressed questions whose relevance was readily evident to 
a  broader  public.  The  aim  of this  chapter  is  to  situate  the  discourse  of the  most 
prominent  nationalist  and  populist  intellectuals  of the  late  1950s  and  1960s  within 
broader public debates about national and political identities during that period and to 
analyse how revisionism related to these debates.
71Intellectual debates and Peronism
After 1955, socio-cultural conditions for a rise in concern with issues of national 
identity were favourable in Argentina.  Theorists  of nationalism,  most famously per­
haps Ernest Gellner, have often pointed to the connection between nationalist identity 
constructions and modernisation.  In Argentina after  1955, two aspects of modernisa­
tion converged: first, cultural modernisation, manifest in phenomena such as the exten­
sion of education systems, the widening of sectors that consume cultural goods or the 
differentiation of the  cultural  field  into  specialised  sub-units with their own  mecha­
nisms  for  the  accumulation  of cultural  capital.  Second,  urbanisation  and  its  social 
effects. Following Gellner, the connections of these two processes with nationalism are 
readily  evident:  the  link  with  education,  because,  as  he  has  stressed,  “the  minimal 
requirement  for  full  citizenship,  for  effective  moral  membership  of  a  modem 
community, is literacy” and the connection with migration to cities, because the strains 
of anomie  as  an  effect  of massive  urbanisation  create  ideal  conditions  for  identity 
politics.1   The relationship between modernity and nationalism remains ambivalent in
this model, since there is an
inverse  relationship  between  the  ideology  and  the  reality  of nationalism.  The  self-image  of 
nationalism involves the stress of folk, folklore, popular culture, etc. In fact, nationalism becomes 
important precisely when these things become artificial.2 
One  combination  that  facilitates  the  flourishing  of nationalism,  then,  might  be  the 
conjunction of modem means (mass media, a broadening cultural market, etc.) and the 
desire to construe a perennial  identity in the absence of customary social  bonds that 
would make any such attempt seem superfluous.
In this chapter, I will argue that the wider appeal of revisionism after 1955 indeed 
developed  alongside,  firstly,  a  rapid  modernisation  of  cultural  life  and,  secondly, 
debates  about urbanisation.  There  was  not  necessarily a direct or causal  connection 
between  these  processes.  It  would  be  misleading  to  see  Argentine  nationalist 
intellectuals as promoters of the most important developments in cultural and intellec­
tual  life. The role of both reactionary nacionalistas and populist writers in processes 
such as the transformation of the book market or the renovation of the higher education
* Risieri Frondizi, “La universidad y sus misiones” (October-November 1956), reproduced in Beatriz 
Sarlo (ed.), La batalla de las ideas (1943-1973) (Buenos Aires: Ariel, 2001), p. 318 and Rodolfo 
Puiggrds, La universidad del pueblo (Buenos Aires: Crisis,  1974), p. 29.
1  Gellner, Thought and Change, pp.  147-178. The quote is from p.  159.
2 Ibid., p.  162.
3 This argument about modernisation and an increase in anomie as factors favourable for the spread of 
nationalism has been made very often. See e.g. Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds.), The invention, 
“Introduction”, pp. 4-5.
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system  was  negligible.  Among  those  who  after  1955  contributed  to  Buenos  Aires 
living  up  to  its  self-image  as  a  cosmopolitan  city  at  the  forefront  of  the  latest 
international trends in culture,  arts or science,  we will  search in vain for any of the 
nationalist  intellectuals that  have  been mentioned  in the  previous  chapter.  With  the 
partial  exception of Galvez,  Argentina’s  nationalist intellectuals  lacked  international 
reputations.  As I will  argue, virtually all  of them found themselves  in a subordinate 
position  in  relation  to  dominant  trends  in  academia  and  other  areas  of intellectual 
activities.
Nor did nationalists alone “invent” the issue of urbanisation, to be then exploited 
for their political goals. Internal migration was one of the main concerns of intellectual 
debates after 1955. If, up to the  1920s, the strongest migratory impact had come from 
overseas, the following decades had seen urbanisation with migrants from the pampas 
and the littoral provinces.  The effects of this internal migration were  still  evident in 
Buenos Aires in the 1960s, now accompanied by a further influx of migrants from the 
North-western and Northern provinces.4 The proportion of the population residing in 
cities  rose  from  52.2  percent  in  1950 to  approximately  70  percent  in  1975  and  the 
population of Greater Buenos Aires grew from approximately 5.2m in  1950 to seven 
million in 1960 and over nine million in 1970, when it was still the largest metropolis 
in Latin America.5  Throughout the period from  1930 to  1970, Buenos Aires’  society 
was in a state of fluidity, accommodating a stream of migrants whose values and habits 
often  differed  markedly  from  those  of  long-term porteno  residents.  As  Jose  Luis 
Romero remarked in  1976, “no such [...] crisis had arisen in Latin America since the 
irruption of Creole society.” But, “as this was repeated, a discussion that harked back 
to  old  arguments  was  resumed”,  in the  form  of “a  superficial  analogy  between  the 
Creole groups [...], some constituted in montoneras, and the new urban masses.”6 As I 
will  try  to  show,  revisionism  gained  currency  as  an  attempt  to  redefine  national 
identity in view of contemporary debates about internal migration. Migrant workers of 
the decades after 1930 were often understood as the latter-day descendants of the rural
4 See generally Javier Auyero and Rodrigo Hobert, ‘“^Y esto es Buenos Aires?’ Los contrastes del 
proceso de urbanizacidn”, in: Daniel James (ed.),  Violencia, proscription y autoritarismo (1955-1976) 
(Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 2003), pp. 213-244.
5  Kenneth Ruddle and Mukhtar Hamour (eds.), Statistical Abstracts of Latin America:  1969 (Los 
Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center Publications,  1970), p. 76 for the last figure, C. Paul Roberts 
and Takako Kohda (eds.), Statistical Abstracts of  Latin America:  1966 (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin 
American Center,  1967), p. 61  for the figures of Greater Buenos Aires in  1950 and  1960 and James W. 
Wilkie and Stephen Haber (eds.), Statistical Abstracts of  Latin America:  1980, vol. 21  (Los Angeles: 
UCLA Latin American Center,  1981), p. 87 for the estimation of urbanisation.
6 Jose Luis Romero, Latinoamerica: las ciudadesy las ideas (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 2004), p. 378.
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culture  of  caudillismo  that  revisionists  exalted  as  the  authentic  embodiment  of 
Argentine national identity.
The debate about internal migration became tied to a political question:  how to 
interpret Peronism.  Was populism not the political expression par excellence of these 
internal migrants, who soon came to be called cabecitas negras (little black heads)? 
The  search for cultural  and political  identities  appeared to  be only two  sides  of the 
same coin. Federico Neiburg has persuasively argued that, under these circumstances,
7 ‘“explaining Peronism’ was synonymous with ‘explaining Argentina”’.  After Peron’s 
downfall there was indeed a widely shared perception that Peronism had brought to the 
surface certain problematic and hitherto neglected aspects of Argentina’s social reality 
and, by implication, that the unravelling of the enigma of Peronism held the key for 
understanding Argentina. Not surprisingly, literary, essayistic and scientific attempts to 
come to terms with Peronism achieved broad dissemination in this period. Due to the 
ongoing political weight of Peronism, this was not only an academic discussion. The 
task  of explaining  Peronism  seemed  politically  all  the  more  urgent,  the  clearer  it 
became  that  successive  political  endeavours  to  integrate  Peron’s  illegalised  and 
alienated  followers  into  the  political  system  (especially  President  Arturo  Frondizi’s 
project) did not show satisfactory results.  Furthermore, as the successive debacles of 
attempts to divert the working class’ allegiance away from the deposed leader became 
undeniable,  the  participants  in  debates  about  Peronism  were  impelled  to  position 
themselves in relation to the outlawed mass movement in one way or another. In this 
way, questions of cultural identity which had become more pressing due to the effects 
of internal migration were increasingly politicised.
This  chapter  will  contextualise  nationalist  and  populist  writers  within  these 
debates.  The main argument is that the particular kind of cultural modernisation that 
took place in Argentina after 1955 led to a situation in which the irregular distribution 
of  cultural  capital  among  intellectuals  became  politicised.  As  a  result,  populist 
intellectuals  (most  of whom can  also  be  classified  as revisionists)  formed  a distinct 
group in the most important debates of the late 1950s and 1960s, inasmuch as they felt 
marginalised  from  the  most  prestigious  institutions  of  intellectual  life.  Whilst  the 
themes  addressed  in  revisionist  writings  closely  resembled  the  general  intellectual 
concerns of the period —especially regarding internal migration and Peronism— the
7 Neiburg, Os intelectuais, p.  14. See also Federico Neiburg, “Ciencias sociales y mitologias nacionales: 
la constitution de la sociologia en la Argentina y la invention del peronismo”, Desarrollo Econdmico, 
vol. 34, no.  136 (1995), pp. 533-556.
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position  from  which  revisionists  made  their  arguments  set  them  apart  from  other 
intellectuals. As a first step, the main traits of cultural modernisation in general and the 
restructuring of universities in particular will be sketched. Against this background, I 
will  then cast the various  interpretations  of the  link between  internal  migration  and 
Peronism,  beginning  with  sociology  as  the  main  example  of an  academic  under-
o
standing of Peronism.  This will  then be  linked to non-academic  writings  that  were 
concerned  with  similar  questions,  using  the  essays  of nationalists  and  populists  as 
primary  sources.  Finally,  I  will  return  to  the  question  of  how  the  fragmentation 
intellectual field contributed to the specificities of nationalist discourse.
1.  Universities and modernisation after 1955
To become effective on a massive scale, printed political ideas —including nationalist 
ones— first require a market.  With literacy rates surpassing most Southern European 
countries, conditions had always been favourable for this in Argentina.  Literacy rose 
from  86 percent in  1947 to  91  percent in  1960, but the explosion of the number of 
students in higher education was the most important factor in cultural developments. It 
more  or  less  doubled  in  every  decade  after  1950:  there  were  approximately  82,000 
students in  1950;  181,000 in  1960;  322,000 in  1971; and 620,000 in  1977, by when 
almost half were women. The growth of numbers in Argentina was slightly below the 
average of the Americas so that, by the mid-seventies, Argentina came only fifth in the 
Americas in absolute figures, but since Argentina neither had the continually high birth 
rates of other Latin American countries nor the post-war baby boom of North America, 
the relative impact of this explosion was nonetheless accentuated.  In the late sixties, 
Argentina  had  far  more  students  per  one  million  inhabitants  than  any  other  Latin 
American country, more than France and twice as many as the United Kingdom.  By 
1975,  more  than  a  quarter of all  Argentines  between  20  and  24  years  of age  were 
enrolled  in  higher  education  institutions.  The  humanities  grew  disproportionately: 
between  1962  and  1968  alone  the  number  of students  in  humanities  tripled  and  in 
1966,  a third  of all  students  who  graduated  did  so  in  humanities.9  Yet,  paralleling
8 On sociology in the  1960s see Lucas Rubinich, “La modemizacibn cultural y la irrupcion de la 
sociologia”, in: James (ed.),  Violencia, proscripciony autoritarismo, pp. 247-279 and Francisco Delich, 
Criticay autocritica de la razon extraviada: veinticinco ahos de sociologia (Caracas: El Cid,  1977).
9 In comparison, in the USA, the number of history graduates between the early fifties and the early 
sixties doubled (John Higham, History: professional scholarship in America, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press,  1989), p. 236). All the figures given here should be treated with care, because
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developments in most other Spanish American countries, there were also other,  new 
disciplines,  especially  sociology  and  psychology,  both  of which  were  inaugurated 
between 1955 and 1958 in several Argentine universities.
Two remarks are apposite in relation to this rise in student numbers.  Firstly,  it 
was  accompanied  by  broader  cultural  modernisation.  One  of the  more  immediate 
connections  concerned publishing.  Between  its  foundation  in  1958  and  the  military 
coup  of  1966,  when  the  government  seized  control  of it,  UBA’s  university  press 
(Eudeba) published 802 titles and sold roughly twelve million copies.1 0 Eudeba thus 
became the single most important factor in a veritable revolution of the book market.1 1  
The main novelty were cheap editions sold through newsstands on porteho  streets, a 
sales strategy pioneered by Eudeba and imitated by the main publisher of revisionist 
literature,  Arturo  Pena Lillo,  which massified  reading habits.  Another novelty  were 
bestseller lists, from 1962 onwards published on a weekly basis in the news magazine 
Primer  a Plana. Produced by a staff of professional journalists and modelled upon the 
American  magazine  Time,  Primera  Plana  became  a  symbol  of  Argentina  having 
joined the age of modem mass media with its colourful full-page advertisements for 
cars,  office  furniture  or  haute  couture.  Changes  in  the  culture  of journalism  and 
publishing were complemented by much broader developments, statistically reflected 
in  such  diverse  phenomena  as the  growth  of cinema audiences  (average  yearly  per 
capita visits grew from 6.3  in  1953 to  15.5  in  1967), the spread of psychoanalysis or 
the rise of divorce rates.1 3  Secondly, these were social transformations that, once acce­
lerated or (depending on your viewpoint) released by the downfall  of Peron,  largely
of national differences in education systems (one reason why figures in the USA were much higher) and 
in survey methods, but what matters is the general trend. Figures on Argentina and many of the 
international comparisons differed only minimally, wherever I looked them up. They are taken from 
Kenneth Ruddle and K. Barrows (eds.), Statistical Abstracts of  Latin America:  1972 (Los Angeles: 
UCLA Latin American Center,  1973) pp.  198 and 208-209, Wilkie and Haber (eds.), Statistical 
Abstracts 1980, pp.  133 and 139, Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael Craig Hudson,  World handbook of 
political and social indicators (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,  1972), pp. 229-231, 
Jorge B. Rivera, El escritory la industria cultural (Buenos Aires: CEAL,  1985), p. 634 and Sigal, 
Intelectualesy poder, p. 78.
10 Sarlo (ed.), La batalla, p. 69. The corresponding figures for 1959 to  1962 are 200 new titles and 
approximately three million copies (Sigal, Intelectualesy poder, p. 77).
1   The annual output of titles grew in the two decades after 1955 (from approximately 3,500 titles in 
1955 to 6,700 in  1976) and so did the number of copies produced for each title. See Raul H. Bottaro, La 
edicion de libros en Argentina (Buenos Aires: Troquel,  1964), pp. 30-32 and Wilkie and Haber (eds.), 
Statistical Abstracts 1980, p.  170.
1 2  On Primera Plana see Maite Alvarado and Renata Rocco-Cuzzi, ‘“Primera Plana’: el nuevo discurso 
periodistico de la decada del 60”, Punto de Vista, no. 22 (1984), pp. 27-30.
1 3  See generally Peter Waldmann, “Anomia social y violencia”, in: Alain Rouquie (ed.), Argentina, hoy 
(Mexico City: Siglo XXI,  1982), pp. 206-248. The cinema figure is from Wilkie and Haber (eds.), 
Statistical Abstracts 1980, p.  174. The comparable cinema figure for West European countries today is 
usually below 3.
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escaped the control of governments.  From a broad perspective, it seems that govern­
mental  policies  regarding  higher  education  reacted  to faits  accomplis  rather  than 
following a clear programme. Often, decisions seemed odd in view of the ideological 
orientation of the decision-maker: a Catholic nacionalista as education minister (Atilio 
Dell’Oro Maini) assisted the initial drive towards the renovation of public universities 
after  1955.  Frondizi’s  developmental  administration  (1958-62)  allowed  for  the 
foundation of Catholic universities and the culturally reactionary rulers of the so-called 
Argentine  Revolution  (1966-73)  further  expanded  public  higher  education,  thereby 
revealing the suicidal tendencies of their regime.
Yet the Argentine version of the worldwide cultural revolution was also linked to 
the  domestic  political  context.  Despite  the  Cordoba  Reform  movement  of  1918, 
Argentine universities continued to depend upon state power for most of the twentieth 
century.  The  main  instrument  to  bring  universities  under  political  control  was  the 
president’s  constitutional  faculty  to  “intervene”  them  and  appoint  trustee  rectors 
(interventores).  Such  interventions  occurred  repeatedly,  in  particular  after  military 
coups, but also at the beginning of both presidencies of Peron (1946 and  1973). Not 
surprisingly,  descriptions of the institutional trajectory of universities conventionally 
follow the periodisation that is marked by different governments and one refers to the 
“Peronist University” or the later “Reformist University”. The interventionist tenden­
cies  of the  state  were  strong  under  Peron,  whose  programmes  for higher education 
vacillated between  indifference,  efforts to  curb  a bastion of anti-Peronist opposition 
and an ingrained disdain for the  Reformist demands of 1918.  The climate  in public 
universities  under  Peron  has  thus  usually  been  described  as  somewhere  between 
stifling and obscurantist.1 4  The coup of 1955, in turn, opened a phase of renovation and 
improvement of scholarly standards, which was cut off by the intervention of 1966, 
leading to massive resignations of academic staff. Finally, after the Peronist return to 
power  in  1973,  public  universities  were  briefly  dominated  by the  radicalised  youth 
sectors  of  Peronism,  especially  the  Montoneros,  who  then  became  the  victims  of 
purges  by  the  most  right-wing  groups  within  Peronism,  from  whom  the  military 
dictatorship took over in 1976.
Among  those  who  were  to  gain  academic  weight  after  the  coup  of  1955,  the 
overthrow of Peron’s regime induced optimistic forecasts for academia, as expressed
14 See Carlos Mangone and Jorge A. Warley, Universidady peronismo (1946-1955) (Buenos Aires: 
CEAL,  1984) and Silvia Sigal, “Intelectuales y peronismo”, in: Torre (ed.), Los anos peronistas (1943- 
1955), pp. 481-522.
77Intellectual debates and Peronism
in  a  special  issue  of the  cultural journal  Sur  under  the  programmatic  title  Por  la 
reconstruccion nacional.1 5   Liberal intellectuals who had felt alienated by the  stifling 
intellectual  climate during the  Peronist era now came to the  fore  and tried to  assert 
hegemony  under  the  new  conditions.  Similarly,  the  student  union  of the  capital’s 
university,  the  Federation  Universitaria  de  Buenos  Aires  (FUBA),  bolstered  by  its 
traditions of anti-Peronism and support for the University Reform, seized the moment 
of 1955 in order to occupy university buildings and to lay claim to the students’ right 
of participation in decision-making. In a programmatic document entitled ‘ We are the 
University”, the students vowed to fulfil the programme of the University Reform.1 6  
The education minister Dell’Oro Maini indeed allowed the (re-)implementation of the 
Reform’s  primary  aspiration,  the  tripartite  government  —consisting  of  teachers, 
students  and  alumni—  as  the  central  governing  body  of universities.  FUBA  also 
succeeded in imposing its preferred candidate as rector of the UBA, Jose Luis Romero, 
a  medievalist  with  political  inclinations  towards  socialism  and  a  supporter  of the 
University Reform.  Romero’s  successors,  including Risieri  Frondizi,  the  later presi­
dent’s brother, continued to lead the UBA in a Reformist spirit. Throughout the period 
ranging  from  1955  to  1966,  by  implementing  an  academic  system  of  scientific 
standards that worked without overt political meddling, Argentine universities had a 
relatively high degree of autonomy from governments.
This  is not to  say that the  Reformist University was  apolitical.  Conflicts  arose 
when governmental policies were perceived to run contrary to the goals of the Reform 
of  1918,  which  became  evident  in  1958,  when  Frondizi’s  administration  tried  to 
introduce  private  universities.  Already  under  the  Liberating  Revolution,  education 
minister Dell’Oro Maini had championed private initiative in higher education, which 
was mainly seen as a concession to the Catholic Church’s longstanding claim to run its
1 7 own  universities.  Romero  had  already  resigned  in  opposition  to  these  plans.  The 
conflict simmered for three years until  in September  1958, against the opposition of 
virtually all bodies of student opinion as well as of his brother Risieri, President Arturo 
Frondizi exerted sufficient pressure for Congress to promulgate law  14,557, allowing
1 5  Tulio Halperin Donghi, “La historiografia argentina en la hora de la libertad”, in Sur, no. 237 
(November-December 1955), reproduced in Sarlo (ed.), La batalla, pp. 402-407.
1 6 Reproduced in Alberto Ciria and Horacio Sanguinetti (eds.), La Reforma Universitaria (Buenos Aires: 
CEAL,  1983), vol.  1, p. 157.
1 7 Article 28 of decree-law 6403 from December 1955 envisaged the creation of private universities. 
Between then and 1958, this article led to embittered political confrontations and caused the fall of 
Dell’Oro Maini as well as the resignation of Romero.
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the creation of private universities. In practice, the measure did favour mostly Catholic 
institutions,  which  were  now  officially  recognised  as  universities  —such  as  the 
Universidad del  Salvador or the Universidad Catolica Argentina (UCA),  to mention 
only the two best-known examples  from the  Federal  Capital—,  it also  enabled non­
religious foundations, notably of the Instituto Torcuato di Telia. Although the Instituto 
di  Telia  became  an  important  repository  for  artistic  and  scientific  innovation, 
especially after the coup of 1966,1 8  private universities generally played a secondary 
role in Argentina’s intellectual life before the 1980s, especially in comparison to other 
Latin American countries, such as Chile or Colombia.
Despite  the  dispute  between  the  UBA  and  successive  governments,  populist 
sectors of public opinion identified the Reformist University with anti-Peronism. This 
was facilitated by the fact that the restoration of university autonomy after  1955 was 
the  outcome  of the  measures  of a military regime  keen to  eradicate  Peronism  from 
Argentine politics rather than the result of the achievements of staff and students.  In 
1955, many of the lecturers who had held posts during the Peronist University had to 
leave their offices, whilst those who had been dismissed or who had resigned after the 
military coup of 1943 were reinstated. Although this reinstatement was only symbolic 
because, afterwards, everybody had to apply anew in open competitions, in many cases 
the reinstated teachers won these competitions.1 9 It was difficult to determine whether 
they  did  so  because  of  academic  or  political  criteria,  since  scholarly  excellence, 
cultural capital  and anti-Peronist credentials  so often coincided.  Academic  standards 
did  improve  after  1955,  but  the  procedure  through  which  this  was  enforced  gave 
reason to suspect that the new dominant groups in public universities had arrived in 
their positions because they were anti-Peronists. The authorities perceived no tension 
between  de-Peronisation  and  the  implementation  of academic  standards.  Since  the 
practice of appointing staff during the Peronist decade was  seen (in many cases not 
without  reason)  as  politically  motivated,  the  ensuing  academic  de-Peronisation  was 
portrayed as a necessary measure to restore the universities’  autonomy from politics. 
The  government’s  higher  education  policy  thus  became  a  lesson  in  the  pitfalls  of
1 8 See John King, El Di Telia y el desarrollo cultural argentino en la decada del sesenta (Buenos Aires: 
Ediciones de Arte Gaglianone,  1985) on artists and Mariano Ben Plotkin and Federico Neiburg, “Elites 
intelectuales y ciencias sociales en la Argentina de los afios 60: el Instituto Torcuato Di Telia y la Nueva 
Economia”, Estudios Interdisciplinarios de America Latinay el Caribe, vol.  14, no.  1  (2003), pp.  119- 
149 on economists.
19 See Monica Esti Rein, Politics and education in Argentina 1946-1962, translated by Martha 
Grezenback (Armonk and London: M. E. Sharpe,  1998), pp.  165-167.
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authoritarian liberalism, creating resentment among those who were barred from the 
Reformist University. The argument that universities were an ideological tool of anti- 
Peronism began to sound more plausible.
Many of the  intellectuals who  were  expelled  because they were  deemed  to  be 
close to Peronism can also be identified as revisionists, both nacionalistas and popu­
lists.20  Since  the  leaders  of the  Liberating  Revolution  identified  nacionalismo  with 
Peronism, Rosas with Peron (see chapter five), the experience of the purges of 1955 
bound together many of those who wrote revisionist history. It was as if the winners 
and the losers of 1955  could be divided into cosmopolitan liberals and socialists, on 
the one hand, and nationalists, Peronists and revisionists, on the other (with a heteroge­
neous group including communists in neither of these two camps). For example, by the 
end of 1955, two  of the  later best-known revisionist writers,  Rosa and the  Marxist-
Peronist  Juan  Jose  Hernandez  Arregui,  had  to  give  up  their  academic jobs,  which
21 meant that they now found themselves in an economically more precarious situation. 
In  general,  especially  those  former  lecturers  who  could  rely  neither  on  a  wealthy 
family nor on a regular job had to find other sources of income. Many of the expelled 
began to  seek alternative channels  for articulating their ideas,  usually in journalism. 
For example, Rosa first secured a post at the Instituto de Estudios Politicos in Madrid, 
a formerly Francoist think tank,  and,  after his return to Argentina in  1958,  began to 
write for weekly papers and magazines, whilst reorganising the Instituto Rosas. Later, 
he wrote the  script for Miguel  Antin’s feature film Juan Manuel de Rosas of 1971,
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which popularised central themes of revisionism.  Others  continued a more  limited 
degree  of teaching  in  surrogate  areas,  for example  in  secondary  schools  or  in  adult 
education linked to Peronist trade unions. After 1958 some revisionists were employed 
by Catholic universities.  The historian Julio A.  Torres or the neo-Peronist politician
20 The information on the professional careers of revisionists stems from a large number of primary and 
secondary sources and the generalisations, therefore, cannot be referenced in detail. As for primary 
sources, periodicals in which they published or back covers of their books often contained valuable 
information. Furthermore I consulted the Programas de Estudio of UBA’s Faculty of Philosophy and 
Letters and the university’s Resoluciones del Consejo Superior. For facilitating my access to the latter, I 
would like to thank Eugenio Gallinar. Useful secondary works on history as a discipline at the UBA and 
the UNLP are: Buchbinder, Historia de la Facultad de Filosofiay Letras, esp. pp.  155-217 and Zarrilli, 
Gutierrez and Graciano, Los estudios historicos, esp. pp.  141-190.
21 Rosa had taught at the UBA, Hemdndez Arregui at the UNLP.
22 See Revista del Instituto Rosas, second series, no.  10, August 1971, p. 40 on the film. Rosa seems to 
have evaded references to his stay in Spain from the 1960s onwards, but the Revista del Instituto Rosas, 
no.  17 (1958), pp.  108-109 recorded his “most brilliant intellectual activity” in Madrid. I would like to 
thank Jose Alvarez Junco for clarifying that the Instituto de Estudios Politicos was no longer a bastion 
of Francoism by the mid-fifties.
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and sociologist Rodolfo Tecera del  Franco became professors at the Universidad del 
Salvador,  whilst  Villegas  Oromi,  a  founding  member  of the  Instituto  Rosas,  was 
granted  a minor  administrative  post  at the  Cultural  Institute  of the  UCA.  Although 
nationalist intellectuals were not categorically banned from public universities,  most 
of them  had  to  retreat  into  other  areas.  The  emergence  of these  divisions  in  the 
intellectual  field were likely to become politicised,  since the excluded identified the 
Reformist University with anti-Peronism.
2, Internal migrants and interpretations of  Peronism
Alongside  these  fragmentations  developed  intellectual  debates  about  the  nature  of 
Peronism.  Among  academics,  sociologists took the  lead.  Created  as  an  independent 
discipline at UBA’s Faculty of Philosophy and Letters in 1957, Gino Germani became 
the primary figure in the discipline.  Bom in Rome in  1911,  Germani had arrived in 
Argentina  in  1934,  where  he  had  gained  academic  experience  with  quantitative 
sociological studies. During the Peronist decade he had remained outside academia and 
frequented  anti-Peronist  circles.24  Conceptually  indebted to  structuralism,  functiona­
lism  and  modernisation  theory,  observing North  American  trends  in  the  discipline, 
Germani  became  known  for  postulating  what  he  called  “scientific  sociology”.25 
According to him, disinterested scientific knowledge had previously been thwarted by 
the state’s indifference towards statistics and Argentine intellectuals’  predilection for 
interpretative essayism, which in his eyes amounted to a combination of an unscien­
tific literary pastime and an ideologically charged enterprise. Rejecting this tradition of 
ensayismo and social philosophy, which he discarded as “speculative”, he invoked the
“necessity of organising the knowledge of social reality in a systematic way and in a 
•  •  •  •
scientific  spirit.”  This  spirit,  in  practice  conducive  to  the  accumulation  of  large 
amounts  of data,  would  allow  for  scientific  distance  from the  object  of study.  The 
renovation and relative autonomy of universities after 1955 seemed to be favourable to 
the implementation of these designs.
23 For example, Garcia Mellid and Hernandez Arregui gave talks at UBA’s Law Faculty in the late 
fifties: Mayoria, no. 34, 25 November  1957 on Garcia Mellid and Norberto Galasso, Juan Jose 
Hernandez Arregui: del peronismo al socialismo (Buenos Aires: Ediciones del Pensamiento Nacional, 
1986), p. 90 on Hem&ndez Arregui.
24 Neiburg, Os intelectuais, pp.  157-166.
25 A brief look at the footnotes of Germani’s works suffices to see the influence of North American 
scholars, especially Talcott Parsons.
26 Quoted in Neiburg, Os intelectuais, p.  182.
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Due to its immediate political relevance, scientific distance was seen as critical to 
the sociological interpretation of Peronism, which now became a point of focus in the 
discipline as well as a sub-area for achieving academic distinction.  Although only a 
part  of Germani’s  best-known  work,  published  in  1962,  was  explicitly  devoted  to 
Peronism,  it was this  part that  attracted  most  attention.  In  this  study,  Germani  cast 
Argentina’s socio-political developments in the twentieth century as a transition from a 
“traditional society” to a “mass society”, in the course of which rural workers migrated
27 to the large cities in search of employment in expanding industries.  Industrialisation, 
he  argued,  had  not  been  accompanied  by  the  creation  of political  mechanisms  or 
interest groups that would have represented the demands of these migrant workers and 
would have allowed their democratic participation.  This explained the emergence of 
Peronism, described as  a local variation of totalitarianism,  which  “uses  an ersatz of 
[=substitute for] participation, creates among the masses the illusion that now they are
7Q the decisive element, the active subject, in guiding public affairs.”  The groups that 
irrationally fell victim to this illusion, in Germani’s view, were the politically inexpe­
rienced migrants from the interior who had moved to Greater Buenos Aires throughout 
the decade that preceded Peron’s ascent to power. According to his interpretation,
[t]hese  great  masses,  which  had  been  rapidly  transplanted  to  the  cities  [...],  gained  political 
significance  without  at  the  same  time  finding  the  necessary  institutional  channels  to  integrate 
themselves  into  the  normal  functioning  of democracy.  [Combined  with  other  factors,  this]  left 
these masses “in [a condition of] availability”, made them an element ready to be taken advantage 
of by any venture that would offer them some sort of participation.30 
Germani’s  famous  dualism distinguished these  migrant workers  from an established 
working class in the cities, consisting largely of descendants of immigrants, who by 
the  mid-1940s  had  acquired  a  high  degree  of unionisation,  often  under  socialist  or 
communist  auspices.  Contrary  to  these  skilled  industrial  workers,  the  most  striking 
characteristic  of the  migrants  was  their  “spontaneous  or  improvised  participation, 
without training or discipline.”3 1  Having previously tarried beyond the reach of moder­
nisation processes, they came to embody the socio-cultural essence of Peronism. This 
became known as the orthodox interpretation of Peronism among scholars.
27 Gino Germani, Politico y sociedad en una epoca de transicion: de la sociedad tradicional a la 
sociedad de masas (Buenos Aires: Paidos,  1962).
2 %  Ibid., pp.  150-162.
29 Ibid, p. 239.
30 Ibid, pp. 230-231.
31 Ibid., p. 249.
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Germani’s interpretation was dealt a serious blow with the publication of Juan 
Carlos  Portantiero  and  Miguel  Murmis’  study  on the  origins  of Peronism  in  1971, 
which, from a Marxist perspective, refuted the notion of a dualist working class and 
interpreted Peron’s regime mainly as the outcome of a cycle of capital accumulation 
without  redistribution.32  Whilst  Germani’s  thesis  never recovered  from  this  critique 
and  became  discredited  among  academics,33  the  thrust  of his  interpretation,  namely 
that Peronism symbolised the emergence of social sectors from the country’s interior, 
characterised by their “non-modem” cultural attributes, was a widespread assumption 
in  intellectual  debates  of the  1960s,  far beyond the  confines  of sociologists.  In this 
“invention of Peronism”, as Neiburg has called these debates,34 the fusion of a cultural 
identity (the internal migrant) with a political one (Peronism) became a main feature. 
The undisciplined migrant workers who  allegedly  incorporated the  essence  of Pero­
nism came to be seen as the latter-day descendants of the nineteenth-century gaucho 
hordes that followed a caudillo. In this point, most interpretations of Peronism of the 
period from 1955 to 1966, although expressed from different political and institutional 
standpoints  and  couched  in  very  different  literary  genres,  showed  remarkable 
similarities.
In the above-mentioned issue of Sur from late  1955, deriving his authority from 
his  status as an internationally acclaimed writer —i.e.  from a source which differed 
markedly from Germani’s scientism—, Jorge Luis Borges, who was named director of 
the Biblioteca Nacional by the regime of the Liberating Revolution in 1955, drew out 
some of the tropes that were often employed  in depictions of Peronism.  His  article, 
entitled L ’illusion comique, was an allegory of the events of 17 October 1945, a crucial 
day in the Peronist liturgy, when a mass demonstration on Buenos Aires’ central Plaza 
de Mayo had successfully demanded Peron’s release from prison.  Two major themes 
stood  out  in  Borges’  article.  Firstly,  in  his  account,  the  demonstrators  appeared  as 
“vulgar” hordes that rampaged the symbolic city centre. The word that Borges used for 
the  “accumulating”  enforcement  squads  [amontonando]  bore  the  connotation  of the
32 Miguel Murmis and Juan Carlos Portantiero, Estudios sobre los origenes del peronismo, 2nd ed. 
(Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno,  1972), esp. p.  118 for a critique of Germani.
33 See Mariano Plotkin, “The changing perceptions of Peronism: a review essay”, in: James P. Brennan 
(ed.), Peronism and Argentina (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Books,  1998), pp. 29-54 and Tulio 
Halperln Donghi, “Algunas observaciones sobre Germani, el surgimiento del peronismo y los migrantes 
intemos”, Desarrollo Econdmico, vol.  15, no. 56 (1975), pp. 765-781.
34 Neiburg, Os intelectuais.
35 Jorge Luis Borges, ‘L’illusion comique’, in Sur, no. 237, November-December 1955, pp. 9-10, 
reprinted in Sarlo (ed.), La batalla, p.  122.
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nineteenth-century gaucho bands from the interior, the montoneras, encapsulating the 
impossibility of their assimilation to civilised urban life and their unyielding hostility 
towards the cosmopolitan port city.  Secondly, Borges depicted this invasion as a sort 
of nightmarish theatrical production whose actors irrationally performed on the basis 
of a peculiar blend of coercion and willingness. He thereby revisited the camivalesque 
motif that  was  already  present  in  his  literary  account  of  17  October,  La fiesta  del 
monstruo. Both qualifiers for Peronism —the vulgar hordes from the interior and their 
irrationality— can be seen as associated to the idea of a persistent barbarism that had 
not yet been eradicated by the advance of civilisation. Despite the differences of genre 
between Borges and Germani,  in the writings of both,  Peron’s  supporters were thus 
characterised by their irrationality and their origin from the interior provinces.
The association between Peronism and the traditional culture of the interior was 
also made by pro-Peronist authors. In contrast to Borges’ abhorrence at Peronism and 
Germani’s scientific sobriety, their writings glorified the supposedly authentic traits of 
Argentine  nationality  that  were  embodied  in  Peronism  and  the  migrants.  Marxist- 
nationalist essayists such as Jorge Abelardo Ramos or Hernandez Arregui or populists 
like Jauretche not only differed from scientific sociologists in that they were outside 
academe, but also  in that they stressed that their writings  should be put to  concrete 
political  uses.  Yet the  general  assumptions  beneath their  interpretation  of Peronism 
resembled  Germani’s.  As  scholars  who  refuted  Germani’s  thesis  have  remarked, 
central traits of this thesis were shared by populist writers who depicted the Peronist 
movement  as  the  latest  instance  of a  division  that  supposedly  pervaded  Argentine 
history.36  Germani’s  orthodox  interpretation  converged  most  clearly  with  populist 
depictions of Peronism in the leitmotiv of the internal migrant, who came to be called 
cabecita  negra  in  Peronist  vocabulary.  Whilst  the  term  originally  bore  pejorative 
racial connotations, it became a positive signifier of Peronist identity, often connected 
to the imagery of the gaucho.  An oft-cited text by Scalabrini Ortiz, first published in 
1949, was typical of how populist intellectuals portrayed what they saw as the cultural 
essence of Peronism. Describing the scenes on the Plaza de Mayo on 17 October 1945, 
he wrote:
36 Murmis and Portantiero, Estudios, pp. 62-64. Walter Little, “The popular origins of Peronism”, in: 
David Rock (ed.), Argentina in the twentieth century (London: Duckworth,  1975), p.  163 and p.  166.
37 For an early example after 1955, see Antonio Castro, “La leccion nacional de los cabecitas negras”, 
Columnas del Nacionalismo Marxista de Liberacion Nacional, no. 3,  1   September 1957, p. 3.
38 To name only two examples of a potentially endless list, both taken from the Peronist press in the 
1960s: Relevo, no.  1,  17 October 1962, p. 5 and Dinamis, no.  137, November 1967, pp. 42-55.
84Intellectual debates and Peronism
In front of my eyes I saw swarthy features, burly arms and strapping torsos marching [...]. It was 
the strangest crowd the imagination can conceive of. The traces of their origin could be detected 
on their faces. [...] It was the subsoil of the roused fatherland. It was the basic foundations of the 
nation  that  were  revealed just  as  the  past  ages  of the  soil  are  revealed  in  the  upheaval  of an 
earthquake. It was the substratum of our idiosyncrasy and of our collective possibilities that were 
right there in their primordiality.39 
In Scalabrini’s view, their provenance from the “subsoil”, which can also be read as an 
allegory for the interior, implied their “primordiality” and a state of mind that was not 
yet corrupted by the processes of modernisation.  Unlike the Europeanised sectors of 
the working class, they had resisted the temptation of “foreign” ideas such as Marxism.
Germani’s  notion  of  working-class  dualism  was  also  shared  by  pro-Peronist 
essayists. In particular left-wing authors who tried to disentangle themselves from the 
supposedly European ideals of Argentina’s traditional Left stressed the split between 
skilled industrial workers (identified with the Socialist and Communist Parties) and the 
new migrant proletariat that allegedly formed the bedrock of Peronism.  For example, 
Alberto  Belloni,  a leader of the  union  of state  employees  (ATE)  who  came  from  a 
socialist  background  but  began  to  sympathise  with  Peronism  after  1955,  explained 
that,  in the  1930s,  in  Greater Buenos  Aires  there  had  emerged  a new proletariat  of 
“native  ancestry”,  made  up  of internal  migrants.40  In  another  book,  Belloni  made 
explicit his notion that there had  emerged two different wings of the working class: 
unionised workers, who were descendants of European immigrants, whereas the
other  wing  of the  country’s  working  class  movement  consists  of the  stream  of native  youth, 
offspring of the creoles and gauchos of the montoneras, who descend on the port-city.  [...] They 
have a virgin mentality without much experience or consciousness of their situation as a class in 
modern society.
In  Belloni’s view,  their “virgin  mentality”  not only made them  susceptible  to  Pero­
nism, but also meant that they were the “real face of our people”. The fact that “[t]he 
strength of these men came from the very entrails of the earth and the Argentine people 
[...] makes them capable of marking out a new national course.”4 1
Whereas Germani dissected the socio-cultural stratification of the working class 
in order to explain why large parts of it had fallen victim to what he saw as totalitarian 
demagogy,  populist  intellectuals  hailed  the  new  workers  as  an  authentic  national-
39 CGT de los Argentinos, no. 25,  17 October 1968, p. 6. Also reproduced in Companero, no.  17,  16 
October 1963, p. 3. Originally published in El Laboralista,  16 October 1949.
40 Alberto Belloni, Del anarquismo alperonismo: historia del movimiento obrero argentino (Buenos 
Aires: A. Pefia Lillo,  1960), p. 59.
41 Alberto Belloni, Peronismoy socialismo nacional (Buenos Aires: Coyoacan,  1962), p.  13.
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revolutionary movement and depicted them as the latest instance of a longer historical 
genealogy,  moulded  in  a  revisionist  understanding  of  history.  For  example,  the 
Trotskyist nationalist Ramos posited the socio-political origins of Peronism under the
heading “The cabecitas come to Buenos Aires”:
In only few years we saw a new Argentina appearing before our eyes [...]. The cabecitas negras, 
as  the  wrathful  and  blind  oligarchy  later  called  them,  descended  from  the  Mediterranean 
provinces.  [...]  Descendants  of the  eponymous  montonero,  they turned  into  industrial  workers 
and  became  the  backbone  of our  young  proletariat.  They  arrived  without  unionist  or  political 
traditions, elevated in the ladder of civilisation through passing from the countryside to the city, 
enshrouded  in  an  elemental  nationalism,  vernacular,  naive  and  profound  [...].  In  the  social 
subsoil seethed the necessity of a new economic policy.
Whilst  this  process  first  led  to  the  aberration  of the  1943  coup,  the  native  or  new 
working class, on  17 October  1945, paved the way for a movement that “manifested 
the national will to be.”42 Similarly, the Marxist-Peronist Eduardo Astesano wrote that 
the
participation of the people  in political action  [...]  had already been manifest in the montoneras 
and in rosismo and, in a distant future, would come back [...] on a certain 17 October.
The  continuity  with  the  past,  in  Astesano’s  view,  was  encapsulated  in  a  “gaucho 
working class” which he opposed to the skilled immigrant workers of Buenos Aires.43 
Hence, while populist intellectuals, in contrast to Germani, claimed to be the spokes­
persons of the marginalised new proletariat and of Peronism, the underlying diagnosis 
of a division between the interior and the established urban working class was easily 
compatible with the  orthodox  sociological thesis.  In this  sense,  the  interpretation of 
Peronism  offered  by  populist  and  neo-revisionist  writers  like  Ramos  or  Astesano 
mirrored understandings that were widespread at the time.
3.  Scientific sociology and Peronised intellectuals
However,  populist essayists  stressed their opposition to  academic  views,  identifying 
them with  liberalism  and  anti-Peronism.  There  are  many examples that bespeak the 
populist resentment against academics. The following passage from a book by the left-
42 Lucha Obrera, no. 5, 22 December 1955. The longer quotation is from Jorge Abelardo Ramos, De 
octubre a setiembre: ensayos politicos de Victor Almagro (Buenos Aires: A. Pefia Lillo,  1959), pp. 342- 
343.
43 Eduardo B. Astesano, Martin Fierro y la justicia social: primer manifiesto revolucionario del 
movimiento obrero argentino (Buenos Aires: Relevo,  1963), p.  113.
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wing nationalist writer Rodolfo Puiggros —which might as well have been written by 
Ramos or Astesano— can illustrate this:
Even today, it is taught from the highest ranks of the university professoriate that our country is 
afflicted by a recurring disease and that we cannot consider ourselves “civilised” until  we  have 
eradicated it for ever.  It [the disease] is caudillismo in its four incarnations: montoneras,  Creole 
politics,  Yrigoyenist rabble  [chusma]  and  descamisados  or cabecitas  negras  of Peronism.  The 
politicians and sociologists who are dazzled by the declining Europeanist civilisation see in these 
ups  and  downs  the  expression  [...]  of the  same  substantial  barbarism,  which  has  not  been 
stamped out.44
In this view, academic positions corresponded with political viewpoints. The academic 
claim of scientific distance to the object of analysis, according to this account, could 
not  conceal  that  “politicians  and  sociologists”  were  together  in  their  Europeanist 
arrogance towards the supposedly authentic expressions of Argentine nationality.
In  a  similar  vein,  Ramos  constructed  two  opposed  historical  genealogies,  in 
which academics like Germani represented the most recent exponent of the supposedly 
anti-popular  and  anti-national  intellectual  establishment.  In  Ramos’  view,  this 
establishment consisted  in an alliance between the traditional  Left,  embodied  in the 
founder of the Socialist Party Juan B. Justo, the liberal oligarchy, for which he singled 
out Mitre, and imperialism. According to Ramos, the old Left’s succumbing to libera­
lism under Argentina’s “semi-colonial” conditions had meant that
[o]ne of the weaknesses of our national and popular revolution [...] is that there has to date been 
no  scientific  and  Marxist  critique  of  our  historical  past,  which  is  indispensable  for  fully 
understanding  the  national  and  social  struggles  in  Argentina  and  the  function  of the  popular 
masses in these struggles.45 
In the book in which Ramos set out to accomplish this task, Revolucion y contrarre- 
volucion en la Argentina, the first part of which was published in 1956 to an enormous 
success that  led to  several  enlargements  and  re-publications,  he  cast  Germani  as  an 
intellectual successor of Justo’s reputed anti-popular socialism. Justo’s
“scientific theory of history” was as little scientific as it was Marxist. [...] Yet curiously, his ideas 
of how to  evaluate the  historical  process  would become  precursors  of the  modem  “sociology” 
carved  out  according  to  the  North  American  model  and  propagated  by  abstract  statisticians
[estadigrafos]  of the  likes  of Gino  Germani  or by cipayo “Marxists”  of the  lower ranks,  who,
46
impotent to understand Argentine reality, kneel before Pythagorean divinity.
44 Rodolfo Puiggros, El peronismo: sus causas, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: Carlos Perez,  1971), p.  18.
45 Lucha Obrera, no. 8, 25 January 1956.
46 Jorge Abelardo Ramos, Revolucion y contrarrevolucion en la Argentina, 3rd ed. (Buenos Aires: Plus 
Ultra,  1965), vol. 2, p. 80. The term cipayo is untranslatable. It is probably an etymologic derivate of the 
word “sepoy”. According to Ramos himself, who frequently used the term, it originally referred to
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Although  Ramos  claimed that his  argument was  based  on a political  criterion,  it  is 
revealing that the target  of his  attack were  intellectuals-politicians  (especially  Mitre 
and Justo, about whom he developed a veritable obsession) or intellectuals (Germani) 
rather than politicians.  The symbolically violent rhetoric of this passage and the fact 
that  Ramos’  own  understanding  of Peronism  had  shown  similarities  to  Germani’s 
suggest that the rationale behind this attack was not so much differences in interpre­
tation of Argentina’s reality,  but rather a resentment  against what Ramos  and  other 
populist intellectuals perceived as a mandarinic intelligentsia.
Attacks  against the  Reformist  University  were  the  specialty  of nationalist  and 
populist  intellectuals  who  were  excluded  from  public  universities  and  not  of the 
Peronist rank and file.  In the Peronist press directed towards a working class reader­
ship, academic debates usually passed unnoticed. Yet on the rare occasions when such 
periodicals  engaged  with  intellectual  discussions  about  the  nature  of  Peronism, 
Germani appeared in a favourable light. For example, Dinamis, the monthly magazine 
of the union of the light and power workers,  introduced a section in  1966 to review 
books, which the union had acquired for its library.  The first review was devoted to 
Germani’s Politica y sociedad,  which was praised for having  achieved  an objective 
and scientific evaluation of the significance of Peronism.47 Opposition to the Reformist 
University, therefore, was not primarily a question of Peronists versus anti-Peronists, 
even though writers such as Puiggros or Ramos portrayed their polemics as part of this 
political dichotomy.
Nor was an anti-academic bias confined to the populist Left. Intellectuals of the 
extreme Right also took issue with public universities. Although, in contrast to Ramos 
or  Puiggros,  the  Right  pictured  academia  as  a  hotbed  of communism  and  moral 
atrophy, arguments resembled each other in that academics were seen as the promoters 
of an “anti-national” ideology. A typical example of this view was a front-page article 
in the  reactionary pro-Peronist  weekly Retorno,  entitled  “The  university  against the
4 o
entire country”. The piece was targeted against Ismael Vinas,  Romero, Germani and
natives fighting in the British army in India and was subsequently applied to Cubans fighting for the 
Spanish in the late nineteenth century. FORJA had introduced it into Argentine political vocabulary 
(ibid., p. 478). The word was frequently used in the jargon of the national-popular camp. It could mean 
traitor of the fatherland, someone with affinities to European culture, mercenary of an imperialist power, 
cosmopolitanist.
47 Dinamis, no.  112, 4 April  1966.
48 Together with his brother David, Ismael Vifias was the main figure behind the cultural journal 
Contorno. In 1956, he was Romero’s secretary at the UBA. Later, he was close to Frondizi’s wing of the 
Radical Party and joined the Partido Socialista Argentino de Vanguardia in  1963.
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Eudeba, who were lumped together under the claim that they were the fifth column of 
international communism. To this information, the author added several anecdotes of 
students who had allegedly been kidnapped and tortured by communists.  The article 
concluded that the institutional safe-haven for these events, the “liberal and democra­
tic” university, had to be eradicated because it “does not serve the nation”. As a conse­
quence, the conditions of the Peronist University had to be reinstated.49 Unsurprising­
ly, one of the main contributors to Retorno was the nacionalista sociologist Alberto 
Baldrich, who, after having served as a minister for the military governments of 1943- 
46 had found a comfortable niche in the Peronist cultural apparatus as a professor at 
the UBA until 1955, when he had to leave (see also chapter four on him).
Populist intellectuals,  virtually  all  of whom were  excluded from the  Reformist 
University,  constructed  an  opposition  between  the  people,  whom  they  claimed  to 
express, and the “intelligentsia”. A good example of this dichotomy were the writings 
of the essayist Arturo Jauretche. In his widely read book El medio pelo en la sociedad 
argentina of 1966, he referred to the author Beatriz Guido, who was known for her 
cosmopolitan  lifestyle,  as  “a  sub-product  of literacy  campaigns”  and  added:  “[t]he 
reader must understand that the space that I am going to devote to her is only justified 
by the interest of a dissector in front of the anatomic specimen.”50 Jauretche opposed 
his  style  to  a  scientific  tone  and  grounded  his  authority  to  intervene  in  intellectual 
debates  on  an  appeal  to  the  practical  experience  of the  common  people,  whom  he 
claimed to express through an ostensibly unpretentious and non-academic prose.  He 
wrote that
[t]he Nation is a life, that is to say a continuity, an elemental notion, which nevertheless generally 
escapes  the  country’s  academic thought,  perhaps to  the  same  extent to  which  [this  thought]  is 
disconnected  from  it  [the  nation].  There  are  truths,  such  as  this  one,  which  escape  the 
“intelligentsia” but which are easily accessible to our common countrymen, for the simple reason 
that they think with common sense and for themselves instead of applying borrowed information 
and opinions.5 1
As the subheading of El medio pelo announced, in opposition to the social sciences in 
public  universities,  Jauretche  advocated  a  “national  sociology”.  The  book’s  blurb 
enthused that the language of this approach was indebted to everyday forms of expres­
49 Retorno, no. 60,  1   September 1965.
50 Arturo Jauretche, El medio pelo en la sociedad argentina: apuntes para una sociologia nacional, 9th 
ed. (Buenos Aires: A. Pefla Lillo,  1967), p.  194. The term medio pelo (literally middle hair) refers to 
sectors of the middle class which aspire to acceptance among the upper class.
51 Jauretche, Politico nacional (1982), p. 9.
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sion  among  common  Argentines.  After  an  anecdotal  example  that  was  meant  to 
prove the general uselessness of statistics —which amounted to the remark that only 
half  of  Cordoba’s  buildings  appeared  in  official  property  registers—  Jauretche 
explained that his insights were derived  from the  experience of everyday  life  rather 
than from scholarly training.  Invoking Jose Hernandez, the author of the gauchesque 
epic  Martin  Fierro  (first published  in  1872),  he  avowed:  “I  simply  ride  along  [the 
discipline  of sociology]  with  ‘halter  and  lasso’,  as  Hernandez  said,  a  sociologist  of 
ours who was not specialised either.”  What a truly “national” sociology needed was 
the  posture  of a  gaucho  like  Martin  Fierro,  conducive  to  the  “rectification  of the 
apparently  scientific  datum  by  experience  [which]  requires  a  degree  from  the 
university of life.”53 In this domain, Jauretche portrayed himself as uniquely qualified. 
As  he  believed  that  the  option  was  “[b]etween  being  an  intellectual  and  being  an 
Argentine”, he affirmed: “I do not accept being defined as an intellectual.  [...]  I vote 
for the second. Without reservations.”54
Behind the populist claim to speak for the “people” or the “nation” instead of the 
supposedly anti-national “intelligentsia” often lurked a bitterness for not being recog­
nised  as  serious  intellectuals.  Whereas  Jauretche  attacked  the  “intelligentsia”  with 
irony and sarcasm, this resentfulness was especially clear in the writings of Hernandez 
Arregui.  Against  possible  methodological  reproaches  from  academics  (who  were, 
according to Hernandez Arregui,  equivalent to the “intelligentsia,  [...]  the colonised 
middle classes”) he defended himself for the absence of footnotes in his works:
If I have not done it [include footnotes], this is not because I am unaware of the technique, which 
is  precisely  what  I  have taught to  generations  of university  students,  but because  —and  those 
gentlemen who confuse  reviewing with  nit-picking may  as  well know this—  my  books  do  not 
come from research but from struggle.55 
The passage not only shows Hernandez Arregui’s political commitment, which hardly 
anyone could have doubted given his Peronist militancy, but also that this commitment 
implied a positioning against academia. Had it been so clear that Hernandez Arregui’s 
writing  was  defined  only  in relation to  politics,  it would  have  been  unnecessary  to 
polemically declare its non-academic character. Populist intellectuals thus defined their 
position  in  relation  as  much  to  the  political  as  to  the  intellectual  field.  A  similar
52 Jauretche, El medio pelo.
53 Ibid., p. 9. and p. 13.
54 Quoted in Sigal, Intelectuales y poder, p.  176.
55 Juan Jos6 Hem&ndez Arregui, iQue es el ser nacional? La conciencia historica hispanoamericana 
(Buenos Aires: Hachea,  1963), pp.  12-13.
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attitude towards academia can be detected in a passage from an article by the president 
of the Instituto Rosas, Jose Marla Rosa, published in the nationalist weekly Santo y 
Sena in 1960. Rosa wrote that
[t]here are many anti-revisionists who read us, but in secret,  like boys who eat the neighbour’s 
grapes.  I  know this  from  experience.  Two  years  ago,  I  published  a  book on the  fall  of Rosas, 
which was read a lot because it sold out. The adversaries read me, looking for a chink to stick the 
knife into and as yet they have not found one:  I keep waiting for the reviews in the big dailies.  I 
correct myself: one adversary found a mistake (or at least that’s what he thought).
The disagreement was over the question of whether the Brazilian army, after the battle 
of Caseros, had marched through Buenos Aires on 20 February, as Rosa had written in 
his book, or one day earlier. Rosa explained that,
since I’m an expert in such matters, I let him come. I opened the game by showing the memoirs 
of Cesar  Diaz,  which  affirmed  that  it  was  on  the  twentieth.  A  long-time  player  of truco,  I 
withheld the best card for the final showdown.  My opponent, a callow player, threw back at me 
that one  witness  alone,  however qualified he  was,  was  not worth  anything  in  court  against the 
date of the decree that said clearly “19 February”.  [...]  So I played the ace of spades that I  had 
hidden away: no one less than Sarmiento, the courier of the Allied army, said that the march had 
been  fixed  for  the  nineteenth,  but  took  place  on  the  twentieth.  [...]  I  awarded  myself all  the 
points, as befits a complete victory.56 
Similar to this example, many writings by populist and revisionist authors implicitly 
indicate a wish for recognition by whom they attacked as their opponents.
Another sign of this desire was that the populist intellectuals felt obliged to de­
monstrate erudition, literary knowledge and education. Jauretche, for example, sought 
to  derive  authority  from  frequent  quotations  from  European  writers  —Chesterton, 
whose writings the  1930s courses of Catholic education had introduced in Argentina, 
being among his favourites. In 1963, Hernandez Arregui, whose style Horacio Gonza­
lez  has  fittingly  labelled  “doctoral  Leninism”,57  gave  an  interview  to  the  left-wing 
Peronist weekly Companero, in which he was asked which writers had influenced him 
most.  This  was the  question on which  Hernandez Arregui  gave  the  longest  answer, 
stressing that  he  had  “never been  a  ‘vulgar’  Marxist”  and  that he  had  read,  among 
many  others,  Dilthey,  Husserl,  Feuerbach,  Vico,  Ernst  Troeltsch,  Durkheim,  Hans 
Freyer, Ferdinand Tonnies, George Herbert Mead, Wright Mills and Freud.58 Hernan­
dez Arregui’s  book Imperialismo y cultura  was  in  large  parts  designed  to  show  its
56 Truco is an Argentine card game. Jose Maria Rosa, “Asi fue Caseros”, in Santo y Sena, no.  12, 2 
February 1960.
57 Gonzalez, Restos pampeanos, p. 269.
58 Companero, no.  12, 27 August 1963, p. 4.
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author’s  familiarity  with  the  great  names  of world  literature,  ranging  from  Rainer 
Maria Rilke to Jean-Paul Sartre.59 Hence, despite their refusal of the category,  many 
populist writers in fact did portray themselves as intellectuals, understanding this term 
very  classically  as  independence  from  the  constraints  of  politics  and  claiming  a 
knowledge-based  authority  for  themselves.  Jauretche’s  stress  upon  having  “always 
been marginalised” came close to the notion of the bohemian freedom of the intellec­
tual who was only bound to his own conscience. Since, according to him, “there is no 
freer man in Argentina than me”, he had no political obligations vis-a-vis Peron: “I had 
very good relations with Peron, but we practically broke them off, because at a certain 
moment I told him what nobody used to tell him and the  man had  grown unaccus­
tomed to my frankness.”60 In a similar vein,  in a letter to the writer Ernesto  Sabato, 
Hernandez Arregui  wrote:  “I  do not have any commitments  and I boast of absolute 
intellectual independence.”6 1
In  sum,  the  recurring  polemics  against  the  Reformist  University  by  populist 
intellectuals should be seen in the light of their subordinate position in the intellectual 
field. As Bourdieu has remarked,
[i]f the  denunciation  of professional  routine  is  to  some  extent  consubstantial  with  prophetic 
ambition, [...] it is none the less true that producers cannot fail to pay attention to the judgement 
of university institutions.  [...] There are plenty of attacks upon the university which bear witness 
to the fact that their authors recognize the legitimacy of its verdicts sufficiently to reproach it for 
not having recognized them.62 
A similar attitude towards universities conditioned Argentine populist discourse in the 
1960s.  This is not to  say that political  ideas played no role in this.  On the contrary, 
writers  like  Ramos,  Hernandez  Arregui  or  Jauretche  identified  positions  in  the 
intellectual field with political viewpoints.  Yet precisely for this reason, it is difficult 
—and  probably  futile—  to  establish  whether  invectives  against  the  “intelligentsia” 
were either the result of resentment because of these populist intellectuals’  perceived 
marginalisation from official academia or the expression of a genuine conviction on 
behalf of populists that intellectuals represented the anti-national forces and therefore 
should  be  attacked  on  political  grounds.  In  any  event,  the  fragmentation  of  the
59 Juan Jos6 Hernandez Arregui, lmperialismoy cultura, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: Hachea,  1964).
60 Interview with Jauretche by Luis Alberto Romero, 22 April  1971, Archivo de Historia Oral, Instituto 
Torcuato di Telia, p. 130.
61 Juan Jos6 Hernandez Arregui, lmperialismo y cultura, 3rd ed. (Buenos Aires: Plus Ultra,  1973), p.
341.
62 Pierre Bourdieu, The field of  cultural production: essays on art and literature (Cambridge: Polity 
Press,  1993), p.  124.
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intellectual  field  became  politicised,  as the  unequal  distribution  of symbolic  capital 
came to be seen as coinciding with political divisions.  According to the accounts of 
those who were excluded from it, the Reformist University represented an anti-national 
—and by  extension anti-Peronist—  establishment that had to  be  fought.  Intellectual 
prestige was habitually depicted as resting on political grounds so that the boundaries 
between intellectual and political strategies of legitimation were increasingly blurred.
4.  The rise of  Peronism in universities, 1966-73
Although the legitimacy of academic  scholarship had thus been undermined  already 
before  1966, it took the military coup of this year to finish off university autonomy. 
Whilst  the  regime  of General  Juan  Carlos  Ongania,  self-styled  as  the  Revolucion 
Argentina,  initially  wavered  in  its  social  and  economic  policies  —before  adopting 
orthodox  stabilisation  measures  that  antagonised  the  working  class—  its  attitude 
towards cultural policy was resolute from the outset. Denouncing public institutions of 
higher education as breeding grounds for moral  degeneration, hotbeds of subversion 
and  obstacles  to  the  implementation  of  “Western  and  Christian”  values,  the 
government seized control of the universities in a remarkably violent police operation 
on 29 July 1966 at UBA’s Faculty of Sciences, which became known as the “Night of 
the Long Sticks”. This measure ended the autonomy of the universities by eliminating 
the system of tripartite government and converting the rectors into mere administrators 
under  the  government  authorities.  If  the  aim  of  the  repressive  measures  was  to 
depoliticise universities, the overall  educational policy of the  government backfired. 
The rapid expansion of student numbers continued after 1966 and the military regime 
further  encouraged  this  process  by  decreeing  the  foundation  of twelve  new  public 
universities between 1971  and 1973, thereby more than doubling their overall number. 
As elsewhere in the world, the change in the social composition of university students 
as a result of the expansion of higher education contributed to the students’  radicali- 
sation in the late 1960s.
After 1966, Argentine universities underwent a “Peronisation”, as many students
AT
began to declare their faith in Peron.  In 1971, Peron, in his routine letters to the Pero-
63 There had already been isolated pockets of Peronist student groups before  1966 and pro-Peronist 
intellectuals had occasionally spoken in public universities. For example, Hernandez Arregui had toured 
provincial universities in the early sixties (these talks were published as Hem&ndez Arregui, i Que es el
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nist Youth (JP), courted his addressees as “a marvellous generation of young people, 
which is showing its capacity and grandeur every day”.64 The leftist wing of Peronist 
unionism also took an increasing interest in the matters of university students.65  The 
alliance  between  workers  and  students  reached  its  climax  in  the  cordobazo,  as  the 
unrest in the city of Cordoba in May  1969 came to be known, which precipitated the 
fall  of the  military  dictatorship  and  ultimately paved  the  way  for  Peron’s  return  to 
Argentina  in  1972/73.66  Between  the  cordobazo  and  Peron’s  return,  the  Peronist 
guerrilla  group  Montoneros,  closely  tied  to  the  JP,  gradually  gained  sway  among 
students,  culminating  in  1973  in  the  ilmontonera  university”.  When  Puiggros  was 
named rector of the UBA and Jauretche director of Eudeba in  1973, this was only the 
apex of a process of Peronisation that had been under way since the late  1960s. As a 
contemporary who found herself at the centre of this political mobilisation of middle- 
class youth noticed in 1971, “paradoxically, Ongania’s government had done more for 
a real politicisation of the student body than fifty years of [the University] Reform.”
In order to explain the Peronisation of Argentine universities after 1966, broader 
factors must be taken into account.  In part, this Peronisation was simply the Argen­
tine equivalent of the student radicalisation that occurred elsewhere in the world.69 The 
idea that “the student movement has a debt with the working class”, as a student leader
70 at the University of Cordoba had put it already in 1964,  was not peculiar to Argentina 
in this period, but since the local working class continued to identify with Peronism, 
the logical consequence of this impression was that students did so, too. Generational 
conflicts may also  have  played  a role.  Since most students  came  from  non-Peronist 
milieus, declaring one’s faith in Peron could be a rebellion against the father genera­
ser nacional?). However, such examples were very rare and the coup of 1966 was a watershed in this 
respect.
64 Juan Domingo Peron in his letter of 23 February 1971, in: Roberto Baschetti (ed.), De la guerrilla 
peronista al gobierno popular: documentos 1970-1973 (La Plata: La Campana,  1995), p.  139.
65 E.g. CGT de los Argentinos, no.  12,  18 July 1968, p.  1.
66 On the Cordobazo see e.g. the testimonies in Juan Carlos Cena (ed.), El cordobazo: una rebelion 
popular (Buenos Aires: La Rosa Blindada, 2000). On the union background: James P. Brennan, The 
labor wars in Cordoba,  1955-1976: ideology,  work, and labor politics in an Argentine industrial city 
(Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press,  1994) and Monica Gordillo, Cordoba en los 
‘60: la experiencia del sindicalismo combativo (Cordoba: Publicaciones de la Universidad de Cordoba, 
1996).
67 Envido, no. 3, April  1971, p. 55.
68 A useful introduction to this question is Waldmann, “Anomia social y violencia”, in: Rouquie (ed.), 
Argentina, hoy, pp. 206-248.
69 The faculty that had expanded most in previous years, Philosophy and Letters, was also the faculty in 
which Peronist groups drew most votes in the student elections of November 1973. See Militancia, 6 
December 1973.
70 The student leader introduced a speech by John William Cooke. See John William Cooke, El retorno 
de Peron: un analisis revolucionario (Buenos Aires: Segunda Etapa,  1964), p. I.
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tion.  The political  situation that was established through the  coup of 1966  made  an 
impact,  too.  By  closing  congress,  prohibiting  political  parties  and  restricting  union 
activities,  Ongania’s  regime  reduced  the  multiplicity  of axes  along  which  political 
conflict had been negotiated before.  In this politically and culturally stifling climate, 
oppositional  sectors  identified  the  Peronist  movement,  which  by  then  had  already 
proven  its  survivability  under  the  conditions  of  illegality,  as  the  most  promising 
vehicle to realise their demands. From exile, Peron helped to further enlarge the groups 
of his  adherents  by  nurturing  the  (notoriously  incompatible)  ambitions  of his  self-
7 1 declared  followers  to  become  the  dominant  part  of his  movement.  Overall,  this 
reinforced  the  impression  that  the  central  axis  around  which  Argentine  politics 
revolved was the division between Peronists and anti-Peronists.
To a lesser extent than students, university staff also became more pro-Peronist 
after  1966. This was not immediately clear after the coup, nor was it the outcome of 
governmental plans for higher education. Instead, this development is best understood 
as a long-term effect of the mass exodus of staff after the “Night of the Long Sticks”. 
In  protest  against  this  measure  and  in  the  unavailing  hope  of regaining  their  lost 
autonomy  through  protest,  about  8,600  university  teachers  resigned  in  the  Federal
no
Capital alone within a few days.  As a result, less experienced staff had to be drafted 
in from other areas,  such as private  institutions or secondary schools.  In accordance 
with Ongania’s sympathies with the Catholic Right and the orientation of his secreta­
ries  of state  for  culture  and  education  (Carlos  Maria  Geliy  y  Obes,  Jose  Mariano 
Astigueta and  Dardo  Perez  Guilhou),  the  new appointees were  often recruited  from 
Catholic  universities.  The  new  directors  of  UBA’s  Department  of  Sociology,  for 
example, Justino O’Farrell and Gonzalo Cardenas, had previously taught at the UCA. 
In the wake of the Second Vatican Council, however, many of these younger Catholics 
drew closer to the Left and to Peronism, paralleling developments among students and 
the birth of left-wing Peronist guerrilla groups. As early as 1967, the bibliography of a 
course  taught  by  Cardenas  read  like  a  who  is  who  of populist  and  neo-revisionist 
authors,  with  Scalabrini  Ortiz,  Hernandez  Arregui  and  Puiggros  among  the  favou­
71 For a discussion of Perdn’s tactic in relation to union leaders between 1955 and 1973, see James W. 
McGuire, Peronism without Peron: unions, parties, and democracy in Argentina (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press,  1997), pp. 80-163. For the ways in which Peronist discourse exacerbated this problem, 
contributing to the political violence after 1973, see Sigal and Veron, Peron o muerte.
72 Sigal, Intelectuales y poder, p. 46.
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rites.73 Under the auspices of O’Farrell and Cardenas emerged the so-called catedras 
nacionales, university chairs that were explicitly devoted to foster political goals close 
to  Peronism.  The  politicisation  of the  discipline  was  reflected,  too,  in  the  fact  that 
tercermundista  periodicals  such  as Antropologia del  Tercer  Mundo,  Cristianismo y 
Revolucion,  both  committed  to  continent-wide  trends  among  the  Catholic  Left,  or 
Envido  became  important  sources  of reference  across the  social  sciences.  Unsurpri­
singly,  these  developments  met  the  approval  of left-wing  Peronists  like  Hernandez 
Arregui, who celebrated that the students finally adopted a “national consciousness”, 
adding  that,  after  an  education  in  an  anti-Peronist  environment,  they  had  now 
transformed Peron into the great “patriot of today”.74
In the form of the catedras nacionales, national-populist essayism, even though 
its best-known proponents did not take part in their organisation, thus won out over 
Germani’s scientific sociology. The “Declaration of Peronist university teachers in the
discipline of sociology” stated:
we  reject  any  attempt  to  revive  the  modernising  sociology  that  worked  as  an  anti-popular 
ideology  in  the  period  that  followed  the  overthrow  of the  last  government  of the  people  in 
Argentina, the government of General Juan Domingo Peron.  We believe that sociologists tied to 
the institutions [...] function in the service of imperialist domination in our country.75 
By the  same  token,  in  an  article  published  in  Cristianismo y Revolucion,  Cardenas 
pledged to create a “national  sociology” —as Jauretche had done before— and con-
76 demned the supposed enclosure of Germani’s circle in a detached ivory tower.  The 
author of another article  in the  same journal  similarly reasoned  “that  ‘scientificism’
77
and ‘rationality’ can also be a weapon of the regime”.  In stark opposition to Germani, 
the academics of the recently founded catedras nacionales often promulgated a return 
to ensayismo as a means to accomplish the social and political tasks that, in their view, 
scientific sociology had neglected, circumvented or deliberately inhibited. Even though 
the  most  prominent  populist  intellectuals  remained  outside  the  principal  cultural 
institutions of the state before  1973, these developments enlarged the market for their 
writings.  When  the  magazine  Panorama  surveyed  sociology  students  from  UBA  in
73 “Programas de estudio”, Facultad de Filosofla y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires, segundo 
cuatrimestre  1967, no. 81. The bibliography also included right-wing nacionalistas like Ernesto Palacio 
and Walter Beveraggi Allende.
74 Juan Jos6 Hemdndez Arregui, Peronismo y socialismo (Buenos Aires: Hachea,  1972), p.  147.
75 Reproduced in Horacio Gonzalez (ed.), Historia critica de la sociologia argentina: los raros, los 
clasicos, los cientificos, los discrepantes (Buenos Aires: Colihue, 2000), p. 83.
76 Gonzalo C&rdenas, “Historia de nuestra dependencia”, Cristianismo y Revolucion, no. 5, November 
1967, pp. 4-6.
77 Cristianismoy Revolucion, no. 30, September 1971, p. 3.
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1971, asking them to name the sociologists they had read, the most frequent answers
78
were  Marx,  Lenin,  Peron,  Ramos,  Jauretche  and  Ernesto  “Che”  Guevara.  The 
viewpoints of the populist opposition to the Reformist University thus gained ground 
in public universities after the coup of 1966.
Sociological interpretations of Peronism, in this context, resembled the views that 
had  previously  been  expressed  by  the  populist  Left.  In  both  content  and  tone,  a 
contribution to a book on Peronism edited by Cardenas mirrored the view of authors 
like Ramos:
in  Peronism,  the  man  who had hitherto been banished  found his  expression,  the  man  from the 
interior whom the refined classes called cabecita negra and who had come to Buenos Aires,  in 
response to the new impulse of industrialisation.
This man’s roots could be traced back to the very origins of the nation, since there had 
been  two  genealogical  lines  of  historical  continuity  which  “were  bom  with  the 
emergence of nationality  [...].  On one side was the ideal of the  [...]  refined classes, 
especially of Buenos Aires, on the other side the ideal of the man from the interior and 
the gauchoP19 As many university students declared themselves Peronists in the late 
1960s, they constmcted their newly acquired political identity on the basis of similar 
interpretations.  Put  schematically,  they  saw their parents  as  examples  of the  urban, 
liberal  and  anti-Peronist  middle  classes,  to  which  they  opposed  the  allegedly 
autochthonous  traditions  of national  identity,  of which  they  depicted  Peronism  and 
themselves as heirs.  This political  alignment of university students further expanded 
the market for populist and neo-revisionist essays, which endowed these students with 
a political identity.  It might further be argued that, since their declaration of faith in 
Peron  usually  did  not  stem  from  working-class  socialisation,  but  instead  was  an
elective affinity, they were in particular need of such justifying identity constructions.
80 Among these groups, revisionist books found a fruitful market.  This is not to 
say that nacionalista ideas of the  1930s became the main inspiration for the political 
attitudes  of university  students  in  the  late  1960s.  If they  read  revisionist  authors, 
Hernandez Arregui,  Ramos  and Jauretche,  maybe  also Jose  Maria Rosa,  were  more
78 Rubinich, “Modernization y sociologia”, in: James (ed.),  Violencia, proscripciony autoritarismo, p. 
272.
79 Pedro Geltman, “Mitos, simbolos y hdroes en el peronismo”, in: Gonzalo Cdrdenas (ed.), El 
peronismo (Buenos Aires: Cepe,  1973), pp.  109-137, here p.  123 and pp.  111-112.
80 This assertion is unfortunately difficult to quantify, since there were no available statistics as to the 
readership of particular books. However, various kinds of documents of Peronist student sectors from 
the time suggest as much. See also chapter four and the remarks on university curricula in chapter six. 
According to a statistic published in La Opinion, 25 September 1973, the high sales figures of Evita’s 
La Razon de mi vida were largely due to the book’s middle-class and student readership.
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popular  choices  than  the  reactionary  and  at  this  time  less  known  members  of the 
Instituto  Rosas  such as  Doll  or Palacio.  Furthermore,  interpretations  of Argentina’s 
contemporary  and  past  reality  by  populist  intellectuals  frequently  mingled  with 
international inspiration, ranging from the Cuban Revolution and the Algerian war of 
independence to tercermundismo and liberation theology.  Writers  like  Puiggros thus 
shared the  upper ranks  of non-fiction  bestseller  lists  in the  1960s  with  authors  like
o 1
Frantz Fanon and Herbert Marcuse.  Yet it is nevertheless true that within this eclectic 
blend of orientations, revisionism became an important tool to construe an interpreta­
tion  that  explained  contemporary  predicaments  and  justified  political  actions  and 
choices, since revisionism allowed to embed these questions of the present within an 
alleged  historical  continuity.  As  indicated  by  the  cognomen  of the  most  important 
Peronist  guerrilla  group,  the  Montoneros,  young  self-declared  Peronists  sought  to 
enthrone themselves as the culmination of a historical  lineage which arose from the 
figures  exalted  in  historical  revisionism.  Paralleling  the  passage  from  scientific 
sociology to “national sociology”, revisionism superseded the current of social history 
that had been practiced by Romero and others and, among large sectors of the reading 
public, imposed itself as the predominant version of Argentina’s history.  The main 
vehicle in this transition were not the history books written by members of the Instituto 
Rosas, but populist essays,  which moulded the contemporary question that mattered 
most  —namely  how  to  understand  Peronism—  within  a  broader  understanding  of 
Argentine national identity and history, based on revisionist premises.
Conclusion
The revival of the notions of historical revisionism after 1955 was not so much due to 
developments  among  historians,  but  instead  linked  to  the  questions  of  how  to 
understand Peronism and how to relate this movement to  issues of national  identity. 
Given the political survival of Peronism after the Liberating Revolution of 1955  and 
the ongoing social effects of internal migration, these questions became urgent matters
8 1  Primera Plana, no. 232,  12 June  1967 (Puiggr6s); no. 78, 5 May 1964 (Fanon); and no. 304, 22 
October 1968 (Marcuse). Besides the seeming inchoateness of this repertoire, I was always baffled by 
the enormous repercussions of Algeria’s war of independence, almost across the entire political 
spectrum, including the apotheosis of the FLN by the extreme Peronist Right. The commitment to the 
cause of Algerian independence of Fanon and Sartre, both widely read in Argentina at the time, could 
provide some clues for an explanation.
82 On this development see Luis Alberto Romero, “La historiografia: de la historia social al 
revisionismo”, Todo es Historia, no. 280 (1990), pp. 48-55.
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in  contemporary  debates.  The  predominant  framework  within  which  intellectual 
debates discussed these topics in the  1960s resembled Germani’s orthodox  interpre­
tation of the origins of Peronism. The populist movement, according to this view, had 
come into being because of the emergence of an unskilled migrant proletariat without 
experience of political organisation, as opposed to the established urban working class. 
Migrants therefore easily fell victim to Peron’s populist demagogy. Peronism represen­
ted a particular part of national identity, namely the culture of the interior, identified as 
a “pre-modem” or authentic lifestyle, uncorrupted by clear political ideologies such as 
Marxism  or  liberalism.  Whilst  in  the  eyes  of some  this  was  a  sign  of uncivilised 
backwardness, others exalted the alleged features of authenticity and a national spirit in 
this picture. Yet the overall framework within which these different evaluations were 
expressed was relatively stable throughout the  1960s. This general understanding was 
then  moulded  into  more  far-reaching  historical  analogies,  in  which  Peronism  was 
depicted  as  a recurrence  of nineteenth-century caudillismo  and  its  supporters  as  the 
descendants of the montoneras.
These debates need to be cast against the background of cultural and intellectual 
developments that affected the ways in which they acquired relevance and meaning. 
Broadly  speaking,  the  cultural  modernisation  during  the  two  decades  after  1955 
provided an expanding market for the  circulation of such debates.  The explosion of 
student numbers created a growing potential readership for social science and history 
books as well as essayistic accounts of Argentina’s social and political reality past and 
present,  from  which  revisionist  products  benefited.  Furthermore,  similarly  to  the 
second half of the 1930s, the second coming of revisionism in the late fifties coincided 
with a wave of modernisation in cultural institutions. As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, in the late thirties this could be seen in the consolidation of historiography as 
an  academic  discipline,  whereas  here  it  has  been  connected  to  a  more  general 
development in higher education. Massification of education might be seen as encoura­
ging the  spread  of ideas  relating to  national  identity per  se  and,  according to  some 
modernist theorems, was even a necessary pre-condition for the emergence of nationa­
lism. Insofar, from the perspective of theories of nationalism, the observation that the 
expansion of the book market enhanced the dissemination of the ideas  of nationalist 
intellectuals  in  Argentina  after  1955  is  hardly  surprising.  However,  this  cultural 
modernisation also had some more specific traits that should be taken into account in 
order to explain which position nationalist and populist intellectuals occupied in it. The
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field of production of intellectual  debates after  1955  was  fragmented because  of an 
unequal  distribution  of  the  possibilities  to  access  symbolic  and  cultural  capital. 
Virtually all of the well-known propagators of the neo-revisionism of the  1960s were 
populist essayists  outside public  universities.  As  the  academic  sociologist  Francisco 
Delich pointed out in retrospective in 1977, the gap between the progressive members 
of the Reformist University and nationalist essayists was so wide that there was hardly 
any communication between them.83 This created what Liah Greenfeld has identified 
as  a  frequent condition  in the  emergence  and  spread  of nationalist  ideas,  namely  a 
“ressentiment-prone”  situation.84  As  we  have  seen,  nationalist  and  populist  intellec­
tuals attacked what they saw as an impenetrable intellectual establishment, from which 
they  were  excluded.  A  sense  of  marginalisation  was  what  bound  not  only  the 
nacionalista  revisionists  of the  1930s,  but  also  their  populist  successors  together. 
Lacking  the  kind  of prestige  that  university  positions  conferred,  they  resorted  to 
legitimising  their  viewpoints  by  claiming  that  they  expressed  the  “people”  or  the 
“nation”  and,  ultimately,  by  declaring themselves to  be the  intellectual  basis  of the 
Peronist movement.
The dividing lines of the intellectual field thus became politicised. The problem 
was not the anti-Peronist bias of the writings of Germani or Romero that their oppo­
nents alleged. As we have seen, a magazine like Dinamis could detect no such bias in 
the  orthodox  sociological  interpretation of Peronism,  which even coincided  in  large 
parts  with  the  version  of populists  like  Ramos.  Nor  was  a  categorical  “absence  of 
autonomy” of public universities the raison d'etre of scientific sociology, as Neiburg
or  b   #   #
has  suggested.  The  problem was that,  because the  Reformist University had  come 
into being under the auspices of a regime that was dedicated to eradicating Peronism 
from  Argentina’s  political  and  cultural  life,  it  became  more  plausible  to  portray 
academics  as  anti-Peronist  ideologues  or  as  members  of a  liberal  and  cosmopolitan 
intelligentsia  that  was  opposed  to  the  “authentic”  demands  of the  “people”.  This 
undermined an academic basis of legitimacy from the very outset, further exacerbated 
through  the  military  coup  of  1966,  which  finished  off what  was  left  of university 
autonomy and, for various reasons, opened a phase during which Peronist tendencies
83 Delich, Criticay autocrltica, p. 28.
84 Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: five roads to modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1992), p.  16. My usage of her concept is rather free because she uses the term with reference to 
international relations and not an internal domestic problem, as I do here.
85 Neiburg, “Ciencias sociales”, p. 552.
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gained  weight  among  intellectuals  and  students.  The  two  epigraphs  of this  chapter 
show this development towards political justifications of intellectual  activity.  Whilst 
Risieri  Frondizi  in  1956  demanded  a  university  independent  from  governmental 
interference, the UBA-rector at Rodolfo Puiggros, who became rector of the UBA in 
1973, claimed that his task was to ensure that the universities were at the service of the 
national  (by then  Peronist)  government,  which  in his  rhetoric  automatically  implied 
that  they  served  the  “people”.  The  following  chapter  will  further  elaborate  on  the 
question  of  how  revisionism  can  be  seen  as  an  expression  of the  complaints  of 
nationalist and populist intellectuals against the establishment, which they opposed to 
the “people”.
101Chapter three
The heterogeneity of revisionism: 
between authoritarianism and Marxism
Introduction
The well-known neo-revisionists of the 1960s, such as Puiggros, Hernandez Arregui or 
Jauretche, differed from the nacionalistas who dominated the Instituto Rosas not only 
in that they produced essays that interpreted contemporary national reality rather than 
history books, but also in their ideological orientation. This difference matched broader 
shifts in the climate of ideas. As described by Oscar Teran, the new hegemonic current 
in  intellectual  debates  in  the  1960s  was  the  “New  Left”.1   Doctrinally  eclectic  and 
sometimes  heterodox,  but  commonly  marked  by  its  dissidence  from  the  official 
Communist  and  Socialist  Parties,  the  New  Left  began  to  favourably reconsider the 
importance of the national question as well as Peronism and some of its intellectuals 
began to embrace increasingly nationalist views. Hence, although the forms of nationa­
lism expounded by right-wing Catholics and other authoritarian thinkers did not disap­
pear after the Peronist decade, to put it schematically, the intellectual mainstream of 
nationalist ideas was populist, interspersed with Marxist elements.  Whilst nacionalis- 
mo reflected the authoritarian ideas of the interwar period, the populist currents of the 
sixties  blended  anti-imperialism,  nationalism,  Marxism  and  a  stress  on  Spanish 
American  solidarity.  Whereas  in the  1930s  nacionalistas had often taken  inspiration 
from the Southern European Right, the international horizon of the  1960s was shaped
1  Teran, Nuestros anos sesentas.
2 The terms Left and Right are understood relationally rather than attributively here, since it is debatable 
whether, say, Jauretche should be described as “left-wing”.
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by the Cuban Revolution and national liberation movements in other countries of the 
Third World. In a clarifying simplification, one might say that Frantz Fanon replaced 
Charles  Maurras  on  the  reading  list  of nationalist  Argentine  intellectuals.  In  this, 
Argentina’s left-wing nationalism of the  1960s had a lot in common with what Jorge 
Castaneda has described as a general Latin American trend in that era:  the idea that 
“the  ‘real’  country  [...]  is  perceived  to  be  the  nation  of  the  marginalized  poor, 
illiterate, ethnically distinct. The elite is exterior to the nation”.3 However, in contrast 
to  many  other  Latin  American  nationalisms  where  the  authoritarian  currents  of the 
interwar period had left more marginal imprints, Argentina’s left-wing nationalists of 
the  1960s —including Marxists—,  in search of vernacular antecedents  of their anti­
imperialism and anti-liberalism, appropriated nacionalista motifs. The main theme that 
they adopted, as I will try to show in this chapter, was historical revisionism, the deve­
lopment of which, as a result, reflected the broader changes of Argentine nationalism.
These transformations raise the question to what extent it is possible to pin down 
a  coherent  nationalist  ideology.  This  question  is  especially  complicated  from  the 
perspective of the ideological mobility of the 1960s, but there has even been scholarly 
disagreement  with  the  regard  to  the  two  or  three  decades  before  1955.  Cristian 
Buchrucker, for example, has argued that it is necessary to distinguish between a right- 
wing strand, which he calls “restorative”, and the populist ideas of FORJA that were 
more influential in Peronism.4 Other authors, in turn, have maintained that nationalism 
might have developed sub-groups, but that these overall resembled each other ideolo­
gically (especially in their anti-liberalism); they should therefore be grouped together.5  
Following this line of interpretation, David Rock has also argued that the authoritarian 
ideas  of what he has  called “the Nationalist movement”  remained relatively  similar 
between around 1910 and 1990.6 This second group of scholars, who have emphasised 
common traits over differences in Argentine nationalism, have often pointed to histori-
•  •  •  7
cal revisionism as  one  such common denominator.  The  argument is true  insofar as 
virtually all nationalist intellectuals indeed adhered to an understanding of the past that 
can  be  classified  as  revisionist.  However,  this  observation  does  not  resolve  the
3  Jorge Castafieda, Utopia Unarmed:  The Latin American Left after the Cold War (New York: Vintage 
Books,  1994), p. 273.
4 Buchrucker, Nacionalismo y peronismo.
5 Most explicit in this interpretation is Spektorowski, The origins.
6 Rock, Authoritarian Argentina.
7 E.g. Navarro Gerassi, Los nacionalistas, pp.  131-145, Deutsch, Las Derechas, pp. 223-224 and 
Spektorowski, The origins, pp. 99-105.
103The heterogeneity of revisionism
question of how similar their political  ideas  were.  As the  scholarship  on nationalist 
historiography has shown, it is by no means clear that revisionism expressed specific 
ideas and goals on which all its proponents agreed. Quattrocchi-Woisson, for example,
has stressed that there were two currents of historical revisionism from early on, one
•  8  •  populist, the other aristocratic-authoritarian.  Again, the question is even more proble­
matic  for  the  1960s.  As  Fernando  Devoto  has  convincingly  argued  in  view  of the 
writings of left-wing nationalists like Puiggros,  it is difficult to  find any meaningful 
ideological unity among all revisionists for the period after 1955.9
In this chapter, I will analyse the neo-revisionist discourse of the 1960s, which in 
terms of its weight in public debates was in the main Marxist-nationalist or populist, 
and compare it to the notions that had been dominant three decades earlier. I will argue 
that both versions resembled each other in that they were anti-liberal and nationalist, 
although saying so is almost a tautology. More important, therefore, is another simila­
rity, namely the perception of the common enemy of “official history”. At first sight, 
this observation may seem superfluous, too, since the very definition of revisionism 
implies that it was opposed to “official history”. However, as I will argue, the fact that 
revisionism  was  central  for  Argentine  nationalism  at  large  should  not  go  without 
saying because it allows for broader conclusions about nationalism. From this perspec­
tive, the common ground of nationalism was not so much a clearly defined political 
idea  or  objective,  but  instead  can  be  first  and  foremost  understood  as  a  discourse 
against what was portrayed as an “official” liberal establishment. In order to show this, 
particular attention will be given to the so-called izquierda national, which is usually 
associated with Ramos and Puiggros and, to a lesser extent, Hernandez Arregui, but 
populists  like Jauretche  or Rosa will  also  be part of the  analysis.  In contrast to  the 
previous  chapter,  here  I  will  concentrate  on  their  biographical  backgrounds,  their 
intellectual trajectories and the historiographical dimension of their writings.
1.  Trajectories of the izquierda nacional and the national-populist camp
From a biographical perspective, it is very difficult to identify a common trajectory of 
the  neo-revisionist  intellectuals  who  became  widely  known  in  the  aftermath  of the 
Liberating Revolution. However, a good starting point to reconstruct their backgrounds
8 Quattrocchi-Woisson, Un nationalisme.
9 Fernando Devoto, “Reflexiones en tomo de la izquierda nacional y la historiografia argentina”, in: 
Devoto and Pagano (eds.), Historiografias academicay militante, pp.  107-131.
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might be the intellectuals of the izquierda nacional, who came from the Marxist Left 
and,  throughout  the  fifties,  drew  closer  to  populist  and  nationalist  viewpoints.  The 
main reason for their reconsideration of the national question was that Peronism had 
deprived the traditional Left, that is the Socialist and Communist Parties, of their ideal- 
typical clientele, namely the working class.  The decade after the Second World War 
thus brought about a reorientation of parts of the Left, in which Marxist notions were 
blended with an emphasis of the nation as the crucial category of analysis. In contrast 
to some other Latin American countries, on the shores of the River Plate this merging 
could not rely on many  intellectually  solid precedents.  Argentina had  never had  an 
equivalent of Jose Carlos Mariategui and if any Argentine Marxist had come close to 
the  Peruvian’s  talent,  it  might  have  been  Anibal  Ponce,  whose  thought  has  been 
described as a “Marxism without nation”.10 The leader of the Argentine  Communist 
Party,  Vittorio  Codovilla, had a reputation of being obsequious to  Muscovite  direc­
tives. During the election campaign of 1945, he struck an alliance with the bourgeois 
parties  of the  Union  Democratica  and  notoriously  called  for  the  defeat  of “Nazi- 
Peronism” at the ballot box in order to “open an era of liberty and progress”,11  thereby 
echoing  the  Soviet  strategy  of  building  popular  fronts  even  two  years  after  the 
Comintern had officially been dissolved.  Although throughout the following decade, 
the party vacillated in its strategy towards the Peronist regime, it never managed to rid 
itself of its reputation of anti-Peronism and bourgeois sympathies. In comparison, parts
of the Brazilian CP placed much stronger emphasis on national unity and, despite the
12 violent confrontations of 1937, sided with Getulio Vargas in 1945.
Revisionism  played  into  this  problem,  because  the  anti-Peronism  of  the 
Communist and Socialist Parties was bolstered by interpretations of Argentine history 
that  could  be  regarded  as  liberal.  This  might  sound  surprising  in  the  case  of the 
Communist Party (which in other respects, of course, can hardly be called liberal), but 
the  writings of the party’s  official  historian,  Leonardo  Paso,  were  supportive  of the
1  3
liberal rather than of the revisionist pantheon.  Likewise, the work of other commu­
10 Oscar Terbn, “Anibal Ponce o el marxismo sin nacibn”, in: Oscar Teran, En busca de la ideologia 
argentina (Buenos Aires: Catblogos,  1986), pp.  131-178.
1 1  Victorio Codovilla, Batir al nazi-peronismo para abrir una era de libertady progreso (Buenos Aires: 
Anteo,  1946).
1 2  Michael Lowy (ed.), Marxism in Latin America from 1909 to the present: an anthology, translated by 
Michael Pearlman (New Jersey and London: Humanities Press,  1992), p. xxxv.
1 3  See Leonardo Paso, Los caudillosy la organizacion nacional (Buenos Aires: Silaba,  1965) and his 
“Rivadavia y la linea de Mayo”, in the CP’s Cuadernos de Cultura, nos. 27 and 29, March and 
September 1957.
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nists, such as Hector Agosti or Rodolfo Ghioldi, read a bourgeois-democratic tradition 
into the May Revolution, embodied in Mariano Moreno —after whom the communist 
institute  of history  was  named—  and  later  manifest  in  Echeverria  and  Sarmiento, 
whom  communists  contrasted  with  caudillismo.14  The  opposition  against  Peronism 
was even more clearly anchored in liberal traditions in the case of the Socialist Party.1 5  
During the electoral campaign of 1945, Socialists had coupled their understanding of 
Peronism as fascism with evocations of Argentina’s liberal pantheon.  In a statement 
dating from December 1945, Jose Luis Romero (the later rector of the UBA who was 
close  to  Socialism)  drew  a clear-cut  boundary  between  some  classical  figures  with 
liberal connotations and Peronism:
A phantom haunts the  free country  in which  Echeverria and Alberdi,  Rivadavia and  Sarmiento 
were  bom:  the  ominous  phantom  that  rises  from  the  scarcely  closed  graves  of Mussolini  and 
Hitler.16
In a similar fashion, the leader of the Socialist Party, Americo Ghioldi, pointed out in 
1956  that  Peronism  was  a  “historical  denigration”,  since  Peron  had  slandered  the 
“builders of nationality”,  whilst glorifying “the tyranny of Rosas.”17  Ghioldi did not 
specify whom he  meant by “builders  of nationality”,  but this was hardly  necessary, 
since  it  was  sufficiently  known  that  the  figures  mentioned  by  Romero  were  those 
habitually evoked by Socialists. In 1956, the party congress even adopted a declaration
1  R against historical  revisionism.  In  short,  anti-Peronism  and  liberal  historical  evoca­
tions seemed to converge among the Left.
In  opposition  to  this,  Marxists  like  Ramos  and  Puiggros  reasoned  that  the 
traditional  Left’s  liberal  blueprints  forbade  it  to  understand  the  reasons  behind  the 
working class’ mass defection to Peronism. In their view, this desertion was not due to 
the fact that Peron had better material rewards to offer than Communists and  Socia­
1 4  Hector P. Agosti, Naciony cultura, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: CEAL,  1982). See also the contributions 
by Agosti and Portantiero on the  150th  anniversary of the May Revolution in Cuadernos de Cultura, no. 
47, May/June  1960, pp.  1-8 and 21-32 and the remarks on the commemoration of Echeverria in  1951, in 
which liberals and communists participated in close cooperation, in Jos6 Aricd, La cola del diablo: 
itinerario de Gramsci en America Latina (Buenos Aires: Puntosur,  1988), pp.  174-181
1 5  Marcela Garcia Sebastiani, “El Partido Socialista en la Argentina peronista: oposicion y crisis de 
representacion politica (1946-1951)”, Estudios Interdisciplinarios de America Latinay el Caribe, vol.
13, no. 2(2002), pp. 31-64.
16 Quoted in Silvia Sigal, “Intelectuales y peronismo”, in: Juan Carlos Torre (ed.), Los ahos peronistas 
(1943-1955) (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 2002), pp. 481-522, p. 502. For the reading of Peronism as 
fascism, see Romero, A history, p. 238.
17 Americo Ghioldi, De la tirania a la democracia social (Buenos Aires: Gure,  1956), pp. 91-96.
18 Daniel Omar De Lucia, “Liberalismo e izquierda: una relacion poco estudiada”, Paper presented at the 
Primeras Jomadas de Historia de las Izquierdas, Buenos Aires, 8-9 December 2000 (Centro de 
Documentation e Investigation de la Cultura de Izquierdas en la Argentina), p. 3.
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lists, but to cultural factors. Based on the argument that the classical parties of the Left 
were  incapable  of understanding  the  authentically  Argentine  spirit  of the  working 
class, the Marxist dissidents thus began to positively re-evaluate Peronism, concentra­
ting on nationalist categories without abandoning their Marxist concepts. Throughout 
the decade of Peron’s government, this development led to the emergence of two main 
breakaway  groups  among the  Left.1 9   The  first,  led  by Puiggros  (1906-80),  emerged 
from the communist cell of the railway workers of the southern section of the Federal 
Capital. It broke with the Communist Party in  1948/49 and shortly afterwards formed 
the Movimiento Obrero Comunista (MOC). As Puiggros laid out in Clase Obrera, the 
organ of the group, “the Codovilla tendency, of which we were a part, stands in open 
contradiction to the historical development which leads the Argentine people towards 
their  liberation.”  In  contrast,  the  MOC  portrayed  itself as  “a  child  of  17  October 
1945”,  which implied the appropriation of populist themes, such as the glorification 
of a national community and the charismatic bond between leader and masses. In the 
eyes of the MOC-ideologues, these traits had to be incorporated as part of a movement 
towards  an  emancipatory  revolution,  the  vehicle  for which would  be  a united  anti­
imperialist front. According to this interpretation, the nation was the key category to 
understand  the  historical  development  of those  countries  that  were  deemed  semi­
colonial,  a classification  of Argentina which  could  rely  on the  authority  of Lenin’s
21 Imperialism,  the highest stage of capitalism.  Although the group’s erstwhile leader, 
Puiggros, spent much time in Mexico during the 1960s, his writings as well as those of 
other MOC-members left a strong imprint on left-wing nationalist debates in Argentina 
after 1955.
The  second  main  grouping  from  which  Marxist  populists  emerged  was  the 
Partido  Socialista  de  la  Revolution  Nacional  (PSRN).  Most  of  its  members  had 
belonged to the Socialist Party before they broke away from it in 1953, but among its 
ranks  were  also  intellectuals  who  had  come  from  other  sectors  of the  Left.  The 
Trotskyist  group  around  Ramos  (1921-94),  who  had  been  editor  of the  newspaper 
Octubre, gained particular influence in the PSRN.  Similarly to the MOC, the PSRN
19 Altamirano, Peronismo y cultura de izquierda, pp.  13-25 gives a general overview of these divisions 
before  1955.
20 Clase Obrera, no. 50, April  1950, pp. 3 and 4.
21 Vladimir I. Lenin, Imperialism, the highest stage of  capitalism, first published in  1917, available from 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/ch06.htm. On the MOC during the Peronist 
regime see Samuel Amaral, “Peronismo y marxismo en los aftos frios: Rodolfo Puiggros y el 
Movimiento Obrero Comunista,  1947-1955”, Investigaciones y Ensayos, vol. 50 (2000), pp.  167-190.
107The heterogeneity o f  revisionism
drew  closer  to  Peronism,  evoking  the  events  of  17  October  1945  as  proof of the
22 working class’ support for Peron.  In December 1955, Esteban Rey thus maintained in 
the  PSRN-organ  Lucha  Obrera  that  the  last  “ten  years  of tough  national  struggle 
waged by the working class and popular movement, which originates on  17 October 
1945”, could be the prologue of a united anti-imperialist front.  The history of both 
these groups, which formed the core of what is usually called the izquierda nacional, 
thus suggests a path from a Marxist background towards nationalist positions. As the 
Catholic nacionalista Fermin Chavez remarked in  1957  in a journal  with the telling 
title  Columnas  del  Nacionalismo  Marxista  de  Liberacion  Nacional,  Marxists  had 
opened themselves up to “national reality”.24 Marxist populists shared this understan­
ding of their own development.  For example,  Eduardo Astesano,  another prominent 
member of the MOC and the director of the Columnas, retrospectively summed up his 
biography as a move from Marxism to nationalism in a bibliographical essay about his 
own  works,  published  in  1970.  There,  he  qualified  the  book  with  which  he  had 
initiated his writing in 1941, an interpretation of the May Revolution, as a “class-based 
analysis”.  In  1949,  he had finished what he now considered as  a “first  approach to 
economic  nationalism”  and,  through  his  “enlistment  in  historical  revisionism” 
(performed in his book of 1963, Rosas y el nacionalismo popular), he finally arrived at 
the “synthesis of the national vision of the process” that he attributed to his book of
25 1967, La lucha de clases en la historia argentina.
However,  although  the  history  of  the  izquierda  nacional  suggests  a  linear 
movement from the Left towards nationalism at the origins of the neo-revisionism of 
the  1960s, the biographies of the writers who are usually associated with this current, 
followed no homogenous pattern.  It  is worth remembering  in this  context that Jose 
Maria Rosa, whose writings became widely known in the 1960s when he had declared 
himself a supporter of the Cuban Revolution, originally came from the extreme Right. 
Although,  in  his  function  as  president  of the  Instituto  Rosas,  Rosa  tried  to  bind 
together all those who can be called revisionists and who published in the  1960s, the 
differences  of their  backgrounds  are  striking.  First,  the  nacionalistas  described  in
22 See on the PSRN see Norberto Galasso, La Izquierda Nacionaly el FIP (Buenos Aires: CEAL,  1983), 
pp. 79-89. Other Trotskyist groupings, such as Nahuel Moreno’s Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POC), 
which joined the PSRN in 1954, adopted a positive reading of Peronism only after 1955.
23 Lucha Obrera, no. 5 (22 December 1955).
24 Columnas del Nacionalismo Marxista de Liberacion Nacional, no.  1,  14 July 1957, p. 3.
25 Eduardo B. Astesano, Nacionalismo historico o materialismo historico (Buenos Aires: Pleamar,
1972), pp. 207-208.
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chapter  one  were  still  present,  most  of them  without  substantially  modifying  their 
reactionary ideas.  As  many either came from Catholic  spheres  of sociability or had 
taken  part  in  the  legions,  political  associations  and  street-fighting  factions  of the 
extreme Right in the 1930s, they were fervently anti-Marxist and most remained so. To
be sure, over time the boundaries became blurred.  The contacts between Ramos and
26 the nacionalista Marcelo Sanchez Sorondo, for example, were well-known.  It would 
be an exaggeration, however, to see this as a rule. Neither Ramos nor Puiggros socia­
lised in nacionalista circles  such as the  Instituto  Rosas,  nor did they publish  in the 
periodicals  that  expressed  this  tendency.  Yet  even  among  the  ideologically  more 
compatible populist essayists —a group that besides Ramos and Puiggros for example 
includes Jauretche or Hernandez Arregui— there was no common biographical pattern. 
Some  of them  had  had  connections  to  Radicalism,  whilst  others  had  begun  their 
careers at the extreme Right of the ideological  spectrum,  later drawing closer to the 
populist Left. Several examples can illustrate this.
Jauretche (1901-74) was bom in Lincoln, province of Buenos Aires, into a middle
77 class family.  His father was a functionary of the Conservative Party and although the 
family did not own land, they had close ties with the local landowners. After he had 
moved to the  capital  at the  age  of 19,  he  enrolled  in the  elite  state  school  Colegio 
Nacional de Buenos Aires and, in 1925, entered the Law Faculty of UBA. In the same 
year, partly inspired by the Mexican Revolution, he participated in demonstrations of 
the anti-imperialist Union Latinoamericana and in the uprising of Paso de los Libres in 
1933 against the Justo government, as a result of which he spent four months in prison. 
Two  years  later,  he  became  one  of the  founders  of the  breakaway-group  from  the 
Radical  Party  in  1935,  the  Fuerza  de  Orientation  Radical  de  la  Joven  Argentina 
(FORJA),  which  claimed  the  populist  heritage  of  Hipolito  Yrigoyen  and  was 
influenced by Victor Raul  Haya de  la Torre’s APRA.  Jauretche’s political  activities 
brought him into contact with Peron at a time when the  latter was  still  secretary of
26 See e.g. Arturo Pefta Lillo, Memorias depapel: los hombresy las ideas de una epoca (Buenos Aires: 
Galema,  1988), p. 88 or the interview with the Peronist politician Oscar Albrieu by Luis Alberto 
Romero,  12 June 1972, Archivo de Historia Oral, Instituto Torcuato di Telia, p. 3. Frondizi’s adviser 
Rogelio Frigerio claimed that Hernandez Arregui, too, was a friend of S&nchez Sorondo (Compahero, 
no. 12, 27 August 1963). Son of Matlas, an anti-Semitic former minister, the journalist Marcelo Sanchez 
Sorondo was bom in 1912, wrote for the youth section of LNR and nacionalista periodicals such as 
Nueva Politico, Baluarte or Dinamica Social before he became editor-in-chief of Azul y Blanco. He 
studied in a Jesuit secondary school and had Castellani as his history teacher, before studying law at the 
UBA.
27 On Jauretche’s biography see esp. Norberto Galasso, Arturo Jauretche: biografia de un argentino 
(Buenos Aires: Homo Sapiens,  1997).
109The heterogeneity o f  revisionism
welfare  and  labour.  Understanding  FORJA  as  a  part  of Radicalism  that  supported 
Peron’s  policy,  Jauretche  was  among  those  who  worked  for  the,  ultimately  failed, 
agreement between Amadeo Sabattini’s Radicalism in Cordoba and Peron in  1944. In 
December  1945,  FORJA  declared  its  dissolution  in  favour  of Peronism.  Under  the 
Peronist governor of Buenos Aires, Domingo Mercante, Jauretche became director of 
the  provincial  bank  in  October  1946,  but  had  to  leave  this  post  after  the  conflict 
between Mercante and Peron in 1950.
Hernandez Arregui’s public career had some similarities to Jauretche’s,  but his
■jo
social background differed.  He was bom into a lower middle-class family in 1912 in 
Pergamino, in the province of Buenos Aires. After his father had left the family, his 
mother  brought  him  up  in  the  Federal  Capital,  where  he  studied  at  UBA’s  Law 
Faculty. In  1933 the early death of his mother and economic insecurity as a result of 
this obliged him to interrupt his studies and move to the province of Cordoba, where 
he  lived  with  his  uncle.  This  uncle’s  contacts  with  the  provincial  government  of 
Sabattini allowed him to work in public libraries and as director of an institute for the 
formation of secondary school teachers for a few years, until he re-entered university 
at  the  age  of 26.  Instead  of law,  he  now  studied  philosophy  at  the  University  of 
Cordoba, where he came into contact with the Italian Marxist Rodolfo Mondolfo, who 
supervised  his  doctoral  thesis  on  “The  sociological  bases  of Greek  culture”.  This 
contact,  later  stressed  by  Hernandez  Arregui  as  a  decisive  intellectual  influence,
9Q probably  led  him  to  adopt  Marxism,  of a particularly  Hegelian  and  idealist  kind. 
Hernandez Arregui engaged in Radical student groups whilst studying in Buenos Aires 
and, like Jauretche, became an adherent of Yrigoyen. When in Cordoba, he supported 
Sabattini  and by  1944  he  had  become  secretary  of the  provincial  committee  of the 
UCR.  He  met Jauretche  in the  course  of the  Peron-Sabattini  negotiations,  but  only 
fully identified with Peronism from  1947 onwards. Contrary to much of the izquierda 
nacional,  which  followed  the  slogan  of  “critical  support”  for  Peron,  Hernandez 
Arregui  henceforth  defined  himself as  a  Marxist  Peronist  and  underscored  that  his 
statements  had  to  be  understood  as  declarations  from  within  the  movement. 
Throughout the Peronist decade he was lecturer for the introduction course in history
28 On Hernandez Arregui see Galasso, Hernandez Arregui.
29 See the interview in Compahero, no.  12, 27 August 1963, p. 4. The Hegelian influences might have 
come from Mondolfo, who was primarily known for an anti-materialist reading of the Hegelian Marxist 
Antonio Labriola.
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and regular professor for historiography at the University of La Plata and, until  1955,
30 directed a little-known radio programme called Vida Artlstica.
Another important  left-wing  and  populist  revisionist  was  John  William  Cooke 
(1919-1968), bom into a wealthy family in La Plata.3 1   His father had been a Radical 
congressman, ambassador to Brazil and, a supporter of the Allies in World War II, was 
named minister of foreign affairs in August  1945. Cooke junior was elected national 
deputy on a Peronist ticket in 1946 and thereafter became known as a nationalist, first 
by opposing the ratification of the Act of Chapultepec by the Argentine  Senate  and 
later by criticising Peron’s contracts with the US company Standard Oil.  Throughout 
the Peronist decade he was also a lecturer in political economy at UBA’s Law Faculty 
and  in  1954  was  appointed vice-president of the  Instituto  Rosas.  Although  Cooke’s 
political sympathies resembled many of the ideas of the other thinkers mentioned, he 
was exceptional in this context in that he was more important as a political organiser 
than as an intellectual, at least before he moved to Cuba in 1960 (see also chapter five). 
It is revealing in this respect that, in comparison to Hernandez Arregui and Jauretche, 
Cooke  was  less  anti-intellectual,  instead  defending  the  role  of the  “revolutionary 
intellectual”.33 At least in this respect, Cooke could be classified as a Cuban Marxist 
rather than an Argentine nationalist.
In short, the biographies of Argentina’s most important nationalist intellectuals of 
the  1960s  followed  no  identifiable  pattern.  Ideologically,  they  came  from  very 
different and often hardly compatible traditions. Socially, their backgrounds were more 
diverse than those of the largely upper-class nacionalistas of the  1930s. In contrast to 
other intellectuals of the  1960s,  such as the writers of the cultural journal Contorno, 
who, as Carlos Altamirano has shown, can be called a “generation”,34 the neo-revisio­
nists did not belong to a particular age group either. Although many of them were bom
30 On his pre-1955 posts at the University of La Plata see Zarrilli, Gutierrez and Graciano, Los estudios 
historicos, p.  110.
31 On him see Ernesto Goldar, John William Cooke y el peronismo revolucionario (Buenos Aires:
Centro Editor America Latina,  1985), Galasso, Cooke and Miguel Mazzeo (ed.), Cooke, de vuelta: el 
gran descartado de la historia argentina (Buenos Aires: La Rosa Blindada,  1999).
2 The ratification of the Act of Chapultepec was an important point of disagreement between Per6n and 
nacionalista groups such as the ALN. See its organ Alianza, extra, August 1946.
33 Quoted in Ter£n, Nuestros ahos sesentas, p.  142.
34 Altamirano, Peronismo y cultura de izquierda, pp. 56-61. On Contorno see William H. Katra, 
Contorno: literary engagement in post-Peronist Argentina (London and Toronto: Associated University 
Press,  1988) and Marcela Croce, “Contexto, compromiso, contestacidn. Contorno: situation en el 
mundo intelectual”, in: Noemi Girbal-Blacha and Diana Quattrocchi-Woisson (eds.), Cuando opinar es 
actuar: Revistas argentinas del siglo XX (Buenos Aires: Academia Nacional de la Historia,  1999), pp. 
443-476.
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between  1910 and  1930, Jauretche and Puiggros were older, whilst two other Marxist 
revisionists,  the  lawyers  Rodolfo  Ortega  Pena  and  Eduardo  Luis  Duhalde,  whose 
history books were also widely read in the latter half of the sixties, were much youn- 
ger.  In geographical terms, they came from different parts of the country, and from 
both rural and urban backgrounds. Although their activities in the sixties were usually 
based in the Federal Capital, there was no over-representation of people who had been 
bom there.  Ultimately, the fact that many had received an education in law is  less a 
sign of the homogeneity of their backgrounds than evidence that this career remained 
common among Argentine intellectuals in general at that time.
Although their backgrounds cannot serve as a trait of unity, one common feature 
was  that  most  became  well  known  shortly  after  1955,  when  their  first  widely  sold 
books were published.  The political events of these years were the stimulus to bring 
them together under the signs of anti-liberalism, nationalism and support for Peronism. 
This  meant not  only that  Puiggros  and  Ramos  now wrote  for periodicals  that  were 
more closely tied to  Peronism.  In  1957,  Chavez clarified his consent to  contribute 
articles to Astesano’s Marxist journal in the following words:
Five  or  six  years  ago,  [...]  it  would  have  been  easy to  deny them  [the  Marxists]  any  kind  of 
collaboration without explaining to these  comrades that our nationalist position  forbade  us  any 
dialogue  [...].  Today,  in turn, this dialogue has become possible, more than anything due to the 
events which have occurred in Argentina in the last two years.
With  this,  Chavez  hinted  at  the  growing  opposition  to  Aramburu’s  regime  after 
November 1955, in the course of which many intellectuals began to see Peronism in a 
more positive light. This regime antagonised revisionists not only by sacking some of 
them from their university posts, but also through more overt repression. For example, 
in late 1955, Rosa was imprisoned with Cooke, who had sought refuge in his house, as
35 They are always mentioned together, since all their publications were written jointly. Both had studied 
at UBA’s Law Faculty and came from Greater Buenos Aires. Ortega Pefia (1935-74) was the grandson 
of the novelist David Pefta, who is often seen as a proto-revisionist, and the son of wealthy parents. He 
briefly flirted with Frondizi’s Radicalism as a student, but in  1957 affiliated himself with the CP. 
Duhalde (bom in  1939), who must not be confused with the Argentine president from 2000 to 2003 
(also called Eduardo Duhalde), had enjoyed a Catholic education and his first political socialisation was 
linked to the Catholic Action. As a student he entered a movement that supported the University Reform 
and identified himself as a Marxist. In the wake of Frondizi’s loss of intellectual support, they conjoined 
with the contributors of El Popular and began to frequent Peronist circles, especially under the influence 
of Hemdndez Arregui. There is now a useful short summary of their lives and writings: Ariel Eidelman, 
Militancia e historia en el peronismo revolucionario de los ahos 60: Ortega Pehay Duhalde (Buenos 
Aires: Centro Cultural de la Cooperacidn, 2004). See also Duhalde’s autobiographical article: Eduardo 
Luis Duhalde, “Peronismo y revolution: el debate ideologico en los 60: una experiencia”, Confines, no. 
6(1999), pp. 53-65.
36 Puiggros in Benitez’ Rebeldla, Ramos in El Lider (see Roberto Baschetti (ed.), Documentos de la 
resistencia peronista,  1955-1970 (La Plata: La Campana,  1997), p. 24).
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a result of which Rosa, as he stated in an interview of 1978, “became incorporated into 
Peronism”.  However, their common alienation from the  government was hardly in 
itself capable of generating a shared political ideology. The next question to consider, 
therefore, is whether or to what extent they held similarideas.
2.  The instability of the revisionist pantheon
Generally speaking, the unifying element of these ideas was that they were first and 
foremost  characterised  by  three  “antis”:  anti-liberalism,  anti-imperialism  and  anti- 
intellectualism.  Populist  revisionists  equated  the  people,  the  masses  and  the  nation, 
demanding  Argentina’s  sovereignty  against  foreign  intrusion  and  the  unity  of  the 
nation against disruptive individualism and politicking. However, although it was to a 
degree  distinctive  of revisionist  writings  that  these  three  “antis”  always  appeared 
together and that they were formulated in vitriolic language, none of these elements 
per se was specific to revisionists. As Teran has shown, liberalism fell into disrepute in 
nearly  all  areas  of intellectual  debates  in  the  period,  anti-intellectualism  was  very 
common,  too,  and,  as  he  has  put  it,  “anti-imperialist  discourse  was  hardly  visible 
because, like God, it was everywhere”.  Slogans such as patria o colonia were not the 
prerogative of those who are commonly labelled “nationalists”, but permeated all areas 
of political  life.  The  repudiation  of imperialism  and  liberalism was  shared  by  most 
diverse  tendencies,  ranging  from the  Radical  Party,  Peronist  unions,  the  military to 
Communists. The specificities of Marxist or populist neo-revisionism thus have to be 
sought elsewhere, too.
What united the neo-revisionists’ interpretation of the past with their forerunners 
from the  1930s? It immediately becomes difficult to identify common grounds within 
revisionist historiography, if the question is what historical figures were glorified, how 
and for what reasons. Broadly speaking, the historiographical differences between the 
writers of the izquierda nacional (Ramos and Puiggros, but also Hernandez Arregui) 
and the nacionalistas (for example Palacio or the Irazustas) were as follows:  in terms 
of genres, the nacionalista historians had formed an institutional nucleus in the form of 
the  Instituto  Rosas,  where  they  wrote  more  specialised  history  books  and  articles,
37 Hem&ndez, Conversaciones con Rosa, p.  130 (“qued6 incorporado al peronismo”). This series of 
interviews remains the best source for biographical information on Rosa. For his Santa Fe activities see 
Macor and Iglesias, El peronismo antes del peronismo, esp. pp. 37-38.
38 Teran, Nuestros ahos sesentas, pp. 55-72 on anti-liberalism, pp.  137-147 on anti-intellectualism. The 
quotation about anti-imperialism is from p.  111.
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whereas the authors of the izquierda nacional usually produced essays that sweepingly 
dealt with both history and contemporary politics.  As  for historical  symbols  for the 
contemporary political struggle, the izquierda nacional preferred the federal caudillos 
to Rosas, because these could be more easily depicted as the embodiments of a popular 
national identity based in the interior provinces, in contrast to the former governor of 
Buenos Aires,  who  seemed  suspicious  as  an icon of centralism and the  landowning 
oligarchy.
Yet even this scheme is problematic, since the writers who did not clearly fit into 
either the izquierda nacional or the conservative rosista category (for example, Jauret­
che or Ortega Pena and Duhalde)  outnumbered those who  did.  The main feature of 
both the  historical  interpretations  and the  ideological  viewpoints  among revisionists 
was their bewildering polyphony, as debates around the figure of Rosas can illustrate. 
The problem with which the neo-revisionists of the izquierda nacional and populists 
like Jauretche had to come to grips was that, although Rosas may have been a popular 
patriot and even, if one liked, a champion of national capitalism who had protected the 
manufacturing  industries  of the  interior,  he  was  also the  owner of vast  estates  who 
acted in the name of the cattle-breeders of Buenos Aires.  Within revisionism, discus­
sions about this often started from the question of whether it was more important to 
apply class or nation as the more fundamental criterion in historical analysis. An article 
by Jauretche, which was published in a book that had the clear-cut title For Rosas or 
Against Rosas,  focused  on this  issue.  According to  the  author,  those  writers  of the 
izquierda  nacional  who  had  argued  that  Rosas  was  in  the  main  a  member  of the 
landowning elite, opposing him to the federal caudillos, were guilty of “crude materia­
lism”. Jauretche saw in this non-rosista version of revisionism an instance of “Mitro- 
Marxism”,  that  is  an  interpretation  of Argentine  history  by  Marxists  who  had  not 
sufficiently freed themselves from the liberal mitrista views that were seen as typical 
of the traditional Left. Against this, he affirmed that, rather than class as a category, the
on
nation “was always the axis and remains so.”
But other neo-revisionists were less sure how to interpret Rosas. The symbol of 
the  former  Buenos  Aires  governor  divided  the  populist  neo-revisionists,  since  the 
nacionalista  Right  had  established  a  clear-cut  case  in  this  question.  With  their 
authoritarianism, Catholicism and nostalgia for a lost golden age, rosistas had glorified
39 Arturo Jauretche, “Don Juan Manuel y el revisionismo timido”, in: Federico Barbara and others, Con 
Rosas o contra Rosas: 32 escritores e historiadores emiten su opinion sobre D. Juan Manuel de Rosas 
(Buenos Aires: Freeland,  1968), p. 20, p.  18 and p. 21.
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their  hero  as  the  “restorer  of law”  rather than  as  a  popular  caudillo.  The  Marxists 
Puiggros and Ramos did not see Rosas as a model to emulate in contemporary politics 
and preferred to focus on other figures. Hernandez Arregui, too, tried to circumscribe a 
profile beyond “the nacionalista tendency grouped around the figure of Juan Manuel 
de  Rosas  and  the  liberal  one  around  Mayo  and  Caseros”,  since  “during  Rosas’ 
government the porteho monopoly maintained all its vigour” and “Rosas’  arguments 
were the same as those put forward by Rivadavia”.40 Other intellectuals of the izquier­
da  nacional,  however,  saw  Rosas  in  a  more  favourable  light.  Whilst  Hernandez 
Arregui had rejected an  invitation to  speak at the  Instituto  Rosas  in  1954,  Astesano 
gave a talk there in 1959.41 At this time, he had already abandoned the position he had 
defended  in  1951,  namely  that  Rosas  had  not  been  interested  in  true  economic 
independence,  and  arrived  at  an  interpretation  of him  as  a  champion  of a  popular 
bourgeois  revolution.  Even though  Astesano,  too,  detected the  most  strenuous  anti­
imperialism in the interior provinces, he nonetheless curtailed the distance that separa­
ted Rosas from the federal caudillos of the hinterland by asserting that both forms of 
federalism  “were  an  expression  of the  reaction  against  a dependent,  colonising  and 
foreign capitalist development.” Astesano thus paved the way for his interpretation of 
Rosas  as  a  popular  leader  and  the  founder  of Argentine  independent  capitalism.42 
Another positive interpretation of Rosas from a Marxist perspective came from Ortega 
Pena  and  Duhalde.  Although  they  were  methodologically  less  scrupulous  in  their 
employment of Marxist analytical categories than Astesano and criticised the Marxism 
of the izquierda nacional, they also stressed the common grounds between Rosas and 
the  federal  caudillos,  arguing  that  there  was  a  “continuity  between  the  policies  of 
Rosas and the montonera [...] on the level of the historical needs of nationality”.43
Conversely, right-wing revisionists distrusted the Marxist novices. Quite how far 
apart the world of authoritarian nacionalistas was from that of the Marxist populists
40 Hernandez Arregui, Imperialismo y cultura, p.  15 and p. 20.
41 On Hemdndez Arregui’s rejection, see Galasso, Hernandez Arregui, pp. 66-67, on Astesano’s talk 
Revista del Instituto Rosas, no.  19 (1959), p.  108.
42 Columnas del Nacionalismo Marxista de Liberacion Nacional, no. 3,  1   September 1957, p.  1   and p. 3. 
He fully elaborated his reading of Rosas in Eduardo B. Astesano, Rosas: bases del nacionalismo 
popular (Buenos Aires: A. Pefia Lillo,  1960).
43 Rodolfo Ortega Pefia and Eduardo Luis Duhalde, Felipe Varela contra el Imperio britanico.  Las 
masas de la Union Americana enfrentan a las potencias europeas (Buenos Aires: Sudestada,  1966), p. 
166. For their criticism of the izquierda nacional see Boletln del Instituto Rosas, no. 5 (second period), 
May 1969, p. 24. The difference between writers like Astesano and Puiggros, on the one hand, and 
Ortega Pefia and Duhalde, on the other, might also be interpreted as one of quality. As long-standing CP 
intellectuals Astesano and Puiggros had a more solid acquaintance with both Marxism and Argentine 
history than Ortega Pefia and Duhalde.
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was testified by a review in the bulletin of the Instituto Rosas of a book by Ramos, 
written by the Jesuit Leonardo Castellani,  an admirer not only of Rosas,  but also of 
Jose  Antonio  Primo  de  Rivera.  Whilst  Castellani  found  fault  with  Ramos’  alleged 
ignorance  of the  Gospel,  he  displayed  his  own  unfamiliarity  with  Marxism,  as  he 
unselfconsciously rechristened Ramos’  Leninist-inspired Ejercito y semi-colonia with 
the more unobtrusive title Ejercito y political Within the Instituto Rosas —essentially 
still  a  nucleus  of right-wing  nacionalistas—  further  disputes  erupted  when  Ortega 
Pena and Duhalde decided in  1966 that their goals were best served by turning into 
Marxist revisionist historians  and joining the  institute.  Soon, they found themselves 
embroiled in a polemic over the War of the Triple Alliance against Paraguay with the 
nacionalista Oliver, who, after the publication of a history book by the Marxist Leon 
Pomer sensed “a communist tactic of infiltration in the national currents”.45  It trans­
pired in the course of the polemic that Oliver was no longer sure that Mitre deserved 
the negative judgments by revisionists, since, as Oliver reasoned, he had patriotically 
led Argentina into a war against foreign aggression. Ortega Pena and Duhalde, in turn, 
avowed that Oliver’s account had “its root in the \ibem\-mitrista education” and that 
“there cannot be any confusion in the camp of the nationals: with the liberals, there is 
no  possibility  of understanding  whatsoever”.46  The  exchange  threatened  to  escalate 
when Oliver denounced the institute’s president, Rosa, as “a distinguished publicist of 
fantasy-history  and  patrician porteho  ancestry  [...]  who  sometimes  coincides  with 
reality”,  so  that  the  editorial  board  decided  it  was  better  to  declare  the  debate  as 
finished.47 But what it showed was that there were few figures and events exempt from 
controversy,  even within revisionism.  Still,  Rivadavia was  a foreign-inspired  liberal 
ideologue and so was Sarmiento. Although San Martin was an undisputed hero and so 
were caudillos like Guemes and Dorrego, liberals laid claim to these three figures, too. 
And if revisionists no longer agreed over Rosas and Mitre, what was one to make of 
figures that never clearly belonged to either liberalism or revisionism, such as Mariano 
Moreno  and,  especially,  Alberdi?  The  revisionist  pantheon  became  increasingly 
unstable.
However, the importance of history as a central axis in these disputes should not 
be overestimated, as the contributions of Rosa, ecumenical in matters of ideology, can
44 Boletin del Instituto Rosas, second series, no. 5, May 1969, p. 21.
45 Boletin del Instituto Rosas, second series, no. 4, April  1969, p. 24 and p. 27.
46 Boletin del Instituto Rosas, second series, no. 5, May 1969, p. 23.
47 Boletin del Instituto Rosas, second series, no. 6, September 1969, p. 32.
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illustrate. Given his position as president of the Instituto Rosas, if anyone had a vested 
interest in the glorification of Rosas it was him. Unsurprisingly, in a letter written in 
1958, Rosa criticised Puiggros for not having sufficiently revised the interpretation of 
Rosas that Puiggros had given in his 1944-book Rosas el pequeho. Trying to persuade 
Puiggros  that  “Rosas  was  a  socialist  avant  la  lettre”  (an  affirmation  based  on  a 
document in which Rosas had expressed his sympathy for the European revolutions of 
1848), Rosa wrote that “the problem of Rosas is crucial to our history and it has not 
been ‘overcome by time’, as you say.”  On another occasion, however, Rosa argued 
that “the essential problem is not the figure of Rosas but the different criterion that we 
apply to judge him.”49 In any event, what really mattered, according to Rosa, was that, 
“when communism and nationalism coincide  [...], the world-wide national liberation 
of the  peoples  and  the  social  emancipation  of the  proletariat  [...]  is  inevitable.”50 
Notwithstanding  his  self-professed  Marxist  nationalism,  however,  he  had  no 
difficulties  in positing class  and nation  as  analytical  categories  in dichotomy.  In  an 
interview in 1968, he explained that
history  sometimes  shows  us  the  internal  confrontation  of  a  national  mentality  and  a  class 
mentality  [...].  The  bourgeoisie  has  a  class  mentality,  but  I  cannot  find  this  in  the  so-called 
working class.  Look what happens in our country: those above have ‘class consciousness’, those 
below national consciousness.
Although there was little in this statement that would have made it incompatible with 
the  Marxist analyses of other authors,  the observation,  in Rosa’s  eyes,  showed  “the 
great mistake of Marxism”.5 1
In short, the political ideas of nationalist intellectuals were not uniform.  Unless 
categories as broad as anti-imperialism or anti-liberalism are applied, it is difficult to 
distil  common  denominators.  Exercises  aimed  at  disentangling  different  strands  of 
Argentine nationalism became a favourite activity of the izquierda nacional itself. For 
example, large parts of Hernandez Arregui’s bestseller La formacion de la conciencia 
nacional were devoted to separating reactionary from progressive nationalism, as were
48 Josd Maria Rosa to Rodolfo Puiggrds, Madrid,  14 March  1958 (I would like to thank Omar Acha for 
having made accessible this letter to me). The corresponding reference to the book on Rosas is Rodolfo 
Puiggrds, Rosas, el pequeho, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: Perennis,  1953).
49 Mundo Nacionalista, no. 3, 5 September 1969, quoted in Jauretche, Politico nacional (1982), pp.  10- 
11. In italics in original.
50 Letter Rosa to Puiggrds,  14 March  1958.
51 Rosa, Historia del revisionismo, pp.  10-11. The expression “internal confrontation” supposedly 
referred to a confrontation within one country.
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passages of Puiggros’ work.  Ramos described the nacionalista Alberto Baldrich as “a 
contumacious fascist (later Peronist-fascist)”.  But does that mean that it is mistaken 
to group all these nationalists together? After all, the izquierda nacional was conscious 
of its  appropriation  of historical  revisionism  from  the  nacionalismo  of the  1930s. 
According to Hernandez Arregui,
the  merit  of Argentine  nacionalismo,  and  its  real  contribution  to  the  formation  of  national 
consciousness, was its historiographical work.54 
Although revisionists did not share a biographical pattern, fought between themselves 
over  ideological  differences  and  could  not  agree  on  what  figures  precisely  should 
populate the pantheon of national heroes, their trait of unity consisted in that they iden­
tified a common enemy. As the label revisionism indicated, this common enemy was 
what they perceived as the deformation of the nation by “official” liberalism.
3.  The centre of the revisionist argument
Regardless of what historical  symbols revisionists picked, for varying forms of anti­
liberalism and anti-imperialism, they all praised the personalistic political principle of 
caudillismo.  The charismatic bond between the  leader and the people,  in their view, 
was the typically  Argentine  way of doing politics,  whereas  they  equated  liberalism 
with  corrupting  politicking.  The  typical  caudillo  in  their  account  did  not  represent 
group interests, but simply the nation. The search for valuable caudillos was therefore 
tantamount to the claim to rescue from oblivion a real or authentic Argentina, which 
had allegedly remained invisible under the surface of liberal disintegration. In an essay 
published  in  1959,  in  which  he  linked  the  necessity  of historical  revision  to  the 
exigencies of Peronism, Jauretche called for a search for the “authentic nation”.55 This 
plea, of course, was so generic that all revisionists could agree upon it, ranging from 
the izquierda nacional to the Catholic Right. But while, as we have seen, the question 
which  figures  or  events  embodied  this  “authentic  nation”  and  for  what  reasons 
remained uncertain, it was easier to agree on the “enemies” of authenticity: distortion 
and  falsification.  From  this  stemmed  three  basic  characteristics  of  all  revisionist
52 Juan Josd Hernandez Arregui, La formacion de la conciencia nacional (1930-1960), 3rd ed. (Buenos 
Aires: Plus Ultra,  1973) and Rodolfo Puiggrds, Elproletariado en la revolucion nacional, 2nd ed. 
(Buenos Aires: Sudestada,  1968), pp. 47-66.
53 Ramos, Revolucion y contrarrevolucion, vol. 2, p. 557.
54 Hernandez Arregui, La formacion (1973), p. 264.
55 Jauretche, Politico nacional, p. 51.
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narratives.  Firstly,  they  relied  on  a  Manichean  set  of binary  oppositions,  such  as 
authenticity versus  falsification,  people  versus  anti-nation,  masses  versus  oligarchy, 
sovereignty  versus  imperialist  yoke,  caudillos  versus  effeminate  liberal  ideologues, 
interior versus port city and real nation versus intelligentsia.  Secondly, one particular 
point in this model was often explained by referring to another. Thirdly, these dichoto­
mies usually took on the form of a conspiracy theory, according to which hidden forces 
(such as the falsifications of intellectuals or secret manoeuvres in the City of London) 
powerfully pulled the strings beyond the visible fa9ade.
The  concept  of  distortion  in  particular  made  revisionism  compatible  with  a 
rudimentary  Marxism,  because  it  fitted  well  into  a  crude  form  of  the  Marxist 
understanding of ideology that Raymond Williams has defined as the idea of “a system 
of illusory beliefs”.56 The notion of a history distorted by liberalism was common to 
both the nacionalistas and the Marxist and populist neo-revisionists. If one had asked 
right-wing  revisionists  whether  there  was  one  sentence  by  Marx  with  which  they 
agreed, they might well have picked the phrase that “the ideas of the ruling class are in 
every epoch the ruling ideas”.  This is not to say that they were influenced by Marx. 
Nor  that  the  izquierda  nacional  took  great  care  in  analysing  this  notion.  Also, 
nacionalistas  and  Marxists  meant  slightly  different  things  when  they  employed 
concepts like ideology or falsification.  When Ernesto Palacio entitled his  1939 book 
La  historia falsificada  he  quite  literally  had  in  mind  historians  who  deliberately 
distorted the evidence, which was a problem that he thought easily redeemable through 
his own archival research.57 In turn, what Jauretche later labelled “pedagogic colonisa­
tion”  referred  to  a  problem  that  allegedly  affected  all  levels  of  society  and  was 
therefore more difficult to rectify: through education and cultural influences imperialist 
powers had colonised the minds of Argentines, so that a concerted effort was needed to
C O
achieve cultural liberation.  According to Jauretche, “pedagogic colonisation” had to 
be understood as part of a “cultural superstructure”, a concept that he had learned from
56 Williams, Marxism and literature, p. 55. As elsewhere, this concept of ideology coexisted relatively 
peacefully with other uses. Halperin Donghi, Ensayos, p.  111  has observed that many revisionists of the 
thirties saw democracy as an ideology or a false consciousness. It must be added that this was different 
in the writings of the izquierda nacional. Puiggrds’ criticism of “constitutional fetishism”, for example 
(Rodolfo Puiggros, Las izquierdas y el problema nacional, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: Cepe,  1973), p.  15), 
should not be interpreted as antidemocratic.
57 Ernesto Palacio, La historia falsificada (Buenos Aires: Difusion,  1939).
58 Arturo Jauretche, Los profetas del odioy layapa: la colonizacion pedagogica, 6th ed. (Buenos Aires: 
A. Pefia Lillo,  1973).
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Ramos.59 Hence, although Jauretche’s view was not exactly the same as Palacio’s, his 
account nevertheless echoed the merging of the revisionist denunciations of a falsified 
history with Marxist vocabulary, which, even though he was unfamiliar with Marxist 
theory, began to populate his writings at precisely this point.60
In  this  mixture,  Marxian  subtleties,  such  as  the  differences  between  ideology, 
false consciousness and alienation, mattered little, as different terms were used inter­
changeably.  In  Imperialismo y  cultura,  a  good  example  of this  blend,  Hernandez 
Arregui avowed that “the point of departure is the consideration of cultural activity as 
ideology”. From there,
the aim is to prove how this generation [from the  1930 military coup onwards] was the instrument 
of imperialism, which used it to reinforce a false consciousness of the nation’s own essence and 
to disarm the defensive spiritual forces that struggle for national liberation [...].61 
Ideology  always  had  to  be  understood  in  the  context  of Argentina’s  semi-colonial 
condition and the role of imperialism. The same author thus affirmed that
the imperialist offensive goes hand in hand with ideological  invasion.  The entire public opinion 
of the country is infected to the core by this publicity that dissolves the national consciousness of 
a people. Institutions do not escape this propaganda. I am referring here to imperialist infiltration 
of the trade unions, the armed forces and the universities.62 
The  alleged  liberal  falsification  of  history  was  deemed  part  of  this  “imperialist 
penetration”.  Although,  Maristella  Svampa  is  thus  right  to  argue  that  “revisionism
AT  •
methodologically  reinforces  the  Marxist  reading”,  this  does  not  mean  that 
revisionism necessarily  engendered  a rigorous  Marxist  methodology.  Without  much 
acknowledgement  or  discussion  of  problems  of  method,  approaches  ranged  from 
Rosa’s Rankean optimism (for him, the accumulation of documents sufficed to demon­
strate what the great men of the nineteenth century had actually been like) to the rigid 
Marxism of Puiggros, who of all revisionists came closest to economic determinism.
What really unified the revisionist argument thus continued to be its denunciation 
of the ideological penetration of imperialism and the  distortion of history.  That this 
was the point of connection could not only be seen in that non-Marxists like Jauretche
59 Jauretche, “Don Juan Manuel”, in: Barbara and others, Con Rosas, p.  17.
60 On an international level, the best-known example of a stress on cultural liberation in Third World 
struggles of decolonisation, of course, became Frantz Fanon, The wretched of the earth, translated by 
Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Weidenfeld,  1963), esp. pp. 206-248. Fanon hardly influenced 
Jauretche (in any case, Jauretche’s Los profetas del odio was first published in  1957, that is six years 
before Fanon was first translated into Spanish), but The wretched of the earth was widely read among 
the Peronist Left during the second half of the sixties.
61 Hernandez Arregui, Imperialismoy cultura, p.  15.
62 Hem&ndez Arregui, Peronismo y socialismo, p. 66.
63 Svampa, El dilema, p. 277.
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made  use  of Marxist  concepts  at  this  point,  but  also,  conversely,  in  that  Marxists 
borrowed  from  nacionalismo,  especially  its  hispanismo,  in  order  to  explain  the 
historical origins of this distortion. Although immigration was no longer a crucial issue 
of public debate by the  1950s, Ramos revived the matter to explain the weakness of 
authentic  traditions  in  Argentina.  In  his  eyes,  the  absence  of  grandparents  among 
immigrants
makes  it  completely  impossible  for  the  generations  after  1880  to  perceive  the  fundamental 
outlines of the Argentine historical process, given that the offspring of these successive streams 
of immigrants, who lacked an oral tradition, could understand history only through the textbooks 
of the  schools  that  are  dominated  by the  oligarchy.  These  superstructural  elements  have  huge 
importance  in  twentieth-century  Argentine  politics  and  in  the  historical  imposture  that  still 
rules.64
Whilst Ramos’ works did not usually expound a strong anti-immigration bias, Hernan­
dez  Arregui’s  nationalism  stressed  Argentina’s  Hispanic  roots  more  openly.  In  his 
view, one fundamental problem of the Argentine crisis lay in the economic and politi­
cal replacement of Spain by Britain as the principal point of reference for the ruling 
class. After assuring the reader of the far-reaching Hispanic influences in Shakespeare 
—designed implicitly to prove the cultural superiority of Spain—, Hernandez Arregui 
observed that the masses “remained Hispanic, affiliated to the past.”65
Hernandez  Arregui’s  notion  of hispanidad as  being  constitutive  of Argentine 
national identity was not the same as the nostalgic longing for a pre-capitalist Catholic 
and  hierarchical  age  that  had  been  the  repertoire  of some  reactionary  thinkers  of 
nacionalismo and revisionists of the thirties,  such as Ibarguren,  Galvez or Palacio.66 
Rather, it was meant to exalt a Hispanic American identity in opposition to what he 
perceived  as  a  threatening  American  way  of life.  Nevertheless,  behind  Hernandez 
Arregui’s  nationalism  lurked  a  form  of  cultural  conservatism,  which  suspected 
modernisation of inducing moral degeneration and was not very different from some 
variants of nacionalismo. Moralism and an aversion towards the latest cultural trends 
from overseas were also widespread among the Peronist Youth (JP). For example, the 
JP-organ Trinchera defined “the Peronist lifestyle” in opposition to consuming alcohol 
and visiting brothels. The scenes in Octavio Getino and Fernando Solanas’  1968-film 
La hora de  los homos in the arts branch of the  Instituto Di Telia —at the time the
64 Ramos, Revolucion y contrarrevolucion, vol. 2, p.  166.
65 Hernandez Arregui, iQue es el ser nacional?, p. 29.
66 In fact, the hispanismo of 1930s nacionalismo was explicitly criticised by the izquierda nacional. See 
for example Rodolfo Puiggros, Puebloy oligarqula (Buenos Aires: Jorge Alvarez,  1969), p.  17.
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cutting edge of artistic innovation and known as the manzana loca (the crazy block)— 
pictured its students as the quintessence of frivolity, promiscuity, drunkenness, moral 
corruption  and  indifference  towards  the  misery  of the  mass  of the  people.67  For 
Hernandez Arregui, the Instituto di Telia was “modem art without national roots”.  In 
this view, cultural modernisation was despicable because its flippancy was a symptom 
of imperialism having succeeded in diverting attention away from the cause of national 
liberation.
Overall,  according  to  neo-revisionists,  the  circular  link  between  imperialism, 
oligarchy and  liberal  ideologues  remained  more  important than the  lack  of Spanish 
roots  or  Catholic  morals  in  order to  explain the  distortion of Argentine  reality  and 
history. Puiggros (who can be seen as the neo-revisionist farthest away from the ideas 
of nacionalismo) wrote that
[t]he  ideological  infection  introduced through  imperialist propaganda provokes,  in the  colonial 
mentality of the liberal intellectuals and politicians, [...] a deformed vision of social reality [...]. 
Since, according to this view, the oligarchy controlled the means of communication, it 
was only logical that “the conquest of power cannot be learned in books.”69 In Rosa’s 
view,  “the  intellectuals  —as  happens  in  colonial  or  semi-colonial  countries—
70 unshakeably  continued  to  favour  foreign  ways.”  Hernandez  Arregui  depicted  his 
bestseller Imperialismo y cultura as the first application of the concept of alienation to
71 Argentine  culture,  at  the  roots  of which  supposedly  lay the  imperialist  project  of 
economic domination. In this sense, imperialism was a cmcial explanatory element and 
the  accounts  of the  izquierda  nacional  were  based  on  an  economic  determinism. 
However, arguments about the material basis of the anti-national character of oligar­
chic  literature  in Imperialismo y cultura hardly went beyond mere  affirmation.  “An 
equivocal  literature  of introspection  corresponds  to  the  economy  of monoculture”,
79 Hernandez  Arregui  wrote.  But  rather than  collating  economic  statistics,  the  book 
discussed literary products and the author aimed at proving the cultural liberalism and 
cosmopolitanism of the oligarchy. The material bases of imperialism formed only the 
invariable background and the oligarchy was defined through its cultural rather than its
67 Trinchera, no. 3 (October 1960). In contrast, Dinamis, the magazine of the union of light and power 
workers, found nothing indecent about imitating the style of Primera Plana and giving broad coverage 
to the latest records from the First World or to beauty contests.
68 Hernandez Arregui, Peronismo y socialismo, p. 51.
69 Puiggrds, Puebloy oligarquia, p.  13. Puiggros, Las izquierdas, p.  187.
70 Rosa, Historia del revisionismo, p. 67.
71 Hernandez Arregui, iQue es el ser nacional?, p.  12.
72 Hernandez Arregui, Imperialismo y cultura, p.  127. Italics added.
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economic  properties;  it  was  a  parasitic  rather  than  an  exploitative  class.  In  this 
argument the neo-revisionists had much in common with the traditional historiographi­
cal  strand of the  1930s, too.  As Halperin Donghi has remarked,  in the Irazustas’  La 
Argentina y el imperialismo britanico the anti-nation, the oligarchy, had already been 
defined culturally and not according to economic criteria.
Even though all revisionists identified falsification and distortion as the enemy, at 
first  glance the national-populist Left differed  from the more elitist nacionalistas in 
that  they  claimed  to  rescue  the  marginalised  masses  from  historical  oblivion. 
Hernandez Arregui wrote that “we must oppose the official  history of the  oligarchy 
with a revolutionary revision that exposes the class content of this canonised fable of 
our past.”74 However, although in comparison to the rosismo of the  1930s class as a 
category played a more central role in the populist narratives, in their writings as well, 
it acquired its meaning only in connection with the category of the nation.  Even the 
authors of the izquierda nacional depicted the nineteenth-century masses —not yet the 
proletariat  of the  following  century—  as  a naturally  national  class.  For  Hernandez 
Arregui, “the nationalism of the masses stems from the actual, not theoretical, fact of 
colonisation. Not from books, but from the destructive eradication that comes upon us 
from outside.” The nationalism of the masses appeared as something that had existed a 
priori.  Hernandez  Arregui’s  definition  of the  masses  was  simply that  “they  do  not 
think of the  there  of the  world.  They think of the  here.  Of the  fatherland.”  It thus 
turned  out  that  “the  masses  are  always  national,  although  they  do  not  know  the 
definition of nation” and that “the proletariat [here, the contemporary] is, by definition,
7 c
a  national  and  revolutionary  class.”  Borrowing  Alain  Touraine’s  words,  in  this 
discourse,  “class and nation thus appeared as nothing but the two faces of the  same
7  f\ protagonist of the struggles for national liberation.”  For revisionists, the nationalism 
of the  masses  thus  needed  no  further  discussion because  they  saw  it  as  a naturally 
given essence.
73 On the absence of materialist yardsticks for the characterisation of the oligarchy in the most 
successful book of the Irazusta brothers, La Argentina y el imperialismo britanico, see Tulio Halperin 
Donghi, “Argentines ponder the burden of the past”, in: Jeremy Adelman (ed.), Colonial legacies: the 
problem of  persistence in Latin American history (New York and London: Routledge,  1999), p.  165.
74 Juan Jos6 Hernandez Arregui, Nacionalismo y liberacion (Buenos Aires: Hachea,  1969), p.  19.
75 Hernandez Arregui, Peronismo y socialismo, p.  16, p. 70 and p. 67.
76 Alain Touraine, La parole et le sang: politique et societe en Amerique latine (Paris: Odile Jacob, 
1988), p.  141. Typical of this was the argument of Astesano who, in a first step, established that the 
gaucho was the prototype of Argentineness and, in a second step, depicted the revolutionary capacities 
of the “gaucho working class”.
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Although Marxist revisionists stressed the importance of the popular masses in 
history, the scope they conceded to subaltern sectors in their books was much narrower 
than  they  promised  in  their  introductions.  The  title  of Ramos’  best-known  book, 
Revolution  and  Counterrevolution,  epitomised  its  dichotomous  pamphletic  content 
much more accurately than the subtitle of the original  1956 edition —dropped for the 
1965 edition— which had raised the misleading expectation that the reader held in his 
hands a study about The Masses in Our History. It would have been equally possible to 
take one of Puiggros’ titles, such as People and Oligarchy or The Left and the National 
Problem, since Ramos’ most recurring invectives were directed against those whom he 
saw as the archetypes of the oligarchy, Mitre, and of the anti-national liberal Left, Juan
77
B.  Justo.  Despite  habitually proposing to  retrieve those  who  had  supposedly been 
buried by “official history”, the products of other authors, such as Hernandez Arregui’s 
history of ideas or Rosa’s books of political and diplomatic history, were even more 
inclined to become a history of great men, which rarely included the popular classes. 
Although generic references to the “excluded”, the “marginalised” and in particular the 
“silenced” were frequent, a search for the term “inequality” in the essays and history 
books of national-populist authors would be undertaken in vain. The argument that the 
essays of the izquierda nacional revealed class problems is misleading.  Marxist revi­
sionists, let alone other revisionists, never tackled issues such as housing conditions, 
health care or popular culture. Like their rosista predecessors, they did not write social 
history.
The impediment to social history was not insufficient archival resources, but their 
own reasoning. Class and nation were condensed into a single organic object that was 
the agent of national liberation. The fact that this entity was not only based on national 
values,  but  also  on  the  cultural  properties  of the proletariat,  would  —at  least  if it 
became  conscious  of its  own  destiny—  ensure  the  ultimately  socialist  outcome  of 
national liberation. In principle, this body could be a class as well as a historical figure. 
It was only a short step, then, from the idea that “every historical individuality personi­
fies social powers” to the discovery of figures that embodied the values of both nation 
and  popular  class.78  Marxist  revisionists  saw  these  values  above  all  in  the  federal 
caudillos  who  had  resisted  Mitre’s porteho  centralism,  such  as  Angel  Vicente  “El
77 The respective Spanish titles were: Revolucion y contrarrevolucion en la Argentina: las masas en 
nuestra historia (Ramos,  1956), Pueblo y oligarqula (Puiggros,  1969), Las izquierdas y elproblema 
nacional (Puiggr6s,  1967).
78 Hernandez Arregui, Imperialismo y cultura, p. 21.
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Chacho” Penaloza,  Felipe Varela or Ricardo  Lopez Jordan,  i.e.  in the  interior or at 
least in the littoral provinces. Frequently exalted were also some earlier caudillos who 
had fought against the preponderance of Buenos Aires, such as Jose Gervasio Artigas 
or  Facundo  Quiroga.  Past  and  present  struggles  were  represented  as  analogous. 
Hernandez Arregui asked
From where  did  the  focal  points  of national  emancipation  emerge  in the  last  years?  From  the 
provinces, Cordoba, Tucumdn, Rosario [sic], Corrientes, San Juan, Catamarca [...]. The country, 
crushed  during  the  nineteenth  century  with  the  extermination  of the  last  montoneras  of Felipe 
Varela, is in the interior.79
According to  Ortega  Pena and  Duhalde,  “Mitre  [...]  is  the  symbol  of the  directing 
cattle-breeding class which organised the country according to the dictates of English 
financial capital”, whereas “Felipe Varela [...] is the organisation of the people, of the
o0
provincial working classes.”  For them, Varela thus did not only do what the nation or 
the people wanted, but he was the organisation of the people, at the same time synony­
mous with the “provincial working classes”. The identity between caudillo and people 
had already been established through a homology in the title/subtitle of the book: Feli­
pe  Varela Against the British Empire.  The Masses of the  Union Americana Confront 
the European Powers.  Yet that the  masses and the caudillo  could be melded  in the 
same  semantic  position was  only possible  through their antagonism to  their  always 
implicit opposite: the British Empire or the European Powers.
Neo-revisionist texts commonly established a system of points of reference that 
mutually explained each other: the historical distortions of liberalism led to imperialist 
penetration.  This penetration was manifest in economic and cultural practices, which 
led to the exclusion of those who resisted these distortions. In this way, the imperialist 
penetration again caused a false historical consciousness. It was possible to insert more 
elements into such chains, but in any case the fact that they explained themselves eo 
ipso forever relegated to a subordinate level questions about determinants or about the 
relationship between base and superstructure. Ramos in particular cast a wide net in his 
writings, where every knot was untied through a reference to its neighbours, which was 
then  pressed  into  an  overall  dichotomous  scheme.  At  the  beginning  of the  second 
volume  of Revolucion y  contrarrevolucion,  he  declared that the  social,  cultural  and 
political changes of the twentieth century “only find themselves confronted with one
79 Hernandez Arregui, Peronismo y socialismo, p. 70.
80 Ortega Pena and Duhalde, Felipe Varela, pp.  165-166.
125The heterogeneity of revisionism
invariable factor: the cattle-breeding and commercial oligarchy.” On the last pages of 
the same volume, the reader was told:
However surprising it might seem,  and  in spite of the transformative power of history,  there  is 
one  thing  that  a  century  and  a  half of vicissitudes  has  not  changed  in  our  country:  the  all- 
embracing power of the cattle-breeding oligarchy, built from the balkanisation of Latin America 
and the eclipse of Artigas. The oligarchic nucleus, a truly parasitic and paralysing core, corrupter 
of  Argentine  economics,  politics  and  culture,  bases  itself  on  the  same  interests,  the  same 
psychology and the same myths with which it confronted the caudillos, sustained the exclusivism 
of  one  port  against  the  Nation,  elevated  Rivadavia,  admitted  Rosas,  acclaimed  Mitre, 
exterminated Paraguay, opposed Roca, overthrew Yrigoyen and exiled Per6n.81  
According to Ramos, throughout the twentieth century, the struggles of liberation had 
received  their justification  through  their  negative  opposite,  the  oligarchy,  against 
which the rest had to be measured.
Such  chains  or  dualities,  in  which  the  arguments  confirmed  each  other,  were 
characteristic  of  a  discourse  that  attempted  to  be  at  once  hermetic  and  all- 
encompassing. It ascribed an immobile significance to every historical protagonist and 
event  within  a  global  model  of interpretation,  in  which  every  element  referred  to 
another. The distribution of roles in this game was ambivalent. Rosas, Varela or Peron 
could not simply be seen as the representation of a precise social constituency such as 
the working class. The crucial problems of Argentine history thus assumed an ethical 
rather than a socio-economic character. The enemy was identified as the enemy of the 
fatherland rather than the representation of interests of specifiable social groups. This 
explains why the tone of these writings was always moralist and why “betrayal” was 
such  a recurrent  category  in  this  discourse.  In  this,  revisionism  resembled  populist 
rhetoric. In the words of Peron, “the people never betray, those who betray are the men 
who try to deceive the people.”  As for the historical narratives of national-populist 
writers,  “betrayal”  became the  decisive  concept  in accounting for historical  change. 
When  Rosa  was  asked  in  an  interview by  the  popular historical  magazine  Todo  es 
Historia in  1970 whom he  saw as  “the  most dreadful personage  in our history”, he 
replied: “I understand and explain them all.  [...] I can’t say that I’m the enemy of any 
of them.”  But  he  added  that  “there  is  one  federal  personage  whom  I  can’t  forgive 
because he represents the traitor, and that is Urquiza.”  Revisionists never explained 
the  battle  of Caseros  or  any  other  historical  event  through  changes  in  the  socio­
81 Ramos, Revolucion y contrarrevolucion, vol. 2, p. 7 and p. 698.
82 Quoted in Cronica,  18 October 1964.
83 Todo es Historia, no. 33, January 1970, p. 61.
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economic structure or changing interests, but through the moral ineptitude of eminent 
men.  Just  as  Urquiza was  a traitor  in  Rosa’s  eyes,  for  Garcia  Mellid,  the  political 
activities  of the  Unitarians  were  simply  a  series  of “betrayals”  of the  country  as  a 
whole.  In spite of Ortega Pena and Duhalde’s claim that “every historical individua-
Of
lity personifies  social powers”,  revisionists thus did not usually interpret historical 
figures according to the group interests for which they stood, but instead assorted them 
into a group of anti-national traitors and one of true nationalists.
Summarising,  the  seeming  strength  and  self-sufficiency of revisionism  derived 
from a circular arguments, in which each point explained and legitimised another. This 
can be seen as an attempt to make a discourse invulnerable against the potential distur­
bances  that  stemmed  from  its  own  instability.  Correspondingly,  past  and  present 
mutually  illuminated  and  legitimised  each  other.  According to  Jauretche,  a national 
policy was  conducive to the revision of history just as historical  revisionism would 
entail a national policy.  Curiously grounding his argument on Marc Bloch’s demand 
for  an  histoire  a  rehours,  making  it  sound  like  a  call  for  an  unrestrained  use  of 
anachronisms, he contended that the oligarchic “politics of history” required an oppo­
sitional politics of history. And the political needs of the present not only determined
Of
historiography,  but also  vice versa.  After he had told readers that Anchorenas  and 
Gainzas had been the only families mentioned in Jose Hernandez’ gaucho epic Martin 
Fierro, Ramos wrote that “presently, and by the clear intention of history, they have 
joined together in the family owning the newspaper ‘La Prensa’,  the gloomiest anti­
national  bastion  in  Argentina.”  If the  contemporary  events  posthumously  revealed 
Hernandez’  “mysterious sensibility”, there was also “an intention of history”, which, 
by  the  time  he  had  written Martin  Fierro,  had  already  determined  future  historical
87 events.
84 Atilio Garcia Mellid, Proceso al liberalismo argentino, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: Theoria,  1964), pp. 
317-350. The list of usages of betrayal as the explanatory factor in revisionist literature is potentially 
endless.
85 See footnote 79.
86 Jauretche, Politica nacional, pp. 23-25. Whilst the Annales School in general was an inspiration for 
the kind of social history that emerged in Argentine universities after 1955, Bloch had been translated 
into Spanish and was read by Argentine historians before 1955 (I would like to thank Luis Alberto 
Romero for this clarification).
87 Ramos, Revolucion y contrarrevolucion, vol.  1, p.  189.
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Conclusion
Fernando Devoto is right to argue that it is difficult to identify common denominators
oo
among  revisionists  in  the  1960s.  Although  the  history  of the  izquierda  nacional 
suggests a movement from Marxism towards nationalism, the overall composition of 
Argentine  nationalism  in  the  1960s  was  an  eclectic  mixture  from  different  back­
grounds.  It is impossible to neatly divide nationalism into a right-wing nacionalismo 
and a left-wing and populist current. Most nationalist intellectuals did not fit into either 
of the two categories:  into which group would the widely read Jauretche fall,  or his 
former  FORJA-fellow  Garcia  Mellid?  Ortega  Pena  and  Duhalde,  members  of the 
Instituto Rosas, who denied belonging to the izquierda nacional, or a Catholic populist 
like Fermin Chavez, let alone the prolific Rosa, are no easier to classify. If one strand 
was singled out on the basis of the twofold self-definition of Marxism and populism it 
would have to include at least Puiggros, Ramos, Astesano, Cooke, Hernandez Arregui, 
Rosa, Ortega Pena and Duhalde. But as we have seen, their ideological backgrounds 
had little in common:  some had a trajectory in the traditional Left, others in Radica­
lism,  and  Rosa  had  originally  been  a  sympathiser  of fascism.  Unsurprisingly,  the 
political  ideas  of nationalist  intellectuals  revealed  no  common  pattern  either.  There 
were certain themes they had in common, such as anti-imperialism, perhaps always the 
most promising candidate to  bind together Marxism and nationalism.  But there  was 
little agreement over what exactly this anti-imperialism meant and,  furthermore,  the 
label  is  too  generic  to  pin  down  an  unmistakable  nationalist  ideology.  Conversely, 
assuming that all nationalists shared a revisionist understanding of Argentina’s history, 
if we  try  to  find  historical  figures  or  a  set  of figures  they  exalted  or  reviled,  the 
possible choices quickly turn out to be too specific. In the 1960s, not even the classics 
were spared from arguments. Many revisionists still admired Rosas, but others did not. 
Puiggros, although he did not repeat the criticism of the former governor of Buenos 
Aires that he had written in 1944, was especially known for his dislike of Rosas. Mitre, 
formerly the target par excellence of revisionist attacks, recovered stature as a great 
patriot  in  some  accounts.  Oliver  saw  “communist  infiltrations”  in  the  nacionalista 
ranks  and  Ramos  identified  a  “contumacious  fascist”  in his  environment.  Jauretche 
tried to steer a middle course, but also felt that the “Mitro-Marxists” of the izquierda 
nacional were a danger to revisionist orthodoxy.
88 Devoto, “Reflexiones”, in Devoto and Pagano (eds.), Historiografias academicay militante, pp.  107- 
131.
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But is it therefore mistaken to speak of revisionism in the singular? It seems to 
me that the  attraction of revisionism lay precisely in its  lack of specific  ideological 
demands. That nationalist intellectuals of all persuasions turned to history might have 
served two goals at the same time: first, it was a means of legitimising themselves in 
the present;  second,  it can be  seen as  a way of dissolving political  questions  of the 
present  in  an  overarching  historical  narrative  that  made  precise  definitions  in 
contemporary politics less necessary. Instead of being geared towards the realisation of 
concrete  political  aims,  revisionism  derived  its  coherence  from  combining  three 
enemies:  liberalism, imperialism and intellectuals. The very term revisionism already 
suggests that it was directed against a perceived orthodoxy. The fixation on the idea 
that there had been a distortion provided a degree of cohesiveness that otherwise would 
have been absent. On the positive side of its dichotomous reading of reality stood the 
caudillos. The chosen figures and the reasons for which they were picked could differ, 
but the form of politics that revisionists praised was always the personalistic principle 
of caudillismo and the charismatic bond between a symbolic leader and nation.  This 
leader  had  to  be  above  the  atomised  group  interests  that  were  typical  of  liberal 
politicking.  Therefore,  it was problematic when a certain figure,  for example Rosas, 
could be seen as the expression of the interests of a specific group (in this case, of the 
cattle-breeding oligarchy).  He  was  then  no  longer the  embodiment  of the  nation  as 
such. In the accounts of national-populists, the masses, who had the same interests and 
fulfilled the same historical function as caudillos, were naturally national. They had no 
particular  demands,  needs  or  concerns,  just  those  of the  people.  A  closer  look  at 
phenomena such as social stratification or inequality would have endangered the cohe­
rence of this discourse.  Such questions were thus hardly raised in revisionist writings 
and  they  had  to  be  sacrificed  to  the  overarching  principle  that  coalesced  class  and 
nation into a single organic agent that would bring about national liberation.  Within 
this overall model, the question of what exactly it meant that the people or the leader 
represented  the  authentic  nation  were  resolved  in  a  circular  argument,  such  as:  the 
caudillo was the real nation because he incorporated the people who were opposed to 
the oligarchy; the oligarchy was anti-national, because it was aligned with imperialism, 
which tried to depose the caudillo. If in reality it had been a federalist (Urquiza) who 
deposed Rosas, this could only be because of betrayal and lack of loyalty to the nation.
In this, revisionism was very close to the features of Peronist discourse that have 
been described by Sigal and Veron: “Peronism is not a political position among other
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possible ones, it is by definition a trans-political entity: to be Peronist simply means to 
be a true Argentine.” Just like the ideal revisionist caudillo, “Peron does not represent 
an ideology, nor does he pursue a political interest.” For that reason, “like the Father-
OQ
land, Peron determines who is loyal and who is a traitor.”  Revisionist discourse also 
resembled Touraine’s description of Latin American populism in general.
Populist discourse does not seek to be representative and the political boss does not direct himself 
to a precise category or class.  The  leader is identified with an ensemble, the people, the  nation, 
the fatherland [...]. The enemy is defined as the anti-nation, the anti-people [...]. This absence o f 
a social reference can be explained because the populist  leader believes that it  is consciousness 
that determines social transformations [...] He turns political problems into ethical choices.90 
In short, revisionists did not express precise tenets or demands.  This turned it into  a 
polysemic discursive blueprint which could be applied for different reasons and with 
different aims. In this lay part of its attraction. As Bourdieu has remarked, “the great 
prophesies are polysemic  [...]  Therefore, thinkers with great elasticity are  like a gift 
from  God  [...]  for  an  annexationist  interpretation  and  for  strategic  usages.”91  This 
opens  another  line  of  inquiry,  namely  how  revisionism  was  made  applicable  for 
“strategic usages”.
89 Sigal and Ver6n, Peron o muerte, p.  128. and p.  129.
90 Touraine, La parole et le sang, p. 205.
91 Pierre Bourdieu, “Les conditions sociales de la circulation des idees”, Romanistische Zeitschrift fur 
Literaturgeschichte, vol.  14, no.  1-2 (1990), pp.  1-10, p. 5.
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Networks of dissemination of revisionism: 
periodicals, publishers and political groups
Introduction
Left-wing Argentine intellectuals became increasingly politicised in the 1960s. As has 
been argued in chapter two, this politicisation was in part linked to the fragmentation 
of the intellectual  field.  It also  mirrored international  developments,  however.  Since 
French debates enjoyed great prestige in Argentina, Sartre’s demand that the intellec­
tual put his activity to political uses was perhaps especially influential.1  The interest in 
post-revolutionary developments in Cuban culture further reinforced the  ideal  of the 
militant intellectual.  Although in an urbanised society like Argentina it was less ob­
vious than in Cuba how the step from advocating armed insurgencies to actually taking 
part  in  them  should  be  made,  many  Argentine  intellectuals  nevertheless  convinced 
themselves that revolution was the order of the day in their country too.  To be sure, 
when middle-class  students began to arm themselves in the late  1960s,  it turned out 
that not every intellectual  who  had  freely used the term revolution was  prepared to 
follow them.  Yet at the very least the  1960s were a period in which the majority of 
Argentine  intellectuals  believed,  as  Beatriz  Sarlo  has  put  it,  that  “the  distinctively 
intellectual dimension of [their] activity could gain a purpose through the distinctively
1  As Tony Judt, Past imperfect: French intellectuals 1944-1956 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press,  1992), pp. 205-245 has shown, the French intellectual community of the post-war period was also 
characterised by a combination of self-abnegation and suspicion of anything associated with liberalism.
2 See Claudia Gilman, Entre la plumay el  fusil: debates y dilemas del escritor revolucionario en 
America Latina (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 2003), pp.  189-231.
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political dimension.”3 The disappointment with Frondizi’s developmentalist adminis­
tration in late 1958, in which many intellectuals had hoped to be granted a crucial role, 
further  exacerbated  their  despair  of ever  finding  a  political  home.  Especially  after 
1966, many began to associate themselves with the Peronist movement.
Revisionists, perhaps even more so than other intellectuals, were also politicised 
and  drew closer to  the  Peronist movement,  as  scholars  who  have  studied this  topic 
have  often  emphasised.4  Revisionists  furthermore  coupled this  call  for political  en­
gagement with a bias against intellectuals. Sigal has even argued that “the revisionists 
[...] brought to Argentine political culture  [the] dimension [of] anti-intellectualism.”5  
As we have seen, nationalist intellectuals accused the “intelligentsia” of being respon­
sible  for  the  nation’s  ills  and  they  had  argued  since  the  1930s  that  historiography 
should  be  understood  primarily  as  a  political  weapon.  Back  in  1934,  the  Irazusta 
brothers’  fundamental concern already lay in the political rather than the historiogra­
phical domain. This could be deduced most easily from the structure of their founda­
tional  revisionist  book,  La Argentina y  el  imperialismo  britanico,  where  the  short 
excursion into history was little more than an appendix to the authors’ more immediate 
urge to condemn the Roca-Runciman Treaty of the previous year as the abominable 
seal of Argentina’s capitulation to British commercial interests. After the downfall of 
Peron, revisionists further accentuated their instrumentalist notion of history. In 1959, 
Jauretche  criticised  his  forerunners  of the  1930s  for  not  sufficiently  asserting  the 
ultimately political goals of their writing:
The task which the revisionist school fulfilled [...] ran the risk, even if they had the truth on their 
side,  of remaining  a  simple  revalorisation  of history  as  anecdote  [...].  In  this  way,  historical 
revision would have been an act of justice but not the contribution necessary to placing history at 
the service of national politics.6 
In  1973, an article in the periodical Militancia, which supported the Montoneros and 
was  directed  by  Ortega  Pena  and  Duhalde,  maintained  that  revisionism  helped  the 
people “not to think abstractly,  but to  find themselves as politicised beings.”  If the 
programme  of the  1960s  consisted  in  further  politicising  revisionism,  the  ways  in 
which revisionism was disseminated in order to become politically applicable warrant 
further attention.
3 Beatriz Sarlo, “Intelectuales: ^escisidn o mimesis?”, Punto de Vista, no. 25 (1985), pp.  1-6, p. 2.
4 See for example Halperin Donghi, El revisionismo, Quattrocchi-Woisson,  Un nationalisme or 
Cattaruzza, “Algunas reflexiones”, in: Devoto (ed.), La historiografia, vol.  1, pp. 113-139.
5  Sigal, Intelectualesy poder, p.  13.
6 Jauretche, Politico nacional (1982), p. 61.
7 Militancia, no. 3, 28 June 1973, p. 22.
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This chapter examines the ways in which revisionist imagery was disseminated 
and appropriated for political goals. It thereby relates to a broader theoretical question, 
namely how nationalist ideas can develop an appeal beyond the original producers of 
these ideas. As Anthony Smith has argued, modernist approaches towards nationalism 
that  concentrate  on  the  pivotal  role  of intellectuals  in the  formulation  of “invented 
traditions” often fail to explain why and how these intellectual “inventions” pervade
O
much larger sectors of the population.  Since this generic problem exceeds the scope of 
this chapter, the question might be narrowed by asking to what extent revisionists as a 
group of intellectuals could manipulate the spread of their ideas. The controllability of 
a  discourse  might  be  said  to  depend  on  the  types  of vehicles  through  which  it  is 
conveyed. Widely sold books, for example, tend to promote the fame of an author, not 
of a group, and they are open for appropriating uses by a broad public. In contrast, as 
Beatriz Sarlo and Carlos Altamirano have put it,
a periodical tends to organise its public, that is the area of readers that recognise it as an instance 
of authorised intellectual opinion. Therefore, the difference between book and periodical  [...] is 
not  merely  technical.  Every  periodical  includes  a  certain  class  of  writings  (declarations, 
manifestoes etc.),  around the  ideas of which it seeks to create stable  links and solidarities  [...]. 
Another trait that can sometimes take the form of the book, but that seems inherent to the form of 
the periodical is that it habitually translates a group strategy.9 
It might be added that this is especially true for cultural reviews that appear regularly 
and are led by the same editors over an extended period of time. Finally, stable cultural 
institutions with regularly published reviews can provide an even stronger coherence 
for  permanently  promoting  a  group  strategy.  Although  not  very  stable  itself,  the 
Instituto Rosas was the only revisionist institution in this sense.
Although the review and the bulletin of the Instituto Rosas habitually described 
revisionism as a “movement” and celebrated its “success”, the main argument of this 
chapter  is  that,  after  1955,  the  dissemination  of revisionism  cannot  be  seen  as  a 
concerted strategy of a group of intellectuals with clearly defined boundaries. Instead, 
revisionist  imagery  gained  currency  through  informal  networks,  often  linked  to  the 
Peronist  movement,  in  which  intellectuals  and  political  activists  mingled.  Although 
periodicals  did  play  a  crucial  role  in  this,  the  ones  that  became  most  important  as 
vehicles  of revisionist imagery were  usually  short-lived  enterprises that  supported  a
8 Anthony Smith, Nationalism and modernism: a critical survey of  recent theories of nations and 
nationalism (London and New York: Routledge,  1998), esp. p.  116 for a critique of Elie Kedourie for 
attributing too great a role to intellectuals.
9 Carlos Altamirano and Beatriz Sarlo, Literatura/Sociedad (Buenos Aires: Hachette,  1983), pp. 96-97.
133Networks of  dissemination
certain political  faction.  This  meant that the  spread  of revisionist  themes  and  their 
appropriation  by  political  groupings  became  difficult  to  control  for  their  erstwhile 
producers. In order to show this, as a first step, I will analyse the traits of, firstly, the 
print media that carried articles by revisionist authors and, secondly, book publishers. 
Next,  it  will  be  shown  how  the  Instituto  Rosas  unsuccessfully  struggled  to  regain 
initiative  in  this  dispersion.  Finally,  I  will  examine  how  factions  of the  Peronist 
movement appropriated revisionist motifs for their own purposes. All this contributed 
to a further subordination of history to political goals.
1. Periodicals and publishers
One might expect that historiographical debates that have an important repercussion in 
the  public  sphere  are  discussed  in  the  mainstream  mass  print  media.  The  (West) 
German  Historikerstreit  over  the  question  of the  uniqueness  of the  Holocaust,  for 
instance, was almost exclusively conducted through mass media.10 Similarly, contribu­
tions to Israel’s historians’ debate of the 1990s were often first published in the literary 
supplement  of  Ha’aretz.u  In  stark  contrast,  however,  a  search  for  the  debates 
surrounding Argentine historical revisionism in the 1960s in dailies such as La Nacion 
and La Prensa or in the weekly magazine Primera Plana would be almost fruitless. 
Though perhaps obvious to anyone familiar with the topic, this does not go without 
saying because  it  is  indicative  of the  fact that  revisionism was  not perceived  as  an 
important  public  debate  in  itself;  instead  it  was  seen  mostly  as  an  appendix  of a 
political  orientation,  namely  Peronism.  One  of the  very  few  exceptions  in  which 
revisionism was  mentioned  in the  mainstream press,  an  article  in Primera Plana  in 
1964, can illustrate this. After lamenting in the headline that “the past still divides the 
Argentines”,  the  journalist  reported  that  two  Peronist  unionists  had  travelled  to 
Southampton to visit Rosas’  grave and that the Peronist-dominated municipal council
of a town  in the  province  of Chaco  planned to  rename  its main  street  as  “Avenida
1 2 Rosas”, but not a single revisionist writer was mentioned in the entire article.  Their 
absence  from  the  mainstream  press  nurtured  the  revisionists’  claim  that  they  were 
silenced by powerful media moguls, linked to imperialism. Their favourite target was
10 Especially in the two leading daily broadsheets Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Siiddeutsche 
Zeitung and the most important weekly newspaper, Die Zeit.
1 1  See Barbara Schafer (ed.), Historikerstreit in Israel: Die  “neuen” Historiker zwischen Wissenschaft 
und Ojfentlichkeit (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2000).
1 2  Primera Plana, no. 75,  14 April 1964.
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La Nation, which they saw as a bastion of the establishment. In the eyes of Ramos, La 
Nation remained irrevocably associated with the liberal and pro-imperialist falsifica­
tion of history that had been instigated by the paper’s founder Mitre, the “hero of the 
fatherland-selling oligarchy”:
If ‘La Nacion’  has been an important element in the elaboration of the mythology,  it is no  less 
true  that  Mitre  and  mitrismo  constitute  a  bulwark  of imperialism  in  the  River  Plate;  this  fact 
explains  the  glory  that  the  falsified  history  has  awarded  to  the  political  inspirer  of  the 
assassination of Chacho [Peflaloza], [... ] the last of the great caudillos of our gaucho army.1 3  
According  to  the  nacionalista  periodical  Retorno,  in  turn,  the  problem  was  that, 
instead of reporting on Rosas,  “the big press,  instrument of the hidden headquarters 
that pull the  strings of contemporary history,  always has up  its  sleeve  a scandalous 
topic to dis-inform public opinion.”1 4
The idea that the liberal-conservative La Nation sidelined nationalist and populist 
views of Argentina’s history on political grounds was not entirely mistaken. The paper 
often buttressed its editorial demands for democracy, social justice and civil liberties 
—a  rhetoric  that  was  often  abandoned  when  it  came  to  the  analysis  of practical 
policies— with references to the figures associated with the liberal and cosmopolitan 
tradition, such as Rivadavia, Sarmiento and Mitre. The contributors that were chosen
th
to write in its supplement on the occasion of the  150  anniversary of the May Revolu­
tion underscored this liberal  outlook of the paper,  as they were likely to  sympathise 
with figures of the liberal pantheon.1 5  However, there was no orchestrated “conspiracy 
of silence”. Not all revisionists had always been excluded from what they saw as the 
liberal establishment.  Scalabrini Ortiz and Julio Irazusta had written for La Nation in 
the  1930s.  Several rosistas had also published in Victoria Ocampo’s literary journal 
Sur, which was usually seen as a bastion of the cosmopolitan intelligentsia.16 Despite 
the journal’s liberal image and cosmopolitan reputation, Ramon Doll had deemed Sur 
an appropriate place to publish his fervent denunciation of “the Europeanised classes 
with their backs turned against the Nation”.1 7   Personal contacts between revisionists 
and those who came to embody the quintessence of the oligarchic and cosmopolitan
1 3  Lucha Obrera, no. 8, 25 January 1956.
14 Retorno, no. 39, 7 April  1965.
1 5  La Nation's supplement for this anniversary included texts by Bartolom6 Mitre, Carlos Alberto Erro, 
Juan Mantovani and Francisco Romero, among others.
16 On Sur, see John King, Sur: a study of the Argentine literary journal and its role in the development 
of  a culture: 1931-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  1986).
17 Sur, no. 22, July 1936, p. 96. It is notable that some articles, particularly Doll’s review of La 
Argentina y el imperialismo britanico, had the advertisement of historical revisionism as its primary aim 
and that apparently this did not meet objections from Ocampo or others.
135Networks of  dissemination
intelligentsia had not been uncommon. As Irazusta later acknowledged, he had enjoyed 
privileged access to Ocampo’s circle in the mid-1930s.1 8 But there were also examples 
from the two decades after  1955. Vicente  Sierra wrote an article for Clarin in  1960, 
Jose  Maria  Rosa  for La  Opinion  in  1971  and  Juan  Pablo  Oliver contributed  to  La 
Nacion}9  Such contributions  were exceptional,  but they show that revisionists  were 
not  systematically  and  categorically  excluded  from  the  mainstream  press,  as  they 
usually held.
Nor  was  revisionism  prominent  in  monthly  literary  and  cultural  reviews  that
might be said to have translated the strategy of an intellectual group (with the obvious
exception  of the  publications  of the  Instituto  Rosas).  Nationalist  intellectuals  rarely
founded  or  contributed  to  the  kind  of intellectual journals  that  Teran  has  used  to
reconstruct the climate of ideas of the  1960s.  Most of these expressed political and
intellectual concerns with which revisionist ideas did not sit comfortably. For example,
by the 1960s, the Catholic journal Criterio represented a liberal-conservative strand of
Catholicism  and  thus  had  ceased  to  be  a  potential  mouthpiece  of nacionalistas.2 1
Unsurprisingly, revisionism could hardly be seen either in the cultural review of the
Communist  Party,  Cuadernos  de  Cultura,  or  in  Marxist  journals  like  Pasado  y
Presente  or  La  Rosa  Blindada,  the  editors  of  which  had  broken  away  from  the
Communist Party more recently and less radically than Puiggros.  Whilst Criterio had
become  “too  liberal”,  these  reviews  were  “too  communist”  to  draw  on  revisionist 
22 ideas.  However,  the  absence  of revisionism  from  cultural journals  cannot  be  ex­
plained on such ideological grounds alone, because revisionist themes did not feature 
prominently  either  in  intellectual  monthly journals  that  did  expound  political  ideas
1 8  Irazusta, Memorias, pp. 226-227.
19 Sierra in Clarin, 22 September 1960 and Rosa La Opinion, 20 November 1971.1  could not find the 
corresponding references of Oliver’s articles, but the information stems from Boletin del Instituto Rosas, 
second series, no. 5, May 1969, p. 23.
20 Teran, Nuestros ahos sesentas.
2 1 See Marcelo Montserrat, “El orden y la libertad: una historia intelectual de Criterio,  1928-1968”, in 
Girbal-Blacha and Quattrocchi-Woisson (eds.), Cuando opinar es actuar: Revistas argentinas del siglo
XX, pp.  151-192.
22 Since its foundation in  1950, Cuadernos de Cultura remained under the auspices of the Communist 
Party and was directed by Hector Agosti. The other two were projects by dissidents from the 
Communist Party in the 1960s, directed by Jos6 Aric6 {Pasado y Presente) and by Jose Luis Mangieri 
and Carlos Alberto Brocato {La Rosa Blindada). Only in the ideologically most eclectic of the three, La 
Rosa Blindada, in the articles by Le6n Pomer, do we find a sort of “very Marxist” revisionism that came 
close in some respects to the interpretations of the izquierda nacional, and a contribution by Cooke (see 
the later compilation of articles Nestor Kohan (ed.), La Rosa Blindada: una pasion de los  ‘60 (Buenos 
Aires: La Rosa Blindada,  1999), pp.  161-175). On Pasado y  Presente, see Raul Burgos, Los 
gramscianos argentinos: culturay politico en la experiencia de Pasadoy Presente (Buenos Aires: Siglo
XXI, 2004).
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compatible with those of revisionists. This can be illustrated by the examples of two 
periodicals in which, on merely ideological grounds, one might expect to find revisio­
nist  imagery.  These  occupied  diametrically  opposed  positions  on  the  spectrum  of 
nationalism, but each was quite ideologically homogenous.
The first example is the cultural journal Dinamica Social, founded by the Italian 
fascist  Carlo  Scorza,  which  appeared  regularly  between  1950  and  1965.  On  a 
platform  of  rabid  anti-communism,  communitarian  Catholicism  and  exaltation  of 
hispanidad, it brought together the extreme Right of nacionalismo. In a typical article, 
Bruno Jacovella (Tulio’s brother) defined his nationalist position as “a concrete affir­
mation of unity against the abstract and disintegrating positions of Collectivism and 
Liberalism”, aiming to “fight the predominance of the parts,  individual and class”.24 
That the journal  sought to  establish  an intellectual  prestige  rather than to  intervene 
directly  in  contemporary  politics  was  reflected,  for  example,  in  the  bibliographical 
section  of the Boletin  de  Estudios Politicos  of the Universidad Nacional  del  Cuyo,
25 where Dinamica Social was mentioned next to political science journals from Spain. 
Because  of its  identification with the  extreme  Right Dinamica Social was  regarded 
with  suspicion  by  less  sectarian  populists  and  left-wing  nationalists.  Hernandez 
Arregui,  for  example,  refused  to  contribute  on  the  grounds  that  the  publication 
cherished racism, anti-Semitism, nostalgia for an authoritarian hierarchical order and 
Sorelianism.26  The  second example  is  Cristianismo y Revolucion,  a platform of the 
Marxist-Catholic dialogue that developed in the wake of the Second Vatican Council, 
which appeared regularly every month from 1966 to 1971 under the editorship of Juan 
Garcia Elorrio. Politically the journal expounded a tercermundista and often Guevarist 
orientation, combined with a declaration of faith in Peronism, which later made it the 
major platform of the “revolutionary tendency”, that is above all the Peronist Youth 
(JP) and the Montoneros. In the first issue, Garcia Elorrio declared:
The Third World is [...]  growing in the wake of the revolutionary processes  [...] through tough 
and violent but profoundly human action, in which we Christians join. [...].27 
The journal furthermore displayed an interest in the kind of nationalist Marxism that 
was characteristic of the catedras nacionales.
23 See on this publication Noemi Girbal-Blacha, “Armoma y contrapunto intelectual: Dinamica Social 
(1950-1965)”, in Girbal-Blacha and Quattrocchi-Woisson (eds.), Cuando opinar es actuar: Revistas 
argentinas del siglo XX, pp. 399-442.
24 Bruno Jacovella, “La crisis del nacionalismo”, in Dinamica Social, no. 87 (1958), pp. 2-3.
25 Boletin de Estudios Politicos, no. 5/6 (1956).
26 Galasso, Hernandez Arregui, p. 66.
27 Cristianismo y Revolucion, no.  1, September 1966, p.  1.
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Although Cristianismo y Revolucion  and Dinamica Social thus  expressed very 
different  political  beliefs,  revisionism  might  have  been  a  common  denominator. 
Firstly,  compared to  most other periodicals that can be called nationalist,  both were 
quite  intellectual  in  their  outlook  so  that  there  should  have  been  a  concern  with 
historiography  here.  Secondly,  albeit  from  a  different  position,  their  political 
orientation conformed well with the sectors akin to the exaltation of caudillismo. The 
presumable readership of Cristianismo y Revolucion —left-wing Peronist middle-class 
students  and  the  proto-Montoneros—  adopted  revisionist  imagery,  whilst  several 
members  of the  Instituto  Rosas  contributed  to  Dinamica  Social:  Castellani,  Julio 
Irazusta, Bruno Jacovella, Palacio,  Soler Canas or Stieben as well as Sierra and Bal- 
drich (who were associated only later with the institute). Yet in both cases, revisionist 
articles were scarce. In Cristianismo y Revolucion revisionist references were mainly 
confined to the published statements of political groups, in particular the Montoneros. 
The rosistas who wrote in Dinamica Social usually focused on non-historical matters, 
as  in  the  aforementioned  article  by  Bruno  Jacovella.  There  was  one  article  about 
revisionism in  1959, but, oddly, it was written by someone who had few connections
to revisionists. It was entitled “Does our history need revisionism?” and the author was
28 not even convinced that the answer to this question was a yes.
In turn, the periodicals that contributed most to the dissemination of revisionism 
were weeklies in between immediate political goals and intellectual issues. Three main 
features  of  these  periodicals  should  be  stressed.  Firstly,  they  typically  combined 
political  campaigns in favour of a particular politician or faction with evocations  of 
historical  figures.  Secondly,  they were almost invariably in opposition to whichever 
government was in power. This opposition was often their very reason for existence: a 
group of politicians manques, journalists and intellectuals joined to found a publication 
when  their  aspirations  to  take  part  in  political  decision-making  had  experienced  a 
setback.  Thirdly,  almost all  of these periodicals were very short-lived (their average 
lifespan was less than two years), which could be due to economic problems, but also 
to  the  first  two  characteristics.  Although  less  often  than  their  directors  claimed  or 
imagined,  periodicals  were the  victims  of censorship  because  of their  opposition to 
governments.  More  often, the problems  stemmed from their own political  ambition. 
Since the editors-in-chief and the contributors were incapable of fulfilling their politi­
28 Alfredo A. Coronel, “^Necesita nuestra historia del revisionismo?”, in Dinamica Social, no.  102 
(1959), p. 30.
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cal aspirations themselves, they sought to place their activities at the service of certain 
politicians,  but these  allegiances  proved  fatal  for  group  cohesion,  as there  emerged 
disputes over which strategy to adopt, which led to desertions or the abandonment of 
the  entire project.  Unsurprisingly,  such problems  affected in particular ideologically 
eclectic periodicals.
Especially  nacionalistas,  among  whom  there  was  a  greater  degree  of  group 
cohesion than among the populist neo-revisionists  of the  sixties,  had founded many 
periodicals since the  1930s, many of them weeklies.  Midway into an interview with 
Oliver  in  1973,  the  historian  Luis  Alberto  Romero  remarked:  “it  seems  to  me  that 
what’s ideal for a nacionalista politician is to have a periodical”.  Cultural journals 
and  especially  weekly  papers  that  combined  opinion  pieces  on  the  latest  political 
events with more  general essays were an important bond for nacionalistas  since the 
late 1920s. The institution of the periodical was so central that Cristian Buchrucker has 
dated the origin of what he has called the “restorative” strand of nationalism —which 
in the main coincides with what is called nacionalismo here— to the foundation of La
in
Nueva  Republica  in  1927.  The  average  nacionalista  was  a  regular  contributor  to 
several publications at the same time, which taken together provided a degree of group 
cohesion, since the lists of contributors to each of these periodicals often overlapped. 
These publications were usually semi-professional.  In very few cases, their directors 
might have been able to make a living from them, but normally the economic situation 
was  strained.  In most cases,  contributors wrote without pay,  and hence they needed 
other sources of income. Although it is difficult to reconstruct the financial situation of 
most right-wing nationalist intellectuals,  it can be  suspected that law offices were  a 
common financial source, given that many of them had a degree in law. These offices 
might  also  have  subsidised  nacionalista  periodicals,  since  —apart  from  the  most 
successful,  which  reached  circulation  figures  of  100,000—  very  few  of them  were 
profitable for themselves. Advertisements did not yield much, since they were few in 
number  and  consisted  usually  of  unpaid  publicity  for  small  publishing  houses, 
bookshops  and  debating  clubs,  where  nacionalistas  (the  contributors  and  editors 
included) socialised.  Such periodicals —as Baluarte, Crisol, the Catholic Criterio, El 
Federal, Nueva Polltica, Nuevo Orden and El Pampero— mushroomed especially in 
the years before and during the Second World War; and most members of the Instituto
29 Interview with Juan Pablo Oliver by Luis Alberto Romero, 23 June 1973, Archivo de Historia Oral, 
Instituto Torcuato di Telia, p. 39.
30 Buchrucker, Nacionalismo y peronismo, pp.  116-257 on this “restorative” strand.
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Rosas regularly contributed to at least two of them. Although, by contrast to the review 
of the  Instituto  Rosas  and  other  specialised  revisionist journals,  none  was  mainly 
devoted to historical issues, they did become important vehicles for the dissemination 
of rosismo.
This  kind  of  publication  all  but  disappeared  after  the  overthrow  of  Peron. 
Between  1955  and  1960,  the  two  typical  examples  of nacionalista  periodicals,  in 
which  several  members  of the  Instituto  Rosas  published,  were  the  weeklies Azul y 
Blanco and Mayoria. Under the editorship of Marcelo Sanchez Sorondo Azul y Blanco 
was founded in May  1956 by a group of nacionalistas who were linked to the short­
lived  administration  of General  Eduardo  Lonardi  (September-November  1955)  and 
opposed to  the  anti-populist military regime  of Pedro  Eugenio  Aramburu,  who  had 
ousted Lonardi in the palace coup of November 1955. Despite the paper’s attempts to 
project itself as a voice of the now supposedly orphan working class by devoting one 
page to union issues and organising “popular soup kitchens”, the bulk of the articles in 
Azul y Blanco showed little interest in the concerns of workers. Its claim to express the 
demands  of “the  people” translated  into  a preoccupation with preventing the  (very) 
hypothetical advance of communism in Argentine unions, whilst most articles were in 
fact  about  intellectual,  political  and  cultural  rather  than  bread  and  butter  issues. 
Although the  odd headline praised the  “Argentina of labour”  for confronting  “Mar­
xism, leftism, masonry”, the bulk of articles reported on the alleged sidelining of the 
patriotic  goals  of nacionalista  intellectuals.  In  this  context,  the  weekly  claimed  to 
promote popular culture and began to publish exaltations of revisionist heroes such as 
Rosas or Facundo.3 1
Mayoria  showed  more  interest  in  cultural  affairs  than Azul y  Blanco  and  its 
language was less vitriolic. Articles in Mayoria varied from comments on contempora­
ry events and interviews with nacionalista writers to book reviews and longer features 
on  gatherings  of intellectuals  and  politicians.  In  its  political  orientation,  however, 
Mayoria was similar to Azul y Blanco.  Founded in  1957, its director Tulio Jacovella 
belonged to the Catholic and Hispanic Right and maintained good connections to the 
Armed Forces.  Also,  despite the  intellectual concerns of its director, Mayoria was a 
mouthpiece  of political  goals,  as  became  clear  in  1957,  when  it  was  placed  at  the 
service  of a  “national  front”  of neo-Peronists  that  was  proposed  by  the  politician
31 Azuly Blanco, no.  105,  17 June  1958 (headline about the working class) and no.  106, 24 June 1958 
(“silenced intellectuals” and the piece on Facundo).
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Alejandro  Leloir,  to  whom Mayoria  referred to  Leloir  as  “the  ultimate  hero  of the 
popular resistance” in a headline. Later, it campaigned for the leader of the Asociacion 
Obrera Textil, Andres Framini, who belonged to the left wing of Peronist unionism, 
apparently trying  to  benefit  from  Framini’s  popular  support.32  Articles  that had  the 
character of a historiographical campaign complemented the reporting of current poli­
tics. In a one-page biography that commemorated the death of Dorrego, Garcia Mellid 
wrote that
[t]he figure of colonel Dorrego has the value of a symbol because his sacrifice repeated itself over 
and  over  again  throughout  our history.  Dorrego  was  the  interpreter and  leader of an  authentic 
national  and  popular  movement;  he  devoted  himself to  serving  those  social  masses  that  the 
“select minorities” call plebs, rabble or down-and-out.33 
Such articles were complemented by regular columns about history written by Rosa 
and a series about the federal caudillos by Chavez.
Whilst Azul y Blanco  and Mayoria,  despite  their  attachment to  neo-Peronism, 
remained nacionalista in their orientation, other periodicals that became important for 
the spread of revisionism explicitly declared themselves as Peronist, whether from a 
left-  or right-wing perspective.  The  best-known  example  of the  first  group  was  the 
weekly Companero,  appearing  in  1963-64,  which was tied to the  left-wing Peronist 
Youth and became an important platform for revisionism,  due to a series by Ortega 
Pena and Duhalde on the federal caudillos and the Baring Brothers.34 On the extreme 
Peronist Right, in turn, was Retorno (1965-66 and 1970), a weekly newspaper directed 
by Pedro Michelini, an adviser of the CGT in La Plata and Peron’s personal delegate in 
Argentina from 1965 onwards, which also contained frequent references to the figures 
of the  revisionist  pantheon,  even  though  it  did  not  carry  a  series  on  history  like 
Companero.  The  most  important  periodicals  that  included  articles  by  prominent 
revisionist authors like Jauretche were even more eclectic in themselves, albeit always
32 Juan Domingo Peron and John William Cooke, Correspondencia (Buenos Aires: Granica,  1973), vol.
1, p. 202 and p. 260 on the support for Framini.
33 Atilio Garcia Mellid, “Dorrego: un simbolo de nuestra historia”, in Mayoria, no.  10,  10 June  1957.
34 Companero, nos. 21-30,  14 November 1963 to 20 January 1964. The series was prompted by a visit to 
Argentina of a Barings representative.
35 For example, in an article directed against contraception, because this contradicted the “divine 
command to grow and multiply”, the author bolstered his point with the argument that, if Argentines did 
not produce sufficient children, “the great fatherland dreamt of, founded and realised by San Martin, 
Rosas and Per6n respectively would remain utopia” {Retorno, no. 39, 7 April  1965). An important 
figure in the paper was the nacionalista and revisionist Alberto Baldrich (1898-1982). Bom into an 
upper-class family in the city of Buenos Aires, Baldrich became a publicist and politician after he had 
finished his law studies at the UBA, from the late  1940s onwards politically close to the most 
reactionary elements in Peronism, such as those of the journal Frontera 67 (see no.  1, January 1967, p. 
32). To my knowledge, no biography of Baldrich has been written thus far.
141Networks of  dissemination
within an overall populist framework; for example, Santo y Sena and El Popular. Their 
common  denominator  was  that  its  contributors  were  disenchanted  with  Frondizi’s 
government and instead claimed to express the demands of the “people”, as the motto 
of the subtitle of El Popular made clear (“Towards the people for truth”).36
In sum, among nationalist publications, the typical periodical that was a vehicle 
for the dissemination of revisionism was a short-lived, ideologically eclectic and very 
politicised weekly that served a particular political tendency, normally close to Pero- 
nism.  Neo-revisionists  also  repeatedly  founded  their  own  publications.  Hernandez 
Arregui  founded  a review, Peronismo y socialismo,  in  1973,  once  it was  clear that 
Peron was not going to  reward his  militancy in the movement with a public post.37 
Ortega Pena and Duhalde also founded their own periodical, Militancia, in the same 
year.  However, the journalistic undertakings led by neo-revisionists usually ended in 
failure shortly after they had been launched.  Astesano’s  Columnas del Nacionalismo 
Marxista, founded in  1957, lasted for only three issues.  In 1962, he tried again, this 
time  with  a  less  intellectual  format  that  mostly  featured  speeches  by  the  unionist
T O
Framini, but it seems that there appeared only one issue.  Jauretche founded a paper in 
November 1955, El 45, through which he sought to acquire influence in Peronism, but 
the  paper was  banished  by the  authorities  after only three  issues  (see  chapter five). 
Ramos’  weekly  Politico,  in  which  Jauretche,  Astesano,  Jorge  Enea  Spilimbergo, 
Ortega Pena and Duhalde and the Uruguayan revisionist Alberto Methol Ferre wrote, 
first appeared in February 1961, but closed down in September of the same year. More 
often, as regards journalism, the populist neo-revisionists were better known as contri­
butors rather than as editors-in-chief.
However, most important for their fame was their writing of books.  Since some 
of  their  essayistic  books  sold  very  well,  the  book  as  medium  might  indeed  be
36 The contributors to El Popular were ideologically the most diverse. Besides the usual suspects of 
revisionism (here e.g. Chdvez, Cooke, Hemdndez Arregui, Puiggrds, and the right-wing nacionalista 
and Peronist Adolfo Silenzi di Stagni), other contributors did not belong to nationalist circles: the 
sociologist Josd Nun, the writer Ernesto Sabato, the Marxist essayist Juan Jose Sebreli or the former 
Contorno-director Ismael Viftas. Santo y Sena was only slightly less eclectic: Cooke, Rosa, Jauretche 
and Hemdndez Arregui from the pro-Peronist core of populist revisionism, but also Emesto Sabato and 
the nacionalista anti-Semite Juan Carlos Goyeneche.
37 See Gonzdlez, Restospampeanos, pp. 238-241.
38 The contributors to the Columnas were ideologically very heterogeneous, too: besides Astesano, there 
wrote, for example, the right-wing nacionalista Oliver, the Catholic priest Chavez and the Peronists 
Arturo Sampay, Antonio Castro and John William Cooke.
39 Relevo, no.  1, 17 October 1962.
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considered as  one  of the most influential  forms of disseminating revisionism.40  The 
structure of the nationalist book publishing scene in some ways resembled that of the 
periodicals.  Revisionist literature usually did not appear with the biggest publishers, 
such  as  Eudeba  in  the  period  from  1955  to  1966  or,  after  that,  the  commercial 
publisher  Jorge  Alvarez.  Again,  this  was  not  exactly  a  “conspiracy  of silence”,  as 
revisionists  would  have  it.  After  the  Ongania  regime  had  seized  control  of public 
universities  in  1966  —and  by  extension  of  UBA’s  press—  and  especially  after 
Jauretche was named director of Eudeba in 1973, it did publish revisionist authors (see 
chapter  six).  Jorge  Alvarez,  too,  published  revisionist  authors  in  the  late  sixties, 
namely Puiggros and Ortega Pena and Duhalde.41 By and large, however, a number of 
smaller publishers,  some  directed  by  revisionists  themselves,  were  more  important. 
Similarly to periodicals, their reputation rested on political orientation.  For example, 
on the inside of the front cover of the books of Ramos’  publishing house Coyoacan, 
which between  1961  and  1963 edited  18 titles, the rationale of its task was explained 
with the core of the revisionist argument in the 1960s. It said that Latin America’s
subordination was not only economic:  the great international forces elaborated  more subtle and 
effective  chains.  To  perpetuate  their  economic  and  political  control,  historical  tradition  was 
deformed  [...]  and  false  ideologies  were  opposed  to  the  formation  of a  true  national  Latin 
American ideology.42
Coyoacan, the statement went on, had come to rectify these matters of consciousness.
The only publishing house that was explicitly and exclusively set up to further 
historical revisionism, Ortega Pena and Duhalde’s Sudestada, had three similarities to 
the  kind  of periodicals  that typically disseminated  revisionism.  Firstly,  by the  stan­
dards  of  book  publishing,  it  was  rather  short-lived.  It  was  founded  in  1966  and 
published at least 34 titles until  1969, when it was closed down.43 Secondly, its foun­
40 The only available sales figures for individual books are relative, through the bestseller lists in 
Primera Plana. The biggest sales success was Jauretche’s El medio pelo en la sociedad argentina, 
which was re-published eight times between November 1966 and July 1967 alone. It was immediately 
number one on Primera Plano's bestseller list (no. 204,22 November 1966) and (with short 
interruptions) stayed among the top five until October 1967 (no. 249, 3 October 1967). The figures in 
Primera Plana were based on a survey of bookshops only in the capital, but this was where the market 
was concentrated and there is no reason to assume that the relative figures were very different in the 
provinces.
41 For example, Rodolfo Ortega Pefia and Eduardo Luis Duhalde, Reportaje a Felipe Varela (Buenos 
Aires: Jorge Alvarez,  1969) and Puiggros, Pueblo y oligarquia.
42 Here cited from the inside cover of Eduardo B. Astesano, San Martin y el origen del capitalismo 
argentino (Buenos Aires: Coyoacan,  1961).
43 34 was the number of titles I could locate through an online catalogue search in the Library of 
Congress, the COP  AC and the library of the University of Texas at Austin. Although the number is 
therefore approximate, I have not come across books by publishers such as Sudestada that could not be
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dation responded directly to  political  developments.  In the  mid-sixties,  Ortega Pena 
and  Duhalde  were  lawyers  and  ideologues  for  the  metalworkers’  leader  Augusto 
Vandor, the most powerful of all Peronist unionists, who tried to outmanoeuvre Peron 
and constitute a movement that would benefit from the exiled leader’s prestige among 
the working class without letting him participate in decision-making.44 Vandor seemed 
to have lost this struggle, when his preferred candidate in the elections for governor of 
Mendoza in April  1966 lost against the candidate supported by Peron. This helped to 
trigger the  military coup  of June,  which Vandor supported,  whilst Ortega Pena and 
Duhalde at this point broke with Vandor and decided to retreat from involvement in 
political agitation for three years by dedicating themselves fully to writing and publi­
shing revisionist history books.  The closure of Sudestada in  1969, in turn, coincided 
with  them  drawing  closer  to  the  revolutionary  tendency  of Peronism,  from  which 
originated the murderers of Vandor in July 1969. Thirdly, by the same token as many 
nationalist  periodicals,  the  publishing  house  Sudestada  merged  ideologically  very 
diverse currents,  ranging from Marxist neo-revisionism to ultra-reactionary naciona­
lismo. Besides Ortega Pena and Duhalde’s own books, it re-published, for example, a 
work  from  1941  by  Enrique  Oses  —by  then  a  self-declared  Nazi— that  had  first 
appeared in the fascist periodical El Pampero.45
The  repertoire  of the  most  important publisher  of revisionist  literature,  Arturo 
Pena Lillo, also included right-wing nacionalistas, but he mostly specialised in popu­
list essayists.46 Pena Lillo had worked as a printer during the Peronist regime, when he 
was  affiliated to  the  Communist  Party.  Rather accidentally,  he  ended  up  publishing 
Ernesto  Palacio’s  Historia  argentina  in  1954,  through  which  he  became  associated 
with  historical  revisionism.  The  golden  age  of  Pena  Lillo’s  publishing  coincided 
closely with the height of revisionism.  He published at least  159 titles between  1955
found in either of these three catalogues so that I think it unlikely that the total number was much 
higher.
44 On Vandor, see for example Viviana Gorbato,  Vandor o Peron (Buenos Aires: Tiempo de Ideas,
1992) and Graciela Ducatenzeiler, Syndicats et politique en Argentine,  1955-1973 (Montreal: Les 
Presses de l’Universit£ de Montreal,  1980).
45 Enrique P. Os6s, Mediosy fines del nacionalismo (Buenos Aires: Sudestada,  1968). It is very likely 
that Ortega Pefta and Duhalde got in touch with Oses’ work through the Instituto Rosas, because the 
bulletin of the institute published a short biographical summary of Os6s’ life and work in  1968 (.Boletin 
del Instituto Rosas, second series, no.  1, July 1968, p. 6), the same year in which Ortega Pefta and 
Duhalde became more active in the institute and published Os&s’ work. My information on Oses is 
complemented by Daniel Lvovich, Nacionalismo y antisemitismo en la Argentina (Barcelona: Javier 
Vergara, 2003), p. 273.
46 My information on this stems in particular from a personal interview with Pefta Lillo in Buenos Aires 
on 9 December 2004, based on my previous reading of his memoirs (Pefta Lillo, Memorias) and another 
interview with him in Pagina 12, 29 May 2004.
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and  1976,  when  his  business  declined.47  Historiography  in  a  narrow  sense  did  not 
constitute the majority of titles, but all Pena Lillo-books were in one way or another 
about national identity —ranging from essays about folklore and popular culture to the 
more clearly political writings— and most deserved the label of populist revisionism. 
Besides  Jauretche,  who  was  his  most  successful  author,  Pena  Lillo  published,  for 
example, Puiggros, Astesano, Ramos, Rey and Spilimbergo of the izquierda nacional, 
the  nacionalistas  Doll  and  Sanchez  Sorondo,  the  populist  revisionists  Rosa  and 
Chavez,  the  right-wing  Peronist Raul  Jassen or the  former FORJA-members  Garcia 
Mellid and Rene Saul Orsi.
In  comparison  to  Ramos’  Coyoacan,  Pena  Lillo  was  a  more  commercial 
publisher. Although the label became known for historical revisionism, its director did 
not  define  his  enterprise  in  terms  of explicitly  political  goals.  Following  Eudeba’s 
strategy  of  selling  low-priced  books  at  street  kiosks,  the  collection  La  Siringa, 
launched in 1959 with the idea of a new title about history and politics each fortnight, 
became a major commercial success. It was advertised in the following words:
Something completely new is in your hands, reader. In a cruel era, like the one in which we are 
living  [...], this  little object called “book”  is  an  indispensable  instrument for the consciousness 
[...]. The collection La Siringa is meant to close the abyss between the book and the reader [...] 
through publications with a high circulation and with exceptionally cheap prices.48 
As this passage shows, the rationale behind La Siringa was at least in part economic, 
which, of course, was not incompatible with political goals. According to Pena Lillo, 
Ramos  financially  supported  the  launching  of  the  collection  in  the  late  fifties49 
Advertisements for the collection were scattered in periodicals like Santo y Sena,  the 
potential readership of which coincided with Pena Lillo’s (just as the authors were the 
same  in both  cases),  which  had  the  congenial  side-effect that these  advertisements 
were usually unpaid for.
In sum, the dissemination of revisionism through periodicals and book publishers 
did not follow a controllable group strategy. This is not to say that revisionist imagery 
could simply be found everywhere in the media. On the contrary, due to its politicisa­
tion it hardly permeated the mainstream press, to which revisionism appeared largely 
irrelevant  as  an  intellectual  debate  that  would  have  been  worthy  to  report,  if not 
connected to politics.  For a similar reason,  intellectual journals and reviews,  even if
47 See footnote 43 for the way of calculation. Here, it was complemented by a list that Arturo Pefia Lillo 
gave me.
48 Back cover of Jauretche, Politico nacional.
49 Pefta Lillo, Memorias, pp. 89-93.
145Networks of  dissemination
their  tendency  was  ideologically  compatible  with  nationalist  ideas,  hardly  carried 
articles about the revisionist view of the past.  Instead, revisionism was prominent in 
weeklies  that  stood  in  between  political  and  cultural  concerns,  were  ideologically 
eclectic and vulnerable to political changes due to their close attachment to political 
factions.  Taken  together,  they  formed  part  of  an  extended  informal  network,  the 
boundaries of which, however, were blurred. These features undermined the building 
of stable group solidarities that would have allowed a greater measure of controlling 
the spread of revisionism.
2.  Institutions and the dissemination in politics
This  fragmentation  and  instability  of vehicles  of nationalist  discourse  affected  the 
institution  that  laid  claim  to  a  prerogative  over  revisionist  narratives:  the  Instituto 
Rosas. Even though there were initiatives to found other institutions to bring together 
nationalist intellectuals,50 the Instituto Rosas was the only permanent one. Populist and 
Marxist essayists like Hernandez Arregui never launched a single initiative to endow 
their writing with an institutional  framework comparable to the  Instituto  Rosas.  The 
institute, in turn, essentially remained a nucleus of right-wing and upper-class naciona­
listas with a traditionalist esprit de corps. By the 1960s, in contrast to the more famous 
populist neo-revisionists, virtually all of its founders were rather obscure in terms of 
publicity. Carlos Ibarguren (father) no longer engaged in public debates after 1955 and 
his  two  sons  never  matched  their  father’s  fame.  Julio  Irazusta’s  intellectual  and 
political opinions went largely unnoticed in public debate after 1955.5 1  The same was 
true  for  Palacio  and  for  Doll,  a  lonely  old  man  by  the  sixties  whom  no  one  took 
seriously anymore. The one major exception among the reactionaries of the 1930s was 
the Instituto’s president Rosa, who adapted more flexibly to the changing climate of 
ideas in the  1960s by declaring himself a Marxist and supporter of the Cuban Revo­
lution.
50 For example, there was a revisionist-Peronist debating club called Centro de Estudios de Problemas 
Argentinos, which was founded by Alberto Baldrich in La Plata in  1961  and brought together rosistas 
(Rosa, Garcia Mellid, Steffens Soler, Doll and Oliver) with the Peronist politicians Antonio Cafiero, 
Pedro Michelini and Jorge Taiana. This institution seems to have existed only on paper, however, and 
for a rather short period of time. The only reference to this I have come across was in Michelini’s 
periodical Huella, no. 2,  17 September 1963. Throughout my research, I have tried in vain to find out 
more about this initiative.
51 Notably, both his memoirs (Irazusta, Memorias) and the scholarly biography of his life (Mutsuki, 
Julio Irazusta) end with the year 1955.
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The attitude of the members of the institute towards the wide public dissemina-
c'y
tion  of revisionism  was  ambivalent.  Although  this  was  never  made  explicit,  the 
institute’s decision to re-launch its bulletin in  1968  seemed like an attempt to regain 
ground over which it had lost control in previous years. The editorial of the first issue 
triumphantly declared the “victory of historical revision”, but also lamented that “we 
have  lost,  historiographically  speaking,  a  little  dignity  and  seriousness”.  This 
formulation could not conceal the tensions that had emerged among the members. One 
problem was the arrival of newcomers from very diverse backgrounds, like the Marxist 
lawyers Ortega Pena and Duhalde. By the late sixties, there were also several Peronist 
politicians  affiliated to  the  institute,  who  hardly  had  any  interest  in historiography, 
such as Peron’s former personal delegate in Argentina, the physician Raul Matera.54 
According to Fermm Chavez, even the publication of the institute’s bulletin after 1968 
was  managed  by  militants  of the  Peronist  Youth.55  The  institute’s  president  later 
recalled  his  difficulties  in  handling  the  emerging  rows  between  Peronists  and  non- 
Peronists.56  After  Rosa  had  left  the  presidency  vacant  in  1968,  the  feuds  escalated 
further.  In April  1969,  the ultra-rightist Alfredo  Ossorio  was  expelled for  “repeated 
acts of misconduct”, soon to be followed by the vice-president Manuel de Anchorena. 
Both had apparently  sought to  transform the  institution into  a tool  of their political 
ambitions.  From  1971  onwards,  the  institute  saw itself obliged to practically close 
down,  although  it  continued  to  formally  exist  under  the  presidency  of one  of its 
founding members, Alberto Contreras.
There were isolated voices from within revisionism who criticised the current’s 
unruly popularisation. In 1965, the far-right nacionalista Pedro de Paoli accused Rosa 
of Marxist “deviations”  from what he saw as the Catholic orthodoxy of revisionism
52 On this see also Julio Stortini, “Pol&nicas y crisis en el revisionismo historico: el caso del Instituto de 
Investigaciones Historicas ‘Juan Manuel de Rosas’”, in: Devoto and Pagano (eds.), Historiografias 
academicay militante, pp. 229-249.
53 Boletin del Instituto Rosas, second series, no.  1, July 1968, p. 3.
54 See on him Pablo Jose Hernandez, Conversaciones con Raul Matera (Buenos Aires: Corregidor,
1980)
55 Personal interview with the author, Buenos Aires,  11  July 2003.
56 Hernandez, Conversaciones con Rosa, pp.  150-151.
57 Boletin del Instituto Rosas, second series, no. 5, May 1969, p.  16 on Ossorio and no. 7, October- 
November 1967, p. 47 on Anchorena. Precise reasons for their expulsion were not given, but they can be 
inferred from other sources of information. Ossorio seems to have tried to use the institute as a platform 
for the violent nacionalista youth group Tacuara (on which see below; on the links between Tacuara and 
Ossorio see Roberto Bardini, Tacuara: lapolvoray la sangre (Mexico City: Oceano, 2002), pp.  117- 
120). Anchorena had apparently tried to use a campaign for the repatriation of Rosas’ remains that 
might have been financed with money from the institute for his political ambitions in Peronism. On the 
campaign, see Clarin, 21 November 1969, and on his career as a politician see the obituary in La 
Nacion, 24 May 2005.
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that should be derived from telluric forces.58 For the lawyer Elias Gimenez Vega, in 
turn, the biggest problem was the politicisation of revisionism and its exploitation by 
Peronist  groups.  In  1970,  he  complained  that  “in  the  name  of  revisionism  false 
parallels  are  drawn  and  forced  images  are  sponsored.”  In  his  eyes,  the  nationwide 
commemoration  of San  Martin  that  the  Peronist  regime  had  decreed  in  1950  had 
“turned  the  industrialisation  of commemorations  into  a national  plague”,  whilst the 
analogies between San Martin, Rosas, Yrigoyen and Peron that had become standard 
repertoire of the Peronist imaginary by 1970 were “demagoguery”. These voices were 
hardly heard, however. Gimenez Vega had to publish his book under an unknown label 
and, today, it is difficult to find information on him.59
Gimenez  Vega  was  not  obscure  because  what  he  said  was  mistaken.  On  the 
contrary,  as  Ossorio  and Anchorena had  shown,  political  ambition frequently threa­
tened to undermine the group cohesion among revisionists. Political ambition was not 
specific  to  the  nacionalistas  in  the  Instituto  Rosas,  but  also  pursued  by  the  neo­
revisionist  and  populist  intellectuals.  Like  the  nacionalistas  of  the  1930s,  their 
attempts to influence policy-making frequently failed too. Even the famous Jauretche, 
who was candidate for a seat in senate in 1960 on a platform that stressed his Peronist 
credentials, received only very few votes.60 Garcia Mellid decided to engage in party 
politics in December 1955, when he co-founded the neo-Peronist Union Popular with 
the labour lawyer Juan Atilio Bramuglia, who had been Peron’s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs from 1946 to  1949; but Garcia Mellid never came to play an important role in 
this  party.  The  only  one  who  fared  better was  Ramos  with his  Frente  de  Izquierda 
Popular  (FIP),  which  won  7.5  percent  of the  vote  in  the  presidential  elections  of 
September 1973. However, this success was due to particular circumstances, since the 
party drew the votes  of young  left-wing populist followers, who had been alienated 
from  Peronism  in  the  previous  month,  when  Peron  had  sidelined  their  preferred 
candidate, Hector Campora.6 1  In the presidential elections of March, which Campora 
had won, the vote for the FIP had been negligible and the forerunner of the party, the 
Partido Socialista de Izquierda Nacional had languished for several years without ever
58 Pedro de Paoli, El revisionismo historicoy las desviaciones del Dr. Jose Maria Rosa (Buenos Aires: 
Theoria,  1965).
59 Elias Gimenez Vega, Cartas a un joven rosista (Buenos Aires: Luis Laserre,  1970), p.  11, p. 31  and p. 
277. In the previous year, Gimenez Vega had already written a critique of revisionism for which he did 
not find a publisher at all: Gim&iez Vega, Revision al revisionismo.
60 See Arturo Jauretche, “Del programa de Avellaneda al programa de Alsogaray”, in El Popular, no. 5, 
13 October 1960, pp. 8-9.
61 See Galasso, Izquierda Nacional, pp.  134-163.
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making  a  concrete  political  impact  that  would  be  worth  mentioning.  In  general, 
nationalist intellectuals more often attached themselves to an already existing faction 
(rather than creating one themselves) and, sometimes, even their intellectual activities 
followed  the  designs  of politicians.  For  example,  according  to  Fermm  Chavez,  the 
periodical El Popular was founded upon the initiative of the veteran Peronist politician 
Vicente Saadi from the province of Catamarca.62
After 1955, Peronist politicians and especially the trade unions sponsored revisio­
nism. This is a speculative terrain, because systematic financial records are scarce. But 
there  is  much  anecdotic  evidence  to  support  such  a  claim,  not  least  for  the  union 
leaders,  who  dispensed  much  patronage  and  had  many  contacts  with  revisionists.63 
Presumably, for example, the articles that Jauretche and Rosa wrote for the (journalis­
tically  very  professional)  magazine  of the  electrical  workers’  union,  Dinamis,  paid 
better than  most  of their contributions  to  other periodicals.64  According to  Gerardo 
Aboy,  the  meat  workers’  union  hung  up  a portrait  of Rosas  shortly  after  the  anti- 
Peronist coup of 1955, whilst the founding member of the Instituto Rosas and Peronist 
diplomat  Benito  Llambi  recalled  in  his  memoirs  frequent  meetings  between  him, 
Garcia  Mellid,  Tulio  Jacovella,  Tecera  del  Franco  and  the  leader  of  that  union, 
Eleuterio Cardoso, in the same period.65 When Rosa toured the provinces in the 1960s, 
the most frequent venue  of his talks were union premises (see chapter one)  and the 
links between Ortega Pena and Duhalde and Vandor or Astesano  and Framini  were 
close.
Teaching in political training courses for unionists thus became a potential source 
of income for revisionists.  In  1963, the  Secretary General of the CGT, Jose Alonso, 
created  a  Secretariat  of  Press,  Culture,  Propaganda  and  Functions,  the  declared 
rationale of which resembled the revisionist idea of being silenced, stressing in particu­
lar the need to teach Argentine literature, folklore and history to future union leaders.66
62 See Chavez’ preface to the re-edition of the Columnas del Nacionalismo Marxista de Liberacion 
Nacional (Buenos Aires: El Calafate, 2001), p. 4.
631  have never seen any official records, but in an interview in Buenos Aires on  13 December 2004, 
Jorge Oscar Sul£, a member of the Instituto Rosas, confirmed to me that the institute was subsidised by 
the unions. On union finances in general, see James, Resistance and integration, pp.  167-174.
64 E. g. Arturo Jauretche, “Rosas y los caudillos”, Dinamis, no.  126, December 1966, pp. 32-33 and Jos6 
Marla Rosa, “El dla de la soberanla”, ibid., pp. 42-47.
65 Gerardo Aboy Carles, “Las dos ffonteras de la democracia argentina: la reformulacion de las 
identidades pollticas de Alfonsln a Menem”, PhD dissertation, Universidad Complutense, Madrid,  1998, 
p.  155 and Llambi, Medio siglo, p. 276.
66 CGT, Memoriay Balance: 1963-64 (Buenos Aires: Confederation General del Trabajo,  1964), pp.
355 and 367.
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The  content  of  such  courses  is  evident  from  the  summary  of a  history  class  for 
members of the union of municipal employees in 1974. The students learned that
[t]he resistance to the project of [this] liberal political revolution is summed up in the figures of 
San  Martin and the  federal  caudillos.  [...]  Rosas’  period is the clearest resistance to the  liberal 
political  revolution.  During  his  government,  an  attempt  was  made  to  transform  the  United 
Provinces of the River Plate [...]  into a community with a historic destiny [...].  In this way, the 
opposition to any form of surrender before foreign [powers] through the defence of our territorial 
and economic  sovereignty synthesised the aspirations of the entire authentic  nation and  laid on 
Rosas’  shoulders the hatred of those who aimed at a formal country that concealed the birth of a 
new colony.67
Such views  in union classes were  not surprising,  given that intellectuals  like  Cooke 
were invited to speak at union conferences.  Still today, Buenos Aires’ union libraries 
often hold copies of Rosa’s multi-volume Historia Argentina from the late sixties.69 In 
this sense, given the largely Peronist orientation of the unions, revisionists carried their 
ideas into the Peronist movement. As Teran has remarked, historical revisionism thus
70 indeed began to  permeate  sectors  of society far beyond intellectual  circles.  There, 
however,  the usage  of revisionist motifs obeyed a specifically political  dynamic,  on 
which revisionist intellectuals had a more limited influence.
3.  Militancy and history among the Peronist youth groups and the 
Montoneros
Within  the  Peronist  movement,  the  trade  unions  were  not  the  main  consumers  of 
nationalist  symbolic  goods.  Far  more  avid  readers  of revisionist  literature  were  the 
middle-class students who began to declare their faith in Peron as the embodiment of 
what they began to call socialismo nacional. In part, this difference might be explained 
by the fact that the Peronist youth groups were more likely than union leaders to read 
any kind of literature. After all, it might be expected that a typical heavy-handed union 
boss entertained fewer intellectual sensibilities than a sociology student or a Catholic 
seminarist.  Although this  is  probably true,  another explanation can  also  account  for 
why revisionism became more important among the Peronist Youth (JP) than among
67 “Cursos de Capacitacion Polltico-Sindical”, Unidn Obreros Empleados Municipales, en coordination 
con la Secretaria Polltica de la Presidencia de la Nation, leaflet 1974.
68 Here, to the culturally especially active union of telephone workers in 1964. In a letter of regret,
Cooke stated that he could not attend (John William Cooke, “Documentos, cartas, discursos”, Crisis, 
vol.  1, no. 9 (1974), pp. 3-15, p.  11).
69 Jose Maria Rosa, Historia Argentina, 8 vols. (Buenos Aires: Juan C. Granda,  1964-69).
70 Teran, Nuestros anos sesentas, p. 57.
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unionists.7 1   It might be  argued that revisionism permeated  especially those  areas  of 
Peronism that suffered from deficient credentials as a natural part of the movement. In 
this respect, the unions, which represented a well-defined constituency and were called 
the “vertebral column” of Peronism, differed from middle-class children of often anti- 
Peronist parents, who had to prove that they were serious Peronists. In practice, both 
explanatory  factors  (intellectual  habits  and  lack  of legitimacy)  complemented  each 
other,  since  the  revolutionary  tendency  of Peronism  felt  that  it  lacked  credentials 
because it was too intellectual in its outlook. But in order to account for the ways in 
which nationalist imagery was put to political usage it is more promising to focus on 
the  interpretation  that  revisionism  was  used  by  groups  in  need  of legitimacy.  The 
strongest case in point to substantiate this argument is that Peron himself hardly ever
7 7
drew on revisionist imagery.
Revisionism featured strongly in Tacuara, a violent youth group of predominantly 
upper-class  secondary  students  from  Buenos  Aires.  The  very  name  of  the  group 
(Tacuara was a lance used by gaucho montoneras) drew on revisionist imagery. How 
important  revisionism  was  in  this  group  can  be  illustrated  by  a  report  of  the 
intelligence unit of the police of Buenos Aires province, which observed the group’s 
activities in the mid-sixties. The report suggests that the police officer found it difficult 
to  classify the  group  in  ideological  terms.  S/he  noted that Tacuara was  “right-wing 
with a strong tendency to be extreme”, but also added that one of its offsprings had 
entered  into relations with the  Communist Party.  Thus a further category was  intro-
7T duced, namely the group’s “sense of history”, which was “revisionist”.  Founded in 
1955  by  members  of the  ultra-right  Union Nacionalista  de  Estudiantes  Secundarios 
(UNES) that harked back to fascist paramilitary groups of the  1930s, Tacuara’s ideas 
were inspired by the Spanish falange and rosismo. Each year on 20 November it held
7 1   Even the sectors of Peronist unionism that were close to left-wing students and published periodicals 
with intellectual ambitions were less imbued with revisionist imagery than the JP. A good example of 
this is the CGT de los Argentinos (CGTA), led by the graphic worker Raimundo Ongaro and with good 
contacts to left-wing Peronist students. The editor-in-chief of its paper (CGTA) was Rodolfo Walsh, a 
former nacionalista who had written for Mayoria, and later a Montonero. In the 55 issues during the 
almost two years of existence of CGTA from 1968-70, there were almost no references to revisionism at 
all. When it came to the commemoration of 20 November, the paper simply reproduced a passage of 
Saldias’ pre-revisionist book on Rosas (CGT de los Argentinos, no. 31, 28 November 1968, p. 5).
72 See also chapter five and conclusion.
73<Tnforme especial de la Agrupacion Tacuara”, Legajo no.  18.744, Mesa Referencia, Archivo de la 
Comisi6n Provincial por la Memoria, formerly Direction de Inteligencia de la Polida de la Provincia de 
Buenos Aires, p. 2 and p. 7 on the communist contacts of Baxter’s wing. My information on Tacuara is 
based on this report and on Bardini, Tacuara: la polvoray la sangre and Daniel Gutman, Tacuara: 
historia de la primera guerrilla urbana argentina (Buenos Aires: Vergara, 2003).
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commemorations of the execution of Jose Antonio Primo  de Rivera,  combined with 
celebrations of the anniversary of the battle of Vuelta de Obligado.74 The group gained 
influence  in UBA’s  law  student union,  although the codified initiation rites  ensured 
that  it  remained  a  relatively  small  and  elitist  circle  at  first.  Its  members  stressed 
violence,  courage  and  direct  political  action  as  values,  which  were  cultivated  in 
symbolically charged ceremonies that combined rosista imagery with elements taken 
from fascism and anti-Semitism. Tacuara-members frequently engaged in street fights 
and violent physical attacks on Jewish schoolchildren. Its principal leader at this time 
was the young seminarian (and later priest) Alberto Ezcurra Uriburu (1937-93), who 
prided  himself  on  his  family  connections  with  Rosas  and  with  the  leader  of the 
authoritarian military coup of 1930. He, too, came from a wealthy background —the 
family’s house in the countryside was used for folkloric  gatherings— and his  father 
was a long-standing member of the Instituto Rosas and had been an anti-Semite and 
supporter of the Axis.
Tacuara’s  organ  was  called  La  Barbarie.  In  an  article,  it  evoked  Peron’s 
buzzword of the “organised community” that had to unify the “different groups” and 
suppress  “egoists”.  In order for the  “state to recover its  Communitarian function” it 
called for revolution:
A  revolution  is when the  Community restores the  State to  its  function as synthesiser of “social 
antagonisms”.  [...] Through the act of Revolution, society finds itself. In our Fatherland the State 
responds  to  anything  but  its  function  to  serve  the  Community.  It  is  a  historical  need  that the 
National Forces take power and return to the service of the Common Good. Nothing and nobody 
prevents  those  who  have  knowledge  of this  situation  from  taking up  arms to  remedy  it.  Those 
who shun this struggle can only be called COWARDS or TRAITORS.76 
Despite  the  appropriation  of  some  elements  of  Peronist  doctrine,  this  faction  of 
Tacuara stuck to its anti-Semitic and anti-communist line, bolstered by references to 
the past.  In its commemoration of the battle of Vuelta de Obligado on 20 November 
1845 —called “Day of national sovereignty” in nacionalista terminology— it stated: 
Obligado  [...]  is the symbol that expresses the struggle and up to now bitter defeat of a people 
that  was  diverted  from  its  cultural  and  religious  roots  [...];  from  the  Hispanic  to  the 
Europeanising porteho culture and from there to the amorphous sham that is Buenos Aires today 
[...].  It  is here  [in the Avenue Corrientes]  where  sepoyism and the synagogue really meet  [...].
74 This was a common practice among the revisionist Right in general. See for example the poems 
dedicated to Primo de Rivera and Rosa’s article on the Vuelta de Obligado in Azuly Blanco, no.  179,  17 
November 1959.
75 See Alberto Ezcurra Medrano’s article in El Restaurador, no. 5, 3 July 1941.
76 The statement was reproduced in Huella, no. 5, 8 October 1963.
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Don Juan Manuel, illustrious gaucho and faithful interpreter of our purest realities, [...] managed 
to interrupt [this process]  for many years, until the servile mentality that is characteristic of our 
pseudo-intellectuality took  over  and  violated  that  noble  gesture,  a feat  of soil  and  sky,  with  a 
projection of the future that dominates us and won’t die, despite its essential bankruptcy.77 
This discourse of telluric allegories, Hispanicism and anti-Semitism was tempered in 
the  wake  of the  entry  into  Tacuara  of some  lower  middle-class  youths.  The  group 
disintegrated and some members began to sympathise with the Cuban Revolution and 
Peronism.  Thus  was  formed  in  1962  the  Movimiento  Nacionalista  Revolucionario 
Tacuara  (MNRT),  close  to  parts  of the  JP,  which  tried  to  form  an  urban  guerrilla 
nucleus inspired by foquismo.  In the MNRT’s melange of ideas that could be traced 
back to Sorelian syndicalism as well as social Catholicism, some members increasing­
ly looked for inspiration in Marxism-Leninism.
Tacuara’s  usage  of  revisionist  motifs  was  most  notable  in  the  yearly 
commemorations of the battle of Vuelta de Obligado. From the early 60s onwards, the 
papers reported attacks on statues, busts or portraits of Sarmiento on the previous day, 
and violent demonstrations on 20 November, in most of which Tacuara-members were 
involved.78  In  1963, whilst JP militants burned an American,  a British and  a Soviet 
flag  in the  capital,  the  city  of La Plata witnessed the  explosion  of firecrackers  and 
violent clashes between the GRN and Tacuara, which threw flyers with the following 
text:
The  Argentine  youth  is  on  its  feet.  Today  as  yesterday.  Raising  the  same  flags,  we  throw 
ourselves into the fight for God and the Fatherland. We will clean with blood what can only with 
blood be cleaned.
Apparently fearing such violent clashes, police had forbidden a speech by Rosa in the
7Q  •
offices of the union of gastronomic workers.  In the following year, a bomb exploded 
in the Sarmiento museum in the Tigre delta, whereas its counterpart in the capital was 
assaulted by  armed  robbers  who  knocked  down  four employees  and two  visitors  in 
order to take possession of a flag of the Argentine-Brazilian army that had overthrown 
Rosas in 1852. On 20 November, five Tacuara members managed to enter the cabildo 
on the Plaza de Mayo, in the centre of Buenos Aires, climb on the balcony and make 
the fascist salute to baffled spectators. They sprayed the walls of the cabildo with the 
slogan “20 November:  Day of National Sovereignty”, and next to the pyramid on the
77 La Barbarie, no.  11, November 1964.
78 In 1963, a portrait of Sarmiento in a Buenos Aires sports club was tarred, for example (Cronica, 20 
November 1963).
79 Cronica, 21 November 1963.
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square placed portraits of Rosas, Peron and Evita.80 In August  1963, a JP-commando 
stole  San  Martin’s  sabre  from  the  National  Historical  Museum  so  that,  as  the 
corresponding communique affirmed, it would “shine again in the grand fight for the 
re-conquest  of  Argentineness.”  The  authors  went  on  to  reiterate  the  revisionist 
leitmotiv  that  San Martin’s  legacy of his  sabre  to  Rosas proved the high  esteem in 
which the  liberator had  held Rosas.  The thieves then  solemnly swore not to  give  it 
back unless the government annulled the treaties with foreign oil companies and ful­
filled a number of further demands, such as the nationalisation of electrical companies 
and the releasing of prisoners related to the JP.8 1 Two years later, a commando unit of 
the JP went as far as Paris in an attempt to recover a flag that the French had taken 
from  Argentina  in  the  course  of the  battle  of  Vuelta  de  Obligado  and  that  was 
displayed at the Hotel des Invalides.82
What was the role of nationalist intellectuals in these groups? Several revisionist 
authors  were  linked to  Tacuara and the  Peronist  Youth  in one  way or  another.  For 
example,  after  MNRT-members  had  assailed  the  hospital  of  the  union  of  bank 
employees and robbed the wages in 1963, Ortega Pena and Duhalde took on their legal 
defence and Companero published public statements by the group.  The MNRT also 
released a joint manifesto together with CONDOR, a grouping that had been formed 
by  Hernandez  Arregui,  Ortega  Pena  and  Duhalde  and  others,  which  stressed  the 
common  belief in  Peron  among  both  groups:  “This  first  working  together  of two 
organisations that  come  from  different  experiences  of political  action,  has  a deeper 
meaning  that  transcends  it.  The  confluence  in  practice  of a  common  denominator: 
PERON.”84  Unsurprisingly,  the  foundational  declaration  of  CONDOR  had,  like 
Tacuara, stressed the need for historical revisionism as a principal means of imbuing
or
revolutionary consciousness.  Although both Peronist involvement in student politics 
and talks  by revisionists  in public  universities remained  scarce  until the  late  1960s, 
young  Peronist  militants  had  first  come  into  contact  with  revisionist  intellectuals 
through education in the early years of the decade. During a speech by Rosa in UBA’s 
Law  Faculty that  had  been  organised  by  the  JP  in  1960,  the  audience  erupted  into
80 Cronica, 20 and 21 November 1964.
81 Reproduced in Companero, no.  11, 20 August 1963.
82 See Diana Quattrocchi-Woisson, “Entre historia y political el retomo de un emblema”, Desmemoria, 
no.  15 (1997), pp. 51-57.
83 Companero, no. 63, 8 September 1964.
84 In Baschetti (ed.), Documentos de la resistencia, p. 331.
85 Ibid, pp. 394-395.
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chanting “San Martin, Rosas, Peron”.86 Jauretche was the main speaker at the meeting 
of the Juventud Universitaria Peronista (JUP) on the occasion of 20 November 1963 in 
the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters, also attended by members of the union of petrol 
workers (SUPE) and the Argentine division of the Arab League, which led to the issue 
of the  Algerian  war of independence  being  at the  forefront  of the  debates.87  In the 
previous years, Hernandez Arregui had embarked on a tour through universities of the 
interior to  give talks,  out  of which his  book  iQue  es  el ser nacional?  emerged.  In 
1964, Cooke explained the failure of Peron’s return to university students in Cordoba. 
When the Brazilian military regime prevented Peron, on his stopover in Rio de Janeiro, 
from continuing his flight to Buenos Aires, Cooke established a parallel with Rosas’ 
downfall over hundred years earlier. In December 1964, he declared, “one more time, 
just like in 1852, Brazilian despotism solved the problems of Argentine despotism.”88 
According  to  Richard  Gillespie,  Hernandez  Arregui,  too,  held  discussions  with  the
89 proto-Montoneros.
It was no surprise, therefore, that themes taken from nationalist ideology —and in 
particular historical revisionism— strongly permeated these groups, many members of 
which continued a career of political violence. It is difficult, however, to see a clearly 
defined ideology as the reason that motivated these careers.  The  later trajectories of 
erstwhile  Tacuara-members  were  erratic,  ending  up  in  opposed  camps  during  the 
violent confrontations of the  1970s.  Ezcurra Uriburu,  for example,  stayed faithful to 
his fascist-inspired ideas and later, just like the bulk of those who had remained within 
the  UNES,  supported  the  “anti-subversive”  terrorism  of  the  notorious  Argentine 
Anticommunist Alliance (Triple A) and the ensuing military dictatorship of 1976-83. 
The  same  held  true  for  the  members  of Tacuara  who  associated  with  the  Guardia 
Restauradora  Nacionalista  (GRN)  in  1960,  guided  by  the  anti-Semitic  priest  Julio 
Meinvielle.  Two  leaders  of the  MNRT,  on  the  other  hand,  Jose  Luis  Nell  and  Joe 
Baxter, both former law students of Irish descent, later embarked on careers that were 
as tragic as they were bizarre. Nell fought for the Uruguayan guerrilla movement, the 
Tupamaros, and was imprisoned in Montevideo, but he escaped and became a member 
of the Montoneros. During the infamous attacks by right-wing Peronists on Montone- 
ros at Ezeiza airport in Buenos Aires when Peron returned from exile on 20 June 1973,
86 Trinchera, no. 3, October 1960.
87 Cronica, 20 November 1963.
88 Cooke, El retorno, p. 2.
89 Gillespie, Soldiers of  Peron, p. 80.
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Nell  was  shot  and  left  paralysed.  In  1974,  he  killed himself on  a rail  track outside 
Buenos  Aires.  Baxter  fought  for  the  Viet  Cong  and  travelled  to  China,  before 
participating in the foundation of Argentina’s second large guerrilla, mostly of Trots­
kyist extraction, the Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP).  In  1973, he died in a 
plane crash at Paris’ Orly airport, allegedly with several million dollars in his baggage, 
intended for the then little known Sandinistas. Two other erstwhile Tacuara-militants, 
Fernando Abal Medina and Gustavo Ramus, co-founded the Montoneros, whereas the 
later JP-leader Rodolfo Galimberti had also belonged to Tacuara.90
Nationalist  intellectuals  were  never  the  leaders  of the  Peronist  youth  groups. 
Some, like Ramos or Jauretche, even strongly disagreed with the militaristic strategy 
of the Montoneros. Jauretche said about the so-called revolutionary tendency:
I see them right now, all these students who stylise themselves as Peronists, but this is a Peronism 
they  have  invented  and  which  has  very  little  connection to the  real  country.  All  these  terrorist 
groups will  soon be surprised that the country will not follow them,  because they are  into stuff 
that isn’t from here.91
The function that revisionism assumed for these circles was connected to a problem of 
political legitimacy. This was evident in the ways in which the JP or the Montoneros 
made  use  of revisionist  imagery.  Typically,  they  depicted themselves  as  the  culmi­
nation  of a  much  longer  genealogy,  in  which  a  historical  subject  had  periodically 
surfaced  but  essentially  passed  through  time  and  space  in  a  relatively  unchanged 
fashion. The JP-organ Trinchera stated as early as 1961:
we  believe  the  moment  has  come  to  throw  ourselves  into  the  struggle,  as  in  other  times  the 
gaucho masses  did behind  San  Martin and  Giiemes,  Artigas  and  Rosas,  in order to unleash the 
definitive battle: the great battle for national liberation.
Whilst the fact that it called upon the “young Peronist” to fulfil this task involuntarily 
hinted at its readers’ very recent adherence to Peronism, this tension was immediately
92 eased through its incorporation into a much older tradition.
The Montoneros’  usage of nationalist discourse was very similar.  Like Tacuara, 
their very name, derived from the nineteenth-century gaucho militia that fought in the 
name of the federal caudillos, shows how strongly they drew on revisionist discourse.
90 Abal Medina, too, came from a wealthy family, connected to nacionalismo. His father had written for 
El Pampero, the main journalistic support in Argentina for Nazism, and his brother, Juan Manuel, had 
worked for Azul y Blanco. Despite these links, as Gillespie, Soldiers of  Peron, pp. 48-52 has argued, 
Tacuara should not be seen as the nucleus of the Montoneros, who came from many other backgrounds 
too.
91 Interview with Jauretche by Luis Alberto Romero, 22 April 1971, Archivo de Historia Oral, Instituto 
Torcuato di Telia, p.  162.
92 Trinchera, no. 9, July 1961.
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In their first public communique, entitled “The Montoneros  speak” and published in 
Cristianismo y Revolution  in late  1970, their appeal to  arms began with a historical 
reference:
for the same reason we have identified ourselves as Peronists and Montoneros from the moment 
of our first communique we do not believe that the struggles begin with us, but we feel that we 
are part of the ultimate synthesis of an historical process that originated 160 years ago, and which 
in its advances and retreats makes a definite leap forward from 17 October 1945 on.
Argentine history was essentially characterised,  in their view, by two fronts that had 
survived unchanged and that were continuously opposed in an irreconcilable dichoto­
my:
In the  course  of history,  two  great political currents developed  in the  country:  on one  side, the 
liberal  Oligarchy,  clearly  anti-national  and  selling  out  the  Fatherland,  on  the  other  side,  the 
People,  identified with the defence of its  interests which are the interests of the Nation,  against 
the imperialist attacks in all historical circumstances. This national and popular current expressed 
itself in  1810 as much as in  1945, in the struggles of San Martin’s army as much as in the gaucho 
montoneros of the past century [...].93 
The Montoneros saw themselves on the “people’s” side of this dichotomy, of course, 
and thereby claimed actively to shape the future course of history.
This type of self-legitimation became all the more crucial the more the outbreak 
of  internal  fights  between  different  wings  that  all  declared  themselves  Peronist 
required explanations of why a certain tendency considered itself to be more Peronist 
than  another.  Again,  the  Montoneros  were  illustrative  of this  discursive  strategy. 
According  to  Montonero  statements,  the  importance  of Peron  lay  in  his  being  the 
reincarnation of an eternal struggle.  However, since he was only a re-embodiment of 
older  conflicts,  the  struggle  was  in  principle  necessary  and  possible  even  without 
Peron.  In  this  way,  as  Sigal  and  Veron  have  outlined  in  their  study  of  Peronist 
discourse, the Montoneros challenged the authority of Peron.94 This discursive strategy 
was  a  prelude  to  their  claim  that  Peron  did  not  represent  the  essence  of Peronism 
anymore, after he had explicitly withdrawn his approval of what he had hitherto called 
his “special formations” at the May Day rally of 1974, as was expressed in the telling 
headline  of the  Montonero  periodical  El Peronista three  days  after the  rally,  which 
implicitly  denied  that  Peron  was  a  Peronist  by  addressing  him  as  “General”  and 
informing him that “Peronism does not agree”.95
93 Cristianismo y Revolution, no. 26, November/December 1970, pp.  11-14, here p.  11.
94 Sigal and Veron, Peron o muerte, pp.  195-202.
95 El Peronista, no. 3, 4 May 1974: “General: el peronismo no esta de acuerdo”.
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Revisionist references  to  the  past were  employed by both  left-  and  right-wing 
sectors  in  the  internal  Peronist  struggles  first  for  hegemony  and  then  for  physical 
domination.  When  Peron’s  return  to  Argentina  approached  and  the  revolutionary 
tendency  began  to  launch  its  attacks  against  the  “union  bureaucracy”,  which  later 
culminated in the assassinations of union leaders such as Vandor, Jose Alonso or Jose 
Ignacio  Rucci,  these  were  bolstered  by  the  insinuation  that  “Augusto  Vandor,  like 
other historical examples of the national struggles, is like Urquiza and Alvear.”96 Since 
Urquiza had “betrayed” both Rosas and the people-fatherland, Vandor’s inclusion into 
the anti-rosista camp amounted to his elimination from the national and popular line, 
and  by  inference  from  Peronism.  From  the  position  of the  extreme  Peronist  Right, 
Patria  Barbara,  which  labelled  itself a  “weekly  of combative  Peronism”,  charged 
Puiggros, as rector of the UBA, with being a communist and “having written two libels 
that directly attack two figures who are very dear to national sentiment: Juan Manuel 
de Rosas and Juan Domingo Peron.” A headline in the same issue declared that there 
were “black sheep” in Peronism (in other words people who were not real Peronists), 
who according to the writer could be identified by the fact that “they prohibit mentio-
07
ning Juan Manuel  de Rosas.”  As the wave of killings,  among them that of Ortega 
Pena by the vigilante paramilitary Triple A in  1974, drew closer, revisionism was no 
longer merely politicised,  ideologically  charged  or outweighed  by concrete  political 
goals,  but  it  was  ultimately  transformed  into  a  legitimating  tool  for  quite  different 
purposes.
Conclusion
Although in their writing of history revisionists had followed political goals since the 
1930s,  the  militant  nature  of revisionism  intensified  after  1955.  One  basis  of this 
politicisation  had  been  an  anti-intellectual  bias,  which had  long been  strong  among 
revisionists,  but  in  the  1960s  was  reinforced  by  the  New  Left’s  claim  that  the 
intellectuals’  task was  to  contribute  to  national  liberation.  The  changing  ideological 
climate of the 1960s sidelined many of the founders of the Instituto Rosas, who retrea­
ted into writing specialised historiography or compiling documents, which was not a 
route to a successful career in public life. Their political activities were more limited,
96 Lucha Peronista, no. 5, February 1967.
97 Patria Barbara, no. 20,  13 August 1973. The same article stirred up hatred against Hernandez Arregui 
and Ortega Pefla (who was assassinated twelve months after the article).
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too. Julio Irazusta in 1956 joined the short-lived nacionalista party Union Republicana 
—which was close to the Lonardi administration that had been displaced from power 
in November  1955—,  but  after that he  concentrated on  improving his  prestige  as  a 
historian, rewarded in 1971 by his admission to the Academia Nacional de la Historia. 
As  hegemonic  ideas  in  intellectual  debates  had  become  unfavourable to  elitist anti­
populists, the Instituto Rosas was relegated to some sort of folkloric club.
Instead,  what the bulletin of the  Instituto  Rosas ambivalently celebrated  as the 
“victory”  of revisionism  consisted  mostly  in the  high  sales  figures  of the  books  of 
national-populist  essayists,  who  took  the  lead  in  further  subordinating  history  to 
political goals.  In the eyes of Ortega Pena and Duhalde, who were perhaps the most 
politicised  of  all  nationalist  intellectuals,  history  was  simultaneously  a  “feat  of 
clarification”  and a sort of “retrospective  militancy”,  since,  as they held,  “history is
98 politics.”  Neo-revisionists tended to  associate themselves with political  factions or 
tried  to  become  appointed  to  political  offices,  like  Jauretche  in  1960.  In  the  early 
seventies, Ramos might have been recognised by the general public as a politician as 
much  as  he  was  as  a  writer.  Revisionism  thus  became  linked  to  politics  through 
networks  that  consisted  of an  array of short-lived  and precarious  periodicals,  rather 
than through the mainstream mass media or cultural journals. A map of publications in 
the  1960s  shows  that  revisionism  was  especially prominent  in the  most politicised, 
ephemeral  and  ideologically  heterogeneous  periodicals.  Of  course,  their  political 
orientation had to conform to that of historical revisionists, that is, it had to be first and 
foremost nationalist. In most of the no less politicised and short-lived weeklies of the 
New Left, for example in the organ of the Maoist Partido Comunista Revolucionario 
de la Argentina (PCRA), Nueva Hora, there were few references to caudillismo." In 
turn, revisionism became associated with Peronism. Left-wing nationalist intellectuals 
such as Hernandez Arregui  or Ortega Pena and Duhalde  socialised  in networks that 
were  closely  linked to the  emergent radical  youth  groups that advocated socialismo 
nacional and national liberation in the name of the exiled leader. If not Irazusta, right- 
wing nacionalistas, for example Baldrich, were also linked to neo-Peronist politicians,
98 “Rodolfo Ortega Pefla y Eduardo Luis Duhalde: por partida doble”, Todo es Historia, no. 38, June 
1970, p. 38 (italics added in my translation). The other two statements are quoted in Eidelman, Ortega 
Pehay Duhalde, p. 31  and p. 79.
99 I consulted a series over several months in mid-1973, during which the paper mainly quarrelled with 
the Peronist education minister Jorge Taiana.
159Networks o f  dissemination
whereas  the  Peronist  unions  were  a  financial  and  occupational  platform  for  many 
populist revisionists, for example Rosa.
This  politicisation  undermined  the  possibilities  to  centrally  control  the 
dissemination of revisionist discourse, not only for the members of the Instituto Rosas, 
but  for  the  producers  of  revisionist  discourse  in  general.  Hence,  the  spread  of 
revisionist  imagery  in  Peronist  politics  should  not  primarily  be  understood  as  the 
success of a concerted effort of nationalist intellectuals to propagate their ideas.  It is 
worth recalling Smith’s critique of a “diffusionist” approach towards nationalism that 
overestimates  the  capacity  of intellectuals  to  implement  a nationalist  ideology  from 
above. As Smith has argued, the reasons for the spread of nationalism must be sought 
among its supposed recipients, too.100 An analysis of the spread of revisionism reveals 
that  in the  event  nationalist  historical  narratives  were  appropriated  mostly by those 
who  lacked  credibility  as  a  “natural”  part  of the  (nationalist)  Peronist  movement. 
Sectors  of the  young  urban  middle  class,  Peron’s  newly  acquired  compagnons  de 
route, justified their claim to express the authentic “people” or “nation” by drawing on 
historical  analogies  derived  from  revisionism.  The  construction  of  a  revisionist 
ancestry, then, became a preferential strategy in the articulation of what Carlos Altami- 
rano has called “true  Peronism”, which needed to  stress a “truly” Peronist character 
precisely because it could be (and was) doubted. Having emerged from 1955 onwards, 
“true Peronists” needed to explain why it was them who embodied the real essence of 
Peronism (as opposed to their opponents who equally claimed to be Peronists). For this 
purpose, merely invoking the legacy of Peron was risky because, as long as Peron was 
alive and recognised as the movement’s ultimate arbiter, he could excommunicate his 
self-declared  followers  from  the  movement.  This  exacerbated  the  “true”  Peronists’ 
need  to  safeguard  their  identity  constructions  against  the  “risks  of  factuality”,  as 
Altamirano has put it.1 0 1   A longer historical genealogy was a promising tool to make 
the  legitimacy  of “true  Peronism”  independent  from  the  contingencies  of  Peron’s 
volatile  blessings.  In  this  way,  revisionism  was  subordinated  to  the  exigencies  of 
Peronist  goals.  If the  ideological  heterogeneity  of nationalist  intellectuals  and  the 
dispersion  of the  vehicles  through  which  they  publicised  their  views  had  made  it 
already  difficult  to  control  the  dissemination  of revisionism,  its  appropriation  and 
consequent  usage  by  political  groupings  was  even  less  manageable  for  a  group  of
100 Smith, Nationalism and modernism.
1 01 Carlos Altamirano, “El peronismo verdadero”, Punto de Vista, no. 43 (1992), pp. 6-10, here p. 9.
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intellectuals. In the following chapter, the Peronist appropriation of revisionism in the 
context of a crisis of political legitimacy will be explored in more detail.
161Chapter  five
The Peronist appropriation of revisionism
Introduction
The  constellation  of power brokers  in  Argentina between  1955  and  1966  has  been 
described  as  a  “stalemate”  or  an  “impossible  game”.1   Both  concepts  refer  to  the 
incapacity  of  three  main  political  agents  (the  military,  the  Peronist  movement 
—especially its trade union branch— and the Radical Party) to forge a viable political 
order, since each of these three held a veto power to block the implementation of the 
designs  of the  other  two  actors.  In  a  simplified  scheme,  the  predicament  can  be 
summarised  as  follows:  for  nearly  ten  years,  the  Peronist  regime  had  managed  to 
establish a system in which the state arbitrated over sectoral interests, but (not least due 
to macro-economic imbalances) the populist state had become untenable by the mid- 
fifties,  which  led  to  the  military  coup  that  ousted  Peron  in  September  1955.  This 
“Liberating Revolution” was initially led by General Eduardo Lonardi, who assembled 
officers and civilians who had taken offence, not so much at the corporatist elements of 
populism, but at Peron’s anti-clerical campaign of 1954 and at the regime’s contracts 
with the US petroleum company Standard Oil. Lonardi and his nacionalista followers, 
however, were unseated in a palace coup in November, when Pedro Eugenio Arambu- 
ru was sworn in as president, who led the more “liberal” sectors of the Armed Forces. 
His  was  a  very  authoritarian  liberalism,  since  although  he  declared  representative
1  See Luis Alberto Romero, Breve historia contemporanea de la Argentina,  1916/1999 (Buenos Aires: 
Fondo de Cultura Economica, 2001), pp.  133-168, who speaks of a “stalemate”, and Guillermo 
O’Donnell, Modernizacion y  autoritarismo (Buenos Aires: Paidos,  1972) for the notion of “impossible 
game”.
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democracy as the ultimate aim, in order to reach this goal, Aramburu said, it was first 
necessary  to  eradicate  “totalitarian”  Peronism  from  the  political  scene.  The  new 
authorities thus dissolved the  Peronist Party, prevented  its  successors  from electoral 
participation and directed “re-educating” measures at Peronist supporters.2 However, 
this goal soon proved difficult to accomplish, because large parts of the working class 
continued to adhere to the exiled Peron.  Although the Liberating Revolution handed 
over  power to  the  elected  civilian  administration  of the  Radical  Arturo  Frondizi  in 
1958,  Peronism  essentially remained  banned  until  1973  (albeit to  varying  degrees), 
which  permitted  the  Radical  Party  to  win  what  effectively  amounted  to  minority 
elections. The organisational forms with which Peronists fought against this situation 
varied, but the unions (as the “most legal” part of the movement) until  1966 were the 
most  powerful  actor,  which  could  topple  governments.3  In  a  situation  of  quickly 
changing and unstable alliances, all three power brokers came to regard state power as 
the most desirable prey in this “impossible game”.
This  political  background  provides  compelling  explanations  of  why  the  link 
between history and politics was reinforced after  1955. For in the face of a restricted 
democracy,  political  actors  had  to  ground  their  quest  for  power  on  sources  of 
legitimation other than democratic elections. Although this problem also affected the 
Radical  Party,  it  was  particularly  acute  for  those  actors  that  did  not  participate  in 
elections  at  all,  namely  the  Peronist  movement  and  the  military.  This  chapter  will 
analyse  how,  in  the  three  years  after November  1955,  both the  leaders  of the  self- 
proclaimed Liberating Revolution and the Peronist press drew on historical analogies 
—“official” history in the case of the Aramburu regime and revisionist in the case of 
Peronism— to buttress their political goals. As the dichotomy between Peronism and 
anti-Peronism became  the  most  important  dividing  line  of the  political  scene,  these 
divisions  were  moulded  into  a  reading  of  national  history  in  which  the  country 
supposedly  had  always  been  divided  between  these  two  strands.  The  idea  of two 
Argentinas thus came to be seen as the origin of the divide between Peronism and anti- 
Peronism.
That Aramburu’s regime chose to draw on the liberal pantheon, whilst Peronists, 
in opposition to this, likened themselves to the heroes of revisionist imagery was not
2 The best political history of the Liberating Revolution is Maria Estela Spinelli, Los vencedores 
vencidos: el antiperonismoy la  “revolucion libertadora” (Buenos Aires: Biblos, 2005).
3 On the Peronist unions in this period see generally James, Resistance and integration and Torre, El 
gigante invertebrado, pp.  1-23.
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an  entirely  arbitrary  choice.  Not only was  Peronism a nationalist movement  and  as 
such  in principle  compatible  with the  ideas  of revisionists.  Also,  analogies  between 
Rosas and Peron had belonged to the rhetorical repertoire of anti-Peronists long before 
1955. For example, in the run-up to the presidential elections of 1946, followers of the 
different  currents  of the  anti-Peronist  Union  Democratica  had  branded  Peron  as  a 
reincarnation of Rosas.4 In  1952,  a (failed) military uprising against Peron had been 
planned to coincide with the hundredth anniversary of the battle of Caseros, in which 
Rosas  had  been  defeated.5   Conversely,  the  revisionist  exaltation of caudillismo  and 
personalistic leadership as authentically Argentine had affinities with Peronist rhetoric 
claiming that the leader had a charismatic bond with the people or the nation. Never­
theless, the Peronist regime refrained from converting revisionism into state orthodoxy 
(see  also  chapter  one).  The  scholarly  literature  has  overwhelmingly  agreed  on  this 
point. Alberto Ciria, for example, has observed that official analogies between Peron 
and historical figures between 1946 and 1955 referred to “characters or episodes from 
national  history,  within  what  could  be  called  liberal  or  traditional  history,  never 
revisionist history.”6  Virtually  all  other  studies  have  convincingly  supported  Ciria’s 
argument that the first two Peronist governments exalted neither Rosas nor the federal 
caudillos and that, on the contrary, official propaganda enthroned Peron at the end of a 
lineage  that  began  with  the  uncontroversial  San  Martin,  but  also  included  several
n
historical figures associated with cosmopolitan liberalism.  The reasons for the Pero­
nist appropriation of revisionism thus have to be  sought in post-1955  developments.
4 See Quattrocchi-Woisson, Un nationalisme, pp. 260-266. This idea persisted throughout Peron’s 
presidency as Altamirano, Peronismo y cultura de izquierda, pp. 27-28 remarks, mentioning the 
example of the liberal essayist Carlos Alberto Erro.
5 Robert A. Potash, The army and politics in Argentina,  1945-1962: Peron to Frondizi (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press,  1980), p.  141.
6 Alberto Ciria, Politico y cultura popular: la Argentina peronista,  1946-1955 (Buenos Aires: Ediciones 
de la Flor,  1983), p. 219. Shortly before the publication of Ciria’s book, Winston, “Between Rosas and 
Sarmiento”, argued more cautiously that Peron tried to maintain a careful equilibrium between Rosas 
and Sarmiento.
7 There are differences of emphasis, however. Authors who have looked at the position of revisionists in 
public universities found that there were convergences between revisionism and Peronism before  1955: 
e.g. Halperin Donghi, El revisionismo, Quattrocchi-Woisson, Un nationalisme, pp. 251-352 and 
Campione, Argentina: la escritura de su historia, pp. 84-90. If the focus is on Peronist propaganda, such 
links look much more tenuous. On this basis, the following authors have been more sceptical about such 
links: Mariano Ben Plotkin, Manana es San Peron: propaganda, rituales politicos y educacion en el 
regimen peronista (1946-1955) (Buenos Aires: Ariel,  1994), pp.  194-197; Svampa, El dilema, p. 229; 
Viviana Postay and Natalia Uanini,  Un pasado heroico para la patria peronista: la construccion 
politico de las versiones de la historia,  1946-1955 (Cdrdoba: Ferreyra, 2001), pp. 37-45. A good 
synthesis can be found in: Cattaruzza, “El revisionismo”, in: Cattaruzza and Eujanian, Politicos de la 
historia, pp.  161-169.
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8  • As has been noted,  the question of why and how this appropriation occurred has not 
been studied in detail as yet.
As  I  will  argue,  the  reasons  for  this  appropriation  can  only  be  understood  in 
relation to  the  breakdown  of the  populist  system  and the  ensuing crisis  of political 
legitimacy. Revisionist intellectuals and ideological questions played a limited role in 
the  beginning  of the  Peronist  instrumentalisation  of revisionist  motifs.  Instead,  the 
usage of revisionist symbols, in particular Rosas, among Peronist groups was largely a 
reaction against the rhetoric of the leaders of the Liberating Revolution who portrayed 
their deed as a repetition of the battle of Caseros, in which Rosas had been overthrown. 
In  order  to  explore  the  Peronist  reaction  against  this  rhetoric,  the  products  of the 
Peronist press from the years immediately following the overthrow of Peron as well as 
Peron’s own writings will be analysed. The main focus will be on the Peronist press, 
by which I mean those newspapers that, despite the movement’s official proscription, 
managed to clearly identify themselves as Peronist to the general public. Often directed 
by  men  who  had  previously  been  largely  unknown  functionaries  of the  Peronist 
government,  most  of these  media  were  directed  at  a  working  class  audience  and 
emphasised  bread  and  butter  topics.  Although  they  are  difficult  to  find  in  public 
archives,  they  are  nevertheless the  only way to  reconstruct the  discursive  formation 
under scrutiny here, since other means of communication that were used by Peronists 
in these years, such as tapes or pictures, are even less accessible. The advantage of the 
focus on Peronist publications —instead of other media that were less closely identi­
fied with the deposed movement—,  lies in the fact that it allows me to consider the 
lines of transmission within Peronism, since the principal aim of this chapter is to trace 
back  the  discursive  mechanisms  from  which  the  penetration  of revisionism  among 
Peronists stemmed.
As a first step, it is necessary to outline the strategies of the military government 
that  took  power  in  November  1955,  especially  its  pronouncements  concerning  the 
national past and their policies towards Peronist means of communication. Secondly, I 
will  delineate  the  formation  of a  dispersed  field  of Peronist  publications  and  the 
implications this had for the functioning of Peronist discourse. Next, the use of history 
in this press will be contextualised in relation to other articulations concerning history 
and its meaning.  An analysis of the most influential Peronist periodical  of the time,
8 E.g. Mariano Ben Plotkin, “The changing perceptions of Peronism: a review esssay”, in: Brennan (ed.), 
Peronism and Argentina, p. 50 and Raanan Rein, Peronismo, populismo y political Argentina 1943- 
1955, translated by Eliezer Nowodworski (Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano,  1998), pp.  107-108.
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Palabra Argentina, should clarify the degree of contingency that was involved in the 
process of identity reformulation after 1955. Ultimately, the picture will be broadened 
towards the more general political reconfigurations that took place between  1955  and 
the beginning of Frondizi’s presidency.
1.  The rhetoric of the Liberating Revolution
After November  1955, the policies of the Liberating Revolution were aimed not only 
at banning Peronism from participation in politics, but also at its symbolic eradication. 
The  most  important  measure  in  this  respect  was  the  enactment  in  March  1956  of 
decree-laws 4161  and 4258 prohibiting the use of all Peronist symbols as well as the 
use of Peron’s name, and banning former Peronist party officials and unionists from 
holding public office. The new leaders bolstered their aims and policies by pointing to 
historical precedents and a historical genealogy was identified to legitimise the task of 
“de-Peronisation”.  Already  in his  inaugural  speech on  13  November  1955,  the  new 
provisional president Aramburu avowed that “a single spirit inspires the movement of 
the revolution: it is the democratic sentiment of our people that blossomed in 1810 and 
resurged  after  Caseros.”9  According  to  this  genealogy,  his  government  had  to  be 
understood as the successor of the Unea Mayo-Caseros: firstly, the May Revolution in 
1810,  which  had  triggered  independence  from  Spain,  and  secondly,  the  battle  of 
Caseros, where General Justo Jose de Urquiza had defeated the government of Rosas 
on 3 February 1852. Less than three months into his presidency, Aramburu seized the 
date  of 3  February to  officially  commemorate  the  battle  of Caseros  in  the  Colegio 
Militar, where he clarified his choice of a historical model:
Caseros is not only the battle that gave the Fatherland back its freedom, but also the vindication 
of the heroic deed of May that was mocked during the dark night of tyranny.10 
In other words, whilst the May Revolution was seen as an uncontroversial part of the 
historical roots of national identity, the battle of Caseros was the politically distinctive 
marker of how this identity should now be interpreted.
The  analogy  between  1852  and  1955,  although  gradually  transformed  into  a 
systematic strategy by Aramburu, was not strictly speaking his invention. The parallels 
between  the  two  events  seemed  readily  evident  to  most  contemporaries,  not  least
9 Pedro Eugenio Aramburu and Isaac F. Rojas, La Revolucion Libertadora en 12 meses de gobierno 
(Buenos Aires: no publisher given,  1956), p. 8.
10 Ibid, p. 49.
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because Peron’s opponents had often likened the populist leader to Rosas.  Then, the 
course of events in late  1955  suggested further similarities.  First, Lonardi’s concilia­
tory strategy towards Peronism resembled Urquiza’s position 153 years before: just as 
Lonardi  was  a Catholic  nacionalista with corporatist (and therefore potentially pro- 
Peronist) affinities, Urquiza had been a Federalist, who had not always been unsympa­
thetic towards rosismo.  There was general agreement on the validity of the historical 
analogy.  When  assuming  office  in  September  1955,  Lonardi  likened  himself  to 
Urquiza by declaring that there should be “neither victors, nor vanquished”, a phrase 
attributed to Urquiza. After Lonardi’s removal by the most anti-Peronist groups in the 
Armed  Forces,  the  comparison  seemed  to  fit  even  better.  Just  as  Lonardi  in  1955, 
Urquiza had been deposed and replaced by groups that aimed at a radicalisation of the 
break with the “deposed tyrant”, as Peron, too, was officially called after 1955.1 1  Those 
who had removed Urquiza from power tried to establish a liberal-enlightened nation­
state,  embodied  in  the  constitution  of  1853.  Likewise,  the  “liberal”  leaders  of the 
Liberating Revolution around Aramburu sought to replace the Peronist constitutional 
reform with this original of 1853.  From  1956 onwards,  groups close to the deposed
Lonardi thus continued to compare him to Urquiza, arguing that both had attempted to
] 2 reconcile a divided nation against the “ideologues [who] follow a politics of hatred.” 
That the unfortunate Lonardi had a “taste of Urquiza”, as Rodolfo Ortega Pena recalled
1  3
nine years later, could simply not be missed.  The analogy furthermore suited the libe­
ral sectors to articulate their denunciations of Lonardi’s conciliatory position towards 
Peronism,  which  could  plausibly  attributed  to  his  team’s  nacionalista  connections. 
Aramburu not only suspected Lonardi of hidden sympathies with Peronism, but there 
were  also  signs  that  his  administration  included  admirers  of Rosas.  The  stumbling 
block that triggered the palace coup of November was Lonardi’s attempt to appoint the 
nacionalista  Luis  Maria  de  Pablo  Pardo,  who  had  been  a  founding  member  of the 
Instituto Rosas, as Minister of the Interior.1 4  In short, the analogy between  1852 and 
1955 was a perfect fit in almost every respect.
Aramburu  and  his  vice-president  Isaac  Rojas  transformed  this  circumstantial 
evidence  into  a  systematic  rhetorical  strategy to portray their deed  as  an  analogous
1 1  Since it was forbidden to mention Peron’s name, he was usually referred to as “deposed tyrant” or 
“fugitive dictator” in the media and in government speeches.
1 2 Azuly Blanco, no. 29, 2 January 1957.
1 3  Rodolfo Ortega Pefta, prologue to: Hernandez Arregui, Imperialismo y cultura, p. 7.
14 Potash, Army and politics,  1945-1962, p. 221.
167The Peronist appropriation
repetition of Caseros.  Aramburu declared that “after Caseros, the country stood firm 
and did not look back to the sombre past; nobody longed for the time of the tyranny,” 
and as a logical consequence, “the men of the Liberating Revolution, under analogous 
circumstances, will not do so either.”1 5 Not surprisingly, the efforts of the government 
to replace the “false constitution” —that is the one reformed under Peron in  1949— 
with the original version from 1853 were also buttressed by favourable allusions to the 
battle of Caseros.16 And if the coup against the Peronist regime was the contemporary 
equivalent  of Caseros,  it  followed that  Peron  was the  reincarnation  of Rosas.  Vice- 
president  Isaac  Rojas  declared  that  the  enactment  of decree-law  479  of 7  October 
1955, which had created a national commission in order to investigate the purported 
excesses of repression under the Peronist regime, was responding to the “outcry of the 
Fatherland and the voices of history”. The results of the investigations were published 
in a book, whose title (.Libro negro de la segunda tiranla; “Black book of the second 
tyranny”)  implied  that  Peronism  had  to  be  seen  as  a  repetition  of Rosas’  “first” 
tyranny.1 7  The  government  thus  not  only  couched  its  political  objectives  within  a 
particular  reading  of Argentina’s  national  history,  but  bound  up  their  anti-Peronist 
policy with an anti-rosista politics of history.
These  were  not  occasional  references.  Most  public  speeches  delivered  by  the 
president and the vice-president contained eulogistic evocations of the battle of Case­
ros or other events and figures that had long been reviled by revisionists.  In a well- 
advertised  journey  to  San  Juan,  for  example,  Aramburu  ended  his  speech  with
1  ft favourable remarks  about  Sarmiento.  From May  1957, the  government could even 
count on a periodical called Proclama en la Unea de Mayo y de Caseros, which was 
almost  entirely  devoted  to  the  construction  of this  historical  lineage.19  Historical 
propaganda also permeated the syllabi for the training courses of future unionists in the 
Confederacion  General  del  Trabajo  (CGT),  of  which  the  government  had  seized 
control.20 Clearly, the historical precedents of 1810 and 1852 were intended to occupy
1 5  Aramburu and Rojas, La Revolucion Libertadora, p. 51.
X b  Ibid., p. 71.
1 7  Ibid., p.  171  for the Rojas statement. Lonardi’s decree-law 479 established the commission, headed by 
the vice-president, but not yet the title that was given to the book. This was decided by decree-law 
14,988 of 16 August 1956, i.e. under Aramburu’s government (see Libro negro de la segunda tirania, 
(Buenos Aires: no publisher given,  1958), p.  18 and 25).
18 See the numerous examples in Aramburu and Rojas, La Revolucion Libertadora, pp. 35-38 
(Sarmiento) and p. 87.
19 Proclama en la llnea de M ayoy Caseros, no. 2, 22 May 1957.
20 Confederacion General del Trabajo, Intervention Departamento de Cultura, “Reglamentacion y 
Programa para la Escuela de la CGT” (Buenos Aires,  1957).
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a visible position, which was also perceived by Peronists. In an editorial commenting
upon  Aramburu’s  inaugural  speech,  Palabra Argentina  noted  that  “the  men  of the
provisional  government have referred to the ideals of May and Caseros with strange 
21 insistence.”  This recognition implied that some Peronists who had previously shown 
little interest in harnessing historical references were dragged into such discussions.
2,  The Peronist resistance, political realignments and historical references
This  official  rhetoric  went  along  with repression  against  Peronism,  which  aimed  at 
closing  the  channels  through  which  Peronism  had  expressed  itself.  Already  during 
Lonardi’s  interregnum  the  national  daily  newspaper  La  Prensa,  after  having  been 
under the control of the CGT, was handed back to the Gainza Paz family, which was 
known as anti-Peronist,  and the government cut the links between Peronism and the 
other  major  national  dailies.  Yet  the  dismantling  of the  Peronist  media  intensified 
under  the  presidency  of Aramburu,  whose  government  seized  control  of the  most 
important remaining Peronist periodical, El Llder, and shut down others,  such as De 
Frente, which had been  directed by Cooke,  now the main organiser of the Peronist
99 resistance.  This policy had two main effects.  Firstly,  it succeeded in scattering the 
Peronist  discourse,  which  had  been  tightly  centralised  under  Peron’s  regime.  The 
illegalisation and dispersion made the Peronist field more heterogeneous. The constant 
preoccupation about the editorial  line of Peronist publications in the correspondence 
between  Cooke  and  Peron  of these  years  shows  that  the  Peronist  leaders  found  it
9^
impossible to ensure that their movement spoke with one voice.  Secondly, it created 
space for the appearance of new Peronist or pro-Peronist media, which were produced 
clandestinely or under semi-legal conditions. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, a 
wave of new weekly publications mushroomed, which situated themselves in or near
21 Palabra Argentina, no. 2,  1   December 1955. Italics added.
22 For the intervention in El Llder see Arturo Jauretche, “Los cien dias de ‘El Lider’”, in Dinamis no. 46, 
May 1973, quoted in Baschetti (ed.), Documentos de la resistencia, p. 23. On government policy 
concerning the oppositional press, see Julio Cesar Melon Pirro, “La prensa de oposicidn en la Argentina 
post-peronista”, Estudios Interdisciplinarios de America Latina y el Caribe, vol.  13, no. 2 (2002), pp. 
115-138.
23 Per6n and Cooke, Correspondencia. This was a more general problem of the Peronist resistance. Most 
accounts of the Peronist resistance are based on the correspondence between Cooke and Per6n and on 
(sometimes oral) accounts by former militants, again with a strong bias towards Greater Buenos Aires 
and Rosario. See Juan Manuel Vigo, La vidapor Peron: Cronicas de la resistencia (Buenos Aires: A. 
Pefia Lillo,  1973); Carina Capobianco and Eduardo Matuc, ‘“No temamos otra voz’: una aproximacion a 
la militancia peronista de base en Rosario: la resistencia peronista 1955-1958”, Cuadernos del Ciesal 
Rosario, vol. 3, no. 4 (1998), pp. 89-109; and Liliana Garulli, Antonio Cafiero and others (eds.), 
Nomeolvides: memoria de la resistencia peronista,  1955-1972 (Buenos Aires: Biblos, 2000).
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the Peronist sphere, for example: La Argentina (Justa, Libre y Sober  ana), directed by 
Nora  Lagos  in  Rosario;  Debate,  produced  by  a  Peronist  committee  in  Resistencia, 
province of Chaco; and, in the Federal Capital, Heman Benitez’ Rebeldia, Doctrina (es 
verdad y nuestra guia), directed by Jose Ruben Garcia Main, El 45, whose editor-in- 
chief was Jauretche, El Descamisado, led by Manfredo Sawady, and Palabra Argenti­
na, directed by Alejandro Olmos.
What did they have in common? In comparison to the periodicals examined in the 
previous chapter, their average life span was even shorter (many launched only one or 
two  issues),  their  outlook  was  less  intellectual  and,  with  very  few  exceptions,  they 
were not directed by known politicians or intellectuals.  Similarly to the generational 
renovation of the post-1955  Peronist union leadership,24 few of the directors of these 
new Peronist publications had gained political experience or held important posts prior 
to  1955.  In terms of content,  articles were not usually signed by the  author and,  in 
many cases, they were presumably written by the editor-in-chief.  Coverage of union 
issues  and  day-to-day politics  was the  main focus  of reporting  and all  were  visibly 
directed at a Peronist readership, identifying themselves as Peronist by mentioning the 
three  principles  of justicialismo  (political  sovereignty,  economic  independence  and 
social justice)  in  their headings,  thereby  circumventing the  censorship  that  affected
O S explicitly and unmistakeably Peronist  symbols  or terms.  Sometimes,  letters  by the 
exiled  Peron  occupied  their  front  pages  and  they  published  his  latest  writings  in 
extracts,  which  then  usually  entailed  their  closure.  In  terms  of circulation,  they 
ranged from small neighbourhood broadsheets, which were passed from one person to
07 another  with  average  circulation  figures  below  5,000,  to  important  weeklies  like 
Rebeldia and Palabra Argentina which sold well above 50,000 copies.28 As most of 
them cannot be found in public archives, it is impossible to assess their geographical
24 James, Resistance and integration, pp. 43-100.
25 Carlos Altamirano, Bajo el signo de las masas (1943-1973) (Buenos Aires: Ariel, 2001), p. 22 holds 
that at least two of these principles (social justice and political sovereignty) had been standard symbols 
of nacionalismo by the early 1940s. However, we can safely assume that the general public identified 
them as Peronist by 1955.
26 El Guerrillero, for example, started publishing Perdn’s book Los vendepatria from no.  17, 6 March 
1958, onwards. It was one of the papers that responded most directly to the “official” line of Cooke and 
Perdn. This changed amidst the confusion about Perdn’s orders with regard to the presidential elections 
of 1958, when El Guerrillero distanced itself from Cooke and claimed that Perdn’s order had been 
abstention instead of voting for Frondizi (El Guerrillero, no.  15,  13 February 1958).
27 Miguel Angel Moyano Laissue (ed.), Elperiodismo de la resistencia peronista 1955-1972: anos de 
luchasy de victorias (Buenos Aires: Asociacidn de la Resistencia Peronista, 2000), pp.  15 and 55 
mentions such figures for two cases, Renovacion and El Doctrinario.
28 See below for a discussion of circulation figures.
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distribution,  but  it  seems  that  they  circulated  mainly  in  Greater  Buenos  Aires  and 
Rosario. In sum, besides illegal radio stations and tapes that reproduced Peron’s voice, 
these  publications  constituted  the  chief  means  of  Peronist  communication.  Even 
though there was a sense of solidarity between them due to their shared condition of 
semi-legality, they often competed for the same public and each editor largely worked 
in isolation, which created room for (often divergent) individual ambitions.
Regarding  the  use  of  history,  this  dispersion  of  the  Peronist  resistance 
predisposed its publications to react vis-a-vis the highly visible imagery from above 
instead  of  independently  developing  a  new  historical  imagery  from  below.  Not 
surprisingly therefore, most of the new Peronist media made no effort to reformulate 
historical  narratives.  With  rare  exceptions,  they  did  not  articulate  revisionist  ideas 
without prior reference to the Iinea Mayo-Caseros or other historical themes raised by 
the  government,  such  as  the  evocation  of  Mitre  or  Sarmiento.  Notwithstanding 
Aramburu’s reiteration of the issue, the Peronist press did not respond immediately. 
Whereas  Aramburu’s  genealogic  construction was  extensively covered  in the  main­
stream national press such as La Prensa and La Nacion, initially it was most conspi- 
cuous by its absence from Peronist papers.  When, after a while,  some publications 
slowly began see contemporary events in historical perspective, references to history 
were  subordinated  to  the  more  pressing  issues  of day-to-day politics.  In  December 
1955, El Proletario, the successor of El Descamisado —which had been closed down 
because  of its  too  evocative  name—  commented  on  the  government’s  attempts  at 
abrogating the constitution of 1949. Given that the government was trying to legitimise 
these attempts by hailing the original constitution of 1853, it was hardly surprising that 
the paper picked up the same point: “The political function of this Constitution [1853] 
was  to  enforce  the  pillaging  of the  oligarchy  and  the  meddling  of the  voracious 
English, and later Yankee, imperialism.” In the same article, it accepted the claim of 
the government that there existed a historical parallel between 1852/53 and 1955, since 
both could be  seen as an attempt of the oligarchy to regain power.  A reactive and 
defensive pattern was also manifest in publications that were not directly linked with
29 La Nacion and La Prensa,  14 November 1955. It is impossible to obtain complete collections of the 
Peronist press of the time. Some examples where the historical debate was absent although one would 
expect some hints, include: El Descamisado, no.  1, 30 November 1955; Doctrina (es verdady nuestra 
guia), no.  1,  15 December 1955; La Argentina (Justa, Libre y Sober  and), no.  1, 28 December 1955; and 
Jauretche’s El 45, no. 2, 30 November 1955.
30 El Proletario, no. 2, 21  December 1955. On  17 October 1945, a crowd had gathered on the Plaza de 
Mayo in the centre of Buenos Aires to (successfully) demand Peron’s release from prison. In the 
following years, the date became part of the standard propaganda repertoire of the Peronist regime.
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Peronism,  but had been  increasingly  alienated  by the  Aramburu  administration  and 
began to see Peronism in a more positive light, for example in Revolucion Nacional, 
whose  director  was  Luis  Cerrutti  Costa,  who  had  been  Minister  of Labour  under 
Lonardi.3 1
Gradually,  a  pattern  evolved  by  which  many  of  the  new  Peronist  media 
acknowledged that Aramburu and Rojas could be seen as the heirs of the llnea Mayo- 
Caseros. Initially this recognition could take the form of ridiculing the government’s 
use of history.  In January  1957, Consigna, a paper which was mostly concerned with 
bread and butter topics regarding the unions, ran a question and answer game, which 
can be read only as an ironical comment upon the who is who of the official historical 
narrative:
Question:  can  you  name  a great  man  of our national  history?  [...]  —  Answer:  the  august and 
sublime  General  Mitre.  [...]  —  Q:  who  was  the  General  Angel  Vicente  Penaloza?  —  A:  a 
monster bom in the jungle of La Rioja.  At some point, he was good and fought the tyranny of 
Rosas. [...] — Q: who ordered the decapitation of the crypto-CGT-man Angel Vicente Penaloza? 
— A: the liberator and war strategist Domingo F. Sarmiento.  [...] Q: what is a strike? — A: it is 
something crypto-deposed, metallurgic and illegal. [...] Q: is there any line running parallel to the
one from Mayo to Caseros? — A:  yes.  The one from Constitution to Retiro.  The  latter has the
32
advantage that it has some breathing space.
Here,  the  dividing  line  between  liberal  icons,  such  as  Mitre  and  Sarmiento,  and 
revisionist  ones,  such  as  Rosas  and  Penaloza,  is  very  clear-cut.  Of  course,  the 
vilification of the latter two is as ironic as the panegyric to Sarmiento and Mitre. The 
passage  also  shows  to  what extent the  historiographical  question was  already  inter­
woven with the question of Peronism. The figure of Penaloza, for example, appears to 
be associated with Peronism, since he is a “cripto-cegetista”, that is a crypto-unionist 
of the  CGT.  Finally,  the  government  speeches  are ridiculed by comparing the  llnea 
Mayo-Caseros to an underground line in Buenos Aires, emphasising the stubbornness 
of Aramburu by indicating that his rhetoric left no “breathing space”. However, whilst 
the article indicates that an affirmative use of figures such as Sarmiento —a common 
practice  of the  Peronist  regime  until  1955—  had  become  highly  problematic  for 
Peronists by early  1957, the text aimed at the rejection of the governmental iconogra­
31 In this case as well, the rejection of the linea Mayo-Caseros was moulded within the contemporary 
political discussion about the different versions of the constitution (Revolucion Nacional, no. 2, 30 
August 1956). After the ousting of Lonardi, Cerrutti Costa moved to the opposition.
32 Consigna, no. 5, 22 January 1957.
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phy  rather than  at  finding  one  of its  own.  The  ironic  style  still  implies  a  reaction 
against the glorification of May and Caseros.
This  is  not  to  say  that  revisionists  played  no  role  whatsoever  in  the  gradual 
appropriation  of  revisionist  motifs  by  Peronism.  Since  the  Liberating  Revolution 
alienated both nacionalista sectors and Peronists, these drew together in opposition to 
the regime and, in the course of this process, revisionist imagery gained currency in the 
Peronist  camp.  The  history  of the  periodical  Palabra  Argentina  can  illustrate  the 
interplay between various processes in which intellectuals, journalists and politicians 
fostered the identification between Peronism and rosismo. Palabra Argentina was sold 
for the first time on  14 November  1955  —the day after Aramburu’s inauguration— 
with eight pages  in a broadsheet format,  which was reduced to  four pages  from the 
second issue onwards. Like other Peronist papers of the time, its precarious financial 
situation, lack of copyright registration and its insecure existence in legal terms com­
bined to generate anxiety about an imminent closure. Despite these adverse factors, the 
paper managed to maintain a regular weekly production, until the government closed it 
in December 1956. It reappeared four months later and continued to be published until 
1961, albeit more irregularly from  1958  onwards and in a different format in its last 
two years.  As with most Peronist papers, its political orientation was primarily based 
on the tenets of its editor, Alejandro Olmos.
Olmos, whose grandfather had been governor of the province of Tucuman during 
the  presidency  of Manuel  Quintana  (1904-06),  came  from  an  upper-class  family,  a 
background that later allowed him to finance the paper.34 After the family had moved 
from Tucuman to the capital, Olmos became a junior political commentator on radio at 
the  early  age  of thirteen,  but after  enrolling  in UBA’s  Law Faculty,  he  temporarily 
abandoned his journalistic activities, though not his interest in politics. Over the years, 
he  personally  befriended  several  nationalist  intellectuals,  such  as  Jose  Luis  Torres, 
Jauretche, Scalabrini Ortiz, Chavez and Cooke. His political career and his relationship 
with  Peronism  was  seriously  disturbed  over  his  and  other  nationalists’  protestation 
against the Act of Chapultepec and, during the Peronist regime, he worked as a rather 
unimportant  functionary  in the  National  Customs  Authority  (Direccion Nacional  de
33 The date of its closure is indicated by Mel6n Pirro, “La prensa de oposicion”. Moreover, the paper’s 
director was arrested in January 1957. This and the other information stem from a reading of the paper 
itself.
34 This information is based on an interview with Alejandro Olmos (son) in Buenos Aires on  1  
November 2004.
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Aduanas). At the same time, he socialised in rosista groups, becoming editor-in-chief 
of Juan Manuel in  1951,  an  ephemeral  rosista publication that  campaigned  for the 
repatriation of Rosas’ remains and was the organ of a club of mostly right-wing middle 
and upper class nacionalistas with Olmos as its secretary general. The group had links 
with former members  of the  government of Edelmiro J.  Farrell,  as well  as  with the 
Instituto Rosas, but no noteworthy connections with Peronism. The paper was mostly 
devoted to the announcement of public gatherings that campaigned in favour of Rosas, 
often accompanied by folkloric rosista iconography.35
Olmos  continued to  alternate  between political  and journalistic  activities.  Four 
years  after  the  experience  with  Juan  Manuel,  Olmos  wrote  an  open  letter  to  the 
Aramburu government, published in the first issue of his Palabra Argentina, in which, 
describing himself as an average “citizen”, he underlined his conflictive relationship 
with the  Peronist regime  over the previous  nine  years.  In the  same  issue,  however, 
Olmos explicitly exalted the justicialista flags  of “a socially just,  economically free 
and politically sovereign Argentina”.  Despite his rapprochement with Peronism and 
the fact that Cooke, in a letter to Peron, attested that Palabra Argentina had a “truly
T7
Peronist tone”, it was not “in the orthodox line”, as Cooke added.  Olmos can indeed 
be seen as an early example of “true Peronism”, to borrow Carlos Altamirano’s formu-
IQ
lation once more.  Trying to exploit Peronist sympathies of potential voters,  Olmos 
founded  a  neo-Peronist  Party,  the  Partido  Blanco,  through  which,  however,  he 
followed a political agenda that could differ from Peron’s, as became clear when he 
tried to disobey Peron’s order to support Frondizi in the presidential elections of early 
1958,  even  though  Olmos  himself had  good  relations  with the  Radical  presidential 
candidate.39 Ultimately, Olmos had to bow to Peron’s pressure and supported Frondizi, 
with whom he  was  soon disappointed,  leaving  him bereft of political  alliances  and 
embarking  again  on journalistic  enterprises.  In  the  sixties,  he  first  tried  to  open  a 
university  funded  by  the  unions  and then to  re-launch Palabra Argentina,  but  both 
projects  failed  due  to  the  lack  of support  from  the  unions  and  neo-Peronist  MPs
35 See the lists of speakers at public gatherings and advertisements of meetings in Juan Manuel, no. 2, 9 
August 1951. The main organiser of the group was David Uriburu, the nephew of Jose Felix Uriburu 
who had led the coup of 1930, inspired by corporatism and fascism. Ramdn Doll (see chapter one on 
him), was also involved in the group.
36 Palabra Argentina, no.  1,  14 November 1955.
37 Per6n and Cooke, Correspondedia, vol.  1, pp. 299 (not orthodox) and 193 (Peronist tone).
38 Altamirano, “El peronismo verdadero”. See chapter four.
39 On the Partido Blanco see Marla F. Arias and Raul Garcia Heras, “Carisma disperso y rebelion: los 
partidos neoperonistas”, in: Amaral and Plotkin (eds.), Peron del exilio, pp. 89-121, esp. 94-97.
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respectively. In 1970, Olmos launched another periodical, called Tercer Frente, which 
expounded  left-wing  tercermundista  views,40  and  under  the  government  of  Isabel 
Peron, he became a cabinet adviser.
Taking into account Olmos’  earlier experience as a rosista campaigner together 
with  his  post-1955  alignment  with  Peronism,  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  Palabra 
Argentina merged elements taken from rosismo and Peronism, before it received news 
of Aramburu’s inaugural speech. However, the paper initially articulated its favourable 
comparison between Rosas and Peron in a rather indirect fashion:
Confronted with this process that was initiated by hatred [the Liberating Revolution], one could
say, paraphrasing a concept by Rosas formulated in his English exile:  ‘judgement of Peron falls
41
to God and History, because only God and History can judge the deeds of a people.’
The analogy between Rosas and Peron was thus rather unobtrusive at first and only in 
the following issue, after Aramburu’s inaugural speech, was it made more explicit. The 
editorial  of Palabra  Argentina  on  1  December  picked  up  Aramburu’s  statements, 
stating that
for the  first time,  a  Government of a revolution  invokes  Urquiza’s  revolt and the  sad  military 
action of Caseros as a “glorious” precedent. A revolution that calls itself “liberating” cannot take 
pride in the evocation of the biggest tragedy of our history. [...] Caseros did not mean “liberation 
from the dictatorship”, but the decline of a national sense of personality and sovereignty.  It was 
not  the  triumph  of our  doctrine,  but  the  violent  imposition  of a  spirit  formed  amid  foreign 
philosophies and interests 42 
Hereafter, the paper often framed the political events of 1955 within the language of 
revisionism. In comparison to other periodicals close to the Peronist resistance, Olmos’ 
paper contained such references more often.
Palabra Argentina was more influential than most other Peronist papers. In 1957, 
Cooke  informed  Peron  at  length  about  the  importance  of  Olmos’  newspaper, 
calculating that it had a readership of one million and advising Peron that it was crucial 
to  maintain  good relations with its  editor 43  In June  1957, the periodical  showed  its 
effectiveness  in  mobilising  the  Peronist  rank  and  file,  when  Olmos  called  for  a 
demonstration to commemorate the first anniversary of the failed pro-Peronist military 
uprising  of June  1956.  Cooke  wrote  to  Peron  that  Olmos  had  successfully  brought
40 I could only locate the first issue of this periodical, from  11  December 1970.
41 Palabra Argentina, no.  1,  14 November 1955. Although this appeared on the day after Aramburu’s 
inauguration, the paper’s conditions of production obviously did not enable it to cover the new 
president’s speech.
42 Palabra Argentina, no. 2,  1   December 1955. As we have seen in other cases already, the article was 
accompanied by an argument in favour of maintaining the Peronist constitution of 1949.
43 Peron and Cooke, Correspondencia, vol.  1, pp.  193 and 299.
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about 20,000 people to the streets of Buenos Aires, even though the march had been 
forbidden by the authorities.44 Although it is impossible to establish reliable data on 
the periodical’s circulation beyond Cooke’s assertions, the estimate of a readership of 
one million was perhaps not exaggerated. Together with the nacionalista weekly Azul 
y Blanco and Jauretche’s El 45 (which appeared for only three issues), both of which 
claimed a circulation of 100,000 copies, Palabra Argentina was certainly among the 
main opposition weeklies.45
Since  nacionalistas  who  had  been  close  to  Lonardi  suffered  less  under  the 
repression  of the  Liberating  Revolution than  Peronists,  their journalistic  enterprises 
were in a better position to project themselves as the voice of opposition to Aramburu, 
whilst simultaneously trying to  appeal to a Peronist readership.  This was  essentially 
the strategy pursued by Azul y Blanco.  Although the paper was not strictly speaking 
Peronist,  it did try to  capture the  Peronist working-class  audience,  which  its  editors 
thought available due to the closure of the media that had previously been targeted at 
this readership. From late 1956 onwards Azul y Blanco devoted one of its four pages to 
news concerning the unions.  Once Lonardi, to whom many members of the editorial 
board (such as Mario  Amadeo, the Minister of Foreign Relations,  and Raul Puigbo, 
who participated in Lonardi’s coup against Peron), had been removed, the contributors 
of Azul y Blanco showed themselves increasingly disenchanted with the new direction 
of the Liberating Revolution under Aramburu and drew closer to neo-Peronist circles. 
Together with Peronists, the paper campaigned for the casting of blank ballots in the 
election for the constituent assembly in  1957 and published letters by Peronist politi­
cians, such as Alejandro Leloir’s, by then the president of the highest Peronist organi­
sational  body,  the  Consejo  Superior,  who  declared  his  “friendship”  with  Lonardi.46
44 Cooke {ibid., vol.  1, p.  176) indicated other figures, both below as well as above his own estimate of 
20,000. In this letter, he did not mention that the demonstration was organised by Olmos. We can 
assume, however, that Peron had knowledge of this detail, as the demonstration was a well publicised 
event in the centre of the Federal Capital (see Moyano Laissu£ (ed.), El periodismo, p. 27).
45 El 45, no. 2, 30 November 1955; Azuly Blanco, no. 22, 4 November 1956 for the circulation figures 
of these two papers. Since I do not know what a usual ratio between the figure of sold copies and 
readership was, I find it difficult to assess Cooke’s estimate. All these figures are very high in 
comparison to mainstream dailies. For example, it has been estimated that La Prensa sold about 350,000 
copies in  1956 (Carlos Ulanovsky, Paren las rotativas: historia de los grandes diarios, revistas y 
periodistas argentinos (Buenos Aires: Espasa,  1997), p.  114). Nevertheless, it does not seem to me that 
the figures regarding weeklies like Palabra Argentina or Azuly Blanco are grossly inflated. For 
example, Jauretche, like Cooke without any discernible interest in exaggeration, estimated that El Llder 
sold 200,000 copies (quoted by Sigal, Intelectuales y poder, p.  118).
46 Peron and Cooke, Correspondencia, vol.  1, p. 216 on Azuly Blanco supporting the Peronist “voto en 
bianco” campaign. Azuly Blanco, no. 75,  19 November 1957 for Leloir’s letter. Like Cerrutti Costa, 
Puigbo was a typical example of the passage from Lonardi to Peronism.
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Furthermore, there are some indications that the newspaper functioned as a sphere of 
sociability  for  future  Peronists.  For  example,  Juan  Manuel  Abal  Medina,  who  was 
secretary general of the Movimiento Nacional Justicialista in 1972 and had a decisive 
influence in negotiating Peron’s return to Argentina, worked on the editorial board of 
Azul y Blanco during the Liberating Revolution.47 Azul y Blanco thus exemplified the 
rapprochement between Peronism and nacionalista sectors, which partly played into 
the Peronist appropriation of revisionism.
3.  The circumstances of the Peronist appropriation
However, it would be misleading to interpret the increasing usage of revisionist motifs 
by Peronists as merely the result of successful attempts of nacionalista ideologues to 
indoctrinate  disoriented  Peronist  followers.  Even  in  Palabra Argentina  and Azul y 
Blanco, the editors of which had a history of rosista sympathies, the usage of historical 
themes  was  less  clear-cut than one  might expect from that background.  In Palabra 
Argentina,  like  in  articles  in  other  papers  of  the  Peronist  resistance,  historical 
references were usually made in relation to the government’s invocation of the linea 
Mayo-Caseros and never took the form of a revisionist campaign. In the case of Azul y 
Blanco, before 1957, it is even difficult to pin down the paper’s stance towards debates 
regarding the past at all. Although there were some people with revisionist credentials 
who maintained  links to  the  editorial board  in its  initial  composition —for example
48 Puigbo—,  it  is  hard  to  discern  an  overall  revisionist  tendency.  The  author  of an 
article from January  1957, for example, interpreted Caseros in a positive light, albeit 
without  siding  with  Aramburu’s  speeches.  He  accepted  that there  existed  a parallel 
between the events around the battle of Caseros and the contemporary developments, 
but instead of Rosas or Mitre, he singled out Urquiza as the primary positive figure 
that incorporated a positive sense of national identity, on the basis that, like his heir 
Lonardi, he had tried to reconcile the polarised nation.49 Throughout  1957, the paper 
increasingly  accommodated  revisionist  points  of view.  In  1958,  some  of the  most 
prominent right-wing revisionists at the national level and long-standing members of
47 His middle class family background was shaped by Catholic nacionalismo. His father had worked for 
the nacionalista newspaper El Pampero. Juan Manuel’s brother Fernando was a founding member of 
the Peronist guerrilla Montoneros.
48 On Puigbd’s antecedents as a rosista see the report on his speech in Juan Manuel no. 2, 9 August 
1951.
49 Azuly Blanco, no. 29, 2 January 1957.
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the Instituto Rosas contributed historical articles to Azul y Blanco. However, since this 
change in Azul y Blanco coincided with the reformulation of the Peronist narrative of 
national  history  —rather  than  preceding  or precipitating  it—  and,  moreover,  as  the 
Peronist credentials of the paper remained doubtful, it must be interpreted as a symp­
tom or corollary of wider changes, rather than being a decisive cause of the advances 
that revisionism made in the Peronist camp.50
How political motivations played into the Peronist appropriation of revisionism 
can be shown most clearly in the writings that Peron himself published in these years, 
in  which  ideological  considerations,  as  usually  with  him,  played  a  negligible  role. 
Rather than being the final voicing of deeply held convictions about history, his much 
debated “conversion” to revisionism in  1957 hardly deserves to be called as much. It 
should be seen against the convergence of three circumstances in this year: firstly, the 
precarious situation of Peronism, during which his legitimacy as the ultimate arbiter of 
the movement was insecure (perhaps more so than ever before and after); secondly, as 
a consequence of the first factor,  his need to maintain open lines of communication 
with potential  allies,  among them Olmos and nacionalistas who admired Rosas;  and 
thirdly, perhaps most importantly, the official usage of historical references to buttress 
the  government’s  call  for  a  constituent  assembly  to  abolish  the  Peronist  reform  of 
1949, instead of which the original of 1853 should be reinstated. According to Mariano 
Plotkin, Peron, in the  1957 Caracas edition of his book La fuerza es el derecho de las 
bestias, had still drawn an analogy between the repression of the Liberating Revolution 
and  Rosas’  notorious  enforcement  squad  Mazorca.  In  this  comparison,  Rosas’ 
governorship was obviously meant to carry pejorative connotations. Peron’s “conver­
sion” then consisted of two parts. Firstly, in the following edition of the same book, the 
negative reference to the Mazorca was  dropped,  according to Plotkin,  who  supports 
this argument with convincing evidence, upon the initiative of Jose Maria Rosa, who 
had been involved in the revision of Peron’s book.5 1   Secondly, in his  1957-book Los
50 Although it might be argued that Azuly Blanco's opening towards Peronism led to it being read by 
Peronists, it certainly cannot be regarded as a source that gives insights into Peronist attitudes.
51 Mariano Ben Plotkin, “La ‘ideologia’ de Per6n: continuidades y rupturas”, in: Amaral and Plotkin 
(eds.), Peron del exilio, pp. 43-66, here pp. 51-52 and 31 In. There is indeed no such reference in Juan 
Domingo Perdn, La fuerza es el derecho de las bestias (Madrid: no publisher given,  1957). However, 
Plotkin not only maintains that the pejorative reference to the Mazorca was dropped. He also states that 
it was replaced with a comparison between the terror of the Liberating Revolution and the Soviet secret 
police. 1  could not find this reference either in the edition in question and I could not find either of the 
two references in any of the following editions: Lima: Editora Grafica Mundo,  1956; Montevideo: 
Cicerdn,  1958; Buenos Aires: Sintesis,  1973. The issue is somewhat confusing, however, because there 
were at least six editions of the book between  1956 and 1958 alone.
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vendepatria,  Peron  took  notice  of  the  fact  that  “the  dictatorship  [the  Liberating 
Revolution] has invoked the linea Mayo-Caseros which it declares it will follow.” In 
contrast to the analogy he had drawn between Rosas and Aramburu only a few months 
earlier,  he now accepted that “there  can be no  doubt that its  [i.e. the  government’s] 
confession is real.” Backed by this recognition, Peron concluded that “they [the leaders 
of the Liberating Revolution], just as Alzaga, Liniers, Alvear, the enemies of Rosas, 
etc.  undoubtedly belong to the same lineage:  that of the betrayal of the Fatherland.” 
Peron then criticised the British loan given to Argentina under Rivadavia’s presidency 
as  the  foundational  moment  of  Argentina’s  economic  dependence  on  Britain, 
contrasting it with “the government of Brigadier General Don Juan Manuel de Rosas 
[which]  is,  beyond doubt,  the  most evident eloquence of this deaf struggle”  against 
dependence and “betrayal”.52
It would be futile to look for any deeper ideological reasons behind this “conver­
sion”.  As  has  been  often  noted,  Peron  personally  regarded  the  historical  debates 
between revisionists and liberals as unnecessary intellectual exercises.53 Although he 
had studied the history of the independence period, written historical articles about San 
Martin and read the works of Scalabrini Ortiz, regarding the divide between the liberal 
and  the  revisionist  pantheons,  Peron’s  declarations  usually  left  as  much  room  for 
exegeses as his following statement from an earlier period:
From History, and even from its excesses, we extract precious teachings in the face of which we 
cannot and must not remain insensible.54 
Unsurprisingly, what in  1957 looked like a confession of his “real” sympathies in the 
revisionist-liberal  dispute,  if  analysed  in  more  detail,  turns  out  to  be  rather  half­
hearted. Of the book’s 236 pages, Peron devoted two to the question of “the dictator­
ship and history”. One of these two pages was a long quotation from Palabra Argenti­
na.55  Given that its editor gained political weight at this moment and that Peron was 
well informed of this through Cooke, his reproduction of a page from the paper can be 
seen as a tactical move to improve relations with Olmos.56 Although Peron’s denuncia­
52 Juan Domingo Peron, Los vendepatria: laspruebas de una traicion (Buenos Aires: Liberation,  1958),
p. 220.
See for example the remarks by Rosa in an interview in  1970 (Envido, no. 2, November 1970, p. 46).
54 Juan Domingo Per6n, La comunidad organizada (con un apendice de actualizacion doctrinaria) 
(Buenos Aires: Presidencia de la Naci6n,  1974), p. 51. There is no need to extend the quotation, because 
it continues with equally nebulous formulations.
55 Per6n, Los vendepatria, pp. 220-221.
56 Cooke’s letters that had advised Peron not to alienate Olmos (see footnote 42) dated from the weeks 
immediately preceding Peron’s finishing touches on the book (see Peron’s letter from 22 November 
1957, in: Peron and Cooke, Correspondencia, vol. 2, pp. 41-42).
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tion  of Rivadavia  and  the  British  loan was  a  classical  revisionist theme  —perhaps 
appropriated from Scalabrini Ortiz57— the remainder of the passage in Los vendepatria 
was not typically revisionist. Peron’s list of “traitors” was particularly curious. Of the 
three people mentioned, only the Unitarian porteno Carlos Maria de Alvear —surely 
the  Alvear  Peron  had  in  mind—  fulfilled the  standard  criteria of being  a target for 
revisionist vilification.  However,  Alvear was  a rather secondary figure  in revisionist
•  58  •  r narratives.  While Peron’s inclusion of Alvear was thus already slightly peculiar, his 
mentioning of Martin de Alzaga and Santiago Liniers was even stranger.  To be sure, 
both  were  involved  in  fighting  the  British  invasion  of  1807,  an  event  revered  by 
revisionists almost without exception. But although Alzaga was known for being pro- 
Spanish, this in itself did not suffice for a revisionist indictment. Neither of the two 
appeared often in the controversies between liberals and revisionists.  Since they had 
fought each other, it was moreover unusual to mention them together as the symbols of 
the  same  tradition.  The  most  plausible  explanation  for  Alzaga’s  inclusion  in  the 
enumeration of “traitors”  is that,  because  of his pro-Spanish stance,  Peron meant to 
undermine  the  credibility  of the  Liberating  Revolution  as  a  successor  of the  May 
Revolution, without devoting as much attention to the more controversial issues about 
Rosas and the battle of Caseros.
After this “conversion”, revisionists had to wait more than thirteen years before 
Peron  invoked  Rosas  again.  In  mid-1971,  the  filmmakers  Octavio  Getino  and 
Fernando Solanas conducted a series of interviews with him in Madrid, released in the 
same year with the title Actualization politica y doctrinaria para la toma del poder. 
Getino  and  Solanas,  whose  revisionist  views  were  already  apparent  in  their  1968- 
documentary La hora de I  os homos, opened the film with a voiceover that said:
The war for Argentina’s definitive independence is a war that has not as yet been concluded. San 
Martin,  Rosas,  the  montoneras  are  merely  moments  of  victory  in  this  unfinished  war  for 
liberation.  A  war  in  which  the  names  and the  protagonists  changed,  but the character of which 
remained  the  same:  people  and  anti-people,  fatherland  and  anti-fatherland  are  still  irreducible 
opposites.
With regard to the historical antecedents of his movement, Peron said:
We,  a Spanish colony, became an English colony. Therefore,  in Argentina there was an Anglo- 
Saxon  and  a Hispanic  line.  The  Hispanic  line continued  in the  idea of independence.  The other 
line is colonial. And in our country our line is...  [Peron paused before continuing], let’s say, the
57 See Scalabrini Ortiz, Politica britanica, especially p. 90.
58 In revisionist accounts, Alvear was at best a minor villain, mostly because of his opposition to 
Artigas.
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first junta which was in favour of independence, Rosas who defended it and Yrigoyen who was 
another man who also defended it, and Peron. All other Argentine governments belonged to the 
Anglo-Saxon line [...]. So all this has historical continuity.59 
Throughout the interview, Peron evidently courted the film’s likely audience, the so- 
called  revolutionary  tendency,  to  which  the  interviewers  belonged,  as  Peron 
undoubtedly  knew  well.  Strongly  imbued  with  revisionist  imagery,  by  1971  this 
audience was  instrumental  in the  “seizure of power”,  as  envisaged by the  film title. 
However,  in the  disputes  between the  liberal  and the  revisionist pantheon,  with the 
exception of these two  examples  from  1957  and  1971,  Peron followed his preferred 
strategy of interpretable silence.
By  the  time  of the  interview,  revisionist  imagery  had  long  become  common 
currency  among  Peronist  groups,  whereas  figures  of  the  liberal  pantheon  were 
irrevocably  associated  with  the  anti-Peronism  of the  Liberating  Revolution.  Whilst 
during the Peronist regime,  appraisals of Sarmiento as a precursor of Peron had still 
been common practice,  in  1961,  during a Peronist demonstration in Avellaneda, the 
speaker,  the  Peronist  politician  Raul  Bustos  Fierro,  was  booed  for  mentioning 
Sarmiento  until  he  conceded  that  San  Martin  and  Rosas  were  more  praiseworthy 
historical figures for Peronists.60 Although, given the relatively wide circulation of Los 
vendepatria  and  the  importance  that  his  followers  attributed  to  his  words,  Peron’s 
passage in this book might have impacted on how Peronists in Argentina used history 
for  their  goals,  this  should  not  be  overestimated.61  The  official  analogies  between 
Rosas and Peron played a more weighty role in these changes. The ways in which both 
weekly  newspapers  of the  Peronist  resistance  and  Peron  himself evoked  history  in 
relation to contemporary politics, the Peronist use of a revisionist ancestry suggest that 
this  was  hardly  an  invention  by  Peronists  themselves.  Instead,  it  was  the  inverse 
derivative  of the  propaganda  that  had  originated  from  the  government.  A  common 
pattern in this reformulation of national history worked as follows: because the organs 
of the  Peronist  resistance  were  unable  to  articulate  a  cohesive  horizontal  way  of
59 The passage is my own transcript of the film, available at the Instituto Nacional Juan Domingo Peron. 
More recently, the entire text has been made available at:
http://www.rodolfowalsh.org/article.php3?id_article=l 170 (accessed 24 February 2006).
60 Plotkin, “La ‘ideologia’ de Per6n”, in: Amaral and Plotkin (eds.), Peron del exilio, p. 51.
61 According to a letter by Cooke, the first edition of 20,000 was sold out after few days and a new 
edition was under way by late September 1958 (Peron and Cooke, Correspondent, vol. 2, p.  104). 
However, there had been at least one previous edition so that by the end of 1958 there were three or 
more editions. Compared to other books edited in Argentina at the time, 20,000 alone is already a 
relatively high figure: Sigal, Intelectuales y poder, p. 75, calculates that the average number of copies of 
books published in Argentina in 1958 was 5,471.
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communication,  Peronists  received  the  governmental  iconography  from  above  and 
began  to  accept that the  Liberating Revolution could be  seen  as  a repetition of the 
battle of Caseros.  By inversion of the originally pejorative meaning of this analogy, 
revisionist  icons,  especially  Rosas,  became  increasingly  used  as  Peronist  signifiers. 
Borrowing Maristella Svampa’s terms, we could thus argue that a pejorative “hetero- 
re ferential appropriation” —that is the labelling of Peronism as barbaric with defama­
tory connotations— was transformed  into  an affirmative  “auto-referential  appropria-
•  99  •  6 2 tion” by Peronists.  Such a discursive mechanism was not new in Peronism. Central 
signifiers such as the descamisado, the shirtless person, started their public life as anti- 
Peronist insults, before they were accepted and endowed with a positive self-value.63 
The reformulation of the national past in Peronist circles was originally an imposition 
from above  —before  being reformulated— rather than an invention from below.  In 
short, it was reactive rather than creative.
After  1958, Peronist uses of history ceased to refer to the rhetoric of the leaders 
of the Liberating Revolution.  An early example of an attempt to fuse the revisionist 
iconography  with  the  Peronist  doctrine  was  Rebelion,  a  Peronist  neighbourhood 
newssheet from Rosario, which was first published on 18 November 1959 to comme­
morate  the  anniversary  of the  battle  of Vuelta  de  Obligado.  Contrary  to  the  vast 
majority of the Peronist press before Frondizi’s presidency, Rebelion was exclusively 
concerned with a merging of revisionism and Peronism, this time without referring to 
the propaganda of the Liberating Revolution.64 As was the case in later publications of 
the  JP,  the  employment  of revisionism  amidst  Peronist  symbols  in  Rebelion  was 
marked.  Unsurprisingly,  it was the organ of a youth group —with the unusual name 
Juventud Justicialista— that attempted to raise  its credentials as a legitimate part of 
Peronism.  By  1959, however, the developments that underpinned the Peronist appro­
priation of revisionism had already taken place.
62 Svampa, El dilema, pp. 247-281. Gonz&lez, Restos pampeanos, p. 284 makes a similar point when he 
refers to the Peronist inclination towards “adopting the words of the adversary and draining them [of 
their meaning...], making them suitable for signifying another thing”.
63 The revalorisation of descamisado was made explicit in a speech by Peron: “they do not offend us by 
calling us descamisados; let us not forget that the descamisados of old France [presumably the sans­
culottes] were the ones who indicated a new direction to humanity.” (Juan Domingo Per6n, Peron 
expone su doctrina (Buenos Aires: Centro Universitario Argentino,  1948), p. 61.)
64 1  could locate the first two issues of this publication (Rebelion, nos.  1   and 2,  18 November 1959 and 
first half of December 1959). I do not know whether there were more issues following.
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Conclusion
From  the  viewpoint  of revisionists,  who  had  long  campaigned  for  their  ideas  to 
become  the  popularly  accepted  interpretation  of  Argentine  history,  the  Peronist 
appropriation at first sight might have appeared as a victory. Finally, Rosas —and, in 
the long run, other heroes of the revisionist narrative, too— seemed to be rehabilitated 
as symbols of Argentine national identity by an important political movement.  After 
1955,  Peronism  became  the  main  vehicle  for  the  mass  dissemination  of revisionist 
ideas.  This  was  not  surprising  given  the  affinities  between  revisionist  and  populist 
discourse, both of which frequently invoked personalistic leaders as the expression of 
the supposedly authentic aspirations of the “people” or the “nation”.  However, in its 
beginnings,  the  reformulation of the  historical  discourse  of Peronism  should not be 
seen as a necessary outcome of ideological similarities. Nor was it the result of efforts 
of nationalist intellectuals to indoctrinate the Peronist movement with their views. The 
outlawing  and  dispersion  of  Peronism  after  1955  would  have  made  such  efforts 
difficult to achieve in practice anyway. Peronists came to see Rosas as a signifier for 
their movement, not because they were convinced by the writings of revisionists, but 
because  they  reacted  defensively  against  the  official  rhetoric  of  the  Liberating 
Revolution. The leaders of the provisional government chose to construct a historical 
line from the May Revolution, via Caseros, to the Liberating Revolution as a promi­
nent and visible element of their official propaganda, in response to which much of the 
Peronist reinterpretation of history developed. The Peronist press began to invert the 
pejorative connotations of the official use of history:  revisionist heroes,  in particular 
Rosas, were identified as positive symbols.
Similarly,  Peron’s own “conversion” to revisionism was not a matter of deeply 
held convictions. In  1970, Rosa observed about Peron’s attitude towards the disputes 
between the liberal and the revisionist pantheon:
He  often  said:  “let  us  leave  the  dead  in  peace,  we  have  enough  work  with  the  living.”  It was 
useless to tell him that one should not say this, that we are what we are by virtue of the past. [...] 
What I noticed about Peron was that he gave little importance to the past.65 
On the two occasions when Peron did seem to have decided himself in favour of the 
revisionist account, it can be explained with the concrete political circumstances that 
formed the background to his use of such a historical genealogy. In 1957, the future of 
his movement seemed particularly uncertain and he invoked Rosas, similarly to much
65 Interview with Rosa in Envido, no. 2, November 1970, p. 46.
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of the Peronist press in Argentina, as a means to oppose the linea Mayo-Caseros that 
had been constructed by the leaders of the  Liberating Revolution.  In  1971, when he 
was asked  in an interview about his historical views, his answer conformed to what 
was  known  to  be  the  interpretation  of his  interviewers,  who  served  as  mediators 
between  the  exiled  Peron  and  the  revolutionary  tendency,  which  at  that  point  was 
instrumental for bringing down the military regime that had been installed in 1966.
Revisionism thus did become a political weapon, but this was not the victory of 
militant nationalist writers. The role of intellectuals in the early stages of the Peronist 
appropriation  of  revisionism  was  rather  limited,  as  the  case  of Alejandro  Olmos 
exemplarily demonstrates. Intellectuals were important, of course, as the producers of 
discourses about national identity, which could then be appropriated. It was no surprise 
that Olmos’ paper drew on revisionist imagery more than other periodicals, given that 
he had socialised with writers such as Scalabrini Ortiz, Jauretche and Chavez. But he 
himself was  a  public  functionary,  self-made journalist  and  (unsuccessful)  politician 
and  not primarily  known  as  an  intellectual.  In  contrast to  the  allegedly  one  million 
readers of Palabra Argentina,  the impact of someone  like Jauretche on the Peronist 
movement  was  very  limited  at  that  moment.  His  paper El  45  published  only  three 
issues, and he was forced into exile in Uruguay. Although Cooke was more important, 
his weight was not due to his links with nationalist intellectuals (such as those of the 
Instituto Rosas,  of which he had been vice-president), but to the fact that Peron had 
named him as his personal delegate. An unimportant backbencher during the Peronist 
regime, he suddenly became a crucial political organiser in 1955, based on an authority 
that was derived  from Peron’s  blessing rather than from intellectual prestige.  Cooke 
never wrote a book and most of the publications that bore his name were compilations 
of speeches and articles that appeared from the mid-1960s onwards, by when he had 
lost  his  influence  on  Peronist  politics.  The  identification  of the  Peronist  movement 
with  revisionist  figures  should  not  be  attributed  to  Cooke’s  influence.  In  the  two 
volumes of correspondence between Cooke and Peron, one struggles to find references 
to anything related to historical revisionism.66
In  short,  the  Peronist  appropriation  of revisionism  obeyed  to  the  predicaments 
imposed by the political constellation after 1955. As the national-popular consensus of 
previous  years  had  broken  down  and  the  dichotomy  between  Peronism  and  anti- 
Peronism became the main structuring force of Argentine politics, the divide between
66 Peron and Cooke, Correspondencia.
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the  liberal  and  the  revisionist  account  of the  past  began to  texture  this  dichotomy. 
Nationalist  intellectuals  had provided the  iconographies,  but the  Peronist movement 
appropriated  them  instrumentally  in  response  to  a  political  crisis  of legitimacy.  A 
strongly  militant  account  of  the  past,  directed  against  “officialdom”,  suited  a 
movement that now found itself in opposition. In the following and last chapter, this 
link between revisionism and political opposition will be further explored.
185Chapter six
Revisionism and political power
Introduction
It has often been argued that the  absence  of a strong civil  society in Latin America 
endowed intellectuals with a disproportionately great importance as the producers of 
identity  narratives  that  mediated  between  state  and  society.  As  Alain  Touraine  has 
maintained, given the weak articulation of social demands through the political system, 
the “intellectual party” often became the bearer of unifying myths that vindicated the 
demands  of  “the  people”.1   This  argument  leads  to  another  question,  namely  the 
relationship  of intellectuals  with  political  power.  From the  observation  —similar to 
Touraine’s— that “intellectuals have always fulfilled a central function  [...]  in Latin 
American societies and politics”, Jorge Castaneda has inferred that
where structured, enduring political parties emerged,  intellectuals participated in their leadership 
or  drafted  their  platforms  [...].  And  when  the  opportunity  to  govern  presented  itself,  they 
embraced it.2
The  most  promising  country  case  study  to  substantiate  this  argument  is  probably 
Brazil, where, according to Sergio Miceli, intellectuals were granted privileged access 
to the corridors of power and public office.3 It has been argued, however, that this does 
not hold true for most Spanish American countries.4 If Castaneda’s point is stretched, 
it  might  still  be  applied  to  Mexico  to  some  extent,  but  it  certainly  does  not  fit the 
experience of Argentine intellectuals. As Juan Carlos Torre has remarked, Argentina’s
1  Touraine, La parole et le sang, pp.  137-150.
2 Castafleda, Utopia Unarmed, p.  177 (first quotation) and p.  178 (second quotation).
3 Sergio Miceli, Intelectuais a brasileira (Sao Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2001).
4 Miller, In the shadow.
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lower degree of socio-economic polarisation and the political power of the unions as 
the expression of working-class demands meant that Argentine intellectuals were less 
important  as  mediators  between  state  and  society than their Brazilian counterparts.5  
Silvia Sigal has shown that Argentine intellectuals were indeed weakly integrated into 
the state and political organisations, at least in the 1960s.6
This  chapter  contributes  to  this  discussion  by  specifically  looking  at  the 
relationship  of  historical  revisionists  to  political  power.  It  is  difficult  to  assign 
revisionists  to  either of the  two  categories  identified  by  Sigal,  namely  “progressive 
intellectuals”,  whose  access  to  political  powers  was  limited  according  to  her,  and
n
“nationalist ideologues”, who did become political advisers in her view.  The question 
is not whether revisionists were “progressive” or “nationalist” (the second adjective is 
the  one  that fits),  but rather whether they  should be  classified  as intellectuals  or as 
ideologues.  What  does  this  distinction  mean?  Following  Norberto  Bobbio,  I  will 
understand ideologues as one variant of intellectuals, namely as those “intellectuals to
o
whom  the  holder  of power  attributes  the  role  of promoters  of  consensus.”  This 
definition allows to treat revisionists as intellectuals in order to then ask whether they 
can also be seen as ideologues in that they enjoyed privileged access to the “holders of 
power”.
The question of the extent to which revisionists frequented the corridors of power 
relates to  a broader debate about Argentine nationalism.  In particular with regard to 
nacionalisnto,  it has often been argued that its proponents had cordial  contacts with 
powerful circles, especially in the military.9 Even for the period after  1955, there are 
indeed several cases to support this argument, such as the nacionalistas Jordan Bruno 
Genta,  who  had  links  to  the  air  force,10  or  Mario  Amadeo,  Lonardi’s  Minister  of 
Foreign Affairs. Occasionally (although not often) revisionists, too, have been interpre­
ted as organically involved in drafting the designs of power brokers.1 1  I will argue that 
this idea is very misleading and that the fact that neither Genta nor Amadeo had much 
interest in historical revisionism was not a coincidence, but followed a pattern.  As a 
general rule, those nacionalistas who took on positions as political advisers were not
5 Interview with Torre in Hora and Trimboli (eds.), Pensar la Argentina, pp. 214-215.
6 Sigal, Intelectuales y poder.
I Ibid, p. 63.
8 Bobbio, II dubbio e la scelta, p.  118.
9 E.g. Rock, Authoritarian Argentina.
Ibid., pp.  188-189.
II Especially by Rama, Nacionalismo e historiografia.
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revisionists. There is an element of tautology in this argument, since, given the anti­
establishment characteristics of revisionism, it might be said that Genta’s or Amadeo’s 
lack of interest in revisionism was a result of their relative success as political advisers. 
However,  the  centrality  of revisionism  in  nationalist  discourse  and  the  fact  that  its 
proponents were by and large excluded would then nevertheless tell a different story 
about the ways in which nationalist imagery became effective: rather than through the 
influential posts of nationalist intellectuals, it would seem that their discursive produc­
tion was tied to their exclusion from political power.
My principal concern, then, is to examine whether there was a pattern to how the 
production of nationalist ideas related to political power and the state. The relationship 
between revisionists and the state, of course, changed over time and depended on the 
government in power. Given the way Argentine politics functioned during much of the 
twentieth  century  (as  indeed  in  many  other  countries  of the  developing  world  with 
strongly presidential  systems),  the  incoming  of a new head  of state  entailed  a high 
turnover of personnel  in most public  institutions.  In the domain of culture,  this was 
exacerbated by the fact that the president holds extraordinary powers to intervene in 
public  cultural  institutions,  notably  in  universities,  and to  appoint key  functionaries 
there.  These  considerations prompt me to  consider the relationship between revisio­
nists and three specific governments in this chapter: Frondizi’s developmentalist admi­
nistration from 1958 to  1962; the military regime known as the Argentine Revolution 
that  began  with  the  coup  led  by  Juan  Carlos  Ongania  in  1966;  and  the  Peronist 
government  from  May  1973  onwards.  These  three  governments,  the  second  two  of 
which intervened in public universities, allow us to adopt a comparative perspective 
that is broadly representative of the relationship in question and to delineate common 
traits  as  well  as  differences.  The  choice  of these  three  examples  seems  justified, 
because the  Liberating Revolution has already been dealt with in some detail  in the 
previous chapter, whereas the Radical government of Arturo Illia from  1963 to  1966 
offers  few  variables  that  could  add  much  to  the  overall  analysis.  The  general 
relationship  between  revisionism  and  Radicalism  will  be  covered  in  the  section  on 
Frondizi,  whose  administration  furthermore  marks  a  more  interesting  turning  point 
concerning the attitudes and positioning of intellectuals in relation to politics.1 2
121  have referred to the importance of “Frondizi’s betrayal” on several occasions already and the topic 
has received much attention in the secondary literature, notably by Teran, Nuestros anos sesentas, pp. 
117-137.
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From  the  analysis  of these  three  governments,  two  main  arguments  will  be 
advanced. Firstly, several of the central political ideas of nationalist intellectuals were 
compatible with the rhetoric of these three administrations. Revisionists were thus not 
excluded  from  official  positions  for  ideological  reasons  by  “anti-national”  govern­
ments,  as  they themselves  would  have  it.  Secondly,  however,  it was  true  that their 
involvement in policy-making was limited. Whilst the administrations of Frondizi and 
Ongania yielded few important positions for them, the Peronist government after 1973 
co-opted them into rather insignificant posts, which entailed a decline in their intellec­
tual activities. Through this examination, this chapter further underscores that revisio­
nism was intrinsically linked to the perceived political marginalisation of its writers.
1.  Revisionism, Radicalism and developmentalism
Since  revisionist  imagery  had  become  a  Peronist  signifier  during  the  Liberating 
Revolution,  it  was  no  surprise  that  neither  Frondizi  nor  Ongania  wholeheartedly 
adopted revisionism as a new official history.  Whilst in their politics of history they 
both sought to create a unified national identity, revisionism remained a partisan and 
largely oppositional version of the past that was promoted by sectors that opposed their 
governments,  even  though  the  ideological  outlook  of their  administrations  and  the 
political background of their coalitions did not contradict the ideas of revisionists in 
principle.
Two  years  after  Aramburu  and  Rojas  had  launched their  attempts  to  eradicate 
Peronism  from  Argentine  society  and  politics,  it  was  already  evident  that  their 
strategies were doomed to fail, as large parts of the population continued to adhere to 
Peronism, whilst the Liberating Revolution did not provide the material rewards that 
could  have  helped  to  uproot  this  political  identity.  In  July  1957,  the  results  of the 
elections for a constitutional assembly to annul the Peronist reform of 1949 proved the 
lack  of support  for  both  Aramburu  and  the  Radical  Party,  which had  split  into  the 
factions of Arturo Frondizi’s “intransigent” wing (UCRI) and Ricardo Balbin’s Union 
Civica Radical del Pueblo (UCRP) in January that year. The approximately 2.1m blank 
ballots  (24  percent  of the  electorate)  were  mostly  associated  with  Peronism,  which
IT
thereby  constituted  the  strongest  single  political  force.  For  Frondizi,  presidential
1 3  For the evaluation of these events by the Peronist leadership, see Peron and Cooke, Correspondencia, 
vol.  1, pp. 250-260.
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candidate in the February 1958 elections, it was thus clear that victory was impossible 
without securing at least a part of this chunk of the electorate, whose preferred choice 
was banned.  In late  1957, Frondizi’s emissaries left for Caracas to strike a deal with 
Peron:  the  latter  agreed  to  order  his  followers  in  Argentina to  vote  for  the  UCRI- 
candidate, whilst Frondizi, if elected, promised to take steps towards the re-legalisation 
of Peronism. On 23 February, Frondizi received roughly 4.5m votes and, on May Day, 
assumed  office  amidst  the  widespread  optimism  surrounding  a  government  that 
proclaimed national unity.
Frondizi  indeed  attracted  support  from a broad range  of sectors that had been 
antagonised  by  the  Liberating  Revolution,  which  the  candidate  had  vociferously 
opposed.  Frondizi’s  heterogeneous  coalition consisted  of Catholic nacionalistas  like 
Amadeo, who had been ousted by the palace coup of November 1955; Peronist leaders 
angered by the dismantling of their movement and the anti-popular economic policies 
of Aramburu;  the  Communist  Party;  and  left-wing  intellectuals,  such  as  those  of 
Contorno, who were also alienated by the Liberating Revolution, whilst being attracted 
to the incoming president’s reputation as an intellectual figure.14 Ideologically, Frondi­
zi’s  track  record  and  his  stated  aims  dovetailed  with many populist  and  nationalist 
tenets.  He  had  laid  them  down  in  a  book  published  in  1954,  which,  if not  for  its 
unwieldy subtitle and unembellished soberness, might well have been admitted to the 
canon of revisionist works.15 Written at the height of the opposition to Peron’s invita­
tion to the US company Standard Oil to exploit Argentine reserves, Frondizi argued for 
the nationalisation of all natural resources as a means of ensuring national sovereignty 
against what he denounced as omnivorous imperialist appetites. He held that nationali­
sation  would  assist  the  development  of  an  autarkic  heavy  industry,  reducing  the 
external  dependency  of the  export-led  model  and  setting  the  economy  on  a  path 
towards the fulfilment of the true national destiny.  This programme  gained Frondizi 
applause of populist nationalists and, since Frondizi had combined this with a criticism
14 This last point is particularly stressed by Carlos Altamirano, Frondizi o el hombre de ideas como 
politico (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Economica,  1998).
1 5  Arturo Frondizi, Petroleo y politica: contribucion al estudio de la historia economica argentina y de 
las relaciones entre el imperialismo y la vida politica nacional, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: Raigal,  1956). 
The title of the introduction to this book (“El antiimperialismo: etapa fundamental del proceso 
democratico en America Latina”), published separately in the following year, summarised the anti­
imperialist core of Frondizi’s reasoning.
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of  Peron’s  anti-clerical  campaign,  also  of  nacionalistas  and  some  authoritarian 
Catholic sectors.16
The anti-imperialism of Frondizi’s UCRI harked back to FORJA, the breakaway 
group from the Radical Party of the mid-1930s. Although FORJA had been dissolved 
in  1945  as  a  response  to  the  advent  of Peronism  and  the  majority  of its  members 
henceforth supported the new leader, some members were less convinced about these 
recent  affinities  and  consequently  founded  the  Movimiento  de  Intransigencia  y 
Renovation (MIR), which became Frondizi’s main political platform.  The continuity 
between  FORJA  and  the  MIR  was  personified  by  Luis  Dellepiane  and  Gabriel  del 
Mazo,  both  former members  of FORJA  who  contributed to the  drafting  of political 
programmes of the MIR in the early years of Peron’s government. After the overthrow 
of  Peron,  Del  Mazo  gained  a  reputation  as  an  ideologue  of  Yrigoyenist  anti­
imperialism with the publication of a three-volume history of Radicalism, in which he 
portrayed Yrigoyen as “the personal condensation of the superior elements of Argen-
•  17 tine authenticity”.  In Frondizi’s cabinet, Del Mazo became Minister of Defence.
The two most prolific intellectuals associated with FORJA, Scalabrini Ortiz and 
Jauretche,  also  endorsed  the  UCRI-candidate,  albeit  independently.  Temporarily 
abandoning his view that under no circumstances an intellectual was capable of being 
sensitive to the needs of the masses, Jauretche reasoned about Frondizi that
for the  first time  in  Argentine  history,  an  intellectual receives the  support of the  people,  or,  in 
other words, for the first time the people are not against the intellectual.  [...] Thus collapses the 
theorem of the opposition between civilisation and barbarism. Synthesis is possible and realisable 
[...].1 8
After their experience of marginalisation during Peron’s second term as president, the 
two revisionists now believed their aspirations could be fulfilled by Frondizi.1 9
Scalabrini  and  Jauretche  voiced  their  support  for  Frondizi  through the  weekly 
newspaper  Que  (sucedio  en siete  dias),  the  most important campaigning vehicle  for 
Frondizi,  which,  due  to  their  contributions,  also  contained  revisionist  articles.  The
1 6 Both are evident from the pamphlets that led up to the Liberating Revolution: F61ix Lafiandra (ed.), 
Los panfletos: su aporte a la Revolucion Libertadora (Buenos Aires: Itinerarium,  1955). On the 
Standard Oil contracts as a principal stumbling block that instigated the nacionalista opposition to Peron 
see pp. 443-462 and on their acclaim for Frondizi see pp. 297-301.
17 Gabriel Del Mazo, El radicalismo: ensayo sobre su historiay doctrina (Buenos Aires: Gure,  1957), 
vol. 2 (Caida de la Republica Representativa, el “contubernio”y la  “decada infame”.  1922-1945), p. 
225.
1 8  Quoted in Altamirano, Frondizi, p. 77.
1 9 That Jauretche and Scalabrini threw their weight behind Frondizi did not pass unnoticed in the 
Peronist leadership (see Peron and Cooke, Correspondencia, vol.  1, p. 217).
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paper was founded in  1947 by the entrepreneur Rogelio Frigerio who had previously 
written  for  student  publications  in  support  of the  University  Reform  of  1918.20  He 
acquired  wide  publicity through his  first meeting with  Frondizi  in early  1956,  after 
which he relentlessly championed the cause of the UCRI and ultimately was rewarded 
with an economic super-ministry in May 1958.21 By this time, Que...  —known as “the 
bible of politics”— had achieved wide circulation, especially among intellectuals who 
sympathised with its anti-imperialist and developmentalist proposals.22 Its main inte­
rest was  economic,  advocating Argentina’s  industrialisation to  substitute  for foreign 
imports, reflecting the developmentalist ideas in vogue throughout Latin America and 
their advances in Juscelino Kubitschek’s Brazil. Whilst the paper thus mainly featured 
articles, illustrated by photographs, drawings, statistics and graphs that explained the 
advantages of building up heavy industries, these were complemented by cultural and 
political debates on Argentine national identity. Nationalist intellectuals from both the 
Right (for example, Puigbo) and the Left (for example, Astesano) contributed to Que.
Similarly  to  the  presidential  candidate’s,  Frigerio’s  own  language  was  also 
strongly nationalist.  In  1959, he contended that “only the weekly Que...  arrived at a 
[...]  systematisation of the national and popular thought that was expressed through 
direct struggle.” According to Frigerio, developmentalism was “about being a nation, 
once and forever”, which had finally become possible, because
the enemy can no longer find natural allies in this land. A good part of the minorities traditionally 
linked to its  [i.e. the enemy’s]  interests now have other [interests] which are associated with the 
process of national liberation.23 
Even four years  later,  when his tone had become more  sober,  in a book devoted to 
strategies for economic growth, Frigerio argued that economic growth was important 
because  it  helped  that  “the  national  being  [...]  reaches  its  fulfilment;  sovereignty 
blends  into  authentic  material,  moral  and  spiritual  structures”,  in  opposition  to  a 
“‘borrowed’  culture  [that]  is imposed upon the vernacular and perverts every attempt 
at  cultural  progress.”24  The  advertising  space  that  Que...  offered  for  books  such  as
20 See Fanor Diaz, Conversaciones con Rogelio Frigerio (Buenos Aires: Colihue-Hachette,  1977), pp. 
19-20.
21 Ibid., pp. 31-51  on the first meeting with Frondizi and his trip to Caracas.
22 See generally Maria Estela Spinelli, “La ‘Biblia’ de la politica: la revista ‘Que sucedio en 7 dlas’ y el 
frondizismo (1955-1958)”, in: Asociacion Argentina de Editores de Revistas (ed.), Historia de revistas 
argentinas (Buenos Aires: Asociacion Argentina de Editores de Revistas,  1995).
23 Rogelio Frigerio, Las condiciones de la victoria: manual de politica argentina (Buenos Aires: 
Sociedad Editora Argentina,  1959), p. 7, p. 9 and p.  11.
24 Rogelio Frigerio, Crecimiento economico y democracia (Buenos Aires: Losada,  1963), p.  155 and p. 
153.
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Garcia Mellid’s Proceso al liberalismo argentino or Hernandez Arregui’s Imperialis- 
mo y  cultura  thus  reflected  its  editor’s  views.  As  Celia  Szusterman  has  noted,  the 
ideological  mixture  upon  which  Frondizi  launched  his  presidential  campaign  was 
bound together by the leitmotiv of anti-imperialism, thus being similar to the ideas of 
Peronists and nationalists.25
Another unifying theme were Frondizi’s evocations of the populist legacy of “old
26 Yrigoyen”.  This  struck  a  chord  with  nationalists  of all  kinds,  who  had  admired 
Yrigoyen  since  the  mid-1930s.  Despite  having  been  outspoken  supporters  of 
Yrigoyen’s overthrow in  1930, the original nucleus of nacionalistas around La Nueva 
Republica  had  arrived  at  a positive  re-evaluation  of Yrigoyenism by the  mid-1930s 
that eased convergences with the populist strands of nationalism.27  Later,  Peron was 
often identified as Yrigoyen’s heir. In the  1940s, Galvez argued that “Peron is a new 
Yrigoyen” and Scalabrini published a text called Yrigoyen y Peron:  identidad de una 
line  a  historica.  Similarly,  Cooke  also  constructed  an  analogy  between  the  two 
leaders on the basis that both had been incarnations of popular authenticity. The events 
of 17 October 1945, according to Cooke, were an echo of Yrigoyen’s funeral in 1933, 
a  “popular  demonstration  [which]  only  merited  the  contempt  and  scorn  of  the 
governing  oligarchy.”29  From  the  nacionalista  Right,  Bruno  Jacovella  diagnosed  a 
longer historical analogy, since
the ascent to power of a Rosas, an Yrigoyen and a Peron were characterised by a total uprooting 
of people  from  the  countryside,  whether  natives  or  immigrants,  into  the  big  port  city  and  its 
environs.
In the same article, published in March  1958, Jacovella went on to underline that the 
intervals between these events were becoming shorter, thereby alluding to the alleged
TO nature of Frondizi’s government.  In short, Frondizi’s discourse allowed nationalists
25 Celia Szusterman, Frondizi and the politics of developmentalism in Argentina,  1955-1962 (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press,  1993), esp. pp. 75-107.
26 Frondizi claimed to accomplish the unfulfilled objectives of Yrigoyen (quoted in La Prensa,  17 
October 1956).
27 See chapter one.
28 Manuel G&lvez in El Pueblo,  13 August 1944, reprinted in Altamirano, Bajo el signo, p.  149. Raul 
Scalabrini Ortiz,  Yrigoyen y Peron: identidad de una linea historica, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: Plus Ultra, 
1972). Correspondingly, evocations of Yrigoyen as a leader and interpreter of the truly popular will had 
served as one of the few common grounds for the participants in the hasty formation of Peron’s alliance 
in  1945/46. See Altamirano, Bajo el signo, p. 32.1 would like to thank the author for having drawn my 
attention to this point in a conversation in Buenos Aires,  17 April 2003.
29 John William Cooke, “Definiciones: peronismo revolucionario”, Cristianismo y Revolucion, no. 2-3, 
October/November 1966, p.  14.
30 Dinamica Social, no. 89, March  1958, p. 3.
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of various kind to identify with the incoming president and to hope for governmental 
or other influential posts.
With  regard  to  episodes  of national  history,  the  government’s  overall  rhetoric 
might  well  have  included  revisionist  references.  By the  late  1950s,  there  had  been 
some  common  ground  established  between  revisionism,  rosismo  and  the  populist 
strands  of  Radicalism,  even  though  this  convergence  had  never  been  complete.3 1 
According  to  a  later  article  in  Primera  Plana,  during  his  presidency  Frondizi  had 
indeed supported attempts to repatriate Rosas’ remains from Southampton and adorned 
the  Salon  Blanco  of  the  presidential  palace  with  the  caudillo’s  bust.32  However, 
revisionism did not become the official version of Argentine history under Frondizi, as 
the writings of Marcos Merchensky, one of the UCRI-ideologues in the run-up to the 
elections  of 1958,  demonstrated.  In his  1961  book Las  corrientes  ideologicas  en  la 
historia  argentina,  Merchensky  sought  a  synthesis  between  Rivadavia,  Rosas  and 
Sarmiento, figures that were incompatible for revisionists. The author did not disagree 
with the cause of rescuing Rosas or other caudillos, but stressed that his rehabilitation 
should not lead to the vilification of the liberal statesmen, since “the meaning of histo­
ry”  was that “every era adds  elements to the formation of nationality”;  an approach 
Merchensky  labelled  “integrationism”.  In  the  preface  to  the  book,  Frigerio 
underscored Rosas’  achievement of national unification, but stressed that he did not 
belong to “the revisionist school”, since that had “deepened [...] the gulf that had been 
opened up by the preceding historiography and nourished the passions that divide the 
Argentines. [...] The anti-national interests could not have asked for anything better.”34 
His version of history to an extent resembled the attempts of the Peronist regime one 
decade earlier to strike a balance between Argentina’s conflicting pantheons.
This  scepticism  toward  revisionism  must  not  be  mistaken  for  a  bias  against 
nacionalismo or populism in government circles.  For example, the populist governor
31 Quattrocchi-Woisson,  Un nationalisme, esp. pp. 43-63 goes furthest in this argument by dating the 
link between revisionism and Yrigoyenism to  1916 (see also chapter one). However, there were always 
examples of non-rosista Yrigoyenism. For example, the monthly UCR-organ of the province of Buenos 
Aires,  Yrigoyen, stated on its front page in  1954 (no. 24, September 1954): “Judged in terms of human 
rights, it is proven that Juan Manuel de Rosas is a tyrant and criminal”. There were also erstwhile 
Yrigoyenists and later Peronists who, in matters of history, were inclined towards the liberal pantheon, 
such as the politician Raul Bustos Fierro. On the other hand, it is also true that by 1958 at least one 
former forjista, Garcia Mellid, was a member of the Instituto Rosas.
32 Primera Plana, no. 75,  14 April  1964.
33 Marcos Merchensky, Las corrientes ideologicas en la historia argentina (Buenos Aires: Concordia, 
1961), p. 285.
34 Rogelio Frigerio, “El estudio de la historia como base de la accidn politica del pueblo”, in: ibid., pp. 
5-38, here p.  12.
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of the  province  of Buenos  Aires,  Oscar  Alende,  at  an  homage  to  Jauretche  on  the 
thirtieth anniversary of the foundation of FORJA, declared that “the revolution that is 
unfolding in Argentina [...] will have, once more, a nationalist and popular stamp.”35 
After his governorship had ended, he drew close to Peronist and neo-Peronist circles 
and, in 1969, he took part in a campaign for the repatriation of Rosas’ remains, which 
was  dominated  by  members  of  the  Instituto  Rosas.36  However,  during  his 
governorship, when the institute tried to persuade him to attend its annual commemo­
ration of the battle of Vuelta de Obligado  in  1958, Alende did not show up and the 
provincial police prevented the celebration from taking place. To a letter of complaint 
written  by  Rosa,  according  to  which  Alende  had  promised  to  come,  the  governor 
replied that other commitments had impeded him to take part in the commemoration. 
Although Alende expressed his sympathies with the cause of the commemoration, he 
thus did not sanction the revisionist version of history as official.37
In  terms  of politically  influential  positions  under  Frondizi,  a  similarly  mixed 
picture emerges.  Nacionalistas established a foothold, albeit a rather modest one, in 
Carlos  Florit’s  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  in  which  Luis  Maria  de  Pablo  Pardo 
became  an  adviser,  whilst  Mario  Amadeo  was  appointed  ambassador to  the  United 
Nations.  However,  this  did  not  translate  into  institutional  advances  for  nationalist 
intellectuals who devoted themselves to historical writing. Neither Amadeo nor Pablo 
Pardo,  despite  being  nacionalistas,  were  revisionist  intellectuals.  In  his  writings, 
Amadeo  had  never  shown any  interest  in reasoning about the  essence  of Argentine 
national identity, let alone engaging in polemics of a historiographical nature. His most 
widely read book {Ayer, hoy, mahana), published in 1956, stood out among nationalist 
publications as a pragmatic collection of relatively concrete policy proposals concer­
ning the  question of de-Peronisation,  which its author saw as “the  gravest and most 
urgent problem of the moment”.38 Although Pablo Pardo had been a founding member 
of the Instituto Rosas, he did not appear in the institute’s list of members after  1955 
and he had never published anything worth mentioning.
35 Oscar Alende, “Arturo Jauretche, pasado y futuro”, in: Juan Carlos Neyra and others, Jauretche: una 
vida al servicio de la revolucion nacional (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor de Buenos Aires,  1965), p. 84.
36 Primera Plana, no. 78, 5 May 1964, reported on possible alliances between Oscar Albrieu and 
Alende. See Julio Stortini, “Polemicas y crisis en el revisionismo histdrico: el caso del Instituto de 
Investigaciones Histdricas ‘Juan Manuel de Rosas’”, in Devoto and Pagano (eds.), Historiografias 
academicay militante, p.  102 on the repatriation campaign.
37 Letters reprinted in Revista del Instituto Rosas, no.  18 (1958), p.  117.
38 Amadeo, Ayer, hoy, mahana, p. 89.
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In  stark contrast,  revisionism  flourished  among those  nationalist  groups  whose 
demands for participation remained unfulfilled. In opposition to the government, they 
specialised in cultural debates about the national character. One example was Vicente 
Tripoli,  one  of the  few  former  FORJA-militants  who  never  aligned  with  Frondizi, 
instead  launching  the  short-lived  social  sciences  journal  Ser  Nacional  in  1959.39 
Similarly,  the  nacionalista weekly Azul y Blanco,  from which Amadeo  had by then 
dissociated  himself,  fiercely  opposed  Frondizi  and  in  this  context  counted  an 
increasing number of right-wing revisionists amongst its contributors, such as Castella- 
ni, Doll, Rosa or Steffens Soler (all members of the Instituto Rosas). The intensifica­
tion  of its  opposition  to  the  government  coincided  with  an  upsurge  in  articles  that 
looked  to  history  for  inspiration.  At  the  same  time  as  the  rosista  Oliver  criticised 
Frondizi’s petroleum policy, the paper complained about the “silenced intellectuals”, 
most  of whom  were  linked  to  the  Instituto  Rosas,  and  published  a  piece  extolling 
Facundo’s bravery.40 Also, the opinions expressed in the paper became more radical. 
The  police  impediment  of  the  celebrations  on  20  November  1958  and  Alende’s 
absence, for example, was attributed to a Masonic conspiracy, said to be typical of a 
political  climate  in  which  “a  Jew  can  lawfully  amass  all  the  millions  he  wants  by 
dealing in petroleum”.41 On the same occasion in the following year, next to a poem in 
honour of Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, Rosa reminded the reader that, during Rosas’ 
times, “the ministers did not use to ask international monetary funds for permission to 
increase  salaries”,  in  obvious  allusion  to  Frondizi’s  new  Minister  of Economy  and 
Labour  Relations,  Alvaro  Alsogaray,  who  was  known  as  an  advocate  of  private 
enterprise.42
In  sum,  revisionism  continued  to  be  the  terrain  of  frustrated  intellectuals  in 
opposition and politicians manques who felt that their ambitions were not sufficiently 
recognised or heard.  Revisionism was  a surrogate  intellectual activity for those who 
had  not  been  appointed  to  official  posts  or  who  realised  that  their  influence  as 
ideologues  of the  government  was  more  limited  than they  had  expected  until  mid- 
1958.  This  exclusion  was  not  due  to  a  discernible  bias  against  nationalist  imagery 
among Frondizi’s entourage.  The Instituto Rosas had reopened its doors in  1958 and
39 The only issue I could find included articles by Jose Maria Rosa and Fermin Chavez, in honour of the 
recently deceased Scalabrini Ortiz (Ser Nacional, no.  1, September 1959). See also chapter four.
40 Azuly Blanco, no.  104,  10 June  1958 (Oliver) and no.  106, 24 June 1958.
41 Azuly Blanco, no.  128, 25 November 1958.
42 Azuly Blanco, no.  179,  17 November 1959.
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the government did not exclude authoritarian and Catholic nacionalistas or populists 
on ideological grounds. Yet none of this led to an official recognition of the revisionist 
account  of  Argentine  history.  “Official  history”  proposed  instead  an  inoffensive 
“integrationism”.
2.  Revisionism and the Ongania dictatorship
This constellation was similar during the military regime of Juan Carlos Ongania that 
came to power through the coup of June 1966, the so-called Argentine Revolution. For 
the more right-leaning of the circles in which revisionists socialised, the coup of 1966 
once more promised to yield benefits from various perspectives.  It was clear that, as 
opposed to Aramburu’s regime, Ongania belonged to the sectors of the Armed Forces 
with  nationalist  sympathies;  nor  was  he  an  advocate  of a  complete  eradication  of 
Peronism, as had become clear in the violent confrontations between military factions 
in  1962, where he had been active among the azules, who favoured a tutelary option 
regarding  the  proscribed  movement.  The  new  president’s  views  were  informed  by 
many of the key elements of right-wing nacionalismo with its frequent references to 
Catholic and hierarchic traditions. Deploring that “our country has become a scene of 
anarchy”  and  that  “our  international  dignity  has  been  gravely  compromised  by 
vacillation  and  indifference”,  the  first  statement  of the  military junta  pleaded  for 
Argentines
to unite behind the great principles of our Western and Christian tradition which, not many years 
ago,  made  our  Fatherland  the  pride  of America  and,  invoking  God’s  protection,  to  begin,  all 
together, the march towards meeting the great Argentine destiny.43 
In  his  inaugural  message,  Ongania  confirmed  that  his  outlook  was  similar,  as  he 
declared  that  “faith  in  God,  learning  from  history,  commitment  to justice,  a  lively 
passion  for the  public  good  and  the  greatness  of Argentina  are  the  norms  that  will 
guide  my conduct.”44  The president furthermore professed admiration for Francoism 
and even went so far as to quote almost literally Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, which 
tallied with right-wing nacionalista views.45
43 “Mensaje de la Junta Revolucionaria dirigido al pueblo argentino”, in La Nacion, 29 June 1966.
44 Juan Carlos Ongania, “Al pueblo argentino”, 30 June  1966, quoted in Gregorio Selser, El onganiato 
(Buenos Aires: Samonta,  1973), vol.  1, p. 313.
45 Quoted in Tilman Tonnies Evers, Militarregierung in Argentinien: Das politische System der
“Argentinischen Revolution ” (Hamburg and Frankfurt am Main: Institut fur Auswartige Politik/Alfred 
Metzner Verlag,  1972), p. 60. Ongania said: “La patria es una empresa en la historia y una empresa en 
lo universal. La patria es una sintesis trascendente que tiene fines propios que cumplir.” The
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This orientation was reflected in the composition of the sectors that exerted an 
influence in the Argentine Revolution, especially during its first phase. In comparison 
to  Frondizi,  the  governmental  entourage  included  a  larger  number  of  right-wing 
nacionalistas. Among these, particular importance was attached to the members of the 
Ateneo de la Republica, an informal think-tank that had been founded by Amadeo and 
others in  1962 in order to exert political influence based on corporatist, Catholic and 
authoritarian ideas. Several of its members had known each other since contributing to 
the Catholic nacionalista publication Sol y Luna in the late 1930s (Amadeo and Santia­
go  de  Estrada),  had  been  involved  in the  military  governments  of  1943-46  (Hector 
Llambias)  or  had  been  in  one  way  or  another  linked  to  the  Lonardi  administration 
(Amadeo, Puigbo and Maximo Etchecopar). In 1966, Amadeo was appointed ambassa­
dor  to  Brazil  and,  later  that  year,  the  Ateneo  members  gained  a  stronghold  in  the 
Ministry of the Interior, led by the Peronist sympathiser Guillermo Borda, whilst they 
also had a more limited influence in the portfolios of foreign affairs and of culture and 
education.46 Although the government’s socio-economic policy, as became clear after 
initial wavering, was dominated by liberal authoritarian technocrats with whom nacio­
nalistas  strongly  disagreed,  government  measures  in the  cultural  domain  dovetailed 
with  right-wing  Catholic  ideas.  For  example,  measures  were  taken  to  prohibit  the 
showing  of  films  that,  in  the  eyes  of censors,  “justified”  marital  unfaithfulness.47 
Overall,  relations  between  circles  linked  to  nacionalistas,  including  groups  like
AQ
Tacuara, and the government were relatively well developed under Ongania.
As had been the case with Frondizi, Ongania’s personal view on history was not 
in principle disinclined towards revisionist motifs. For example, in September 1969 he 
chaired  a  commission  for  the  commemoration  of the  hundredth  anniversary  of the 
death  of Angel  Pacheco,  Rosas’  brother  in  arms  in  the  desert  campaign  of  1833. 
Through several members, such as Julio Irazusta, the Instituto Rosas also supported the
corresponding passage by Primo de Rivera is: “Una patria es una misidn en la historia, una misidn en lo 
universal [...] La patria es una sintesis indivisible con fines propios que cumplir.” {ibid.)
46 See generally on the link between Ongania and the Ateneo: Selser, El onganiato, vol.  1, pp.  11-42 and 
Alain Rouquie, Pouvoir mililtaire et societe politique en Republique Argentine (Paris: Fondation 
Nationale des Sciences Politiques and CNRS,  1978), pp. 576 and 686.
47 Tonnies Evers, Militarregierrung, p. 72.
48 For the conflicting combination of Catholic, nacionalista and corporatist sectors on the one hand and 
pro-business groups on the other, see Guillermo O’Donnell, 1966-1973: El estado burocratico 
autoritario: triunfasy derrotas (Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano,  1982), pp. 95-103. Paul Lewis, 
“The right and military rule,  1955-1983”, in Deutsch and Dolkart (eds.), The Argentine right, pp.  147-
180 sees this division as having been common to most Argentine military regimes.
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event.49  According  to  Halperin  Donghi,  Ongania  was  the  first  president  to  make 
positive  remarks  about  Rosas  in  public.50  As  had  occurred  with  such  official 
declarations earlier, however, Ongania refrained from praising Rosas alone. His choice 
of  Lavalle  as  the  accompanying  hero  followed  in  the  footsteps  of  the  historical 
evocations  of  the  followers  of  earlier  military  regimes,  especially  the  nationalist 
corporatism of Jose F.  Uriburu in  1930.5 1   But as an enemy of Rosas, assisted by the 
French and furthermore responsible for the execution of Manuel Dorrego, Lavalle was 
unacceptable  to  revisionists.  From  a  classical  revisionist  standpoint,  Ongania’s 
presumed  aim  of achieving a synthesis  between  different traditions of nacionalismo 
was as uncongenial as Merchensky’s had been a few years earlier.
Regarding public posts for revisionists and institutional advances of their version 
of the past,  as a general  rule,  inroads were made in the area of education.  In public 
universities,  the  background  of the  mass  resignations  after  the  intervention  of July 
1966, especially at the UBA, created new opportunities, since the empty offices were 
partially filled by former lecturers who had been sacked in 1955 and by academic staff 
from Catholic universities. Although Sigal mentions that these changes allowed Rosa 
and Hernandez Arregui to teach at the Universidad del Litoral and the University of La 
Plata (UNLP) respectively,52 most new appointees that were linked to revisionism had 
a  much  lower  profile.  A  typical  example  was  Manuel  Benito  Somoza  (1921-72). 
Although never affiliated to the Instituto Rosas, he did earn credentials as a revisionist 
throughout his  career,  beginning  with journalistic  pieces  in the  daily  newspaper La 
Epoca during its campaign for the repatriation of Rosas’ remains in 1948. In the early 
fifties he  defended his  doctoral  thesis  before Rosa and a number of other historians 
with rosista sympathies;  later he  published in the journal  of the Instituto  Rosas  and 
christened his son Juan Manuel.53 During the eleven years after 1955, he worked for a 
small publishing house and tried to build up a secondary school. After 1966, his career 
improved remarkably. In April  1967, together with Ortega Pena and Duhalde, Chavez 
and the editor-in-chief of the popular history magazine Todo es Historia, Felix Luna, 
he participated  in the  congress  on Felipe Varela that was  organised by the  Junta de
49 Boletin del Instituto Rosas, second series, no. 7, October-November 1969, p. 3.
50 Halperin Donghi, El revisionismo, p. 42.
51 See Cattaruzza, “Descifrando pasados”, in: Cattaruzza (ed.), Crisis economica, p. 436.
52 Sigal, Intelectuales y poder, p. 39.
53 Manuel B. Somoza, “La politica argentina en el ostracismo de San Martin”, Revista del Instituto 
Rosas, no. 23 (1961), pp. 310-322. On the campaign of La Epoca see Quattrocchi-Woisson, Un 
nationalisme, pp. 327-335.
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Estudios  Historicos  de  Catamarca;  in  1969  he  obtained  a  temporary  lectureship  in 
history at the UBA; and ultimately, in  1970, he was appointed to a permanent post at 
the Universidad del Salvador.54
Somoza’s career improvements were linked to a group of historians who founded 
the Fundacion Nuestra Historia in 1968, of which Somoza became president and which 
had good contacts to  government circles.  This group had revisionist inclinations and 
was originally united in the Centro de Estudios de Historia Argentina (CEHA), which 
had been founded by Diego Luis Molinari in  1963. The centre’s leading figure, Jorge 
Maria Ramallo, had previously been active as the editor of the review of the Instituto 
Rosas, to which he tried to give a more scholarly format, but, wearied by the political 
ambitions  in  the  Instituto  Rosas,  found  that  his  pedagogical  ideas  could  be  more 
fruitfully implemented through the newly founded centre.55 After 1966, many CEHA- 
members came from a right-wing nacionalista background and the centre was trans­
formed into a pedagogical pressure group with close contacts to Ongania’s Secretary 
of Education,  Jose  Mariano  Astigueta.  Under  his  auspices,  the  centre  organised  a 
nationwide congress in June  1968 to recommended reforms to the history syllabus in 
secondary schools.56 In line with the orientation of both the education secretary and the 
CEHA-organisers, the congress engaged in activities such as paying tribute to Spain’s 
“Catholic  Kings”,  a  ceremony  that  was  accompanied  by  a  speech  by  the  rosista
c *7
Vicente  Sierra.  The  curriculum  proposed  by  the  centre  also  contained  a  unit  on 
Rosas’  “defence  of sovereignty  against  the  French  blockade  and  the  Anglo-French 
intervention”, whose overall objective was to endow students with an “understanding 
of the  de  facto  unity  achieved  in  the  Confederation  after  bloody  civil  war,  and  its
•   co
importance as a base for institutional unity.”  In December 1968 the CEHA became a 
private non-profit foundation, called Fundacion Nuestra Historia, which received legal
54 See Jorge Bohdziewicz, “Bio-bibliografia de Manuel B. Somoza”, Nuestra Historia, no.  12, 
December 1973, pp. 323-330.
55 Jorge Maria Ramallo, La Revista del Instituto Rosas (1939-1961) (Buenos Aires: Fundacion Nuestra 
Historia,  1984), p.  11.
56 See the centre’s journal Nuestra Historia, no. 3, September 1968, pp.  186-192.
57 Ibid., p.  189. Even within Ongania’s cabinet, Astigueta was known as a particularly fervent Catholic, 
with little idea of how universities and public education worked. His proposals for introducing religious 
education into public universities were thus rejected by many who belonged to Ongania’s inner circle 
(see Robert A. Potash, The army and politics in Argentina,  1962-1973: from Frondizi’s fall to the 
Peronist restoration (Stanford: Stanford University Press,  1996), p. 243).
58 Nuestra Historia, no. 4, January 1969, p. 226.
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recognition as soon as March  1969.59 Shortly afterwards, under the new Secretary of 
Education, Dardo Perez Guilhou, who had previously participated in the organisation 
of the Mendoza branch of the Instituto Rosas and then been rector of the Universidad 
Nacional de Cuyo (UNCuyo) in Mendoza, Ramallo was named the secretariat’s direc­
tor for adult education. From this post he launched a programme for schools, initially 
targeted at union members but later widened to include other groups.
Various  other  Catholics,  authoritarians  and  champions  of  a  national  identity 
based  on  the  values  of  hispanidad  that  belonged  to  this  and  similar  circles  saw 
progress in their careers after 1966. In 1973, for example, two teachers of the UNCuyo 
and members of the Fundacion Nuestra Historia —Pedro Santos Martinez, a hispanista 
and Catholic nationalist who had taught in Spain, and Edberto Oscar Acevedo— were 
appointed to the Academia Nacional de Historia. Julio Irazusta had reached the same 
position two  years earlier.  In  1968,  Roberto  Marfany,  another former lecturer at the 
UNCuyo and member of the Instituto Rosas became director of the Colegio Nacional 
de Buenos Aires, the UBA’s prestigious secondary school. The chair of introduction to 
history at UBA’s Faculty of Philosophy and Letters was occupied by Antonio J. Perez 
Amuchastegui,  another  historian  with  revisionist  sympathies  who  was  close  to  the 
Fundacion Nuestra Historia and later affiliated himself with the Instituto Rosas. When 
the  government  opened  new  public  universities  around  1968,  recruits  from  similar 
backgrounds were drafted in.  For example, Ernesto Maeder,  another historian of the 
Fundacion Nuestra Historia, became rector of the newly founded Universidad Nacional 
del Noroeste. Other right-wing revisionists who gained posts without being associated 
to the Fundacion were  Cardinal Nicolas Fasolino, a reactionary historian from Santa 
Fe who received a seat in the Academia in 1966. These changes were also reflected in 
the UBA’s university press Eudeba, which after 1966 published an increasing number 
of  nacionalista  authors  such  as  Carlos  Ibarguren  (father)  and  Gustavo  Martinez 
Zuviria, as well as writers linked to the Fundacion Nuestra Historia like Santos Marti­
nez or Maeder.60 As these examples demonstrate, institutional advances for historians 
with  right-wing  and  revisionist  sympathies  were  achieved  only  gradually  between 
1966 and  1973.  When these historians  gained official posts under Ongania, this was 
due not to a decision of the presidential office, but to less tangible changes of climate
59 Nuestra Historia, no. 5, May 1969, p. 315. In Spanish this status is called “personeria jurldica”, which 
allows non-profit organisations to act as a private individual, which entails a number of legal 
advantages.
60 This information stems from an online catalogue search through COP  AC.
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in  the  cultural  apparatus  of the  state,  which  continued  under  Ongania’s  successors 
Roberto M. Levingston and Alejandro Lanusse.
Yet the advances of revisionists into state positions —even if we leave aside the 
Marxists of the izquierda nacional and left-wing Peronists for a moment— were more 
modest than these examples suggest. Firstly, although the Fundacion Nuestra Historia, 
whose  members  benefited most  from the  educational  policies  of Ongania’s  regime, 
was a right-wing nacionalista institution, “revisionist” might not be a useful label to 
classify  it.  Most members  of the  foundation were professional historians rather than 
political writers known for their contributions to the revisionist canon.61  Even though 
the predominant ideas in the institution were compatible with this canon, its promotion 
was not the main goal of the Fundacion Nuestra Historia, as the schoolbook by one of 
its  members,  the  Catholic  hispanista  Santos  Fernandez Arlaud,  illustrated.  The text 
was  imbued  with right-wing  nationalist  ideas  and  its  bibliography referenced  many 
nacionalistas and revisionists.  Whenever it came to anything foreign its author could 
not resist damning adjectives. For example, he condemned the Roca-Runciman Treaty 
as  “a  clear  example  of the  unbridled  foreign  appetites  for  exploiting  the  country’s 
wealth”.  A  few  pages  further  on,  students  learned  that,  during  World  War  II,  “the 
United States unashamedly tried to intervene in the internal matters of our country”, a 
move which, however, met the appropriate response in military president Pedro Pablo 
Ramirez’ announcement “that he would not tolerate foreign intrusions and that he was 
determined to halt the process of disintegration of values that threatened the very life 
of  the  fatherland.”62  Regarding  Rosas,  however,  Fernandez  Arlaud’s  assessment 
sounded more reserved from a revisionist standpoint. He wrote only that “whatever the 
opinion that Rosas’ iron government deserves on an internal level, it is evident that he 
brilliantly defended our sovereignty against unjust foreign aggression.”63 This sentence 
was the most positive remark about Rosas or any other caudillo.  The book’s sections 
on the nineteenth century were generally sober and factual. Reviewing another book by 
Fernandez  Arlaud  in  the  bulletin  of the  Instituto  Rosas,  Alberto  Ezcurra  Medrano 
remarked that it “signifies great progress in the teaching of our history”,  but without 
“being a rosista book or being  designed to  exalt Rosas,  which would take  away its
61 The only exceptions were Vicente Sierra and Julio Irazusta, who by the late sixties had built up a 
reputation as serious historians and were no longer typically involved in the political campaigns of 
revisionists.
62 Santos Fernandez Arlaud, Historia argentina: tercer ano del ciclo bdsico y del comercial (Buenos 
Aires: Stella,  1967), p. 418, p. 421  and p. 420.
63 Ibid, p. 363.
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impartiality and consequently its authority”.64 In short, an overtly bellicose revisionist 
account was seen as incompatible with the history taught in public schools. Whilst the 
Fundacion Nuestra Historia had affinities with revisionism,  it was not a platform for 
the systematic adulation of the heroes of the revisionist pantheon.
Secondly,  outside  the  domains  of education  and  culture  there  were  very  few 
revisionists  in  Ongania’s  administration.  With  only  two  exceptions  (Samuel  W. 
Medrano and Hector Llamblas, who were rather secondary figures) the members of the 
Ateneo de la Republica had no connections to the Instituto Rosas or other groupings 
dedicated to the writing of revisionist history.65 Pablo Pardo finally became a minister 
(of foreign  relations)  under  Levingston,  but  by  this  time  his  views  had  so  much 
attenuated that he was  not even primarily identified as  a nacionalista anymore.  The 
erstwhile member of the Instituto Rosas had lost touch with revisionism so much that a 
rosista from the early days felt urged to write an indignant letter to the Instituto Rosas, 
in which he wondered whether the minister still remembered his past contributions to 
the institute’s journal.66
Conversely, not a single prominent revisionist acquired direct political influence 
under  Ongania  and,  similarly  to  the  situation  under  Frondizi,  the  promotion  of 
revisionist  imagery  was  mainly  a  phenomenon  of the  nationalist  opposition  to  the 
military regime. Despite Ongania’s ideological affinities, this opposition also included 
nacionalista sectors,  such as the notoriously polemical Azul y Blanco, which decried 
the government’s alleged liberalism and began to strike more populist chords. As had 
occurred nine  years  before,  the paper once  more  distinguished  itself as  an organ  of 
revisionism  by  offering  advertising  space  to  Ortega Pena and  Duhalde’s  publishing 
house Sudestada.67 Two radical military men who opposed the presidency of Lanusse 
were  also  linked  to  revisionism.  Major  General  Eduardo  Uriburu,  whom  Lanusse 
removed  from  his  post  as  Fifth  Corps  Commander,  apparently for political  reasons, 
and Lieutenant Colonel Fernando Baldrich, a Nazi and fascist sympathiser who took 
part in a failed attempt to topple Lanusse in October 1971, were both members of the 
Instituto  Rosas  in  their  leisure  time.68  Although  neither  of  them  contributed  to
64 Boletin del Instituto Rosas, second series, no. 8, March 1970, p. 28 and p. 29.
65 Stortini, “Pol^micas y crisis”, p. 85 even remarks that the Instituto Rosas distrusted the Ateneo group.
66 Boletin del Instituto Rosas, second series, no. 9, May-September 1970, p. 26.
67 Unfortunately, I found it impossible to locate that second series of Azul y Blanco. The information is 
taken from Rock, Authoritarian Argentina, pp. 210-213 and p. 285.
68 Potash, Army and politics,  1962-1973, p. 265 (on Uriburu) and p. 386 (on Baldrich). They appeared in 
the list of members published in Revista del Instituto Rosas, second series, no.  10, August 1971, p. 2
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revisionist literature or played an important role in the institute, their examples suggest 
that revisionism typically remained a phenomenon of nationalist opposition.
Most left-wing nationalists also opposed his regime, including the most important 
pro-Peronist intellectuals. This had not been clear from the outset. Although Cooke, by 
then  already  a  marginal  figure  within  Peronism,  condemned  the  regime  from  the 
beginning,69  most  left-wing  Peronist  groups  initially  saw  Ongania  as  a  potential 
improvement in comparison to  Illia.  Peronist university groups took no offence with 
the end of the Reformist University and through changes like the catedras nacionales 
they  eventually  benefited  from  the  intervention  of  1966.70  However,  these  sectors 
gradually moved to the opposition. Ramos’ Partido Socialista de la Izquierda Nacional 
made up its mind that it was dealing with a “Second Liberating Revolution”, once the 
government’s economic policy had taken a pro-business turn with the appointment of 
Adalbert  Krieger  Vasena  as  Minister  of  the  Economy.7 1   In  the  same  year,  the 
Revolutionary Peronist  Youth (JPR)  subscribed to  Cooke’s assessment of Ongania’s 
regime as a “dictatorship bound to sell out the fatherland”.72 This opposition became 
clearer among left-wing Peronists in the wake of the Cordobazo, with the emergence 
of guerrilla  groups  that  fought  for  Peron’s  return to  Argentina.  In  1969,  under  the 
auspices  of the  CGTA,  a  recently  formed  “Commission  of National  Affirmation”, 
which consisted of Jauretche, Hernandez Arregui and Rosa, characterised the military 
regime as the latest promoter of “making national culture foreign” and called workers
7 T and students to unite for the “re-conquest of the lost National Sovereignty”.  The most 
widely known populist neo-revisionists remained oppositional before 1973.
In sum, the rhetoric of both Frondizi and Ongania did not contradict the political 
ideas  of revisionists.  Frondizi’s  anti-imperialism,  which harked back to  FORJA-no- 
tions, and Ongania’s sympathies with the Catholic Right were both themes with which 
revisionists  could  in  principle  have  identified.  However,  they did  not become  these 
regimes’  ideologues.  In their politics  of history, both presidents  sought to  achieve  a 
synthesis between the conflicting versions of national identity symbolised by different
(although called “Revista”, this was evidently the continuation of the second series of the bulletin that 
had been republished from 1968 onwards).
69 John William Cooke, Elperonismoy el golpe de estado (Buenos Aires: Action Revolucionaria 
Peronista,  1966).
70 See e.g. the flyer by the “Peronistas Universitarios”, reproduced in: Baschetti (ed.), Documentos de la 
resistencia, p. 452.
7 1 El Partido Socialista de la Izquierda Nacional  frente a la segunda Revolucion Libertadora, (Buenos 
Aires: Partido Socialista de la Izquierda Nacional,  1967).
72 Lucha Peronista, no. 5, February 1967 (“la dictadura vendepatria”).
73 Reproduced in Hem&ndez Arregui, La formacion (1973), p. 532.
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accounts of the past. The partisan nature of revisionism and the fact that it had become 
so closely associated with Peronism resisted “officialisation” and the promotion of this 
version of the past in the main continued to be a feature of nationalist opposition. This 
changed with the  Peronist return to  power in  1973,  when the regime  co-opted these 
hitherto oppositional sectors.
3.  The return of Peronism: revisionism’s final victory?
Since the  fate  of historical  revisionism  was  intimately  interwoven  with  the political 
developments of 1973-74, it is crucial to understand the framework of events.74 In the 
elections of 11  March  1973, which were reasonably free for the first time since  1952, 
the Peronist-dominated multi-party coalition Frente Justicialista de Liberation Nacio­
nal  (FREJULI)  won  with  nearly  50  percent  of the  12  million  ballots  cast.  Amid 
feverish  mobilisation  the  left-leaning  Peronist  Hector  Campora,  a  veteran  of  the 
movement, assumed office on 25  May  1973. The so-called revolutionary tendency of 
Peronism (JP and the Montoneros) greeted his inauguration with enthusiasm and then 
sought to  steer political  developments  in a direction that would assure their share of 
political power by seizing public buildings and trying to prevent opponents within the 
movement  from  assuming  office.75  The  underlying  strategy  of these  actions  was  to 
create faits accomplis before Peron’s imminent return to the presidency,  since  it was 
feared that he might arbitrate against the revolutionary tendency,  instead resorting to 
the union leadership as the main support for his government. Precisely this turned out 
to be the overall direction of events in 1973-74, after Campora had been removed from 
office in July  1973, succeeded first by a brief interim government led by Raul Lastiri 
and  eventually  by  the  inauguration  of  Peron  and  his  wife  Isabel  on  12  October. 
Political events thereafter were characterised by violent confrontations between groups 
of the Left and Right, most of which identified themselves as Peronist, disputing who
74 My account draws on the following: Maristella Svampa, “El populismo imposible y sus actores,  1973- 
1976”, in James (ed.),  Violencia, proscripciony autoritarismo, pp. 381-438; Torre, El gigante 
invertebrado\ Ricardo Sidicaro, Los tres peronismos: estadoy poder econdmico,  1946-55/1973- 
76/1989-99 (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 2002), pp.  112-142; and Liliana de Riz, Retorno y derrumbe: el 
ultimo gobierno peronista (Mexico City: Folios,  1981). For an account in English see Guido di Telia, 
Argentina under Peron,  1973-76: the nation's experience with a labour-based government (London: 
Macmillan,  1983).
75 The most famous example of this strategy was the demonstration staged on 25 May at the prison of 
Villa Devoto, which culminated in the chaotic release of its political prisoners. Campora then 
retroactively legalised this release.
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legitimately qualified as such and who did not.76 The growing influence of the Right 
was reflected in the rise of the Minister of Social Welfare, Jose Lopez Rega —Lastin’s 
father-in-law and Peron’s personal secretary—, who organised and staffed the vigilante 
death squad Triple A. Political violence from the extreme Right had reached an early 
peak on 20 July  1973  at the airport of Ezeiza, where, upon Peron’s scheduled return, 
groups apparently linked to Lopez Rega had opened fire on left-wing Peronists among 
the crowds.77 On the Left, the non-Peronist ERP continued to target businessmen and 
police officers. Although the Montoneros had officially declared a ceasefire, they were 
widely assumed to be behind the assassination of the  Secretary General of the CGT, 
Jose  Ignacio Rucci,  in  September  1973,  in what  appeared  like  an attempt to  remind 
Peron of what they were capable if not granted the political weight they demanded.
Given the previous convergence between Peronism and nationalist groupings on 
both  Right and  Left,  it came as  no  surprise that nationalists  of different orientations 
colonised the state after  1973. Education initially became the target of the Left, since 
gaining  ground  in  this  area  meant  only  the  official  sanctioning  of  informal 
arrangements  that  existed  since  the  rise  of the  catedras  nacionales  and  left-wing 
Peronist student bodies. The predominance of the revolutionary tendency, especially in 
the UBA, was not actively sought, but sympathetically accepted by the new education 
minister Jorge Taiana.  A  long-standing protege  of Peron and his personal physician, 
Taiana’s  record  was  not  unequivocally  left-wing  and  he  was  disliked  by  the  non- 
Peronist Left.78 Even so, when Argentina’s by now 19 public universities were placed 
under governmental control on 30 May  1973, Taiana did not take steps to prevent the 
swing towards  the  Left.  In this process,  many  left-wing populist  and  neo-revisionist 
intellectuals began to assume posts in universities.
The  most  significant  appointment  was  at  the  UBA,  officially  renamed  the 
“National and Popular University of Buenos Aires”, which despite the recent opening 
of new universities remained by far the country’s most important. Here, Puiggros was 
named  intervening  rector,  vowing  to  achieve  the  unification  of  students  with  the 
“people”,  which  was  all  the  more  urgent,  according  to  him,  because  “the  National
76 This is evident from a compilation of street slogans: Cesar Teach (ed.), La politico en consignas: 
memoria de los setenta (Buenos Aires: Homo Sapiens, 2003).
77 See Horacio Verbitsky, Ezeiza (Buenos Aires: Contrapunto,  1985).
78 From  1961 to  1963, for example, he had been affiliated to the Centro de Estudios de Problemas 
Argentinos, a Peronist social science club where politicians like Antonio Cafiero and Taiana joined with 
nacionalista intellectuals, some from the extreme Right, like the club’s president Baldrich. See Huella, 
no. 2,  17 September 1963. See also chapter four.
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University has remained removed from the feeling of a people that with its resistance 
has defended the essences of national culture.”79 Puiggros’ declared aim was to finish 
off the previously dominant “intellectual colonialism” by affirming Argentina’s “own 
culture”;  a programme that seemed to have the  blessing of Peron, who declared that 
“there  will  be  no  technological  revolution  without  a  cultural  revolution”.80  Under 
Puiggros’  aegis,  the  hitherto  more  informal  influence  of the  Montoneros  and  the  JP 
coagulated  into official  positions.  So close was their relationship that Puiggros,  long 
after he had been  forced  into exile  in  September  1974,  became first secretary of the 
Montoneros’ branch of professionals, artists and intellectuals.8 1  Although the power of 
the Peronist Left gradually began to diminish after Puiggros was replaced in October 
1973, it was able to cling on to its position under the three succeeding trustee rectors 
until mid-1974.82
Not  all  left-wing  populist  intellectuals  who  had  acquired  a  reputation  as 
revisionists in previous years, were rewarded. Ramos, for example, assumed no public 
office, as he preferred to follow his own independent political path through the Frente 
de Izquierda Popular (FIP), which strongly disagreed with the revolutionary tendency 
and characterised the internal fighting among Peronists as a dispute between the union 
bureaucracy  and  the  radicalised  petty  bourgeoisie.  Hernandez  Arregui,  despite  his 
long-term  militancy  within  Peronism,  was  not  appointed  to  a  public  post  either.  It 
seems that he expected to be offered an official position, and there were rumours of an 
offer to become ambassador to China,84 which never materialised, possibly because his 
resentful  personality did  not  recommend  him  for public  office.  Without  abandoning 
Peronism,  Hernandez  Arregui  instead  launched  a  periodical,  called  Peronismo  y 
socialismo,  which  brought  together  left-wing  Peronists  close  to  the  revolutionary
or  #
tendency.  Ramos  and  Hernandez  Arregui,  however,  were  rather  exceptional  in 
comparison  to  the  overall  preferment  of  left-wing  populists  in  new  university 
appointments.  If not with  an  official  post,  Hernandez Arregui  was at  least  rewarded
7) Militancia, no. 5,  12 July  1973.
80 Puiggros, Universidad del pueblo, p.  12.
81  See Gillespie, Soldiers of Peron, p.  11.
82 These successors were Ernesto Villanueva, Vicente Solano Lima and Raul Lagussi.
83 See Galasso, Izquierda Nacional, p.  147.
84 Galasso, Hernandez Arregui, pp. 200-201.
85 Peronismo y socialismo was renamed as Peronismo y liberacion in the following year, probably 
because the original title could be too closely associated with the revolutionary tendency. Its 
collaborators included the union leader Raimundo Ongaro, the filmmakers Fernando Solanas and 
Octavio Getino and the intervening dean of UBA’s Law Faculty, Mario Kestelboim.
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with an honorary title as professor emeritus.86 Nearly all other populists who in their 
past had been involved in revisionist networks were drafted into official positions. At 
the  UBA,  Puiggros’  appointment  was  part  of a  broader trend  that  favoured  Marxist 
Peronists, who were close to the Montoneros. For example, Ortega Pena became head 
of the university’s two history departments, one based in the Faculty of Philosophy and 
Letters and the other, more traditional,  belonging to the  Law  Faculty.  Ortega Pena’s 
friend  and  colleague  Duhalde,  in  turn,  was  made  director  of the  UBA’s  historical 
research  institute,  the  Instituto  de  Historia  Americana  y  Argentina.  Peronist 
intellectuals who did not come from Marxist backgrounds also gained posts, not only 
in education and culture. Fermm Chavez became a teacher at the Faculty of Philosophy 
and  Letters  at  UBA,  manager  in  the  public  relations  department  of the  state’s  oil 
company  YPF  and  director  of public  relations  of the  municipality  of the  Federal 
Capital, all in  1973. Jauretche and Rosa became director of Eudeba and ambassador to 
Asuncion  respectively.  Another  member of the  Instituto  Rosas,  the  ex-forjista  Rene 
Orsi, was named intervening governor of the province of Salta by the government of
07
Isabel shortly before the military coup of March 1976.
Gradually,  the  Peronist  and/or  nacionalista  Right  gained  ground.  An  early
example was the rosista historian Sierra, already 80 years old, who replaced Borges as
88 director of the National Library in  1973 and was named a federal judge.  As early as 
May  1973, Alberto Baldrich became Minister of Education of the province of Buenos 
Aires. After the partial reshuffling of the cabinet of July, Benito Llambi, a long-term 
member of the  Instituto  Rosas  (even though virtually unknown for his  writing),  was 
named  Interior  Minister.89  In  the  domain  of culture,  the  pendulum  swung  further 
towards the Right when Isabel took over the presidency after Peron’s death on  1   July 
1974.  In  August,  the  right-wing  Catholic  Oscar  Ivanissevich  replaced  Taiana  as 
Education  Minister  and  Alberto  Ottalagano,  who  had  mixed  socially  with  the 
nacionalista groups from which emerged Argentina’s first revisionist institution in the
86 Militancia, no. 7, 26 July  1973.
87 See the obituary in Hoy, 20 February  1999.
88 For a brief biographical summary see Scenna, Los que escribieron, pp. 266-268.
89 See his autobiography Llambi, Medio siglo. A former major, Llambi had been educated at the Colegio 
Militar de la Nacion and taken part in Uriburu’s coup in  1930, but from  1946 onwards distinguished 
himself as a Peronist. His loyalty was rewarded with ambassadorships to Switzerland and Sweden 
during Peron’s first governments. After 1955, although his nacionalista contacts spared Llambi 
persecution during the Liberating Revolution, he remained outside official positions until mid-1973. 
When the shift towards the extreme Right escalated after Peron’s death under L6pez Rega’s growing 
influence, Llambi resigned from his post in August  1974 and continued his diplomatic career as 
ambassador to Canada.
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province of Santa Fe, the Instituto de Estudios Federalistas, was named rector of the 
UBA90
Unsurprisingly, revisionism gained ground in public cultural institutions.  In part 
this  was  simply  a  side-effect  of the  turnover  in  public  offices.  In  1973  and  in  the 
following year, Eudeba re-published the works of Irazusta, Busaniche, Saldias, Ortega 
Pena and Duhalde and Garcia Mellid. At the UBA, Puiggros named Rosa, Hernandez 
Arregui,  Castellani  and  Padre  Benitez  as  professors  emeriti  and  Scalabrini  Ortiz, 
Cooke and Galvez as doctor  es honoris causae post mortem.9I  Eudeba announced the 
award of an annual prize of 20,000 pesos, called Premio Raul Scalabrini Ortiz, which 
was for work inquiring into
the forms of economic and cultural dependency,  its  interrelation and  its concrete  manifestations 
in  the  field  of politics  [...,]  [t]he  individual  behaviour  of monopolistic  groups,  analysing  in 
monographic form the sway of these groups in the area of culture, in the orientation of education 
and in governmental conduct [...].92 
History courses  in public  institutions assumed an unmistakably revisionist tone from 
1973. This development is difficult to ascertain in the case of secondary schools, where 
the change of government was less directly felt, since the turnover of staff and reform 
of curricula would have required more laborious and lasting efforts than the replace­
ment of academics in a few key positions. At the UBA, however, the change translated 
directly into different course outlines.  For example, Ortega Pena’s module Argentine 
history II faithfully mirrored the content of the books he had published with Duhalde. 
It began with the Baring Brothers deal, largely neglected Rosas apart from mentioning 
his resistance against foreign intrusion and went on to focus on issues such as “British 
promotion of Bartolome  Mitre’s government”, the “assassination of Chacho”,  “histo­
riography and folklore” and “Varela’s revolution”. Later developments (“the regime”, 
“the  Saenz  Pena  Law  as  a  tactical  response  of  the  oligarchy”,  Radicalism,  “the 
oligarchic restoration”, Peronism, the “counter-revolution”) were cast as a continuous 
oscillation between good and evil, reaching a redemptive climax in the activities of the 
Peronist guerrillas and their quest for power.93 In the same faculty there were courses 
on “the thought of John William Cooke”, taught by Cooke’s widow Alicia Eguren, and
90 See the interview with Ottalagano in Macor and Iglesias, El peronismo antes del peronismo, pp.  156- 
175. Much later, Ottalagano also published in Baldrich’s Retorno.
91 Militancia, no. 7, 26 July 1973.
92 Militancia, no. 6,  19 July 1973.
93 “Programas de estudio”, Facultad de Filosofia y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires, segundo 
cuatrimestre  1973, no. 64.
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“Latin American social history” by Puiggros.94 In the second semester of 1973, it had 
become virtually impossible  for students at the  Faculty of Philosophy and  Letters to 
avoid  the  bulk  of revisionist  literature  which  served  as  the  basis  of most  courses. 
Occasionally, Peronist, revisionist and nacionalista authors in the bibliography almost 
completely replaced classic sociological texts.95
The  political  authorities  also  drew  on  revisionist  symbols.  There  were  several 
small  initiatives.  For example, the Peronist bloc of the chamber of representatives of 
the  province  La  Rioja  arranged  for  the  locality  General  Lavalle  to  be  renamed  as 
Coronel  Felipe  Varela.96  When  the  army  and  the  JP  launched  a joint  operation  to 
relieve the  flood damages in the province  of Buenos Aires  in early October  1973,  it 
was  called  “Operation  Dorrego”.97  Most  prominent,  however,  was  the  official 
celebration of 20 November 1973  as “Day of National Sovereignty”. On that day, the 
press secretariat of the presidency placed full-page advertisements in all major newspa­
pers under the headline “Argentina, sovereign country”.98 An official ceremony in San 
Pedro,  where  the  naval  battle  had  taken  place  and  for  that  reason  a  long-standing 
destination  of pilgrimage  of the  members  of the  Instituto  Rosas,  was  attended  by 
Interior Minister Llambi.99 A ceremony that had formed an integral part in the ritualis­
tic  calendar of the  Instituto  Rosas  since  its  foundation  was thus transformed  into  an 
affair  of the  state.  Revisionism  seemed  to  finally  have  become  official  history.  Not 
only had revisionist intellectuals reached the public positions they felt entitled to occu­
py.  Reciprocally,  the  government had  finally recognised their version of Argentina’s 
past.
94 Ibid., no.  187 (Eguren) and no. 66 (Puiggrds).
95 Ibid., no.  149 (the teacher was Arn'bal Yasbeck Jozani). Of the 72 works cited, 46 were Peronist and 
revisionist authors (including Perdn and Evita) and ten more nacionalista and anti-imperialist authors 
(e.g. Jos6 Luis Torres or Manuel Ugarte). Of the remaining  18, eight were works by authors I could not 
identify, but since almost all of them were published by Ramos’ Ediciones Coyoac&n, as a subsequent 
catalogue search revealed, this suggests a very similar ideological outlook. Out of 72, there were thus 
only ten by authors of another kind. These were Mariano Moreno, Lenin, Sergio Bagu, James Petras and 
Paul Sweezy.
96 Militancia, no. 6,  19 July 1973.
97 La Opinion, 7 October 1973.
98 “Argentina, pais soberano”, in Clarin, La Nacion, La Prensa, all 20 November 1973.
99 La Nacion, 21  November 1973.
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4.  The disintegration of revisionism
And yet, revisionism’s supposed hour of glory was not an unambiguous success. Two 
points need to be raised to qualify this success.  Firstly, the importance of the celebra­
tions  of  the  “Day  of National  Sovereignty”  must  not  be  overestimated.  It  never 
replaced  the  national  holidays  associated  with  independence,  namely  25  May  and  9 
July,  which  continued  to  be  the  most  crucial  festivities  in  the  patriotic  calendar. 
Already in its first year, the celebrations of the “Day of National  Sovereignty” lacked 
full official backing.  Although the Minister of Education in the province of Cordoba 
decreed that classes be taught in all secondary schools explaining the patriotic meaning 
of the naval  battle and the UBA-rector Ernesto  Villanueva decided the  same  for his 
institution, the government insisted that it was a working day.100 Peron did not himself 
attend the celebrations in San Pedro, where the battle had taken place, but went on a 
visit to Uruguay for talks with President Juan Maria Bordaberry. Furthermore, by ador­
ning the official  advertisements  in newspapers on that day with a picture  of general 
Lucio N.  Mansilla,  who  had  fought the  battle  in  Rosas’  name,  rather than  of Rosas 
himself,  the  presidency  diluted  a  potentially  controversial  issue.1 0 1   Although  20 
November continued to be commemorated in the two following years, public interest 
in the occasion dwindled. In 1974, the Instituto Rosas celebrated its customary mass in 
the  metropolitan  cathedral,  the  Partido  Justicialista of the province  of Buenos  Aires 
organised  a  gathering,  and  in  Corrientes  the  Peronist  governor  placed  a  bunch  of 
flowers  next to  a  statue  of San  Martin.  But  day-to-day  politics  overshadowed  these 
activities.  The  speech  of the  Peronist  party  chief of Buenos  Aires,  Rodolfo  Decker, 
recalled the events of November of the previous two years (the celebrations of 1973 
and  Peron’s  first  return  to  Argentina  in  November  1972)  rather  than  the  battle  of
1  07
Obligado. The meeting took place in suburban Lanus instead of San Pedro.  By 1976, 
after the military coup, 20 November was no longer officially commemorated.103
Secondly, the revisionist victory was not its own victory, but a side-effect of the 
ascent to power of Peronism. Although many of the appointees —from both Right and 
Left— who acquired official posts after 1973 had links to nationalist networks that had 
made revisionism their politics of history in previous years, this was not the reason for
100 La Voz del Interior, 20 November 1973 on schools in Cordoba and La Opinion, 21 November 1973 
on the other two points.
1 01 La Nacion, 20 and 21 November 1973.
102 La Nacion, 21 November 1974.
103 Clarin, 20 and 21 November 1976.
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their  recruitment.  Many  of them  had  never  paid  much  attention  to  the  revisionist 
enterprise  in  any  event.  For example,  Ottalagano’s  links  to  revisionist  intellectuals, 
including  right-wing  nacionalistas,  had  been  at  best  tenuous.  Likewise,  despite  his 
connections  to  the  Instituto  Rosas,  Llambi  was  not  a  man  with  mainly  intellectual 
interests.  In  his  autobiography,  he  portrayed  himself as  a  career  diplomat  and  the 
Instituto Rosas featured only as a social club in the background, a secondary context 
for the unfolding of his political career.104 Taiana had formed part of an ephemeral and 
largely unknown entity called Comite Nacional Pro-Revisionismo Universitario back 
in  1958;105  but  he  had  never  acquired  other  credentials  as  a  revisionist.  Although 
authors like Ortega Pena or Puiggros did have such credentials, their appointments at 
the  UBA  should  also  be  seen  in the  light  of their  long-term  militancy  in  favour  of 
Peronism  rather  than  as  a  result  of their  historical  essayism.  Their  colonisation  of 
official  positions  was  a  reward  for  political  activism  rather  than  for  cultural 
contributions and the fact that so many “revisionists” were drafted in after  1973  thus 
was  a  sign  of the  extent  to  which  this  version  of the  past  had  become  a  Peronist 
signifier.
This  had  become  clear  once  more  in  the  parliamentary  sessions  in  which  the 
designation of 20 November as a national holiday was discussed.106 The debaters were 
clearly familiar with the historiography and the public controversies about Rosas. After 
a Peronist deputy close to the revolutionary tendency in the Buenos Aires Chamber of 
Representatives  had  rebuffed  a  Radical’s  argument  that  Rosas  also  represented  the 
landowning  oligarchy,  another  Radical  representative  burst  out  with  a  statement 
(“that’s  what  the  rector  of the  University  of Buenos  Aires  says,  whom  you  have 
appointed”),  which  referred  to  Puiggros’  early  criticism  of Rosas  as  an  oligarchic 
rancher.107 Alignment in the discussion was divided along factional lines. Even though
104 Less than one page of his almost 500-page long autobiography was devoted to this theme (Llambi, 
Medio siglo, p. 44).
105 Azuly Blanco, no.  118,  16 September 1958.
106 This was based on several legislative projects. The first project, discussed in the Senate and the 
Chamber of Representatives of the province of Buenos Aires, was the repeal of a law of 1857 which had 
indicted Rosas for having caused offence to the fatherland (“reo de lesa patria”). The second, discussed 
in the National Senate in mid-November, was the proposal to create a commission to arrange the 
repatriation of Rosas’ remains from Southampton and designate 20 November a national holiday. The 
provincial initiative was of concern mainly because Rosas’ testament stated that he wanted his remains 
to returned to Argentina only in the event that his memory had been rehabilitated and the  1857 law 
annulled.
107 “Sancidn de la Ley N° 8.134, reivindicatoria del ex gobemador de la provincia, brigadier gral. don 
Juan Manuel de Rosas”, sessions of 30 October 1973 (La Plata: Legislature de la Provincia de Buenos 
Aires,  1974), p. 73 (Senator Zubiri).
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one  senator  claimed  that  the  rehabilitation  of  Rosas  was  a  heartfelt  question  of
patriotism rather than of party discipline, it was no surprise that he was a FREJULI-
108  •  * member.  All the legislative proposals related to the repatriation of Rosas’  remains 
and the designation of 20 November had been drafted by Peronists  and,  in all  three 
debates, both on provincial and on national level,  FREJULI-members argued en bloc 
in favour of Rosas’ recognition as a great patriot, occasionally interspersed with excla­
mations such as “Glory to the heroes of Obligado!”.109
In contrast, the UCR presented alternative propositions which sought to mellow 
the proposal. Typically for his bloc, a UCR-senator of the province of Buenos Aires, 
said  that  “we  do  not  want to  replace  one  supposed  sectarianism with  another”  and, 
though  he  was  willing  to  contemplate  the  repatriation  of Rosas’  remains,  he  was 
sceptical  about  his  exaltation  as  a  national  hero  and  stressed  the  need  to  tolerate  a 
number of possible interpretations of Rosas.110 When the celebrations of 20 November 
then  took  place,  Peronist  groups  mobilised  their  members  in  support  and  street 
demonstrations  mainly  featured  Peronist  symbols,  such  as  the  three  justicialista 
slogans political sovereignty, economic independence and social justice. Hinting at the 
same  slogans, the UBA-rector Villanueva interpreted the day as a “homage to  those 
who  were  the  precursors  in  the  struggle  for  constructing  a just,  free  and  sovereign
fatherland.”1 1 1   Street  demonstrations  in  the  city  of  Tucuman  were  dominated  by
112 Peronist groups too, one of which was called Unidad Basica Juan Manuel de Rosas. 
Rather than having become the “official history” of the state, revisionist imagery thus 
continued to be a symbol of the political movement in power, namely Peronism.
Yet not only  did  revisionism not become  fully  official.  The  Peronist  period  in 
power after  1973  also  inaugurated its decline, since as a signifler of Peronism it had 
become subordinated to a political dynamic. This problem was evident in that, in terms 
of its  institutional  advances,  what  looked  like the  final  acceptance  of revisionists  at 
first glance was in fact a co-option into rather insignificant positions. Just as Peron’s 
lack of enthusiasm for the revisionist cause revealed that he did not see it as a suitable 
tool to create legitimacy around his presidency, he seems to have been sceptical with
108 Diario de Debates, Camara de Senadores de la Nacion,  14 November 1973, p. 2061  (Senator 
Americo A. Garcia of San Juan).
109 Ibid., p. 2053. (FREJULI-senator Francisco Cerro of Santiago del Estero).
110 “Sancion de la Ley N° 8.134”, p. 41  (UCR-senator Iglesias). Nearly identical points were made by 
the Radicals in the national senate, especially by Carlos Perette (Illia’s vice-president) and Fernando de 
la Rua (president  1999-2001).
1 11 Clarin, 20 November 1973.
112 Gaceta de Tucuman, 21  November 1973.
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regard  to  the  question  of whether  the  notoriously  polemical  intellectuals  who  had 
produced this discourse could be converted into “the promoters of consensus”. To be 
sure,  many  well-known  revisionist  intellectuals  did  receive  posts  with  which  they 
associated a measure of prestige they had previously been denied. But ambassador to 
Paraguay,  director of Eudeba or manager in the  public  relations department of YPF 
were by no means politically influential positions.
The  co-opted  were  absorbed  in  activities  other  than  writing.  Since  the  posts 
revisionists  acquired  often  entailed  a  great  deal  of  administrative  or  teaching 
responsibilities,  there  was  little  room  left for publishing.  Almost none of the  widely 
known  revisionists  wrote  an  important  book  or  article  after  1973.  It  was  no 
coincidence that the two exceptions to this rule —Hernandez Arregui, who launched 
his  new  periodical  in  1973,  and  Julio  Irazusta,  who  published  his  memoirs  in 
1975113—  were  precisely  those  who  had  not  been co-opted.  Overall,  the  number of 
titles launched by the two main publishers of revisionist literature, the populist-leaning 
Arturo Pena Lillo and the more rosista-oriented Theoria, began to drop after a leap in 
1974.1,4 Even these figures are deceptive, because already in 1974 —in contrast to the 
previous year— virtually all titles were re-editions. Moreover, in the case of Pena Lillo 
the decline was accompanied by a change in the authors published: instead of Astesano 
or  Ramos,  he  published  largely  unknown  writers  after  1974.  It  thus  appears  that 
creative  revisionist production  ground effectively to  a halt  in  1973.115  Although this 
was  mostly  a  practical  outcome  of their  absorption  in  other,  often  administrative, 
activities, it can also be seen as the disappearance of what had been the raison d ’etre of 
revisionism in the first place. An oppositional version of the past written by excluded 
intellectuals who attacked everything they regarded as “official”, revisionism no longer 
made sense once its proponents had themselves become “official”.
Furthermore,  the  close  association  with,  and  subordination to,  the  needs  of the 
Peronist movement meant that revisionism was eroded in the mounting, and ultimately 
murderous,  tensions  within  the  populist  movement.  The  years  1973-76  showed  that 
there  could  be  no  simultaneous  “officialisation”  of left-  and  right-wing  revisionism.
113 Irazusta, Memorias.
114 This is based on a bibliographical search of the catalogues of British university libraries (COPAC), 
the Library of Congress and the library of the University of Texas at Austin. The average number of 
titles that these searches yielded for each year were as follows (including re-editions of books published 
originally earlier): for Pefla Lillo:  1972: 3.7 / 1973: 9.3 / 1974:  14.3 / 1975: 6.3 / 1976: 5.3 / 1977: 2.7 / 
1980: 2.7. For Theoria  1972: 2 / 1973: 2.3 / 1974: 3.3 / 1975: 2.7 / 1976: 0 / 1977:  1.3 / 1980: 0.3.
115 Pefta Lillo confirmed this impression in an interview with me in Buenos Aires on 9 December 2004.
214Revisionism and political power
This  impossibility  was  not  due  to  the  incompatibility  of the  different  variants  of 
revisionism, of course, but to the ferocious confrontations between the different wings 
of Peronism that escalated around  1973. Yet if Peronists declared their adherence to a 
revisionist  view  of  the  past,  then  revisionism  was  vulnerable  to  the  disputes  of 
Peronism.  Political  conflicts  had  already  led  to  the  practical  closure  of the  Instituto 
Rosas in  1971.  Two years later,  some of the right-wing nacionalistas of the Instituto 
Rosas found themselves embroiled  in direct clashes with the revolutionary tendency. 
For example, when Manuel de Anchorena, vice-president of the institute in  1969, was 
supposed to become candidate for the governorship of Buenos Aires in early 1973 with 
the backing of Rucci and the party, the decision was overruled by the Consejo Supe­
rior, apparently due to a veto of sectors linked to Montoneros and the JP, which later 
imposed the left-leaning Oscar Bidegain as governor.116 On 7 July, young leftists tried 
to prevent another right-wing rosista, Ignacio Anzoategui, from taking up office, after 
he had been named undersecretary of education.117
Although  none  of this  was  a  question  of historiography,  it  seriously  affected 
populist and neo-revisionist intellectuals. As the following year and a half witnessed a 
swing to the Right, the groups and individuals that had exerted the most far-reaching 
influence upon the dissemination of revisionism in previous years (that is the izquierda 
nacional and left-wing Peronism) were exhausted in a struggle for survival, often quite 
literally,  which  frustrated  intellectual  activities.  Already  on  20  November  1973, 
interior minister Llambi in San Pedro and union leader Julio Antun in Cordoba seized 
the  opportunity  posed  by  the  official  celebrations  to  stage  verbal  attacks  against
I  I  Q
Marxism.  The  situation  of the  Left  became  most  precarious  in  mid-1974,  when 
Ottalagano, a self-confessed fascist with links to the Triple A, was named rector of the 
UBA in order to purge the university from the remainders of the left-wing hegemony 
of 1973. Puiggros had already had to leave his post in October 1973, after which there 
were  rumours  that  he  might  be  compensated  with  an  ambassadorship  to  Algeria.119 
Since  the  offer  never  materialised,  he  stayed  in  Argentina  until,  by  mid-1974,  the
116 See Potash, Army and politics,  1962-1973, p. 483. Like the Montonero journalist Rodolfo Walsh, 
Bidegain, too, had originally been a member of the right-wing Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista (on 
which see chapter one). As compensation, Perdn appointed Anchorena as ambassador to Britain, a 
decision taken on the symbolically charged date of 20 November 1973. Anchorena was supposed to 
negotiate over the Falklands and arrange for the return of Rosas’ remains. He was recalled to Buenos 
Aires in  1975 when diplomatic relations had worsened and lost his post as a result of the  1976 coup. See 
the obituary in La Nacion, 24 May 2005.
117 La Opinion, 8 July 1973.
118 La Voz del Interior, 21 November 1973.
119 La Opinion,  1   and 2 November 1973.
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situation  became  life-threatening  for  him.  He  first  sought  refuge  in  the  Mexican 
embassy and,  in late  September,  fled Argentina.120 The danger was very real  indeed: 
on  31  July,  Ortega  Pena  was  assassinated  by  the  Triple  A.  The  Montoneros,  both 
receivers  and  promoters  of the  revisionist  imagery,  went underground  again.  Mean­
while, saddened by the political developments of their country, Hernandez Arregui and 
Jauretche both died a natural death in  1974. The crude fact of physical disappearance 
thus became another factor in the decline of revisionism.
Apart  from  a  few  groups,  which  despite  their  earlier  record  of nacionalista 
fervour  and  outbreaks  of  violence  looked  like  moderate  peacemakers  under  such 
circumstances  —such as the  nucleus  of the Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista around 
Patricio Kelly121— what was left of revisionism and nacionalismo by late  1974 were 
either its most obscurantist, Catholic fundamentalist, hispanista or quasi-fascist strands 
or  the  few  groups  that  had  limited  themselves  to  historiography,  that  is  the  least 
influential  for  the  mass  spread  of revisionist  imagery.  These  two  categories  were 
peculiarly  blended  in  the  two  revisionist-inclined  institutions  that  survived  the 
thunderstorms  of  1973-74  intact,  the  Fundacion  Nuestra  Historia  and  the  Instituto 
Bibliografico Antonio Zinny.  The second was essentially a subsidiary of the  first,  as 
the  list  of  its  functionaries  at  its  foundation  in  1973  revealed.  Although  its  first 
president, the Jesuit Guillermo  Furlong, was a conservative hispanista historian who 
usually  preferred  to  stay  clear  of politics,  the  Instituto  Bibliografico  Antonio  Zinny 
also had political affinities with the extreme Right, notably through its secretary Jorge
I  ^
Bohdziewicz.  From  1976  onwards,  the public  research  council  CONICET  funded 
the  Fundacion  Nuestra  Historia  and  the  Instituto  Zinny.  The  remainder  of  the 
nacionalista Right,  despite occasional disruptions such as the closure of the  monthly
p i
periodical Cabildo, for which Irazusta and Federico Ibarguren wrote,  continued their 
publishing activities,  notably through the publisher Dictio,  which  filled  the  void that 
had been left by Theoria. Dictio, too, was most successful under the dictatorship from
120 See La causa peronista, no. 9, 3 September  1974 for the Montonero reaction to the university 
developments and Concentracion de la Juventud Peronista, no. 2, October 1974 for the triumphant pose 
of the extreme Right after Puiggros’ flight.
121 See Marchar, no. 2, October 1974 which evoked Evita and Rosas as the emblems of national unity 
against the current extremisms that, according to the article, pointed towards Bolshevism and Nazism in 
Argentina. Although not officially the organ of the ALN at this point, it was clearly linked to its most 
important leaders. Isabel clamped down on Marchar in February 1975. On the Peronisation of the ALN 
in the early sixties, see “Informe Alianza”, Legajo no.  199, Mesa A (Partidos Politicos), Archivo de la 
Comision Provincial por la Memoria, formerly Direccion de Inteligencia de la Policia de la Provincia de 
Buenos Aires.
122 Nuestra Historia, no.  12, December 1973, pp. 377-378.
123 According to Rock, Authoritarian Argentina, p. 225.
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1976, when its annual  output of titles soared.  However,  especially in the case of the 
Fundacion Nuestra Historia, the promotion of revisionism was rather secondary to the 
overall aims of these groups. Since they furthermore lacked the link to Peronism, their 
readership was smaller than that of the populist neo-revisionists of the 1960s. After the 
eradication of the populist Left, they thus were incapable of halting the long decline of 
historical revisionism.
Conclusion
Several  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  the  analysis  of  the  relationship  between 
revisionism and political power during the presidencies of Frondizi, Ongania and the 
Perons  in  1973-76.  Firstly,  in all  three  instances,  albeit  for varying  reasons,  official 
rhetoric  was  compatible  with  the  nationalist  ideas  to  which  revisionist  writers  had 
subscribed. Leaving aside the more specifically historiographical aspects and the adu­
lation of certain historical  figures,  Frondizi’s anti-imperialist rhetoric  echoed notions 
that had been expounded by FORJA, thus dovetailing well with the views of authors 
like  Jauretche.  Ongania’s  affinities  with  the  Catholic  Right  fitted  into  the  ideas  of 
nacionalista groups. And the convergences between Peronism and revisionism need no 
repetition  here.  All  three  political  leaders  often  appropriated  elements  from  the 
discourse that had originally been produced by nationalist intellectuals. On grounds of 
ideological  principle,  there  was  thus  no  incompatibility  between  these  governments 
and the political  ideas of revisionists. The state was not ideologically anti-nationalist, 
as  revisionists  habitually  claimed,  and,  buttressing their  legitimacy,  politicians  often 
adopted  nationalist  motifs,  ranging  from  the  indivisibility  and  sovereignty  of  the 
“nation” and the “people” to the rejection of what was depicted as foreign meddling. 
There were also nacionalistas appointed to official posts, notably under Ongania and 
Peron, and to a lesser extent under Frondizi. From this perspective, nationalist intellec­
tuals might well have become these governments’ ideologues.
However,  the  nationalist  intellectuals’  version  of  the  past,  revisionism,  was 
unsuited  to  become  official  history.  This  was  clearest  during  the  presidencies  of 
Frondizi  and  Ongania,  when  official  rhetoric  with  regard  to  the  national  pantheon, 
although not unsympathetic to  revisionist heroes, balanced Rosas out against figures 
like Sarmiento or Lavalle, who in revisionist accounts invariably belonged to the cast 
of chief villains. Nor did Frondizi or Ongania as “holders of power” choose revisio­
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nists as “promoters of consensus”, to borrow Bobbio’s words again. The nacionalistas 
who  were  drafted  in,  like  Amadeo  or  Pablo  Pardo  were  political  pragmatists  by 
nacionalista  standards,  who  had  never  been  very  interested  in  writing,  and  less  in 
historiography.  In  contrast,  revisionism remained  a political  tool  peculiar to  opposi­
tional  groups,  whether  right-wing  like  Azul  y  Blanco  or  left-leaning  like  the 
intellectuals of the  izquierda nacional.  Their exclusion from and opposition to  these 
governments  was  undoubtedly  also  due  to  the  fact that these  sectors  were  linked  to 
Peronism,  so  that  the  Peronist  return  to  power  bettered  their  chances  to  finally  be 
accepted  as  the  drafters  of  party  programmes,  prestigious  public  figures  or  even 
policymakers.  In  1973,  their  long-standing  identification  with  Peronism  —not  their 
contribution to intellectual debates— was indeed rewarded.
But  the  attempt  to  bring  “anti-culture  to  power”  in  1973,  as  Ortega  Pena  and 
Duhalde’s  newspaper  Militancia  avowed  in  the  headline  of  its  first  issue,124  was 
doomed to failure.  At best, one could try to co-opt it and this seems to have been the 
strategy at first. The recognition of Peronist militancy took the form of a distribution of 
posts, the general  pattern of which resembled the appointments made under Frondizi 
and  Ongania.  Several  people  with  previous  links  to  nationalist-revisionist  networks 
were endowed with politically more influential posts, namely as ministers or governors 
(Llambi, Baldrich, Orsi), but they were hardly the representatives of the “anti-culture” 
to  which  Militancia  alluded.  It  is  noteworthy  that  none  of these  three  had  devoted 
themselves primarily to the revisionist cause. In contrast, those nationalists who were 
known for their writing, invariably from a revisionist point of view, were co-opted into 
politically  less  significant  posts:  as  educational  administrators  (Puiggros,  Duhalde, 
Ortega Pena, Jauretche, Sierra), ambassadors (Rosa), second-rank employees in public 
companies  (Chavez).  Some  did  not  benefit  at  all  from  the  Peronist  return  to  power 
(Hernandez Arregui).  Nor were  their historical  narratives  made  fully official.  Whilst 
many were busy with administrative duties, Peron left for Uruguay on the day that was 
meant  to  be  revisionism’s  hour  of triumph  and  his  press  secretariat  replaced  Rosas 
with  the  unobtrusive  Mansilla.  Tailored  to  suit the  needs  of the  populist  movement 
during  previous  years,  revisionism  was  subordinated  to  Peronism,  whose  tragic 
disintegration  triggered  the  long  drawn-out  decline  of revisionism.  If,  in  previous 
years, revisionism had derived its strength from the link with Peronism, the same bond 
then turned into a vulnerability.
124 Militancia, no.  1,  14 June  1973.
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Returning  to  Sigal’s  distinction  between  “progressive  intellectuals”  and 
“nationalist ideologues”, revisionists were certainly not progressive, but they were no 
ideologues either,  if that term  is taken to  mean  a role as  adviser to the  Prince.  This 
finding does not contradict but confirms Sigal’s overall argument that Argentine intel­
lectuals were weakly integrated into the state. Especially the populist neo-revisionists, 
as  Sigal  herself argues  with  reference  to  Raymond  Williams’  concept,  were  “fully 
oppositional”  intellectuals.125  Saying that the  producers  of an  account of the  past as 
bellicose as revisionism were inappropriate as creators of legitimacy for the state might 
sound  tautological.  But  the  fact  that  revisionism  was  such  a  prominent  feature  of 
Argentine  nationalism  then  allows  broader  conclusions  about  nationalism.  The 
relationship  between  revisionists  and  the  Argentine  state  between  1955  and  1976 
supports John Breuilly’s general observations on nationalist intellectuals:
Exclusion from expected positions can be seen as a betrayal of principles concerning merit and as 
a  simultaneous  expulsion  from  a  firm  position  in  state  and  society.  Nationalism  can  provide  a 
new identity which contains and fuses images of an ideal state and an ideal society in which these 
people will have a secure, respected and leading position.
Many  revisionist  writers  conformed  well  to  this  characterisation  of  “the  typical 
nationalist intellectual  [who]  can be seen as an unsuccessful professional.”126 For the 
same reason,  even though the revisionist discourse was  mainly produced outside the 
state  before  1973,  the  state  nevertheless  acquired  an  outstanding  importance  for 
nationalist intellectuals, because it was in relation to the state that they evaluated their 
own position. This opposition to the government was condensed into the denunciation 
of a state that had allegedly lost the true path to the fulfilment of the nation’s destiny. 
Once the movement that the complainants had depicted as the means to overcome the 
national  yoke  came  to  power the  very  complaint  had to  either disappear or become 
diluted  or modified.  If the  history  of revisionism  conforms  to  Breuilly’s  model  that 
“cultural identity becomes a way of justifying political opposition to the state, often a
127 state which itself claims to define and express national values”,  then the success of 
Argentine historical revisionism in 1973 was indeed a contradiction in itself.
125 Sigal, Intelectuales y poder, p.  179.
126 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the state, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press,  1993), 
pp. 48-49.
ni Ibid.,?. 391.
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It is at the vital points of connection,  where a version of the past 
is used to ratify the present and indicate directions for the future, 
that a selective tradition is both powerful and vulnerable.
Raymond Williams*
The  military  coup  of March  1976  marked  a  watershed  in  Argentine  history,  even 
though at first it might have looked like a moment of deja-vu.  Its leaders’  claim that 
they  had  to  safeguard  the  honour  of the  nation  by  eradicating  what  they  labelled 
“subversion”  was  not  original  and  it  was  not  even  the  first  time  that  a junta  had 
claimed it was necessary to restructure Argentine society. The leaders of the so-called 
“Argentine Revolution” from  1966 to  1973 had already sought to justify their aims in 
similar terms.  But the  scale  of brutality of the  dictatorship  installed  in  1976  had  no 
precedents. The killing of Argentine civilians at the hands of their own Armed Forces 
—euphemistically  called  “Process  of National  Reorganisation”—  cost  the  lives  of 
more than 9,000 people, who according to official terminology “disappeared”.1   Para­
doxically, the regime’s unrivalled authoritarianism marked the revival of liberalism in 
Argentina, which had languished in ostracism since the  1930s. In this, the “liberalism” 
of the  dictatorship  as  well  as  that  of the  neo-populist  administration  of Carlos  Saul 
Menem in the  1990s was reduced to its economic dimension. Both pursued policies of 
deindustrialisation and tried to crush the channels through which the social demands of 
the working class could be expressed, which exacerbated the alarming widening of the 
gap between rich and poor.  But a more political version of liberalism also resurfaced 
from  the  1980s,  as  the  catastrophe  of the  previous  decade  encouraged  Argentina’s
* Williams, Marxism and literature, p.  116.
1  See CONADEP, Nunca mas: informe de la Comision Nacional sobre la Desaparicidn de Personas, 
13th ed. (Buenos Aires: Eudeba,  1986). The estimates of human rights organisations range up to the 
figure of 30,000.
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intelligentsia  to  reconsider  the  premises  upon  which  they  had  claimed  that  their 
worldview  was  built  in  the  1960s.  For  example,  whilst  in  the  sixties  or  seventies, 
readers of Gramsci had searched his texts for advice on how to construct the “national- 
popular”,  in the eighties,  his writings were read as a recommendation to forge “civil 
society” as the bedrock of a truly representative democracy.2
A  study of nationalist  discourse  in  the  period  from  1955  to  1976,  such  as  this 
doctoral thesis, can hardly evade the question of how its subject matter related to the 
spiral  of violence that strangled Argentina in the seventies.  As we have  seen,  motifs 
taken  from  revisionism  underpinned  the justifications  of both  sides  in  this  violent 
confrontation. The Montoneros evoked the legacy of the federal caudillos and, as their 
very  name  indicates,  the  montoneras,  whilst  their  nemesis  preferred  to  draw  on 
imagery  from  the  more  reactionary  nacionalista  currents,  in  particular the  figure  of 
Rosas. Therefore, at first glance, the following argument by Benedict Anderson seems 
to make little sense here. He has alerted us that
[i]n  an  age  when  it  is  so  common  for  progressive,  cosmopolitan  intellectuals  (particularly  in 
Europe?) to insist on the near-pathological character of nationalism, its roots in fear and hatred of 
the  Other  [...],  it  is  useful  to  remind  ourselves  that  nations  inspire  love,  and  often  profoundly 
self-sacrificing love.3
That some Montoneros believed that they were sacrificing themselves in the name of 
the nation might well be true, but seeing their actions (let alone those of the military 
dictatorship) in light of their supposed love for the nation would mean to take at face 
value the discourse that I have set myself to analyse. Nationalism seems to have been 
linked to a much less benign logic here.
On a world map of nationalist accounts of the past Argentine historical revisio­
nism appears to be an oddity. In 1882, Ernest Renan argued that his compatriots should 
leave behind the divisions of the past and  forget the Massacre of St.  Bartholomew’s 
Day, because “to forget and [...] to get one’s history wrong, are essential factors in the 
making  of a  nation;  and  thus  the  advance  of historical  studies  is  often  a  danger  to 
nationality.”4 Indeed, as Craig Calhoun has argued, based on the example of the United 
States, nationalist historical writing often glosses over past fratricides, stressing instead 
a common ancestral past that unites the citizens of a nation regardless of their political
2 See Burgos, Los gramscianos argentinos, pp.  125-345.
3 Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, 2nd 
ed. (London: Verso,  1991), p.  141.
4 Ernest Renan, “What is a nation?”, reprinted in: Omar Dahbour and Micheline R. Ishay (eds.),  The 
Nationalism Reader (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books,  1999), pp.  143-159, here p.  145.
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affiliations.5   In stark contrast, Argentina’s nationalist account of history was strongly 
partisan.  And,  after  all,  a  bellicose  version  of the  past  that  separated  heroes  from 
villains, illustrious warriors from pestilent parasites, the true embodiments of national 
values from traitors of the fatherland, seems to befit a violently divided society. There 
certainly  was  some  sort  of link  between  revisionism  and  the  political  developments 
that occurred during the apogee of its ability to mould the collective imaginary. After 
all, revisionism was what Raymond Williams has called
a selective tradition: an intentionally selective version of a shaping past and a pre-shaped present, 
which  is  then  powerfully  operative  in  the  process  of  social  and  cultural  definition  and 
identification.6
Yet although revisionism might have been “powerfully operative”, this argument must 
not be reduced to a simplistic scheme, in which cynical thinkers for decades planned 
and  then  finally  executed  (or  let  proxies  execute)  their  violent  fantasies.  In  this 
conclusion, I would like to plead for care in conceptualising the relationship between 
nationalist ideas, on the one hand, and political violence or institutional instability, on 
the other.
Closely related to the question of how ideas translate into political practice is the 
social role of the intellectuals who propose these ideas. Albert Hirschman has argued 
that, in order to understand the emergence of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in the 
Southern Cone and Brazil in the 1960s and 70s, it is necessary to bear in mind the role 
of  the  intelligentsia  in  generating  ideological  developments  that  preceded  these 
regimes. Argentina, Brazil and Chile, he maintains, all had in common an intelligentsia 
that “produced in the ideological realm an inflation in the generation of ‘fundamental 
remedies’”, which appear as peculiarly disproportionate to the real dimensions of these 
countries’  crises.7   That  Argentine  nationalist  intellectuals  proposed  “fundamental 
remedies”  against  the  country’s  supposed  ills  can  hardly  be  doubted.  Yet  the  first 
question we must ask is: how did this become important? The answer I can offer to the 
question of why one of the major components of Argentine nationalist discourse, revi­
sionism, became part of the collective imagination in the  1960s must be mostly sought 
in the political usages of this invented tradition. In turn, my answer to the question of
5 Craig Calhoun, Nationalism (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press,  1997), pp. 51- 
54.
6 Williams, Marxism and literature, p.  115.
7 Albert O. Hirschman, “The turn to authoritarianism in Latin America and the search for its economic 
determinants”, in: David Collier (ed.), The new authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press,  1979), pp. 61-98, p. 83.
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why history (especially but not only revisionism) pervaded politics differs little from 
what Silvia Sigal has argued, rather in passing:
the  recuperation  of history through  politics  is  a  lasting phenomenon  that  owed  as  much  to  the 
splits within the field of historiography as it did to the fragility of the properly political principles 
of legitimacy.8
However, hers was not a study about nationalism so that, in the following, by drawing 
on the evidence accumulated  in this thesis,  I  would  like to develop  some arguments 
about how the production and spread of nationalist discourse —in particular historical 
revisionism— in the 1960s might be usefully interpreted.
As the first two chapters have suggested, in the absence of strong institutions able 
to integrate a cohesive community of professional historians, writers of history books 
in Argentina were intellectuals rather than experts. Both “official” history, in particular 
the Academia Nacional de la Historia, and revisionists were fundamentally concerned 
with  a  patriotic  liturgy  that  should  be  implemented  by the  state  in  order to  forge  a 
national  identity  based  on  symbols  from  the  nineteenth  century.  In  their  choice  of 
symbols,  the  two  currents were  mirror images,  but they  shared a tendency to  assess 
historical  figures in the light of their potential as instruments of nation-building.  The 
decisive  division  into  two  opposed  poles  occurred  in the  1930s.  This  could  happen 
because  of the  vulnerability of the  historiographical  field  in relation to  political  and 
ideological  developments  that were  external  to  it.  Revisionism was not a “paradigm 
change” that emerged from a scientific community in the sense of Thomas Kuhn, but it 
was  the  intellectual  epiphenomenon  of the  crisis  of liberalism.  It  emerged  when  a 
number of authoritarian intellectuals —usually lawyers by profession— failed in their 
ambition to take part in policy-making. Irazusta or Palacio had little interest in history 
before  their break  with  Uriburu  in  the  early thirties.  Insofar as the  field  of historio­
graphy  was  thus  invaded  by  non-historians,  the  birth  of revisionism  at  first  glance 
seems like the symptom of a deficient institutionalisation and a lack of independence 
from politics in the field of historiography.9 However, the two main phases in which 
revisionism flourished (the late  1930s and the late  1950s) coincided with advances in 
institutionalisation  and,  in the  second  phase,  also  with  a drive  towards  professiona- 
lisation  in public  universities,  be it in the form of Germani’s sociology or Romero’s 
social history. Revisionism was thus not so much the outgrowth of a complete absence 
of professionalism,  institutionalisation and autonomy from politics, but rather a sub­
8 Sigal, Intelectualesypoder, p.  12. See also, pp.  173-185.
9 This is one of the overall arguments of Quattrocchi-Woisson, Un nationalisme.
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product of an abrupt and uneven push towards achieving these three aims. There might 
have  been  little  communication  between  scientific  sociology  and  national-populist 
approaches, but analytically the two should not be seen in isolation. Revisionists were 
intellectuals, not least because they defined themselves in opposition to the “intelligen­
tsia”,  with  which  they  associated  people  ranging  from  Victoria  Ocampo  to  Gino 
Germani. Their anti-intellectualism not only failed to conceal, but in fact revealed, that 
they defined themselves in relation to the intellectual field.  In contrast, a trade union 
magazine like Dinamis had no objections to Germani.
The  spread  of  revisionism  was  also  linked  to  modernisation,  insofar  as  the 
emergence of a mass reading public created a market for its symbolic goods.  Arturo 
Pena  Lillo’s  book-selling  strategy  not  only  paralleled,  but  also  matched  Eudeba’s 
conquest of the market. The cultural modernisation of the post-1955 years was coupled 
with  societal  changes  in  the  wake  of urbanisation.  If anomie  helps  nationalism  to 
flourish,  as  Liah  Greenfeld  has  maintained,  then  conditions  in  1950s  Buenos  Aires 
provided a promising breeding ground. Not only might the uprooting of socio-cultural 
standards generate an increasing receptiveness for nationalism among the sectors of the 
population most affected by these developments, as in Greenfeld’s model.10 It can also 
reflect on intellectual debates, which in this case were concerned with establishing the 
cultural  identity of internal  migrants,  soon called cabecitas negras. Narratives  about 
national identity, not only revisionist, drew on the presence of migrants from the extra- 
Pampean areas in the port city by the  late  1950s and depicted them as the latter-day 
descendants  of the  nineteenth-century  montoneras.  The  question  of these  migrants’ 
cultural identity was linked to a political question, namely how to interpret and what to 
make  of the  “fact  of  Peronism”.  As  Murmis  and  Portantiero  later  argued,  it  was 
perhaps mistaken to see the cabecitas negras as the social base of Peronism, but the 
idea that they were was widely shared at the time. This debate showed the degree to 
which questions surrounding cultural identity were tied to political problems.
The intellectual field of the 1950s was fragmented. Its fissures partly explain why 
revisionism was so belligerent and divisive. The revisionists’ resentment against what 
they saw as the cultural establishment was very similar to what Bourdieu has called “a 
populist conservatism on the base of an anti-intellectualism, which endemically haunts
10 Greenfeld, Nationalism, p.  15. Anomie is here understood in the Durkheimian sense of an inconsistent 
or unstable state of common standards and values.
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the lower layers of the intelligentsia” and has the “violence of a disappointed love”.1 1  
Quattrocchi-Woisson’s characterisation of revisionism as a “counter-history” captures 
this feature well.1 2 The very term revisionism suggests that it was first and foremost a 
discourse  against a perceived  establishment,  which according to  nationalists  of both 
Right and Left impeded “the people” from learning the truth about their history.  The 
revisionists’ marginalisation from what Jauretche understood as a “cultural superstruc­
ture”, by which he mostly meant public cultural institutions, was very real. This is not 
to  say  that  they  were  victimised  by  a  “conspiracy  of silence”  on  grounds  of their 
political  ideas, as they tirelessly repeated themselves.  They did have access to media 
and funds. As for academe, they were excluded, but this should be seen mainly in light 
of their lack of interest in serious research at a time when academic criteria became 
more rigorous. What matters here, however, was that they were outside academia. The 
problem of revisionists was thus not tied to the practices of the discipline of history, 
which Hayden White identifies as being “constituted by what it forbids its practitioners 
to  do.”1 3   On  the  contrary,  Jauretche’s  and  Hernandez Arregui’s  insistence  that  they 
were free from any kind of obligations was a sign of what Touraine has interpreted as a 
ubiquitous  phenomenon  in  Latin  America,  namely  “the  autonomy  of  ideological 
production in relation to economic interests and political forces.”1 4
For the  same  reason,  I  do  not believe that it is possible to distil  an ideological 
essence of a nationalist dogma that leads to the formulation of specific demands. Nor 
that it would explain very much, if one such dogma was ever found. In this, my thesis 
differs from previous studies, which have tried to pin down a distinctive set of tenets 
that characterises an “ideology”, which is then politically implemented.1 5  There were, 
of course, frequent themes. Those groups that I have called nacionalistas often empha­
sised  authoritarian  values  such  as  order,  hierarchy  and  a  strong  state,  and  stressed 
Hispanic  roots,  Catholicism  and  sometimes  anti-Judaism  as  the  main  ingredients  of 
Argentine identity. The dividing line between them and the more left-leaning populists 
was the question of democracy, a term which the second group did not use often either, 
but  which  at  least  in  principle  it  accepted  as  a  value.  Populists,  among  them  some
1 1   Pierre Bourdieu, Les regies de I’art: genese et structure du champ litteraire, 2nd ed. (Paris: Editions 
du Seuil,  1998), p. 459.
12 Quattrocchi-Woisson, (Jn nationalisme, pp. 65-95.
1 3  Hayden White,  Tropics of  discourse: essays in cultural criticism (Baltimore and London: Johns 
Hopkins University Press,  1978), p.  126.
14 Touraine, La parole et le sang, p.  137. For a similar argument, see Teran, Nuestros ahos sesentas, p. 
140.
15 Especially Spektorowski, The origins and Rock, Authoritarian Argentina.
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Marxists,  thus  demanded  the  political  integration  of  the  masses,  redistributive 
economic  policies and national  liberation from multi-national  companies.  Both these 
currents,  in  turn,  converged  in  other respects,  especially  in their  anti-liberalism  and 
anti-imperialism.  Being  both  “nationalist”,  it  is  needless  to  say  that  both  cast  the 
“authentic nation” against the corrupting influences of a vaguely defined enemy of the 
nation  (be  it communism or the  oligarchy).  But what really characterised nationalist 
discourse  in  Argentina  in  the  1960s  was  that  it  was  a  heterogeneous  set  of themes 
rather than a concrete political programme. Its more left-wing proponents might have 
claimed to be the voice of the excluded masses, but their writings were strikingly out 
of touch with social reality. No revisionist historian or essayist ever produced a work 
of social history worth mentioning and the term “inequality” was virtually absent from 
their  writings.  Their  discourse  was  not  bound  to  the  specific  interests  of particular 
identifiable  groups.  The  main  trait  that  held  nationalism  together  was  its  sermon 
against  the  establishment,  which  the  anti-“official”  revisionism  articulated  well. 
Revisionism only made sense as a discourse that was defined through an adversary.
The “autonomy of ideological production” from specific social demands  should 
not  be  mistaken  for  depoliticisation.  On  the  contrary,  the  ambitions  of nationalist 
intellectuals to influence policy-making made them seek political alliances, whilst their 
discourse’s lack of ideological  specificity opened up the possibility for appropriation 
by  political  actors.  Again,  Sigal’s  argument that the  politicisation  of the  intellectual 
field was not so  much due to the  governmental  intervention in public universities  in 
1966, but rather to a choice by intellectuals holds particularly true for the populist neo­
revisionists.16 Since they were not employed in universities, Ongania’s cultural obscu­
rantism concerned them little;  some openly welcomed it and to some extent profited 
from it. Instead, revisionists themselves subordinated historiography to politics, as they 
explicitly asserted that theirs was a political mission. When Peron was forced into exile 
in  1955, they believed that large parts of the population were politically orphaned and 
sensed a chance  for the  fulfilment of their ambitions.  Both nacionalista and populist 
intellectuals, whose relationship with Peron had been characterised by mutual distrust, 
sought  to  conquer  a  new  public  through  their  mushrooming  periodicals  as  well  as 
through books. They were not politicians, however, and their ambitions usually failed. 
Jauretche’s  unsuccessful  candidacy  as  national  senator in  1960  was  symptomatic  of 
this.
16 Sigal, Intelectualesy poder, p. 207.
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If they  could  not  become  princes  themselves,  they  wanted  at  least  to  be  their 
advisers.  Many  of them  —from  Hernandez  Arregui,  Ortega  Pena  and  Duhalde  to 
Baldrich— attached themselves to Peronism, which in many respects seemed a natural 
choice.  Partly  because,  if the  montoneras  resurfaced  in the  cabecitas  negras  and  if 
these were the  Peronists,  then Peron appeared to  be the natural  leader of the nation. 
And  like  the  antecedents  from  the  nineteenth  century,  Peron  embodied  the  political 
style  that  they  saw  as  typically  Argentine,  namely  caudillismo.  But  besides  such 
considerations, the advantage of Peronism between 1955 and 1973 was that it offered a 
bewildering  array  of possible  projections  that  matched  the  nationalist  intellectuals’ 
own diversity.  The exiled Peron himself was the first to realise the potential political 
benefit  of  the  fact  that  the  hopes  that  were  attached  to  his  figure  were  hardly 
compatible.  He  thus  alternately nourished each of these hopes  sufficiently to  ensure 
that his  status as arbiter between the conflicting interests of his movement remained 
accepted  among  all  of them.1 7  Yet  although  Peron was  their preferential  choice,  in 
principle, nationalist intellectuals were flexible in their allegiances. For some of them, 
Frondizi  or  Ongania  were  promising  candidates,  too.  But  their  ambitions  were  not 
fulfilled  through  any  of their  chosen  allegiances.  Few  nationalist  intellectuals  were 
appointed to official posts under Frondizi and Ongania and those who were (moderate 
populists  under  Frondizi  and  Catholic  nacionalistas  under  Ongania),  were  the  least 
known of them.
After  1955,  Peronism  appropriated  revisionism.  To  be  sure,  it  did  not  simply 
usurp control over it. In principle, Peronist and nationalist discourse had always borne 
similarities. Just as nationalist intellectuals claimed to speak in the name of the nation 
rather  than  class-based  interests,  so  did  Peron.  Both  discourses  relied  on  divisions 
between  loyalty and  betrayal  and both denied that politics might be allowed  to  be a 
field  in which  legitimately differing interests could be played out.  Furthermore, they 
shared  an  exaltation  of personalistic  leadership  as  a  central  political  principle.  And 
analogies  between  Rosas  and  Peron  were  far  from  new  in  1955.  Nevertheless, 
Peronism’s  newfound  affinity for revisionism was elective.  The  Peronist regime had 
refrained from exalting Rosas or federal caudillos and, on the few occasions when it 
ventured away from the ubiquitous San Martin, preferred to stay in the familiar tracks 
of the “liberal” pantheon.  Revisionism only became attractive for Peronism when the
17 The literature on this is broad. See e.g. McGuire, Peronism without Peron, esp. pp. 80-150 for the 
case of the unions.
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legitimacy  of  the  national-populist  system  was  broken  in  1955.  In  an  attempt  to 
compensate  for  its  lack of democratic  credentials,  the  military regime  of Aramburu 
systematically  tried  to  capitalise  on  slandering  Peron  as  a  barbaric  reincarnation  of 
Rosas’  “tyranny” with the  inverse  effect that revisionist imagery  gradually began to 
populate the articles of the dispersed Peronist press. Nationalist intellectuals played a 
secondary role in this appropriation.
That the “nation” and consequently narratives of national identity were prominent 
sources of legitimacy for Argentine politicians,  in turn,  was a phenomenon of much 
longer duration. As Teran has remarked, the onset of the strategy to exploit this source 
has  to  be  dated  back  to  the  second  decade  of the  twentieth  century,1 8  that  is,  in 
connection with the emergence of a more democratic and increasingly massified form 
of politics. The question of why political leaders are able to capitalise on nationalism 
leads us astray. Anthony Smith has made a compelling case for not neglecting popular 
culture  to  answer  this  question.19  For  sure,  nationalism  must  be  socially  grounded. 
However,  political  leaders who are not tied to the interests  of specific  social  groups 
might invoke the “nation” as a legitimising principle more often than the representa­
tives  of  class-based  interests.  In  this  sense,  Touraine’s  argument  of  the  “hyper­
autonomy of political actors” in Latin America is again convincing. According to him, 
a disarticulated society renders political actors, similarly to intellectuals,  independent 
from the social demands of specific groups.  Following this, frequent invoking of the 
nation as a source of legitimacy can be interpreted as symptomatic of a weak institutio­
nalisation of interest  group politics.  Populist leaders,  like  Yrigoyen or Peron, under­
stood that principle best and they were the most successful in constructing legitimacy 
through  references  to  the  nation,  but  this  strategy  pervaded  political  moments  or 
groups of the most diverse couleurs. As we have seen, the Socialist Party, too, identi­
fied with a particular historical tradition that supposedly represented the “nation” and 
sought  to  portray  itself  on  the  basis  of  this  tradition.  Peron’s  nemesis  in  1955, 
Aramburu, equally drew on ideas of what constituted the “nation”. The state’s demand 
for identity narratives to construct legitimacy probably lent a surplus of importance to 
the  suppliers,  intellectuals.  But  as  long  as  intellectuals  were  not  admitted  to  the 
corridors of power, they lacked the means to control the strategies of political leaders
18 Oscar Tercin, “Acerca de la idea nacional”, in: Carlos Altamirano (ed.), La Argentina en el siglo xx 
(Buenos Aires: Ariel/Universidad Nacional de Quilmes,  1999), p. 285.
19 Smith, Nationalism and modernism.
20 Touraine, La parole et le sang, pp.  134-137.
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who appropriated their narratives. The ideas of Argentine nationalist intellectuals thus 
should not simply be seen as a doctrine that their political proxies then implemented. 
On the contrary, in the long run, the interests of the suppliers were subordinated to the 
needs of the demanders.
Crises  of  political  legitimacy  are  likely  to  increase  the  demand  for  identity 
constructions.  Lewis  Coser  has  remarked  that  historically  the  importance  of 
intellectuals  often  grew  in  such  moments  of  crisis.21  But  Argentine  nationalist 
intellectuals, to whom concepts like legitimacy or crisis were alien, overlooked the fact 
that demand  regulated the market.  When they seemed to  be needed  in politics,  they 
were deceived by short-term appearances and believed that their ideas could decide the 
future of the country. They thus began to stroll around the political scene in search of a 
politician who could help with practical implementation (although tellingly they never 
said  of  what).  But  the  politicians  they  found  soon  turned  out  to  have  their  own 
pragmatic designs for which they did not need quarrelsome advisers.  The nationalist 
intellectuals then felt betrayed and went on to bemoan the politicians’ lack of principle 
and  understanding  of the  nation’s  real  needs.  Revisionism  expressed  precisely  this 
complaint of nationalist intellectuals and it therefore only flourished in opposition to 
governments. The importance of revisionism in Argentine nationalism thus reveals the 
abyss between nationalist intellectuals’  political ambitions and their real access to the 
corridors of power.
This was a recurrent pattern throughout the history of revisionism.  In the early 
1930s,  the  current  first  emerged  when  nacionalistas  were  disappointed  because 
Uriburu had  allegedly  “betrayed”  the  “authentic”  course  of the  Revolution  of 1930. 
Later, though under different political circumstances, Jauretche imagined that Peron’s 
sudden lack of interest in him was due to the fact that the leader “was no longer used” 
to the “frankness” of a man who was only bound to his conscience. In both cases, the 
politicians’  “betrayal”  was  in  fact  nothing  but  the  pragmatism  of realpolitik.  For 
example,  Jauretche became a collateral  victim of the conflict between  Peron and the 
Buenos Aires governor Mercante, which had little to do with principles and very much 
with power.22 The “betrayal” was repeated in  1958, after Frondizi’s developmentalist 
project  had  brought  together  intellectuals  of the  most  manifold  persuasions.  Many
21  Lewis A. Coser, Men of ideas: a sociologist’ s view, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press,  1997), pp.  135- 
144.
22 See Graciela Mateo, “El gobiemo de Domingo Mercante: expresion singular del peronismo cl£sico”, 
Estudios Interdisciplinarios de America Latinay el Caribe, vol.  15, no. 2 (2004), pp.  159-192.
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revisionists, not least Jauretche, again believed that their time had come, but they were 
left out once more.  When disappointed, they retreated into writing books, essays and 
articles against “official” history.
To  explain the wide dissemination of revisionism in the  1960s,  an intra-textual 
analysis  of nationalist  writings  can  be  very  misleading.  The  shaping  force  of this 
invented  tradition did  not mostly reside  in the  enunciation  of identifiable  principles, 
but  in  concrete  political  needs  that  lay  far  beyond  the  reach  of the  influence  of 
nationalist  intellectuals.  Peronists  did  not  adopt  motifs  taken  from  revisionism  for 
reasons of principle or belief, but as a legitimating strategy. This becomes clear if we 
ask ourselves which parts of the movement were imbued with this imagery. Apart from 
the singular situation of 1955-58, when the future of his movement appeared particu­
larly  uncertain,  and  an  interview  in  1971,  Peron  kept  silence  on  historiographical 
matters. This could not be explained by Peron’s lack of knowledge, since it was known 
that  he  had  intensely  studied  the  independence  period  and  even  written  historical 
articles on San Martin. Nor was he a revisionist at heart, impeded from voicing his real 
opinion  in  public  by  the  powerful  hidden  forces  of  liberalism.  Even  pro-Peronist 
revisionists  themselves  did  not  claim  as  much.  Rosa  and  Halperin  Donghi  rarely 
agreed,  but  they  did  on  the  point  that  Peron  showed  little  interest  in  the  dispute 
between  the  liberal  and  the  revisionist  pantheons.  Peron  may  also  have  refrained 
from  revisionist  references  to  the  past  before  1955  (and,  mostly,  again  after  1957), 
because he found revisionism unnecessarily controversial.24 Only when it promised to 
serve concrete political purposes, he referred to revisionist views. In turn, revisionism 
began to flourish (in particular after 1966) among Peron’s growing number of compa- 
gnons  de  route  from the  young  middle  classes,  certainly  in  part because  this  was  a 
public  with  intellectual  interests,  but  also  because  these  sectors  lacked  natural 
credibility as a legitimate part of the movement.  Furthermore,  from the viewpoint of 
the Montoneros, revisionism could serve as a tool to challenge Peron’s authority.  By 
depicting themselves as the successors of an ancestry much older than Peronism, the 
figure of Peron himself became less indispensable in their self-justifications.25 The fact
Halperin Donghi, El revisionismo, p. 42 and interview with Rosa in Envido, no. 2, November 1970, p. 
46 (see chapter five).
24 This is the standard interpretation of this matter. See e.g. Ciria, Politico y cultura popular, p. 283, 
Winston, “Between Rosas and Sarmiento”, Rein, Peronismo, pp.  107-109 and Rein., Politics and 
education, pp. 72-83.
25 See Sigal and Veron, Peron o muerte, pp.  195-202 for a similar interpretation of the Montoneros’ use 
of history.
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that the Montoneros utilised revisionist genealogies whilst Peron did not can only be 
explained  by  this  political  dynamic  and  not  by  any  specific  type  of programmatic 
statement  in  revisionist  texts,  with  which  the  Montoneros  agreed,  whereas  Peron 
differed. Hence, the flourishing of revisionism (but also of nationalist discourse in the 
1960s in general) expressed the crumbling of the national-populist consensus and the 
concomitant crisis of political  legitimacy after  1955  and not a fixed set of principles 
that guided the implementation of specific political ideas.
In the course of its increasing usage for political purposes, revisionism began to 
slip out of the control of its erstwhile producers. Divisions between Peronists and non- 
Peronists, as Rosa later recalled, tore apart the cohesion of the Instituto Rosas, the only 
more or less enduring institutional bedrock revisionism (and nacionalismo) had ever 
had.  Outside  these  circles,  in  turn,  by  the  early  1970s,  revisionism  pervaded  much 
broader political groups, transcending the growing violent confrontations between the 
opposed  wings  of Peronism.  The  Peronist  guerrillas justified their campaign  against 
the  “union  bureaucracy”  with  the  fact  that  Vandor  resembled  Urquiza.  Puiggros 
probably just escaped assassination at the hands of some vigilante gang of the extreme 
Right, when he fled to Mexico, after the witch hunt against him had been underpinned
1ft
by the argument that he had written a book that was critical of Rosas.  That revisio­
nism was now even more frequently used in these confrontations probably heightened 
its partisan tone.  The link between nationalist discourse and politics can also explain 
the  seeming  paradox  of a  divisive  nationalism.  Revisionist  texts,  especially  by  the 
more  conservative  authors,  claimed  to  be  inspired  by  love  for  the  fatherland  and 
directed against liberal politicking and in favour of a homogeneous unified nation, but 
whence the national-populist consensus was no longer viable, it became a function of 
the violent confrontations in a disintegrating society.
There  were  some  isolated  and  hardly  heard  voices  of  virtually  unknown 
revisionists who bemoaned the “demagoguery” and the uncontrollable popularisation 
of their  intellectual  product,  but  again  the  most  important  among  them  preferred  to 
hope that Peron would alleviate their suffering by admitting them to the corridors of 
power upon  his return to  Argentina.  In  1973  their moment of glory seemed to  have
26 One might well agree with Richard Gillespie’s argument that the violence of the Montoneros should 
not be compared to the Triple A or the ensuing dictatorship, but (luckily) this is of little concern for my 
general question about the link between nationalism and political violence and/or instability. See 
Gillespie, Soldiers of Peron, p.  155. For a refutation of Gillespie’s argument see Celia Szusterman’s 
review in the Journal of  Latin American Studies, vol.  16, no.  1   (1984), pp.  157-170.
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finally come, as their version of the past was transformed into Argentina’s new official 
history.  Revisionists  did not realise  (or did not publicly admit)  that their attempt  to 
bring “anti-culture” to power was a contradiction in itself In 1973, the fate that Nicola 
Miller  has  seen  as  typical  of  Spanish  American  intellectuals  caught  up  with  the 
revisionists: they became “collective accessories rather than advisers to the Prince”.27 
Had  revisionists  ever  read  Braudel,  they  might  have  known  that,  in  contrast  to  the 
enduring  strategy  of legitimation  that  Argentine  political  leaders  made  of the  term 
“nation”, the ephemeral and diluted officialisation of revisionism in  1973 belonged to 
the  histoire  evenementielle,  the  “most  capricious,  the  most  deceptive”  of the  dura­
tions.28 But whilst Peronism survived the turmoil of the seventies and today —with the 
presidency of Nestor Kirchner— may be on its way to become a phenomenon of the 
longue  duree,  historical  revisionism  lived  its  short  splendour  in  the  shadow  of 
Peronism.
Revisionism  languished  on  for  several  years  more,  but  it  spiralled  downwards 
after  the  mid-seventies.  First,  the  groups  that  had  used  it  to  legitimise  themselves 
began to attack each other.  When the ensuing dictatorship launched its extermination 
campaign  against  the  Left,  many  of  its  disseminators  were  killed.  Some  of  the 
surviving  Montoneros  radicalised  further  into  militarisation.  In  contrast,  some 
reactionary nacionalistas turned into proteges of the dictatorship.  But especially after 
1983,  the  importance  of  revisionism  declined  to  the  extent  to  which  democratic 
principles  of legitimacy  grew.  In  his  election  campaign  of 1989  (not  coincidentally 
again from the standpoint of opposition to the Radical government in power), the later 
Peronist  President  Carlos  Menem  used  it  once  more,  stylising himself as  a  reincar­
nation of Facundo Quiroga. Once elected, he hurried to repatriate Rosas’ remains in an 
official  ceremony,  only  to  declare  the  chapter  of revisionism  as  finally  closed.  The 
meaning  of Rosas’  repatriation  was  not  division  and  partisanship,  he  said,  but  “an 
authentic pacification of profound national reconciliation” and the farewell to “an old, 
wasted, anachronistic, absurd country.”  Shortly thereafter, the pictures on the newly 
introduced peso-notes united figures from each of Argentina’s two pantheons:  Rosas 
was good for twenty pesos, whilst Sarmiento was worth fifty. In the second half of the
27 Miller, In the shadow, p. 245.
28 Fernand Braudel, “Histoire et sciences sociales: la longue duree”, Annales E.S.C., vol.  13 (1958), pp. 
725-753, p. 728. If not by revisionists, the works of the Annales school were warmly received among 
Argentina’s social historians of the late fifties. See Juan Carlos Korol, “Los Annales en la historiografia 
argentina de la d6cada del 60”, Punto de Vista, no. 39 (1990), pp. 38-42.
29 Clarin,  1   October 1989.
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1990s, the nationalisation of the  Instituto  Rosas coincided with the disappearance of 
Menem’s caudillo-style sideburns.30
What  does  the  apogee  and  decline  of historical  revisionism  tell  us  about  the 
relationship between the partisanship of Argentina’s nationalist invention of tradition 
and the country’s difficulties in agreeing on a legitimate political order? The answers 
that  this  thesis  can  provide  are  at  best  partial.  In  order  to  sharpen  the  argument, 
however, the points of two previous studies might be recapitulated. Nicolas Shumway 
has  essentially  argued  that  it  makes  little  sense  to  look  at  the  twentieth  century  to 
answer this question, because most divisions that surfaced throughout its course could 
be  found  already  in the  writings  of nineteenth-century pensadores.  The  divisiveness 
inherent in Argentina’s “guiding fictions”, according to him, was the fountainhead of 
the  violent  disputes  of  the  1970s.31  David  Rock  has  scrutinised  the  texts  of  the 
twentieth-century “Nationalist movement” (which was made up mostly by those who 
in this thesis have been  called nacionalistas)  for an explanation of the  frequency of
T9 military coups and lack of political consensus.  Both authors, however, stress ideolo­
gical  continuities  as  the  ultimate  driving  force  behind  the  political  divides  of the 
twentieth century. Much of the evidence of this thesis has suggested that the apogee of 
a  particularly  belligerent  invention  of  the  past  not  only  coincided,  but  was  also 
intimately interwoven, with the political violence of the seventies.
This thesis cannot resolve the theoretical question of whether ideas translate into 
practices  or  vice  versa,  but  in  the  light  of  what  has  been  said  about  Argentine 
nationalism,  some  arguments  should  warn  against  the  assumption  that  it  has  been 
resolved already. In the thirties and early forties the ideas of reactionary nacionalistas 
did have considerable weight in public political debate and they did possess a degree 
of self-consciousness as a political current.  However, the themes they had put on the 
agenda —rosismo being one of them— developed a dynamic that was modified and 
appropriated  by  other  actors  according  to  changing  political  circumstances.  As  the 
intellectual climate swung towards the Left after 1955, populist and left-wing forms of 
nationalism  gained  importance,  adopting  and  refashioning  earlier  inventions  of 
tradition  in  accordance  with  their  own  views,  which  in  turn  were  appropriated  by 
political actors for purposes that were hardly based on stable ideological blocs. Given
30 http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegIntemet/anexos/45000-49999/45842/norma.htm (nationalisation 
decree of 1997).
31  Shumway,  The invention.
32 Rock, Authoritarian Argentina.
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the  deficient  democratic  legitimacy  of the  years  between  1930  and  1983,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  political  actors  relied  on  invented  traditions.  The  choice  of  these 
traditions  may  not  be  random,  but  it  would  be  misleading  to  assume  that  these 
traditions themselves pass through time and  space unaffected by social  and political 
change,  time  and  again  conspiring  to  defeat  democracy.  In  contrast  to  this  kind  of 
determinism, John Breuilly has warned that the
double-edged role which ideology plays  in political movements, both promoting and  ‘reflecting’ 
those  movements,  [...]  makes  it  impossible  to  provide  any  causal  analysis  between  political 
ideology and political action.33 
Argentina’s  belligerent  anti-liberal  nationalism  was  certainly  consubstantial  with 
political divides and, perhaps, it exacerbated the country’s difficulties in agreeing on a 
legitimate political order, but it should be analysed not only as a promoter, but also as 
a symptom of these difficulties.
These reservations may apply to any study of twentieth-century nationalism, but 
the Argentine case presents particular problems to the historian, because the right-wing 
nacionalismo of the 1930s is so easily mistaken for nationalism as a whole. In the long 
run, it is difficult to identify nationalism as a single political movement in its own right 
with a powerful ideological agenda that was imposed upon other actors. Nacionalismo 
may be called a movement, whose ideologues and activists helped to shape the climate 
of ideas that facilitated the coup of 1943, but shortly thereafter Peronism became the 
nationalist  movement,  discarding  some  nacionalistas  and  co-opting  others  whilst 
reworking  their  ideas.  Afterwards,  the  movement  that  Rock  identifies  was  of only 
hypothetical  existence (mostly in  the minds of its potential  ideologues) and the men 
Rock calls the “Nationalists” were in constant search of political alliances.  The same 
held  true  for  left-wing  nationalists  whose  ideas  became  hegemonic  in  intellectual 
debates in the  1960s,  in accordance with international ideological developments. The 
trait of unity between the nationalist discourse of the  1930s and the  1960s was not the 
ongoing influence of a single movement. Instead, as the prominence of revisionism in 
both these strands of thought suggests, the main common ground was that their writing 
was directed against what was projected as the establishment, both the “intelligentsia” 
and  the  way  in  which  the  state  was  run  by,  in  their  rhetoric,  “the  sellers  of the 
fatherland”. If revisionism was a distinctive marker of a partisan nationalist discourse, 
then  Breuilly’s  argument  about  nationalism  in  general  applies  well  to  this  case.
33 Breuilly, Nationalism and the state, p. 383.
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According  to  him,  nationalism  is  shaped  by  its  opposition  to  the  modem  state  and 
“remains  distinctive  only  for  so  long  as  it  is  unsuccessful”.34  As  the  years  between 
1973  and  1976 showed,  revisionism, as a feature of an oppositional political culture, 
could  not  successfully  be  accommodated.  Having  flourished  in  the  context  of  a 
deficient  democratic  legitimacy,  its  fate  was  bound to powerful  necessities  of much 
longer duration.  When these necessities changed, so would revisionism. As suggested 
in the epigraph by Raymond  Williams, through its point of connection with politics, 
the  selective  tradition  produced  by  Argentine  nationalist  intellectuals  was  not  only 
powerful but also vulnerable.
From this, two generalisations may be hazarded. Firstly, under what conditions is 
the  symbolic  good of historical writing likely to become partisan and how does this 
translate  into  politically  used  identity  constructions?  That  historical  narratives  or  a 
focus  on  figures  and  events  as  symbols  acquire  great  social  importance  can  be 
expected  in  an  immigrant  society  that  lacks  autochthonous  roots.  But  for  these  to 
become so divided and politicised, something more is needed. First, if the state creates 
society rather than society the state, the production of these narratives is less likely to 
become professionalized  by  a specialised  group  independent from the  state.  In turn, 
would-be  universal  intellectuals  assume  such a function.  But more is needed  for the 
past  to  become  partisan.  The  existence  of an  intellectual  field  is  necessary  for  the 
creation of oppositional  identity narratives, which can become particularly combative 
if,  within  this  field,  the  distribution  of  symbolic  capital  is  very  irregular  and, 
consequently,  the  criteria  according  to  which  symbolic  capital  is  accumulated  are 
disputed. This might happen in a rapid, but fragile modernisation. Anomie can encou­
rage  the  re-invigoration  and  reformulation  of existing  narratives.  Moreover,  in  the 
absence of strong bonds with class-based interests, intellectuals will be likely to speak 
in the name of “the people” or “the nation”. In particular those whose symbolic capital 
in  the  intellectual  field  is  limited  will  be  likely  to  seek  alternative  routes  to  access 
symbolic  capital.  The  political  field can seem a promising choice, which might then 
exacerbate  the  lack  of agreement  on  which  criteria  decide  upon  the  distribution  of 
symbolic capital in the intellectual field. The relationship between the intellectual and 
the  political  field  becomes  more  intricate,  if the  state  regulates  the  demand  for  the 
intellectuals’ symbolic goods. Again, the “hyper-autonomy” that makes political actors 
independent from social demands can accentuate this, especially if politics are not only
34 Ibid., p. 390.
235Conclusion
not class-based, but if a widely shared ideal is that the state engineers society. Political 
actors will then equally be likely to derive legitimacy from unifying principles such as 
“the nation” or “the people”. In this constellation, a crisis of legitimacy might be more 
likely to occur, but it also has deeper impacts.  Symbolic goods might begin to largely 
owe their circulation to politics. In this model, narratives of the past initially articulated 
divisions of the intellectual field (which in itself is not necessarily so problematic), but 
this  division  is  decisively  reinforced  as  they  begin  to  exist  mostly  in  function  of 
politics.
From this follows the second generalisation, which is about nationalism.  Under 
the  conditions  mentioned  (and  under  different  conditions,  all  this  might  well  be 
different),  nationalism  is  most  usefully  understood,  in  accordance  with  Breuilly’s 
definition, as
a  form  of  politics  [that]  makes  sense  only  in  terms  of  the  particular  political  context  and 
objectives of nationalism.  Central to an understanding of that context and those objectives  is the 
modem state. The modem state both shapes nationalist politics and provides that politics with its 
major objective, namely possession of the state.35 
In this view, nationalism acquires its meaning only in relation to politics. If understood 
as an “invention of tradition” alone, it is impossible to explain how it becomes socially 
and politically effective. Of course, in Hobsbawm and Ranger’s model, nationalism is 
not simply independent from social reality, but the buzzword of “invention” invites the 
reader  to  simplify  nationalism  as  an  ideology  in  the  sense  of merely  “a  system  of 
illusory  beliefs”.36  Anderson  in  particular  has  criticised  such  an  approach  to 
nationalism.  He  has  argued that  “nationalism has proved  an uncomfortable  anomaly 
for Marxist theory”.  Since it is so problematic to imply “that ‘true’ communities exist 
that can be advantageously juxtaposed to nations [...], [communities are to be distin­
guished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.” 
But what Anderson calls  “‘imagining’  and  ‘creation’”37  should not be understood as 
the brainchild of creative thinkers, conceived from scratch. If nationalism was merely 
that, an analysis of it, unless nationalist texts are taken at face value, tells us nothing 
about  a  society.  Even  in  Latin America,  a region that  Halperin  Donghi  has  called a 
“promised land for post-structuralists in search of confirmation for their conviction that
35 Ibid., p. 366.
36 Williams, Marxism and literature, p. 55 has identified this notion as a particularly prominent and 
reductionist understanding of ideology in Marxism.
j7 Anderson, Imagined communities, p. 3 and p. 6.
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■  38 image shapes reality”,  there are reasons to suspect that the translation of ideas into 
practices is not a unidirectional process.
38 Tulio Halperin Donghi, “Backward looks and forward glimpses from a quincentennial vantage point”, 
Journal of  Latin American Studies, vol. 24, Quincentenary Supplement (1992), pp. 219-234.
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